Priznanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb v družinskopravnih zadevah by Rumenov, Ilija
UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 













Priznanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih 
odločb v družinskopravnih zadevah 
 
(RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS  











Author: Ilija Rumenov 








Contents – Summary 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................viii 
Part I ........................................................................................................................................1 
Chapter I General aspects regarding the family ..........................................................1 
Chapter II General remarks regarding recognition and enforcment .........................17 
Part II Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the Brussels IIbis Regulation52 
Chapter I Scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation ......................................................54 
Chapter II The relationship between the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the Hague 
Conventions…………………………………………………………………………..71 
Chapter III Jurisdictional regime in the Brussels IIbis Regulation ...........................76 
Chapter IV Common provisions...............................................................................108 
Chapter V Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments according to Brussels 
IIbis Regulation..........................................................................................................130 
Part III The procedure for Recognition and Enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in 
Republic of Slovenia..............................................................................................................231 
Chapter I The historical development, structure and legal sources of the Private 
International Law in Slovenia....................................................................................231 
Chapter II Recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions from non-EU 
Member states in Slovenia.........................................................................................243 
Chapter III The recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in family 









Introduction ............................................................................................................................ viii 
1. The purpose of this doctoral thesis ................................................................................... ix 
2. The aim of the doctoral thesis .......................................................................................... xi 
3. Hypothesis of the doctoral thesis ..................................................................................... xii 
4. Methodology.................................................................................................................... xv 
Part I .......................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter I General aspects regarding the family .................................................................... 1 
1. 1 Transformation of the family and its models .............................................................. 1 
1.1.1 The traditional family model ................................................................................ 2 
1.1.2 The modern family model .................................................................................... 5 
1.1.3 Implications of the transformation of the family model from traditional to 
modern ........................................................................................................................... 7 
1.2. The ‘globalization’ and its influence on the family .................................................... 9 
1.3. Divorce and the position of the child in course of proceedings ............................... 12 
Chapter II General remarks regarding the recognition and enforcment .............................. 17 
2.1 Definition and nature of recognition and enforcement .............................................. 17 
2.1.1. Recognition and/or enforcement of foreign judgments ..................................... 17 
2.1.1.1 Recognition of foreign judgments ............................................................... 17 
2.1.1.2 Enforcement of foreign judgments .............................................................. 20 
2.1.2. Types of decisions suitable for recognition and enforcement ........................... 22 
2.1.2.1 Foreign decisions which are suitable for recognition and enforcement ...... 23 
2.1.2.1.1 Judicial decisions and settlements made in court ................................. 24 
2.1.2.1.2 Arbitral awards ..................................................................................... 26 
2.1.2.1.3 Authentic instruments ........................................................................... 27 
2.1.2.1.4 Provisional or protective measures ....................................................... 30 
2.1.2.2 Foreign decisions which are disputable for recognition and enforcement .. 35 
2.2 Basic doctrines for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions .. 37 
2.2.1 Doctrine of comity .............................................................................................. 37 
2.2.2 Doctrine of obligation......................................................................................... 39 
2.2.3 Doctrine of acquired (vested) rights ................................................................... 40 
2.2.4 Doctrine of res judicata ...................................................................................... 41 
2.3 Historical development of the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions in 
Europe.............................................................................................................................. 42 
2.4 Systems of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments ................................ 44 
2.4.1 General ............................................................................................................... 44 
2.4.2. The System of limited control of foreign judgment (contrôle limite) ............... 47 
iii 
 
2.4.3. The System of unlimited control of foreign judgments ..................................... 47 
2.4.4. The System of revision of foreign judgments (revision au fond) ...................... 48 
2.4.5. The System of prima facie evidence ................................................................. 48 
2.4.6. The Systems that don’t recognize foreign judgments unless international 
agreement exists .......................................................................................................... 49 
2.5. Legal Sources ........................................................................................................... 50 
Part II ....................................................................................................................................... 52 
Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the Brussels IIbis Regulation ............ 52 
Chapter I Scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation ................................................................ 54 
1.1 General .......................................................................................................................... 54 
1.1.1 The Material Scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation ............................................. 56 
1.1.1.1 Matrimonial matters covered by the Brussels IIbis Regulation ...................... 56 
1.1.1.1.1 The term ‘marriage’ .................................................................................. 57 
1.1.1.1.2 Factual Relationships................................................................................ 61 
1.1.1.1.3 Divorce ..................................................................................................... 62 
1.1.1.1.4 Legal Separation ....................................................................................... 63 
1.1.1.1.5 Marriage annulment.................................................................................. 64 
1.1.1.2 Parental responsibility issues covered with the Brussels IIbis Regulation ...... 65 
1.1.2 Territorial Scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation .................................................. 69 
1.1.3 Temporal scope of Brussels IIbis Regulation ......................................................... 69 
Chapter II The Relationship between the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the Hague 
Conventions ......................................................................................................................... 71 
2.1 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention ................................................................ 71 
2.2 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention ................................................................. 73 
Chapter III Jurisdictional regime in the Brussels IIbis Regulation ..................................... 76 
3.1 General ...................................................................................................................... 76 
3.2 Jurisdiction regarding matrimonial matters ............................................................... 76 
3.3 Jurisdiction regarding parental responsibility issues ................................................. 80 
3.3.1 ‘Child’s habitual residence’ in the Brussels IIbis Regulation ............................ 81 
3.3.1.1 National definitions ..................................................................................... 84 
3.3.1.2 Practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the determination 
of the Childs habitual residence .............................................................................. 85 
3.3.2 General jurisdiction for parental responsibility issues in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation.................................................................................................................... 91 
3.3.3 Continuing jurisdiction of the child's former habitual residence ....................... 93 
3.3.4 Jurisdiction in cases of child’s abduction ........................................................... 94 
3.3.5 Prorogation of jurisdiction .................................................................................. 99 
3.3.6 Jurisdiction based on the child's presence ........................................................ 102 
iv 
 
3.3.7 Residual Jurisdiction ........................................................................................ 104 
3.3.8 Transfer to a Court better placed to hear the case (Forum Non Conveniens) .. 104 
Chapter IV Common provisions ........................................................................................ 108 
4.1 Ascertaining jurisdiction .......................................................................................... 108 
4.2 Lis Pendens rules ..................................................................................................... 112 
4.3 The Seizing of a Court ............................................................................................. 118 
4.4 Provisional, including protective measures (Article 20) ......................................... 119 
4.4.1. General ............................................................................................................ 120 
4.4.2. Conditions for application of Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation ...... 123 
4.4.2.1 The measures must be urgent .................................................................... 123 
4.4.2.2 The measures must be taken in respect to persons or assets in the Member 
State where the court seized of the dispute is situated .......................................... 125 
4.4.2.3 The measures must be provisional ............................................................ 127 
Chapter V Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments according to Brussels IIbis 
Regulation.......................................................................................................................... 130 
5.1 The system of exequatur in the area of Private International Law of the European 
Union ............................................................................................................................. 130 
5.2 Procedures of recognition and enforcement of judgments according to the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation ............................................................................................................. 134 
5.2.1 Classical exequatur (application for a declaration of enforceability) procedure in 
the Brussels IIbis Regulation ..................................................................................... 135 
5.2.1.1 Recognition of foreign decisions relating to matrimonial matters according 
to the Brussels IIbis Regulation ............................................................................. 136 
5.2.1.1.1 Updating civil-status records .............................................................. 137 
5.2.1.1.2 Recognition......................................................................................... 137 
5.2.1.1.3 Appeal against decision on (non-) recognition ................................... 141 
5.2.1.1.4 Grounds for non-recognition of judgments relating to divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment ..................................................................... 146 
5.2.1.1.4.1 Public policy (ordre public) ...................................................................... 147 
5.2.1.1.4.2 The defense of the party was obstructed or denied ................................... 152 
5.2.1.1.4.3 The foreign judgment is in a conflict with a judgment in a member state in 
which the recognition is sought .................................................................................. 156 
5.2.1.1.4.4 The foreign judgment is in a conflict with a judgment given in another 
Member state or in a third state .................................................................................. 156 
5.2.1.1.5 Authentic Instruments ......................................................................... 157 
5.2.1.2 Recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions relating to parental 
responsibility matters, according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation ....................... 158 
5.2.1.2.1 Enforcement ....................................................................................... 162 
5.2.1.2.2 Grounds for non-recognition of judgments relating to parental 
responsibility (Article 23) .................................................................................. 165 
v 
 
5.2.1.2.2.1 Public policy ............................................................................................. 166 
5.2.1.2.2.2 The denial of the right of the child to be heard ......................................... 168 
5.2.1.2.2.3 The defense of the party was obstructed or denied ................................... 169 
5.2.1.2.2.4 The party against whom the recognition is sought was denied right to be 
heard ........................................................................................................................... 171 
5.2.1.2.2.5 The foreign judgment is in conflict with a later judgment in a member state 
in which the recognition is sought .............................................................................. 171 
5.2.1.2.2.6 Foreign judgment is in a conflict with a judgment given in another Member 
state or in a third state ................................................................................................. 172 
5.2.1.2.2.7 The foreign judgment is in violation of the procedure laid down in Article 
56 (the placement of a child in another Member State) .............................................. 172 
5.2.2 Abolition of the application for a declaration of enforceability relating to child 
abduction and access rights cases according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation .......... 173 
5.2.2.1 Child Abduction Cases under the Brussels IIbis Regime .......................... 176 
5.2.2.1.1 The Duty of the courts for prompt procedures ................................... 183 
5.2.2.1.2 Hearing of the child ............................................................................ 185 
5.2.2.1.3 Hearing of the applicant for the return of the child ............................ 191 
5.2.2.1.4 Limitations on Article 13(1) (b) of the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention ........................................................................................................ 192 
5.2.2.1.5 The position of the Courts of the Member States in the case of a non-
return order pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention ........................................................................................................ 195 
5.2.2.1.6 Abolition of exequatur in the Brussels IIbis Regulation regarding child 
abduction cases and decisions on access rights ................................................. 202 
5.2.2.1.6.1 Access Rights ............................................................................................ 203 
5.2.2.1.6.2 Child Abduction Cases .............................................................................. 206 
5.3 Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding 
recognition and enforcement with particular reference to child abduction cases ......... 213 
5.3.1 General ............................................................................................................. 213 
5.3.2 The Position of the ECtHR regarding Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention............................................................................................... 215 
5.3.3 The Position of the ECtHR on Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation ..... 220 
5.3.4 The position of the ECtHR regarding the Brussels IIbis Regulation child 
abduction regime ....................................................................................................... 226 
Part III .................................................................................................................................... 231 
The procedure for Recognition and Enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in the Republic 
of Slovenia ............................................................................................................................. 231 
Chapter I The historical development, structure and legal sources of Private International 
Law in Slovenia ................................................................................................................. 231 
1. General ...................................................................................................................... 231 
2. Legal Sources ............................................................................................................ 234 
vi 
 
2.1 National legal Sources ......................................................................................... 234 
2.2 International legal sources ................................................................................... 235 
2.2.1 Multilateral agreements in the field of family law relations in Slovenia ..... 237 
2.2.1.1 Council of Europe .................................................................................. 237 
2.2.1.2 Hague Conference on Private International Law .................................. 237 
2.2.1.3 International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS)/La Commission 
Internationale de l'État Civil (CIEC) ................................................................. 238 
2.2.1.4 United Nations ....................................................................................... 239 
2.2.2 Bilateral agreements in the field of family law relations to which Slovenia is a 
party ....................................................................................................................... 239 
Chapter II Recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions from non-EU 
Member States in Slovenia ................................................................................................ 243 
1. General ...................................................................................................................... 243 
2. Types of decisions and jurisdiction regarding recognition ........................................ 243 
3. Conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia
 ....................................................................................................................................... 245 
3.1 Positive conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions 
in Slovenia (formal requirements) ............................................................................. 246 
3.2. Negative conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions 
in Slovenia ................................................................................................................. 248 
3.2.1 Violations of the jurisdiction of Slovenian courts ........................................ 249 
3.2.1.1 Exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Slovenia .................................... 250 
3.2.1.2 Exorbitant jurisdiction of the Country of Origin ................................... 253 
3.2.1.3 Violation of the prorogation of jurisdiction of Slovenian courts ........... 255 
3.2.2 Violations of the right of defense ................................................................. 257 
3.2.3 Existence of final judgment on the same subject matter between the same 
parties or pending concurrent proceedings ............................................................ 263 
3.2.4 Public Policy ................................................................................................. 267 
3.2.5 Reciprocity ................................................................................................... 272 
4. Rules for recognition of the status of persons ........................................................... 275 
5. Types of procedures and courses of action (proceedings) for the recognition of foreign 
judicial decisions ........................................................................................................... 276 
5.1. Types of procedures ............................................................................................ 276 
5.2. Courses of action (proceedings) for the recognition of foreign judicial decisions
 ................................................................................................................................... 277 
6. The enforcement of decisions concerning custody and the right of access in Slovenia
 ....................................................................................................................................... 279 
Chapter III The recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in family matters 
from EU Member States in Slovenia ................................................................................. 281 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 284 
vii 
 
Povzetek ................................................................................................................................. xvi 
Bibliography: ......................................................................................................................... xxx 
1. Monographs and articles ................................................................................................ xxx 
2. Reports, Studies, Conclusions and Programs .................................................................. xli 
3. EU and International Legal Sources .............................................................................. xliv 
4. National Legislation ..................................................................................................... xlvii 








 The ultimate goal of every party that is litigating in front of a judicial authority (or 
another alternative dispute resolution institutions) is to obtain a decision that protects its rights. 
However, the protection of the party’s rights is not secured by the Court rendering a final 
judgment; the party must be satisfied according to the dispositive of the judgment. It is clear 
from the principle of territoriality that a judgment rendered in one legal system has legal effects 
in the territory of that legal system. The state has the necessary measures to enforce the 
judgment and to protect the party’s rights. However, in the absence of an international 
agreement a judgment delivered in one country cannot have a direct operation of its own force 
in another country. In that case, there have to be procedures which will give opportunity to the 
parties to avoid starting a new action in front of a court of a foreign country. This gives stability 
to all individual relationships between natural and legal persons. Such stability is fundamental 
for the protection of individual human rights, especially for the free movement of people. 
Therefore, there must be a goal set in order to achieve this stability, transnational legal certainty 
and the avoidance of repeated litigation and conflicting decisions. This goal is: Every state 
must adopt an efficient, prompt and balanced procedure for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments with full respect of fundamental human rights and the fundamental 
principles of civil procedure. 
 In recent years the European Union (EU) has gone beyond the mere regulation of 
economic relations and the common market. The EU has increased the regulation of family 
relations, a field   wherein conflicts were traditionally resolved under national legal rules or by 
international agreements. Such a diversity of legal sources has multiplied the number of 
potential legal rules that can be applied in a single situation and with that it further complicated 
this already convoluted private international law situation.    
 Another aspect which is also important regarding the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in family matters is that there have recently been great changes within the 
family itself. Globalization is not merely an economic phenomenon; it influences all social 
aspects. There has been a great change in the structure of family in particular. The long-lasting 
traditional concept of family law determined by a complex mixture of religious, social and 
cultural characteristics of one nation now more than ever is undergoing a change. These two 
tendencies (globalization and the change in the family structure) influence recognition and 
enforcement in different manners. Increased free movement of people in the EU produced 
complex cross-border family relations which require proper regulation based on fundamental 
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principles, especially on the principle of ‘mutual trust’ as a precondition of mutual recognition, 
which will allow free circulation of judgments between the Member States. In this manner the 
question of abolition of exequatur arises, whether it functions properly, and whether total 
abolition is required. On the other hand, the traditional concept of family law relations provides 
for certain discomfort when implementing such provisions and when circumventing the rules. 
In a way, this contradicts the principle of ‘mutual trust’. Therefore, the recognition and 
enforcement of family law decisions is particularly important, because it cuts to the core of the 
problem of ‘mutual trust’ and it ‘disembowels’ the functioning of mutual recognition in the 
EU.  
 
1. The purpose of this doctoral thesis 
 The need for recognition and enforcement is undisputed in private international law 
because it is one of the most certain ways of avoiding repeated litigation and conflicting 
decisions and with that achieving transnational legal certainty. It helps the parties to avoid 
spending resources on re-litigation and to have harmonized decisions.  
 This doctoral thesis deals with the regulatory framework of the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments regarding family matters.  The recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments regarding family matters has three distinctions. First, these types of 
judgments are very frequent. For example, the number of ‘international’ divorce proceedings 
on the European level may be estimated at 170.000 annually, which constitutes approximately 
16% of all European divorces. Second, the judgments regarding family matters are specific in 
their subject matter. Family relations have always been one of the central subjects of private 
international law, but as the number of cross-border marriage grows, the need of a balanced 
procedure that respects the parties’ rights increases accordingly. This causes the national legal 
systems to be more cautious when they are recognizing and enforcing foreign decisions. Third, 
there is a great divergence of sources on different levels whose scope of application is in the 
field of family matters. There are sources that apply when the judgments are rendered by courts 
of EU countries and are recognized and enforced in another EU country, but also there are vast 
numbers of international agreements and national rules that deal with this matter which apply 
to judgments coming from third countries. 
 This doctoral thesis presents a research conducted on the basic elements of the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and especially the characteristics of the 
exequatur of judgments regarding family matters. Part one of this thesis contains two chapters. 
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The first chapter will give a brief presentation of the transformation of the family from a 
sociological point of view and will show much it has transformed in its models and functions. 
This chapter will also address the modern phenomenon of ‘globalization’ and will point its 
influence on the shaping of the family. Lastly, this chapter will analyze the position of children 
during the dissolution of marriage and in its aftermath from a psychological perspective. The 
second chapter of this part will firstly give some preliminary remarks and a conceptual 
understanding of legal institutes’ recognition and enforcement. Then the chapter will address 
the types of decisions that can be recognized and enforced with the distinction between types 
of decisions which are undisputed and can undergo the process of exequatur and types of 
decisions which are debatable regarding whether they can be recognized and enforced in other 
countries. Following this, the chapter will give an overview of the basic doctrines of the 
recognition and enforcement. Then it will give a brief overview of the historical development 
of the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions in Europe. In addition, this chapter will 
analyze the systems for recognition and enforcement present in most of the world. Lastly, this 
chapter will elaborate on the legal sources regarding recognition and enforcement.  
 Part two of this thesis consists of five chapters and will address the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments regarding matrimonial matters and matters regarding 
parental responsibility within the EU. This especially refers to Regulation No 2201/2003 of 
November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility (Brussels IIbis Regulation). 
Chapter one will give an explanation of the scope of application of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. It will refer particularly to the material scope of the Regulation but it will also 
address the specifics of the territorial and temporal scope of its application. Chapter two will 
give an explanation of the relationship between the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the most 
relevant international agreements of the Hague Conference of Private International Law in this 
field, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention. Chapter three will specially address the jurisdictional rules in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. This chapter will analyze the jurisdictional rules regarding matrimonial matters 
and its jurisdictional rules with specific reference to the problems that arise in the 
implementation of these rules. This chapter will also provide a detailed structure of the parental 
responsibility jurisdictional rules with specific reference to the rules regarding prorogation of 
the jurisdiction and the transfer of jurisdiction. In chapter four, this thesis will analyze the 
common provisions particularly lis pendens rules contained in Article 19 and rules regarding 
provisional and protective measures contained in Article 20. The main chapter in this part is 
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chapter five, and it is divided into three sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter illustrates the 
general systems of exequatur in the European Union. The second sub-chapter refers to the 
procedures for recognition and enforcement in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. This sub-chapter 
firstly analyzes the procedures and conditions regarding matrimonial matters and parental 
responsibility issues. A considerable portion of this second sub-chapter of chapter five is 
dedicated to the abolition of the exequatur procedure regarding access rights and child 
abduction cases. The third sub-chapter gives a detailed explanation of the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding child abduction cases with specific 
reference to the relation between the protection of human rights and the procedures in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
 The third part of this thesis details the procedures for recognition and enforcement of 
Republic of Slovenia. It is consisted of three chapters where in the first chapter the historical 
development of the procedure for the recognition and enforcement in Slovenia is given. Also 
this chapter provides an overview of the legal sources that are relevant regarding recognition 
and enforcement in Slovenia The second chapter analyzes the procedure for recognition and 
enforcement in Slovenia. This chapter also explains the conditions for the recognition and 
enforcement in Slovenia and gives a comparative overview of similar conditions in the most 
relevant regional and European national PIL acts and will give an overview of the procedure 
for the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions coming from third countries in 
Slovenia. The third chapter explains the procedure for the recognition and enforcement of 
judicial decisions coming from EU Member States. Lastly this thesis contains the concluding 
remarks.   
 
2. The aim of the doctoral thesis 
 The primary objective of this thesis is to address to the problem of exequatur and to 
contribute to an efficient, prompt and balanced recognition and enforcement procedure of 
foreign judgments regarding family matters with full respect of fundamental human rights and 
the fundamental principles of civil procedure. 
 This thesis addresses the academic community as well the practitioners by giving a 
detailed structure and analysis of the procedure for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in family matters. This will not only help in the understanding of such a complex 
part of private international law, but also it will provide legal certainty by giving guidelines to 
the proper application of the relevant legal sources and with that it will enable the protection 
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of fundamental human rights and the maintenance of the fundamental principles of civil 
procedures. 
3. Hypothesis of the doctoral thesis 
 Recognition and enforcement represents one aspect of private international law whose 
goal is to avoid re-litigation and provide for harmonized decisions in which the parties’ rights 
are protected. That places the countries involved between two separate necessities: on one side, 
they have to protect their sovereignty and the integrity of their legal system, and on the other 
they have to satisfy the party’s needs by sparing them of starting a new action in front of a 
court of a foreign country on an issue and between the same parties which was already decided 
by a court of another country. In essence this relates to the balance between ‘trust’ in the 
procedural and substantive law standards of foreign legal systems and the extent of the ‘control’ 
of the state of enforcement that it imposes on the foreign decision and through that on the 
foreign legal order.  
 With the development of the EU, the Member States have transferred part of their 
sovereignty from the national level to the EU level. This is particularly important in the field 
of private international law where, in the Amsterdam treaty, parts of private international law 
are established in the first pillar. As a result of that, the EU has direct competences over 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions coming from the EU Member States 
in particular legal fields. This directly influences the ‘trust’ between the countries where in the 
EU this principle is raised to a new level of ‘mutual trust’ and in the field of recognition and 
enforcement is manifested through the principle of ‘mutual recognition.’ This aspect in turn 
influences the ‘control’ of foreign judicial decisions in the EU where fewer and fewer standards 
are required and the tendency is to fully abolish exequatur.  
 During this process of ‘abolition’ of the exequatur in the EU, another social 
phenomenon becomes present. It is a social construction that influences people’s lives and 
development and, with that, directly influences the family: globalization. Historically it will be 
shown that the family is undergoing a perpetual change of its structure, functions and the 
relationships within it. This thesis will firstly analyze the transformation of the family and 
especially the position of the child during the course of and after the divorce. As marriages can 
be concluded, so also they can be dissolved. Today more than ever in Europe it is accepted that 
divorce represents the civilizational acquirement of ending dysfunctional marriages. However, 
this does not mean that the relationships in the families come to an end. They undergo a certain 
transformation which affects all members but most significantly affects the children. In this 
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light it will be shown that if the relations have deteriorated so tremendously between the parents 
and they have the right to end the relationship, the parents have to create a certain environment 
where a ‘normal’ relationship between both parents and children continue after the dissolution 
of the marriage. Such a result is guaranteed in most of the Conventions and other legal sources 
that relate to human rights.  
 The situation in cross-border cases goes even further. Presently, marriages between 
people from different countries are very frequent. Because of the fact that they are frequent it 
is required for the legal systems to adapt to these two ongoing process: the transformation of 
the family and the frequency of cross-border marriages. These two processes influence many 
legal fields. One of the legal fields which is directly influenced by these societal processes is 
private international law. An additional aspect that influences private international law is the 
European Union. Therefore, this thesis will analyze two aspects of private international law: 
firstly within the EU context and secondly within the national context of Slovenia. The purpose 
of the analysis is to answer the question whether the recognition and enforcement in the EU 
and in Slovenia respond to the position of the child in cross-border divorces so that he or she 
might have a meaningful relationship with both parents and be able to express his or her own 
feelings and views.   
 Regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in family 
matters within the EU context, this thesis will grapple with the issue of abolition of exequatur 
as provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The first fields in which exequatur was fully 
abolished in the EU were child abduction cases and cases regarding access rights. These 
particular cases are very important not because they are frequent but because of the way they 
resonate with society. Often these cases are largely covered by the media with negative 
undertones and represent a genuine threat to the child abduction regime in the EU and therefore 
to the ‘mutual trust’ between EU legal orders. This thesis will propose that the main problems 
of the child abduction regime in the EU is not just the solutions in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
which are in fact rigid, but rather the ‘distrust’ of the main authorities that implement these 
rules. The EU child abduction system is positioned so the final arbitrator regarding these cases 
is the court where the child resided habitually before abduction was made. The country of 
enforcement has a limited, almost non-existent ability to refuse enforcement of the final court’s 
decision for the return of the children. In such a situation, the judicial authorities are 
circumventing the Brussels IIbis Regulation in order to protect the person possessing their 
nationality. This is done not only by the country of enforcement but also by the country of 
origin. In all of these cases the relevant authorities and the parties forget one important aspect:  
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The trauma which the child undergoes. Therefore, as a solution it is important that ‘mutual 
trust’ in the field of child abduction cases in the EU and in all other fields becomes ‘actual 
trust’ where the basic principles of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention are protected. 
The determination of the theoretical solution for this problem is much clearer than determining 
the practical solution. In essence the idea behind the Brussels IIbis regime is that there could 
be no advantage gained from one parent by unilateral selection of the forum and that the proper 
forum for settlement of the custody issues is the place where the child resided habitually at the 
time of the abduction. Most important of all, the Brussels IIbis regime aimed to have the court 
decide it should not base its decision on the fact that one of the parents has the country’s 
nationality but rather on the best interest of the child. This principle of the ‘best interest of the 
child’ means that the transition in their lives is made easier for them by the fact that both parents 
will remain interested and responsible for them. This will mean that children can remain in 
contact with both of their parents and that they can express their feelings and views. Only if 
those principles are protected and implemented by all of the relevant authorities, then this 
abolition of the exequatur regarding child abduction cases and access rights can be said to be a 
complete success. However, the guidelines for resolution of these problems often cannot be 
separated from the political problems between the Member States and the substantive and 
procedural standards in the legal orders. On one hand, the EU’s legal sources lack the strength 
to lower the ‘control’ between the legal orders and to impose ‘trust’. This creates tension 
between the legal systems of the Member States and causes disobedience in the implementation 
of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The proper way for building ‘actual trust’ must start from the 
authorities which are implementing these rules. All of them (in the country of enforcement and 
in the country of origin) must look beyond their national interests and work towards the one 
interest that is universal: the ‘child’s best interest’. 
 In response to this growing importance of trust, the number of bilateral and multilateral 
treaties in the field of family law has grown quickly. However, international agreements in this 
area have not become easier to implement. Both national law and international conventions 
have become more and more differentiated. This differentiation gives a tremendous task to the 
persons who are implementing the rules. They are required to be knowledgeable about the EU 
law, international conventions and their jurisprudence, but also to be able to cooperate between 
different institutions that are involved in family law disputes. Regarding matrimonial relations, 
this task is easier. Contemporary problems which are arising in the area of family relations are 
the new forms of marriages and other types of non-martial bonds. However, the most crucial 
problems arise regarding decisions which concern children. This thesis will address recognition 
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and enforcement in Slovenia, with a comparative analysis of other national PIL acts. The goal 
of the analysis is to see if the national procedure in Slovenia is sufficient to protect children’s 
rights and whether the national legal system is coordinated with the most important 
international agreements. The fact that Slovenia is member to these agreements prefaces this 
issue, however the development of this private international law field is so dynamic that it will 
be required to re-address this problem.    
  
4. Methodology 
 For the purpose of methodological elaboration of the doctoral thesis and to prove the 
hypothesis in this thesis, several combined scientific methods are used, including the following: 
 The thesis uses the axiological method which presents the legal values that should be 
considered in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. With this method, the 
ethical relation between the parties and the state will be shown in correlation to this legal 
phenomenon. This will be especially significant in the determination of the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU and the ECtHR regarding their legal sources and the judicial practice. 
 The teleological method shows the interpretation of the legislative provisions in the 
light of the purpose, values, and legal, social and economic goals these provisions aim to 
achieve. This is particularly important in the presentation and the summarization of the 
findings, proposals and the positions of this doctoral thesis. 
  To show the origin and evolution of the regulatory framework of the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judicial decisions, the historical method is applied.  
 The legal comparative method enables the examination of a wider dimension of the 
legal instruments in different legal systems. 
 The method of description will display a variety of definitions and key elements of the 
terms that relate to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions. 
The research techniques this doctoral thesis contains are: 
 Case studies within the European legal field, within the legal field in Republic of 
Slovenia and within other legal systems.  
 The available literature, all of the professional articles related to recognition and 






Chapter I General aspects regarding the family 
1. 1 Transformation of the family and its models 
 
 The Universal modus vivendi of societies worldwide is perpetual change. This makes it 
difficult to capture the current time in order to be able to depict or describe it. Therefore, any 
categorization becomes highly controversial. The debate is around the question whether we are 
living in ‘modern’ society1 which is a product  of the interaction of various sociohistorical 
phenomena such as the industrial revolution, the enlightenment, secularization, urbanization 
and the technological progress, or are we part of a new social formation; a ‘post-modern’, ‘post-
industrial’ or ‘information’2 society.3 The implication of such a debate is whether the conditions 
that provided for the change from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ are themselves undergoing a 
transformation and whether informatics technology creates new transformations towards a new 
model in society.4 Nonetheless, whichever theory applies, it is undisputed that the family 
suffers a direct implication of these tendencies in society, and in the end the family itself is 
undergoing a transformation.  
 The family as a social construct is defined as a historical variable (in terms of its 
content, structure, and form) which holds some constants: its biological function, bio-social 
function, social function and economical function.5 From a historical perspective, the 
transformation of the family regarding its structure, content and form in the past was 
predetermined by the religious constellations that were dominant in the society in that time. 
                                                 
1 Modernization, in sociology means transformation from a traditional, rural, agrarian society to a secular, urban, 
industrial society. Modern society is industrial society. To modernize a society is, first of all, to industrialize it. 
Historically, the rise of modern society has been inextricably linked with the emergence of industrial society. All 
the features that are associated with modernity can be shown to be related to the set of changes that, no more than 
two centuries ago, brought into being the industrial type of society. This suggests that the terms industrialism and 
industrial society imply far more than the economic and technological components that make up their core. 
Industrialism is a way of life that encompasses profound economic, social, political, and cultural changes. It is by 
undergoing the comprehensive transformation of industrialization that societies become modern, Encyclopedia 
Britannica, on-line version, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/modernization> accessed 15 March 2016. See also, 
Бест С., Келнер Д., Постмодерната теорија, Култура, Скопје 1996, 337 
2 Kumar, K., From Post-Industrial to post-modern Society, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, (1995), 8. 
3 Мицковиќ, Д., Семејството во Европа XVI-XXI век, Блесок, Скопје, (2008), 157. 
4 ibid 158. 
5 Младеновић М., Основи социологије породице, Београд, (2004),24 (as cited in Панов С., Породично право, 
Београд, (2012), 33).  
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These religious aspects were predetermining the concept of Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu 
and other family formations.6 Christian doctrine itself is based on the Bible as the first and 
principal source of law.7 In its time it represented a genuine revolution in comparison with 
other ancient ideas for marriage and the family present in the Roman and Jewish tradition.8  For 
example, in the time when Christianity was in its beginning stages, Roman law was lacking 
any obligatory civil or religious formalities for the conclusion of marriage.9 These 
revolutionary aspects were manifested in the ideas of the impossibility of dissolution of the 
marriage;10 the position that celibacy before marriage is one of the highest moral ideals of all 
Christians and that the sexual activities out of sin represent moral and spiritual degradation, the 
celibacy of the priests and their refrain from marriage; the duty of fidelity of not only the 
woman but also of the man in the marriage, marital obstacles and other aspects. Such ideas 
brought a revolution to the concept of marriage, the family and in the sexual relationships of 
that time.11 This canon of rules on marriage and divorce was collected and made uniform by 
the beginning of the XII century by Pope Gregory VII (1073-1084).12 With the acceptance of 
the Christianity among all of the tribes that lived in Europe and later the export of this concept 
to the ‘New World’, the ideas and the principles of Christianity became leading role model 
upon which the family law aspects were built.13   
1.1.1 The traditional family model 
 
 The traditional family model was built upon the ideas of Christianity.  This model was 
based on canon law in both Catholic and Orthodox churches and was generally very similar 
between the two branches of Christianity.14 In such a family structured according to religious 
principles, the identity of every person in the family was determined by his or her position in 
society and the roles in the family and in society were strictly defined. In the family as in 
                                                 
6 See also, Neuhaus P.H. and Falk Z.W. and Anderson N., The family in religious and customary laws, International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol.IV, Persons and Family, Chapter 11, (1983). 
7 ibid 3. 
8 Мицковиќ, Д., (n 3) 11. 
9 Antokolskaia V. M., Development of Family Law in Western and Eastern Europe: Common Origins, Common 
Driving Forces, Common Tendencies, Journal of Family History, vol. 28, (January 2003), 53-54. 
10 In the Roman church, Matthew’s addition to the strict prohibition of divorce by Jesus – ‘except for fornication’ 
(Matt.5:32, 19:9) – has been interpreted since antiquity to mean that adultery by spouse does not entitle dissolution 
of the marital bond and subsequent remarriage, but rather personal separation of the spouses, Neuhaus P.H. and 
Falk Z.W. and Anderson N, (n 6) 20-21. 
11 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 11. 
12 Antokolskaia V. M. (n 9) 53-54. 
13 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 11. 
14 Antokolskaia V. M. (n 9) 52.   
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society, the desires and the needs of the individuals were arranged according to the interests of 
the groups to which they belonged. Thus in such a system the family was lacking privacy from 
the outside world (everyday life was closely connected with the market, the square, the church, 
the field) but also inside in the family’s  ‘private’ space (it was usual that the whole family was 
sleeping in one or two rooms, on one bed).15 The passiveness, hierarchy, stability and the 
staticity of the relationships were some of the characteristics of the traditional concept of 
family.16 The mere concept of a traditional family is considerably different from the present 
understanding. It consisted of all of the people that lived in one household under the protection 
of the head of the family, including servants, season workers and others.17 In latter XIX century 
the definition of the family moved towards the present understanding where cohabitation and 
the consanguine aspect were considered as basic elements of the family.18  
 Such a position of the traditional family model provided that the purpose of marriage 
would be primarily satisfaction and achievement of certain economic stability and gain, rather 
than the personal happiness of the spouses.19 The goal of both families which were uniting in 
marital unity was to fulfill their personal interests and needs, instead of satisfying the need for 
love of the spouses.20 Accordingly the head of the family took the responsibility for the 
conclusion of the marriage.21 This aspect was not so rigorous in the lower classes of society. 
The economic gain expected from their marriage was not attainable as it was among higher 
classes (due to lack of property) so their marriages generally had more personal sides than the 
higher classes.22 The traditional family model caused families to be strictly closed within their 
own social classes, lacking interaction with the other social classes. Even among persons from 
the same class they rarely mixed with persons of different sub-groups. For example, in France, 
the persons that produced wine were concluding marriages among themselves, as was the case 
with the bourgeoisie.23 
 In the traditional family model there was strict hierarchy in the family structure itself. 
The husband had dominance over the wife. However, this characteristic was not absolute. He 
                                                 
15 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 38-39. 
16 As Margaret Mead states ‘The past of one generation represents the future of the next generation’, (as cited in 
Мицковиќ, Д.(n 3) 27). 
17 Flandrin J.L., Familles. Parenté, maison et sexualité dans l'ancienne société, Edition du Seuilil, Paris, (1997), 
10. 
18 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 29. 
19 Stone L., Broken Lives, Separation and Divorce in England 1660-1857, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
(1992), 70. 
20 Flandrin J.L. (n 17) 83. 
21 Мицковиќ, Д.(n 3) 44. 
22 Stone L. (n 17) 76. 
23 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 50. 
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had some restrictions. Namely, the decisions that the husband made had to be in accordance 
with the religious, moral and customary laws and principles. The husband in the family couldn’t 
force his wife into prostitution, nor could he kill his wife. He had to provide her with food and 
clothing. He was even restricted in bringing another woman into the household.  If the husband 
behaved against these principles, then it was permitted for the wife to leave the husband.24 In 
the pre-industrial period, there was a highly emphasized gender division of labor. This division 
of labor also extended to the other persons in the family.25 The main role of the wife per se in 
the aristocratic families was to give birth to healthy (male) children while in rural communities 
it was for the wife to be a laborer in the household and in the field.26 
 The most remarkable discrepancies that exist between the concept of the traditional 
family and contemporary concepts of the family was on the position of children, the concept 
of childhood, and the relations between parents and children. According to vast majority of the 
authors, in the traditional family there was not any high understanding of the childhood and its 
individualization in regards to the needs of children and the protection and care of them,  
concepts that would emerge in the modern family.27 Because of this approach and because of 
diseases, bad diet, weak or nonexistent health care, and the indifferent attitude of the parents, 
there was a high mortality rate among children in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.28 
The mortality rate in England was high as 33% of all children before they reached age of 15,29 
while in the other European countries it was even higher.30 On the other hand, the high mortality 
rate represented an ‘enchanted circle’ - it was the reason why parents had more distant 
relationships with their children.31 Very often, the children were sent to other households to 
work as servants.32 
 The main role in the child’s life was decided by the father. He decided if, how, and 
when the child would be educated, if he would be sent to work in another household, or where 
he should live.33 Children were excluded from possessing any property until they had reached 
maturity, and all of their income belonged to the father.34 Nevertheless, the position of marital 
                                                 
24 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 54. 
25 ibid 54. 
26 Karras R.M., Women’s Labors: Reproduction and Sex Work in Medieval Europe, Journal of Woman’s History, 
Vol. 15, No. 4, (Winter 2004), 155. 
27 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 63. 
28 Stone L.(n 19) 55. 
29 ibid. 
30 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 66. 
31 Stone L.(n 19) 57. 
32 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 75. 
33 ibid 77. 
34 ibid.  
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children was much better than the position of extra-marital children.35 They were excluded 
from succession, but given a right to have maintenance of property or estates. The reason was 
to prevent these categories of children from being left to rely on the mercy of the state.36 
 1.1.2 The modern family model 
 
 The concept of the traditional family dominated in all of the European countries until 
the beginning of the industrialization and the beginning of the process of urbanization.37 These 
factors paved the way for the transformation of the family from the traditional concept to the 
concept of new nuclear family.38 The new economic and social conditions first influenced the 
so-called middle class to adapt to these conditions and later these conditions were accepted by 
other social groups. With adaptation to such new social and economic conditions the family 
itself went through a substantial change in its structure and this change resulted in the creation 
of new characteristics of the family: a decrease of the functions, closeness in relation to the 
community, dividing the labor according to gender, intensive care for the children and decrease 
of the birth rate, and the creation of close emotional ties between the spouses themselves and 
with the children.39 Such a new structure of the family compared to the traditional family model 
was referred to as modern family model.40 
 One of the first characteristics of the modern family model was that the position in 
society was not inherited, but rather it was earned according to one’s contribution and the profit 
made in the free market. Such a position meant that reproduction was freed from the inheritance 
from the father and was now dependent on the qualities of the son.41 This new model meant 
that the status of the family was dependent on the economic and political position of the 
husband in society, while the wife was responsible for the socialization of the children and care 
of the household. In that context the labor was strictly divided by gender and a clear line was 
drawn between the public life which was the jurisdiction of the husband and the private life 
where the wife had the primary position. So the position in society was evaluated according to 
gender, where the husband was graded according to his work ethic, while the wife was graded 
                                                 
35 Antokolskaia V. M. (n 19) 55. 
36 Мицковиќ, Д.(n 3) 78. 
37 ibid 91. 
38 There is no consensus between authors regarding factors which lead to the change of the family model. For 
these different understandings see, Мицковиќ, Д., (n 3) 91-102.  
39 ibid 97. 
40 ibid. 
41 Coonitz S., The Way We Really Are: Coming in Terms with Americas Changing Families, Basic Books, New 
York, (1997), 175. 
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as a mother and housewife.42 The creation of private life, which didn’t exist in the traditional 
family model, provided for strengthening of the emotional bonds between the family 
members.43 This bond had influence in other functions of the family: education of children, 
their socialization, and as a barrier to delinquency and disobedience.44 
 One of the most significant changes in the concept of the family from the traditional 
model to the modern model was the reasons for conclusion of marriage. In the traditional 
model, the reason for conclusion of marriage were generally about achieving some kind of 
economic, political or status interest for the families. Opposite of this reason, the modern family 
model finds the reason for conclusion of marriage in love, sympathies and close emotional 
attachment between the spouses.45 Such individualization of the reasons for conclusion of 
marriage generally corresponded with the basic tendencies in society in that time - that is, the 
development of the industrialization and urbanization which provided for the emerging of the 
free market, which was based on individual values.46 Nevertheless, these changes did not affect 
all countries and all classes in society in the same period. The lower classes accepted the 
changes much earlier than the aristocracy.47 
 Another important change in the modern family was the relation between parents and 
their children. The main difference between the traditional model of the family and the modern 
one is in the fact that the children now have become a central part of the family.48 Contrary to 
the position of the child in the traditional model of family, where for example the education 
was left to boarding schools or they were sent as servants to other households, in the modern 
family the education or the general upbringing and socialization was left to the parents.49 
                                                 
42 Parsons T., Bales R., Socialization and Interaction Process, (1956), 16-26.  
43 Antokolskaia V. M.(n 9) 58. 
44 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 97. 
45 Antokolskaia V. M.(n 9) 53. 
46 There is generally no consensus whether these reasons develop out of the free will of the persons to choose their 
partner and their financial independence (Shorter, Goode) or as an reaction to the dehumanization that happens in 
modern time (Weber), Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 102. 
47 Especially in this context the abdication of King Eduard VIII because of his love towards Wallis Simpson is 
evident example, Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 112. 
48 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 122. 
49 Historically significant influence on the more wide understanding of socialization of children has John Locke 
with his work ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education’ where he proposed his understanding of children as ‘tabula 
rasa’ a blank sheet, which were gradually filled in by experience. His influence meant that gradually the traditional 
aspect of upbringing of children was abandoned and this new understanding that children should be taught at 
home by their parents or tutor was accepted. In debating whether children are better to be thought in home or sent 
abroad Locke argues ‘Were it not for this, a young man's bashfulness and ignorance in the world would not so 
much need an early care. Conversation would cure it in a great measure; or if that will not do it early enough, it is 
only a stronger reason for a good tutor at home. For, if pains be to be taken to give him a manly air and assurance 
betimes, it is chiefly as a fence to his virtue, when he goes into the world, under his own conduct. It is preposterous, 
therefore, to sacrifice his innocency to the attaining of confidence, and some little skill of bustling for himself 
among others, by his conversation with ill-bred and vicious boys; when the chief use of that sturdiness and 
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Among other changes towards children in this period was the increased care of the children’s 
health and hygiene which led to the decrease in mortality among children.50 
  
 1.1.3 Implications of the transformation of the family model from 
traditional to modern 
 
 In the traditional family model, marriage was under the full influence of the Church. 
According to the Christian belief, marriage was introduced by God Himself at  the creation of 
man and is therefore - unlike the previous Roman law,51 - an institution for all people regardless 
of nationality and rank.52 However, because marriage was introduced by God and the fact that 
the marital bond was a holy secret and symbolically represents the relationship between Jesus 
and the Church, the tie of marriage as a consequence is unbreakable.53 Divorce was generally 
prohibited although there was no clear line between annulment and dissolution of marriage.54 
Another significant characteristic of the traditional family model was that the Church had 
dominance over the issues about the conclusion of marriage and other matrimonial relations.55 
 The reign of secular law over the regulation of family issues is, historically, a recent 
phenomenon. The family law of the whole European continent before the Reformation was 
mainly uniform canon law.56 It has accompanied the rise of the modern state and the 
concentration and consolidation of power in the hands of elected officials and executive branch 
functionaries in lieu of priests, clerics and ecclesiastical authorities.57  
 During and after the Protestant Reformation, marriage in the protestant countries lost 
the status of ‘holy secret’ and with that, the dominance of the Church was diminished.58 
Furthermore, the separation between the Church and the State, transferred the marital affairs 
                                                 
standing upon his own legs, is only for the preservation of his virtue’ Locke J., Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education, (first published 1693) <http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/John-Locke-
Thoughts-Concerning-Education.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016, §70. 
50 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 130. 
51 In the period when Christianity was rising, Roman law considered marriage as a matter for the family and did 
not fall under the competences of the State or religious authorities. Also, in Roman Law, in absence of marriage 
impediments, legal marriage was created by the mutual consent of the spouses, Antokolskaia (n 9) 54. 
52 Neuhaus P.H. and Falk Z.W. and Anderson N, (n 6) 12. 
53 Rheinstein M., Trends in the Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol.18, No.1, (winter, 1953), 8. 
54 Antokolskaia V. M. (n 9) 55. 
55 Мицковиќ, Д., (n 3) 142. 
56 Antokolskaia V. M. (n 9) 53. 
57 Shachar A., Entangled: state, religion, and the family, (2009), Harvard International Law Journal Online, 
<http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/HILJ-Online_49_Shachar.pdf> accessed 05 December 
2014, 134. 
58 Rheinstein M., (n 53) 10. 
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from the Church courts to the state courts.59 The representatives of the Natural Law 
(Puffendorf, Grotius) accepted marriage not as a ‘holy secret’ but found its basis in the 
contractual theory. Furthermore, Voltaire in his Philosophical Dictionary addressed the issue 
of Marriage and stated ‘marriage is a contract in the law of nations, of which the Roman 
Catholics have made a sacrament.’60 
 This conflict reached its peak during the French Revolution, where after the revolution 
in the 1791 Constitution it was stated that ‘[T]he law considers marriage only as a civil 
contract.’61 With that the State sustained a victory over the Church in the secularization and 
power over marital affairs. This represented a turning point in family law generally. Many 
family law institutions were introduced or improved in that period, such as: divorce, limitation 
on the impediments for conclusion of marriage (mainly regarding relatives within certain 
degrees) and the position of the child was improved.62 The influence of the French 
revolutionary legislation, despite the contra-revolutionary legislation introduced after the 
revolution (which again abolished divorce in 1816), was felt in the secularization of marriage 
in Belgium (1830), Italy (1865), and Germany (1875 and 1900). However, the introduction of 
divorce was far harder task which is evident because for example, the last country in Europe to 
introduce divorce was Malta in October 2011. Nevertheless, the understanding of marriage in 
a contractual manner provided for the countries to introduce divorce as a way for marriage to 
be terminated on the basis of the will of the spouses (as contracts can be ended on the will of 
the parties).63 But this understanding must be taken together with the second nature of marriage 
which was that the marriage represents an institution. Such an understanding which was present 
in the French revolution legislation and later in the Code Civil of Napoleon in 1804 provided 
for some restrictions for the spouses. The form for conclusion of the marriage, the conditions, 
the procedure, rights and obligations of spouses, divorce and other issues were under control 
of the State. The spouses (parties) could not absolutely freely carry out these issues. This meant 
that the marriage had a dual nature.64 
                                                 
59 ibid. 
60 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, (first published 1764) 
<https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/v/voltaire/dictionary/chapter318.html> accessed 05 December 2014, Point 318, 
§ I.  
61 Article 7 of the 1791 Constitution  
[L]a loi ne considère le mariage que comme contrat civil. Le Pouvoir législatif établira pour tous les habitants, 
sans distinction, le mode par lequel les naissances, mariages et décès seront constatés ; et il désignera les officiers 
publics qui en recevront et conserveront les actes. 
62 Мицковиќ, Д. (n 3) 142. 
63 ibid 145. 
64 ibid 147. 
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 Out of all of newly introduced characteristics that the transformation of the traditional 
family model to the modern family brought, the emancipation of the woman was one of the 
hardest aspects to achieve. The Code Civil didn’t treat the wife on the same level with the 
husband. Although the position was improved, nevertheless the understanding was that the 
women moves from the protection of her father to the protection that is provided by her 
husband. Women were treated as the weaker part of the family. For example, in Article 213 of 
the 1804 Code Civil the husband owes protection to the wife, while the wife owes obedience 
to the husband.65 Also, the wife was obliged to live with her husband, and to follow him 
wherever he may think was proper to dwell, while the husband was bound to receive her, and 
to furnish her with everything necessary for the purposes of life, according to his means and 
condition.66 Moreover, the wife wasn’t able plead in her own name, without the authority of 
her husband, even if she were a public trader, or non-communicant, or separate in property.67 
The wife according to the 1804 Code Civil was highly dependent on the husband, and had a 
secondary role in the family in most of the matrimonial aspects. For example, she could not 
freely compose a will without the authority of her husband.68 This role of the husband which 
was given according to the Code Civil of 1804, was not only towards the wife but also towards 
the children. The emancipation of the woman was acquired gradually, because Code Civil had 
an immense influence on other European codifications. The emancipation of women was an 
ongoing process which lasted until the middle of the twentieth century. 
 
 1.2. The ‘globalization’ and its influence on the family  
  
 The present time is largely influenced by the new methods through which we are 
collecting, processing and distributing information. These new methods are facilitated by the 
growing importance and capabilities of telecommunication and informatics, which are forming 
the basis of the economic, financial, trade, cultural, policy-making and communications 
                                                 
65Article 213 du Code civil:  
[L]e mari doit protection à sa femme, la femme doit obéissance à son mari. 
66 Article 214 du Code civil:  
[L]a femme est obligée d’habiter avec le mari, et de le suivre par-tout où il juge à propos de le résider: le mari est 
obligé de la recevoir; et de lui fournir tout ce qui est nécessaire pour les besoins de la vie, selon ses facultés et son 
état. 
67 Article 215 du Code civil:  
[L]a femme ne peut ester en jugement sans l’autorisation de son marin, quand même elle serait marchande 
publique, ou non commune, ou séparée de biens. 
68 Article 226 du Code civil:  
[L]a femme peut tester sans l'autorisation de son mari. 
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integration of the world known as ‘globalization’. In the recent past, globalization was often 
primarily focused on the economic side of world affairs, such as trade, foreign direct investment 
and international capital flows.  Most recently the term has been expanded to include a broader 
range of areas and activities such as culture, media, technology, and socio-cultural, political, 
and even biological factors, with the crucial example of climate change.69  Globalization 
influences greatly all social aspects and the family is not an exception. Its influence can be 
observed in the concept of family itself, which has been changing rapidly in quite a short 
amount of time and today is undergoing a structural redefinition. This occurrence strongly 
influences family law, although only recently has this area of law been regarded as traditional, 
because of its s complex interaction of religious, social and cultural characteristics.  
 Around these new tendencies in society the debate continues about whether we are now 
still in a modern society, or as many authors state (Drucker, Mills, Smith, Jenks) if we now find 
ourselves in a new era of cultural and social organization.70 In such a type of organization, the 
concept of individualism has a central role to play. The human is now living as an individual 
and not as a member of a family, profession or State.  Humans are not sacrificing their personal 
interests, desires and needs for others, the family, the state, the nation or the class. In a way, 
ideals have become narcissistic and as a result the relations between the people are becoming 
more demanding for individuals and their personal gain, which does not leave space for 
sacrifice and compromise that are the product when two persons are living together. Such an 
ideology is becoming a stepping stone and a fundamental reason for the weakening of marital 
and family relations in post-modern society.71 
 The transformation of the family from traditional to modern took place over centuries.72 
On the other hand because of the information overflow we are experiencing presently, this 
change in the family structure is occurring much faster now than in any preceding generation. 
The normative and cultural ideal of the family as a small isolated group, which is based on 
marriage concluded out of love and not a material interest and in which there is strict division 
between the roles of the husband and the wife and close emotional relations between all of the 
family members, was disrupted in the middle of the 1960’s.73 Before this period, in the middle 
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of the twentieth century, the nuclear family was in its golden age. As a result of the family 
disruption and social hardship that took place in the 1930s and 1940s, and due in part to the 
postwar economic boom, the 1950’s are described as a ‘golden age’ of marriage.74 The ideal 
of the monistic model of family was, in a short period, changed with the introduction of the 
pluralistic concept of family forms.75 Such a pluralistic family configuration was termed the 
‘post-modern family’.76 According to Shorter, the reasons for this transformation of the family 
can be found in three important changes in family life: 1. the increasing impact of the role that 
coevals have in the process of children’s socialization; 2. increasing marital instability; 3. a 
growing number of female employees.77 In the transformation from nuclear family to post-
modern family, these three distinct characteristics of the modern family model are increasingly 
showing themselves. Firstly, the decreasing of the socialization of children inside the family 
(internal characteristic) is manifested by the children rejection of the views, values and norms 
which their parents espouse and attempt to transfer to them. For example, the adolescents in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s were giving much more importance to exterior socialization and the 
increased role of peers and this is why these generations are known as the rebellious generation. 
Secondly, the increasing instability of the marriage was caused by many factors among which 
is the intensification of the sexual life. Lastly, this change was greatly influenced by the 
financial independence of woman in society and the increased number of female workers.78  
 This new understanding of the family model is not identical to the one given to the 
modern family model. The reason for that is that they differ in their natures. The modern family 
model has a monistic understanding, while the post-modern model consists of different family 
models (fluid, changeable, unstable and undefined).79 With this transformation, the 
understanding of the modern family as the ideal model for regulating the relationships between 
the spouses changes. In the contemporary society, marriage has substantially changed. The 
essence of such change is influenced by the functions that marriage now serves. These 
functions are today manifested as the increased need for providing emotional support, 
friendship, company, understanding and comfort.80 Such functions are different from previous 
models where the economic, protective and reproductive functions of the marriage had been 
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emphasized. With that change, the functions of the marriage for the first time in history 
primarily became individualistic and for purpose of satisfying the emotional and psychological 
needs of the spouses. In that way, marriage has become ‘individualized marriage’.81 In that 
context, more forms of marriages and more alternatives to it are acceptable. The aspects that 
people seek through marriage are changing in such a way that individual aims and individual 
rewards are primarily important and if the relationship does not provide them with these 
individualized rewards then this bond is much more easily severed than in the past in 
‘companionate marriage’.82 
 Another aspect of the decrease of the importance of marriage as an institution is that it 
fell in close connection with the sexual revolution that happened in the middle of the twentieth 
century. The sexual revolution had an effect of increased pre-marital sexual activities which 
changed the attitude, values and morals in western countries.83 This revolution affected men, 
but it more significantly affected women, who in the previous period had more submissive role. 
The separation of male and female spheres and the cult of female purity in the previous period 
created enormous emotional and sexual tensions between men and women.84 However, the 
acceptance of the woman as an equal partner brought an end to the dualistic sexual morality 
system, where it was socially accepted that men could engage in pre-marital and extra-marital 
relationships while all this was forbidden for the woman.85 Again, this emancipation was 
closely connected with the change in society because of the increased number of female 
employees and the financial independence that woman had gained during that period. 
 
 1.3. Divorce and the position of the child in course of proceedings 
 
 The described individualistic model of marriage, which dominates in most western 
countries today, provided for changes in the behavior of the marital partners, their expectations, 
as well as to the nature and functions of marriage. These changes disturbed one of the 
foundations of the modern family model; that is, the stability of marriage. Now instead of 
stability of the marriage as a foundation of the marriage, the quality of the marriage becomes 
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primary.86 The qualities which elevated marriage in the modern sense above all other personal 
and familial commitments (concentration of emotions, passion, personal identity and self-
validation in the couple relationship, attention, emotional attachments and obligations beyond 
the conjugal unit) - are the very same qualities that led to the rise of modern divorce.87 The 
same development that made good marriages so much more central to people’s happiness than 
in the past, becomes the reason for increased divorce in modern societies, that is, the 
nontraditional idea that marriage should be the most powerful commitment in people’s lives.88 
 The 1950’s are often described as ‘golden age’ of marriage. Nevertheless, in that period 
another particularly important trend was ongoing and that was the acceptance of divorce as a 
social phenomenon.89 Another aspect which contributed to the increased rate of divorce were 
the financial independence that woman were gaining by the increased number of female 
employees and the liberalization of social values. These factors (raising expectation for 
happiness and fulfillment in marriage, financial independence of women and more liberal 
social values) laid the ground for the number of divorces to increase significantly in the 1970s 
and 1980s.90 Another aspect that contributed to the increased divorce rate was that there were 
increased divorce factors, all of which were influencing the destabilization of the marriage. 
This divorce factors ranged from liberalization of the legislation regarding divorce, the 
socioeconomic status of the spouses, the nature of marriage (differences in religion, ethnicity, 
education, socio-economic status and other differences between the spouses), age and other 
factors.91     
 Regardless of what the reasons and factors are for divorce, one thing is for certain: 
divorce brings a certain turbulence, discomfort and hardship to children more than any other 
person in the family. The aspect of childhood, the protection of children, and the treatment of 
children as vulnerable entities was the product of the development of modern family model as 
the primary model of family structure. This model centers the family on the socialization of 
children in an environment which is responsive to their needs, empathetic with their emotions 
and strongly fulfills their basic desires, requirements and wishes with the goal of developing a 
healthy individual. Nevertheless, the postmodern society changes this positioning of children. 
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Instead of treating children as vulnerable dependent beings, in the postmodern society children 
are treated as independent, autonomous beings capable from an early age of taking care of 
themselves.92 Such a position changes the treatment of children as human beings dependent on 
their parents who have no understanding of their surroundings, to more wise and independent 
creators of their own destinies with the right to be active participants in their future. The 
consequence of this change in children’s status is that their parents’ goal is not to protect them 
from their surroundings and withhold information, but rather to prepare them for what awaits 
them. This means that they have the right to know the needs of the modern world (sexuality, 
violence, injustice, suffering, death) and to know how life is really like for their parents, as well 
as their weaknesses and their strengths.93 Education is one of the areas where this new position 
of the child is best shown. The educational process today is more demanding with more criteria 
and responsibilities required to fulfill the tasks and duties of school than their preceding 
educational system. Children are taught from early age on that better involvement in education 
puts them in a better position to enroll in better schools and with that comes higher chances to 
reach success. Compared to their predecessors’ childhoods, todays children’s childhoods are 
much more organized with school and extracurricular activities such as languages, sports, and 
private lessons. However, such a demanding education has real drawbacks. All of these 
activities take away children’s free time and decreases their childhood play. In that way parents 
are organizing every second of their time and this leaves less to spontaneity and development 
of their personality based on their choosing.94  
 If the divorce rates continue to follow current trends, one in four children will 
experience the divorce of their parents before they reach the age of 16.95 The two phenomena 
of frequency of divorce and transition of the family have a negative influence on development 
of children. Children who are going through a process of separation and divorce tend to have 
behavioral problems, problems in school, health problems, are more likely to experience 
friendship difficulties, suffer from low self-esteem, have problems with drugs and alcohol, and 
show other antisocial behavior.96 A comprehensive study conducted by Dowling and Gorell-
Barnes on children who are undergoing or underwent a process of separation or divorce has 
shown that:  
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 When  children maintain good relationships with both parents, the negative 
effects of divorce are mitigated;97 
 Continuing conflict between parents after divorce has a negative effect on 
children, mainly because it affects the quality of the parent – child 
relationship.98 
 Another finding of this study shows that there is an impact on children’s cognitive 
performance if the separation occurred before entry in school than on the cognitive 
performance school age children.99 If parents, who usually remain willing to be helpful towards 
their children in this period to help them overcome it, find the strength not to transfer to their 
children the conflict between them and their spouse, then the loss is mitigated much easily than 
if the opposite occurs. This fact gives good reason for the examining the balance the (ex) 
spouses and children and helping parents attend to their children’s needs. Also is necessary that 
parents accept and tolerate the sense of loss of the complete family felt by the children, even if 
they are certain it was the right decision for their family. Only if the children are allowed to 
mourn the family as it was can they begin to come to terms with the new situation and begin 
to adapt to it.100   
 What is particular in these cases is that this process of divorce can be seen from the 
children’s perspective from two aspects. First, the divorce of the parents can be experienced by 
the children as a transition that, on the one hand, brings relief from the ongoing quarreling and 
high level of tension. On the other hand, it is seen as a tremendous loss, particularly of the 
parent who leaves the family home. In addition there are many disruptions to the children’s 
daily life, which result from reorganization of the family during and after separation.101 In such 
a case children which wish to remain in a positive relationship with both parents are caught in 
loyalty binds and find themselves under pressure to reevaluate in their minds of the most basic 
relations with their loved ones: Can I continue to love both parents? Will I hurt one parent if I 
have a good time with the other? How much I can tell the other parent?102 Further, there is great 
impact on their emotional state from the disruption of their contact with the parent who left the 
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family home. This part-time seeing of the other parent creates a confusion for their adaptation, 
where these changes have created a concrete impact on their daily lives. The study has shown 
that most of the children find sharing of two homes to be stressful except for those children for 
whom arrangements were made so they could call and see their non-resident parent whenever 
they wished.103 Schools play important role in this context. This institution provides continuity 
at a time of change. Teachers can be particularly helpful in diminishing the stress and 
normalizing the situation, but only if parents provide them with relevant information, especially 
context with situations from the children’s daily lives. Their role is important also in 
diminishing the stress which children have due to fear that the other parent might ‘abandon’ 
them too, or when more mature children have problems at school because of the fear of 
abandonment.104 Lastly, perhaps the most disturbing characteristic of the child’s emotional 
state is when they are positioned to be intermediaries. Such a position creates a burden on 
children to negotiate with one parent on behalf of the other or to be the recipient of negative 
feelings towards the other parent. It is very important for parents to have direct communication 
in order to avoid placing their children in such a position. 105   
 This study has highlighted three important needs which children have during a period 
of divorce or separation. Firstly, there is the need of a coherent story. It is crucial for children 
to be helped to find an explanation for what has happened and for them to understand that their 
parents, although no longer able to live together, will remain interested and responsible for 
them. Having an explanation will help children move on from the idea that they were 
responsible for the breakup or that if they try hard enough they might bring the parents back 
together.106 Secondly, children have to maintain contact with both parents. In this context, the 
parents must be clear with the children that such situation does not represent the end of the 
parent-child relationship, but it may be a new beginning. The children need to understand when 
and how they will see the other parent and must be free of guilt if they have good time with the 
other parent. The child must understand that the husband-wife relationship may have ended but 
the parent-child relationship has not. Thirdly, children must express their feelings and views. 
This is particularly important in the context of overcoming and accepting the new situation and 
their feelings of anger, disappointment and sadness. Doing so will enable them to gain 
considerable relief and to move on.107 
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Chapter II General remarks regarding the recognition and 
enforcment 
2.1 Definition and nature of recognition and enforcement 
 
 The explanation of the legal mechanism for the implementation of judicial decisions 
emanating from one legal system which aim to produce an effect in another must start from the 
basic explanation of the general terms ‘recognition’, ‘enforcement’, ‘enforceability’, 
‘enforcement title (titre exécutoire)’, ‘finality’ and ‘foreign judgment’. 
 2.1.1. Recognition and/or enforcement of foreign judgments 
  
 Recognition and enforcement are not synonyms. Although they are very often closely 
connected, every foreign decision that is recognized is not necessarily suitable for later 
enforcement. So, first, a distinction must be drawn between recognition of a foreign judgment 
and its enforcement.  
 2.1.1.1 Recognition of foreign judgments 
  
 Recognition as a term can have different meanings. As a general term it can be defined 
as ‘act of accepting that something is true or important or that it exists’; ‘the act of accepting 
someone or something as having legal or official authority’ or ‘the act of knowing who or what 
someone or something is because of previous knowledge or experience’.108 In legal terms 
recognition is determined as ‘acknowledgment of the existence, validity or legality of 
something’.109 However a distinction between acknowledgment and recognition must be made. 
Acknowledgment generally applies to the external admission of a fact, whereas recognition 
refers to the internal aspects. Meriam-Webster dictionary defines acknowledgment as ‘a 
persons expressed recognition to something, or a declaration or an avowal of one’s act or of a 
fact to give it legal validity’110 while recognition belongs to the receiving end, it means 
‘accepting or recognizing something’.111  
 In the context of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, one group of 
authors determine recognition as ‘accepting the determination of the rights and the obligations 
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made by the court of origin’.112 They highlight the external effect of the recognition, which 
are the legal processes that were conducted in the country of origin. Doctrinally, they incline 
towards the understanding which emphasizes the private law aspects of the recognition, found 
mainly in the doctrine of obligation.113 For some of them the recognition refers to the res 
judicata effect of the foreign judgment which spreads out into the country of reception.114 Other 
groups of authors115  concentrate on the internal effect that recognition produces in the country 
where the recognition is sought that is the balancing of foreign and domestic judicial decisions. 
In their view, recognition means equalization of the foreign judicial decision in its effect with 
the domestic ones116 or accepting its finality.117 These authors mainly focus on the prerogatives 
that the country of recognition possess.  
 Nevertheless, to achieve complete understanding of the recognition of foreign judicial 
decisions one must not undermine two factors: the public law and private law aspects of the 
recognition. Indeed, the recognition of a foreign judicial decision is initiated and concerns 
rights of particular persons that need to have an effect in another country. Such a decision 
cannot have proprio vigore effect in another country. Some of the conditions for the recognition 
(right of a defense) are positioned so the country of recognition can determine whether the right 
of that particular individual was protected in the original process that lead to the rendering of 
that decision. However, it is without doubt that the recognition does solely not represent 
protection of an individual’s rights. The conditions for recognition (such as public policy and 
reciprocity), go beyond the protection of the individual’s rights and are focused on the 
protection of the public law interests of the country of recognition. Even if the individual’s 
rights were protected in the country of origin, the court of recognition would still not allow for 
that decision to produce effects if for example the effects of that decision would be contrary to 
its public policy or if reciprocity does not exist between these countries. Having these principles 
in mind,  recognition contains both aspects: its goal is to accept the determined rights and 
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obligations made by the court of origin and the res judicata effect which the foreign decision 
possess and with that on the basis of the principle ne bis in idem to spare the individuals from 
having to reinstitute the proceedings,118 but also it prioritizes the protection (provided by the 
conditions for recognition) of its public law interests in the process of the equalization of the 
foreign judicial decisions in its effects with the domestic ones.  
 Regarding the nature of the decision on recognition, there is a clear standpoint among 
the scholars that the decision is of a declaratory nature.119 Nevertheless, there are some authors 
who state that this unambiguous position can be questioned and give a constitutive nature to 
the decision on recognition.120 For these authors, in situations when recognition is sought as a 
main question, the decision is of a constitutive nature because the binding force of the foreign 
decision is the permission by the court of recognition to allow the foreign decision to produce 
the effect in that country and therefore gives a constitutive character to the foreign decision. 
For them this is more accurate position of the nature of the decision on the recognition, because 
the declaratory nature of a decision provides for this decision to ‘exist’ and the goal of the 
declaratory decisions is to recognize the preexisting legal situation.  In their view, the argument 
for a constitutive nature was also proven by article 86(1) of the PIL act of 1982 where it was 
stated that the foreign decision produces an effect only if it is recognized by a Court of SFRY.  
For the Courts of SFRY, the legal effect of the foreign judgments prior to the recognition was 
not important, only after recognition was granted then the legal effects the judgment could be 
considered. On the other hand, for these authors it clear that the decision on recognition in the 
situations when it appears as a preliminary question cannot be constitutive decisions, 
nevertheless they appear to point to the constitutive effects to the declaratory decision.121 
 It is too far reaching to state that the foreign decision is non-existing and that the 
decision on recognition is of a constitutive character. The existence of the foreign judicial 
decision is provided by the court which rendered that decision. When a judgment is rendered 
this constitutes its existence. What is needed for this judgment to produce an effect in another 
country is that is accepted or recognized and with that to recognize the preexisting legal 
situation. The treatment of the foreign decision during the course of the procedure for the 
recognition is that the foreign decision is an existing one and that only certain procedural 
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defects are inspected (some minor substantive issues are inspected in light of the public policy 
exception). Most of the systems for the recognition of foreign decisions treat the foreign 
decision as a decision. Only the prima facie evidens system treats the foreign decision as a fact 
that needs to be proved and only in that context the decision for the recognition can have a 
constitutive effect. In all of the other systems the treatment of the foreign decision is that it is 
pre-existing and only some procedural deficiencies are tested. So if the foreign decision fulfils 
these requirements this decision is recognized and can have the same effects as the domestic 
decisions. In conclusion for this thesis the decisions on the recognition of the foreign decision 
will be considered to be of a declaratory nature.   
2.1.1.2 Enforcement of foreign judgments 
  
 Enforcement as a legal term can be understood in several ways. For example, it can be 
understood as a generic term that embraces all kinds and levels of legal implementation.122 
‘Enforcement of decisions in domestic legal order’ means a process by which a final judgment 
of a court is carried into effect, or it is a process by which the sentence of the law is put into 
force.123 The term ‘enforcement’ can have multiple meanings and it is necessary to draw the 
distinction between ‘domestic enforcement’ and ‘enforcement of foreign judgments’. 
Nevertheless, some overlapping is unavoidable. While ‘recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments’ examines the ideal insertion of foreign judgments into domestic legal orders and 
restrains or does not refer to the further implementation of such foreign judgments, the 
enforcement in the understanding from the domestic legal order, (which is conducted according 
to the lex fori of the country of enforcement) deals mainly with the material or technical 
execution of foreign judgments.124 In the words of the French Supreme Court enforcement 
represents ‘an act of material execution on the assets or of committal of persons’.125 
 Enforcement depends on the nature of the decisions. For some decisions, depending on 
their nature,126 it is enough that they are recognized in the country of recognition so they can 
have the effect that the judgment creditor desires.127 On the other hand, many decisions need 
to be enforced in the country of enforcement to bring some satisfaction to the judgment 
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creditor.128 So in that context, ‘enforcement’ can be understood as ensuring that the judgment-
debtor obeys the order of the court of origin.129 
 Some of the authors that belonged to or have emerged from the Yugoslavian legal 
doctrine, enforcement is defined as acceptance or recognition of the titre exécutoire 
(enforcement title)130 or the enforceability131 of the foreign judicial decision. Others such as 
Triva/Belajec/Dika have stated that the enforcement of foreign judicial decisions was 
determined and conducted on the basis of the foreign decision and that the court in the 
enforcement proceedings does not render any special decision on recognition or decision 
recognizing its enforceability, but directly determines the enforcement on the same basis as 
domestic decisions.132  
 Therefore, all of these legal institutes must be understood in accordance with the 
functions that they perform. Firstly, it is without doubt that in all of the legal systems in which 
the enforcement agents of the country of enforcement cannot directly be confronted with 
foreign judgments (these judgments cannot have proprio vigore effect), the court must firstly 
declare that the judgments are enforceable in the respective state.133 That is why the foreign 
decision must undergo the process of ‘recognition and enforcement’ to produce the desired 
effect in the country of recognition/enforcement. Recognition of the foreign judicial decision 
can be done as a main question or as a preliminary (prejudicial) question.134 Usually to 
produce the full effect of the recognition and enforcement of the foreign decisions in general, 
it will be raised as a main question. The next steps would depend on the nature of the foreign 
judgment. If the foreign decisions are of a declaratory or constitutive nature they are not 
undergoing the process of enforcement.135 However, the recognition of a foreign condemnatory 
decision is usually sought to be enforced later.136 Therefore recognition of foreign judgments 
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can mean two things: recognition of foreign judicial decision which would not contain 
recognition of its enforceability, that is, where the recognition is not reported in function of 
the later enforcement; or recognition of (condemnatory) foreign judgments which would 
contain recognition of their enforceability with emphasis on the recognition of the 
enforceability.137 In both situations the effect of the recognition is the same and the decision 
on the recognition has an erga omnes effect.138  
 On the other hand, the recognition of the foreign judgment as a preliminary 
(prejudicial) question can occur in all types of procedures (contentious, non-contentious or 
enforcement), but more frequently it will be conducted in enforcement procedures regarding 
an application for enforcement where the foreign judgment (which didn’t undergo the 
procedure for recognition) represents the enforcement title (titre exécutoire).139 In such 
situations what is different from the recognition as a main question is that when for the 
recognition of a foreign decision is decided as a main question then the decision is legally 
binding for all other authorities.140 In the situations when the recognition is decided as an 
incidental question, then this decision has effect only for that particular proceeding and the 
parties can subsequently apply for recognition as a main question.141 
   
2.1.2. Types of decisions suitable for recognition and enforcement 
  
 Different types of decisions according to the EU and national legal sources are 
recognized and enforced between Member States and between member states and other 
countries. For some of these decisions, it is undisputed that they will be recognized and/or 
enforced in most of the legal systems. Others are debated on whether they are suitable for 
recognition and enforcement. Their future generally depends on the legal system of the country 
of recognition (or enforcement) recognizing the desired effect of the decision that it has in the 
country of origin and then enforcing it in the recognition country. This part of the thesis will 
firstly analyze the decisions that are undisputedly suitable for recognition and enforcement, 
and secondly, it will examine decisions that are disputed about whether they are suitable for 
recognition and enforcement.  
                                                 
137 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S. (n 116) 278. 
138 Varadi and others, (n 117) 565. 
139 ibid 566. 
140 ibid 565. 
141 Varadi and others, (n 117) 565; Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 116) 341. 
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 2.1.2.1 Foreign decisions which are suitable for recognition and enforcement 
 
 First of all, as was stated before,142 depending on the nature of the foreign decisions, 
for some  judgments it will be enough that they are recognized in the country of recognition in 
order for them to have the effect that the judgment creditor desires. On the other hand, many 
decisions will need to be enforced in the country of enforcement so they will bring some 
satisfaction to the judgment creditor, such as monetary judgments, the enforcement of awarded 
damages, or maintenance obligations. If the foreign decisions are of a declaratory or 
constitutive nature they do not undergo the process of enforcement.143 Examples include 
divorce decrees, contesting paternity and maternity, attribution, exercise, termination or 
restriction of parental responsibility, etc.144 However, if the decision is of a condemnatory 
nature, to produce the proper effect they need to be enforced in the later stages.145 
 Another term which requires particular attention regarding enforcement is the titre 
exécutoire (enforcement title). This term can be defined as an instrument that is capable of 
enforcement, such as a judgment, or the various types of instruments which permit enforcement 
by means of taxes, rates or rent.146 In the EU context an ‘enforceable title’ means any decision, 
judgment or order for payment issued by a court or other competent authority, including those 
that are provisionally enforceable, whether for immediate payment or payment by installments, 
which permits the creditor to have his claim against the debtor collected by means of forced 
execution.147  
 The types of decisions which can be enforced in other countries vary depending on 
several grounds. So, the main question is what kind of decisions can represent enforcement 
titles which can be enforced in other countries? Firstly, according to the authority which renders 
                                                 
142 Text to n 135 Part I, ch.II sec. 2.1.1.2 (21-22). 
143 Although some constitutive decisions would need to be registered in some civil status registry to produce legal 
effects, Živković M. and Stanivuković M., (n 135)388; Kiestra R.L., (n 118) 200. 
144 Živković M. and Stanivuković M. (n 135) 392; Kiestra R.L., (n 118) 200. 
145 However, sometimes only recognition of condemnatory decision may be sought, for example to have effect 
prejudicially, with its substantive validity, Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 116) 278; Kiestra R.L., 
(n 118) 200. 
146 Kennett A.W., Enforcement of Judgments in Europe, Oxford University Press, (2000), 63. However, what does 
represent ‘enforcement title’ depends on the legal system, for example in Slovenia in the Enforcement and 
Securing of Civil Claims Act (Zakon o izvršbi in zavarovanju, ZIZ, last amendment Uradni list RS, št. 54/15; the 
available at <http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO7089> accessed 12 April 2015) in Article 17 
as enforcement titles are given enforceable judicial decision or settlement made in court, enforceable notarial deed 
and other enforceable instruments. See also Macedonian Enforcement Act (last amendment 2013, Off. Gazz. of 
RM., No.187/13) contains more detailed enumeration of enforcement titles (in this context see also Article 13 of 
the Slovenian Enforcement and Securing of Civil Claims Act).  
147 Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late 
payment in commercial transactions (recast) [2011] OJ L 48/1. 
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these decisions, they can be categorized as judicial decisions (orders and judgments), 
settlements made in court, arbitral awards, and authentic instruments. According to the finality 
of the decision, they can be categorized as final judgments and provisional or protective 
measures. 
2.1.2.1.1 Judicial decisions and settlements made in court 
 
 Decisions rendered in contentious judicial proceedings that are final and based on the 
merit can be delivered as judgments and orders. Judgments represent a type of judicial 
decision by which the court decides on the grounds of the claim.148 They can be defined as 
court acts, by which at the end of the proceedings the court adjudicates on the main issue, which 
is subject to the proceedings.149  The order represents a type of decision which the court renders 
in a contentions procedure when it does not decide with a judgment150 or for all issues which 
are not envisaged to be decidable by judgment.151 In the non-contentious procedure, the court 
decides only with orders.152 
 In terms of recognition and enforcement, the term ‘foreign judgments’ must be 
understood in a broader sense, covering a range of judicial decisions that may be categorized 
separately in various legal orders.153 Also, this broader understanding of the term ‘judgment’ 
is provided in the Brussels Regulations.154 In this context, what is particularly important is the 
question for the applicable law for the categorization of the decision as a judicial decision. The 
dilemma is whether this question should be resolved according to the country of enforcement 
or the country of origin of the decision. In legal theory155 and in many of private international 
law acts,156 the categorization of the foreign decisions as foreign judgments is conducted 
                                                 
148 Јаневски А., Зороска Камиловска Т., Граѓанско процесно право – Парнично право, Скопје, (2009), 418 
149 ibid. 
150 ibid 439. 
151 Dika M., O rješenju u parničnom postupku, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Vol.33 No.1, 
(1991), 37 
152 Јаневски А., Зороска Камиловска Т., Граѓанско процесно право – Вонпарнично право, Скопје, (2010), 59. 
153 Kennett A.W, op.cit., pg.64;  
154 Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation  
[J]udgment means any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be 
called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as a decision on the determination of costs 
or expenses by an officer of the court’.  
Article 2(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation  
[T]he term ‘judgment' shall mean a divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, as well as a judgment relating 
to parental responsibility, pronounced by a court of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, 
including a decree, order or decision’. 
155 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 116) 282; Varadi and others, (n 1170 543; Živković M. and 
Stanivuković M., (n 135) 391; Jakšić A., (n 116) 209. 
156 See article 94 of the Slovenian PILP act, article 99 of the Macedonian PIL act, Article 182 of the Serbian draft 
of the PIL act. The Belgian PIL act contains definition of the term judgment which means ‘…any decision rendered 
by an authority exercising judicial power’ (Article 22(3)). In other legal sources (Bulgarian, Swiss) the 
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according to the country of origin of the decision. The country of origin is usually understood 
as the country where the judgment has been issued,157 the judgment has been given, the court 
settlement has been approved or concluded, or the authentic instrument has been formally 
drawn up or registered.158 Usually this place will correspond with the territory where the 
judgment has been rendered, however some exceptions exist.159 
 A settlement of a dispute between the parties can also constitute an enforceable title in 
all of the jurisdiction of the Member states of the EU160 and in other candidate countries of the 
EU161 if the settlements are at least registered with the court or witnessed by it.162 Court 
settlements are enforceable under the EU Regulations.163 Under these EU instruments court 
settlements are defined as:  
[A] settlement which has been approved by a court of a Member State or concluded before a court of a 
Member State in the course of proceedings.164  
 Court settlements are recognized and enforced differently depending on the instrument 
which is applicable for that specific subject matter. Accordingly it is provided that court 
settlements are recognized and declared enforceable under the same conditions as judgments165 
or as authentic instruments.166  In the EU, the recognition of court settlements on the basis of 
the Brussels I Regulation operated automatically; the only permissible objection to recognition 
was a manifest violation of public policy.167 This automatic position is reaffirmed in the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.168 
 As an example regarding the nature of court settlements, in the context of the Brussels 
                                                 
categorization of the court settlements as judgments is given according to the country of origin (Article 30 of the 
Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law and Article 122 of the Bulgarian PIL Act). It can be concluded per 
analogiam that also other decisions should be categorized as judgments according to the country of origin.  
157 Article 2(5) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
158 Article 2(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. See also Varadi and others, (n 117) 543; Dika M. and Knežević G. 
and Stojanović S., (n 116) 282. 
159 For example decisions rendered by diplomatic or consular authorities in territory other than which they are 
representing. See Varadi and others, (n 117) 543; Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 116) 282. 
160 Hess B. and Pfeifer T. and Schlosser P., Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member 
States (Study JLS/C4/2005/03) (2007), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf> accessed 11 October 2014,  
276 
161 See Article 99(2) of the Macedonian PIL act; Article 141 (2) of the Montenegrin PIL act; Article 182 (3) of the 
Serbian draft PIL act. 
162 Kennett A.W, (n 146) 64; Varadi and others, (n 117) 544; Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 116) 
283. 
163 Article 59 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 48 of the Maintenance Regulation, etc. 
164 Article 2(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. See the similar definition in article 2(2) of the Maintenance 
Regulation. 
165 Article 46 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
166 Article 59 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
167 Hess B. and Pfeifer T. and Schlosser P., (n 160) 276. 
168 See Chapter IV, Articles 58-60 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
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Convention, the CJEU gave its opinion in the case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch169. In 
the view of the Court, court settlements cannot be treated as judgments and firstly, they are 
essentially contractual in that their terms depend first and foremost on the parties' intentions, 
they bring legal proceedings to an end, and they must be approved and registered by the 
court.170 Court settlements do not enjoy the authority of res judicata and as a consequence, 
consent judgments are not treated equally with court settlements and they are recognized and 
enforced according to the regular rules for recognition and enforcement.171 
 For national legislation, as was the case with the judgments, categorization of the 
decision as court settlement is conducted according to the country of origin. In some countries  
if the country of origin determines that the court settlement is final and enforceable, and  if the 
country of origin treats it like a judicial decision, only then can this decision be recognized and 
enforced in another country.172 If the country of origin does not treat the settlement as judicial 
decision, then the foreign settlement is not suitable for recognition.173 
  
 2.1.2.1.2 Arbitral awards 
 
 Foreign arbitral awards cannot have direct effects in another country and, similar to the 
case with foreign judicial decisions, they need to undergo the process of exequatur. However, 
their position is different and has, in fact, been made easier on a global scale because of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards from 1958. This 
convention, also known as the ‘New York Arbitration Convention’ or the ‘New York 
Convention,’ has been ratified by 156 countries.174 The New York Convention is considered to 
be the most successful multilateral instrument in the area of international trade law 
agreements.175 This Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards and the referral by a court to arbitration.176 Such worldwide enforceability of awards is 
considered one of the primary advantages of arbitration.177 The rate of enforcement is between 
                                                 
169 Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch ECR [1994] ECR I-2237 
170 Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch ECR [1994] ECR I-2237 paras 18, 23 and 24. 
171 Hess B. and Pfeifer T. and Schlosser P., (n 160) 276. 
172 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 116) 283. 
173 Varadi and others, (n 117) 544. 
174 For comparative aspects of the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards see, Lew D.M.J and 
Mistelis A.L. and Kröll M.S., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 
(2003), pg.687-730. 
175 ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation to the 1958 New York Convention, (2011), 5. 
176 For more on the recognition and enforcement of foreign and domestic arbitral awards in Slovenia see, Galič 
A., Priznanje in izvršitev domačih in tujih arbitražnih odločb v Sloveniji, Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, LXXIII. 
letnik, (2013). 
177 Lew D.M.J and Mistelis A.L. and Kröll M.S, (n 174) 688. 
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95%-98% of the awards, and this is a result of the virtually universal policy of favoring 
enforcement of awards and the extensive acceptance of the New York Convention.178 Other  
international legal sources worth mentioning, that have helped create such a favorable 
environment for such a for arbitration in the legal system are the 1961 European Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006. 
 As was the case with judicial decisions, foreign arbitral awards can be recognized 
and/or enforced.179 This depends on their nature, purpose, and the national legal systems. For 
example, only recognition is sought when the court is asked to grant a remedy in respect to a 
dispute that has been the subject of previous arbitral proceedings (a dispute that has already 
been decided).180 On other hand, enforcement of a foreign arbitral award can be sought when 
the court is not only asked merely to recognize the legal force of the award, but also to ensure 
that is carried out, by using such legal sanctions as are available.181 Or as some authors 
illustratively explain: 
 [T]he purpose of recognition on its own is generally to act as a shield. Recognition is used to 
block any attempt to raise fresh proceedings issues that have already been decided in arbitration that gave 
rise to the award whose recognition is sought. By contrast, the purpose of enforcement is to act as a 
sword. Enforcement of an award means applying legal sanctions to compel the party against whom was 
made to carry it out.
182
 
 2.1.2.1.3 Authentic instruments 
 
 Authentic instruments are regarded as enforceable titles.183 Nevertheless, their position 
varies in different Countries. While court-approved settlements are known in all Member States 
of the EU, notarial deeds (and similar authentic instruments) are unknown in England, Wales 
and Ireland.184 Usually in national legislation the term ‘authentic instrument’ is defined and 
contains several common characteristics. For example, in France, 
 [A]n authentic instrument is one which has been received by public officers empowered to draw 
up such instruments at the place where the instrument was received and with the requisite formalities’.185  
                                                 
178 ibid. 
179 Redfern A. and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, Oxford University press, (2009), 627. 
180 ibid. 
181 ibid 628. 
182 ibid. 
183 France (Article L111-3, Code des procédures civiles d'exécution of 1 June 2012); Germany (§794 I(5), ZPO); 
Austria (§1(17) EO), etc. 
184 Hess B. and Pfeifer T. and Schlosser P., (n 160) 276. 
185 Article 1317 of the Civil Code (Code civil). 
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 In Germany authentic instruments are understood as:  
 ‘(1) Records and documents that have been prepared, in accordance with the requirements as to 
form, by a public authority within the scope of its official responsibilities, or by a person or entity vested 
with public trust within the sphere of business assigned to him or it (public records and documents), shall 
establish full proof, provided they have been executed regarding a declaration made before the public 
authority or the public official issuing the deed.  
 (2) Evidence proving that the transaction has been improperly recorded is admissible.186  
 In Article 244 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure the term ‘authentic instruments’ is 
defined as:  
 (1) Authentic instruments recorded in the prescribed form by public authorities instituted for 
this purpose or by other state authorities within the limits of their functions (competences) constitute 
proof of what they officially attest.  
 (2) The provision of paragraph 1 applies by analogy also to authentic instruments established 
by professional chambers, territorial organisations, cooperatives or other social organisations within the 
limits of the competences which have been entrusted to them by law within the public administration.  
 In Romania in Article 1171 of the 1864 Romanian Civil Code, an ‘authentic instrument’ 
is the act drawn up with the solemnities required by law by a civil servant in right of office in 
the place where the act was made. 
 Their common characteristics are:  
- The instrument has to be issued by a public authority or an official.  
- The authenticating authority or official has to be empowered to authenticate the type of 
act in question.  
- The authenticating authority or official has to act within its competence in issuing 
authentic instruments.  
- The authenticating authority or official must follow a specific authentication procedure.  
- It must also follow the relevant rules on the formalities for drawing up and issuing 
authentic instruments.  
- The resulting legal effect is that the authentic instrument provides conclusive proof of 
the content of the instrument.  
- Generally, obligations arising from authentic instruments are enforceable (in some 
States by operation of law; in other States if a specific submission to enforcement is 
contained in a declaration in the authentic instrument).187 
                                                 
186 § 415 (1) of the German Code on Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) (ZPO). 
187 Comparative Study on Authentic Instruments - National Provisions of Private Law, Circulation, Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement, Possible Legislative Initiative by the European Union (United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Poland, Romania, Sweden), (2008), pg. iv-v 
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 The meaning of ‘authentic instrument’ in the EU context was firstly determined in the 
in CJEU Case C- 260/97 [1999] ECR I-3715, Unibank A/S.  v Flemming G. Christensen where 
the Court took the view that: 
[S]ince the instruments covered by Article 50 of the Brussels Convention are enforced under exactly the 
same conditions as judgments, the authentic nature of such instruments must be established beyond 
dispute so that the court in the State in which enforcement is sought is in a position to rely on their 
authenticity. Since instruments drawn up between private parties are not inherently authentic, the 
involvement of a public authority or any other authority empowered for that purpose by the State of 
origin is needed in order to endow them with the character of authentic instruments.
188
  
  In this decision CJEU followed the directions given in the Jenard-Möller Report189 
regarding the conditions which had to be fulfilled by authentic instruments in order to be 
regarded as authentic within the meaning of Article 50 of the Lugano Convention. For that 
convention’s requirements, the report mentions three conditions, namely:  
 the authenticity of the instrument should have been established by a public 
authority;  
 this authenticity should relate to the content of the instrument and not only, for 
example, the signature;  
 the instrument has to be enforceable in itself in the State in which it originates.190  
 These views were taken into consideration in the Regulation creating the European 
enforcement order for uncontested claims, the new Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Maintenance 
Regulation and Succession Regulation. This regulation   contains all definitions based on these 
instructions. The Regulation creating the European enforcement order for uncontested claims 
provides that ‘authentic instruments’ are: (a) a document which has been formally drawn up or 
registered as an authentic instrument, and the authenticity of which: (i) relates to the signature 
and the content of the instrument; and (ii) has been established by a public authority or other 
authority empowered for that purpose by the Member State in which it originates; or b) an 
arrangement relating to maintenance obligations concluded with administrative authorities or 
authenticated by them.191 For the Brussels Ibis Regulation an ‘authentic instrument’ represents 
a document which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument in the 
                                                 
188 ibid para. 15. 
189 Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
done at Lugano on 16 September 1988 prepared by Jenard, P. and Moller, G. (OJ 1990 C 189, p. 57, hereinafter 
'the Jenard-Möller Report') 
190 ibid 80. 
191 Article 4(3) a) and b) of the Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims [2004] OJ L 143/15. 
30 
 
Member State of origin and the authenticity of which: (i) relates to the signature and the content 
of the instrument; and (ii) has been established by a public authority or other authority 
empowered for that purpose.192 A similar definition is given in the Succession Regulation but 
with a specification of the subject matter to cases of succession.193 The definition in the 
Maintenance Regulation contains two cases: (a) a document in matters relating to maintenance 
obligations which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument in the 
Member State of origin and the authenticity of which: (i) relates to the signature and the content 
of the instrument, and (ii) has been established by a public authority or other authority 
empowered for that purpose; or, (b) an arrangement relating to maintenance obligations 
concluded with administrative authorities of the Member State of origin or authenticated by 
them.194 
 2.1.2.1.4 Provisional or protective measures  
 
 Traditionally, two arguments have been given for the lack of recognition and 
enforcement of provisional or protective measures. The first argument was that these measures 
are not final, in the sense that they bring an end to the dispute between the parties, and second 
regarded the nature of the provisional or protective measures, which are directly linked with 
the means of enforcement. As such, they were considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the judicial authorities of the State where they were ordered.195 However in recent years this 
understanding has been shifting towards more liberal acceptance of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign provisional measures.196  
 It is undisputed that decisions which are final and are res judicata, and also which are 
suitable for recognition and enforcement, can be considered enforcement titles. There is no 
clear standpoint whether provisional or protective measures can have the same consideration. 
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On a national level there is debate whether the lack of finality of the provisional measures 
preclude them to be recognized and enforced as judgments.197 On the EU level as well there is 
no consensus on whether provisional measures can be recognized and enforced according to 
particular EU instruments, whether they should be recognized and enforced according to the 
national rules, or according to rules provided in international agreements.198 For example, 
Brussels I and now the Brussels Ibis Regulation have specifically provided for recognition and 
enforcement of provisional or protective measures which were ordered by a court having 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.199 In this context the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
doesn’t contain specific rules on the recognition of provisional measures, rather it was left to 
the CJEU to decide this issue. The CJEU has provided that provisional measures, which were 
rendered by court that assumed jurisdiction on the base of the jurisdictional rules from the 
regulation, are recognized and enforced on the basis of the rules in the regulation. They have 
also ensured that enforcement of provisional measures granted in accordance with article 20 of 
the Regulation is not conducted according to the rules in the Regulation.200  
 International instruments contain specific rules regarding the recognition and 
enforcement of protective measures. For example, judgments on protective measures for 
children or adults must be recognized under Art. 8 Convention Concerning the Powers of 
Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Infants 1961 (‘Protection 
of Minors Convention’), Arts. 23–28 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures 
for the Protection of Children 1996 (‘Child Protection Convention’), and Arts. 22–27 
Convention on the International Protection of Adults 1999 (‘Protection of Adults Convention’). 
Therefore, it is very important to briefly determine what provisional or protective measures 
represent, whether they represent titre exécutoire, and if they can be recognized and enforced 
on national and EU levels. 
 Provisional and protective measures can be found in every developed legal system. 
These measures have a different scope or different requirements in different legal systems and 
for their proper understanding it is necessary to consider the whole procedural system of the 
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country in which they originate.201 The common denominator for all of them is the function 
they preform: to secure the subsequent enforcement of judgments on the substance of a case 
(or their anticipated enforcement), organize factual situations or the parties’ rights pro tem, 
safeguard all interests affected pending settlements of the dispute,202 and provide measures for 
urgent cases.203 The measures can be categorized into three kinds of remedies: conservatory 
measures that are meant to secure the enforcement of the decision on the merits; regulatory 
measures that cover a wide range of measures that can be ordered to maintain the status quo or 
to give a provisional arrangement of some kind; and anticipatory measures, which can grant 
claims similar to those in principal proceedings, such as (interim) payments.204 
 Due to  the formation of the internal market and the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and persons, in legal terms it is vital that protective measures circulate freely within the 
territory of the EU because, according to the Brussels systems, they allow the judgment creditor 
to secure the debtor’s assets even before applying for a declaration of enforceability.205 In the 
context of the EU:  
[A] provisional measure is, self-evidently, one which is intended to produce its effects only for a limited 
period – until a certain event occurs or a certain period of time has elapsed.
206  
 Article 47 of the Brussels I Regulation was the first provision of European procedural 
law that fully implemented the principle of mutual recognition.207 Such a position is derived 
from the fact that the provisions in the Brussels I Regulation did not require any previous 
recognition of the foreign title meaning that this decision was recognized without any exequatur 
proceedings. However, this position of Article 47 of the Brussels I Regulation has often been 
neglected by the Member States.208 
 The Brussels Ibis Regulation maintained this position and further provided that the 
provisional measures, including protective measures, which are ordered by a court having 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, can freely circulate under the provisions of the 
Regulation.209 Even if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance 
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of the matter, application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional 
and protective measures as may be available under the law of that Member State.210 As for the 
question whether provisional or protective measures can be recognized and enforced between 
the Member States, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation has undoubtedly stated that: 
 [P]rovisional, including protective, measures ordered by a court or tribunal which by virtue of this 
Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter’ can be recognized and are included in the 
term ‘judgment’.  
 However, provisional, including protective, measures which are ordered by such a court 
or tribunal without the defendant being summoned to appear (unless the judgment containing 
the measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement) are not considered to be 
‘judgments’ according to the meaning that is provided in the Regulation regarding recognition 
and enforcement, i.e. they are not recognized and enforced under the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
provisions.211 
In the Brussels IIbis Regulation the position of the Courts regarding the enforcement of 
provisional measures is not so clear.212 The regulation itself does not refer to this question 
specifically, leaving to the interpretation of the CJEU the determination of whether the 
provisions of Articles 21 et seq. of the Brussels IIbis Regulation according to the Article 2(4) 
also apply to provisional measures in terms of Article 20, or only to decisions on the merits of 
a case. The frequent use of provisional measures provided several opportunities for the CJEU 
to precisely interpret Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. However the interpretations 
of the CJEU regarding provisional measures – including in Detiček,213 Purrucker I214 and 
Purrucker II215 – were considered as insufficiently exhaustive guidelines.216 
The CJEU in the Detiček case distinguished between provisional measures taken on the 
basis of Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and measures of a provisional character 
rendered by courts that have jurisdiction as to the substance of the case. Firstly it was 
                                                 
judgment containing the measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement. This should not preclude the 
recognition and enforcement of such measures under national law. Where provisional, including protective, 
measures are ordered by a court of a Member State not having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, the 
effect of such measures should be confined, under this Regulation, to the territory of that Member State (Recital 
33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). 
210 Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
211 Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
212 European Commission, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options for 
its amendment (Final Report Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 -Analytical annexes), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/bxl_iia_final_report_analtical_annexes.pdf> accessed 13 April 2016,  74 
213 Case C-403/09 PPU, Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193. 
214 Case C-256/09 Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez [2010] ECR I-07353. 
215 Case C-296/10 Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez [2010] ECR I-11163. 
216 Final Report Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 -Analytical annexes (n 212) 46. 
34 
 
considered that such application of the rule, which is an exception to the general rules of 
jurisdiction, can be carried out in exceptional circumstances.217 In the understanding of the 
CJEU, Article 20 enables  a court that does not have jurisdiction as to the substance of the case 
to take, exceptionally, where urgency so requires, a provisional measure or a protective 
measure in respect of assets or persons in its territorial jurisdiction.218 This distinguishes Article 
20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation from measures of provisional character rendered by courts 
that have jurisdiction as to the substance of the case. In such circumstances, these decisions are 
recognized and enforced in other Member States in the same way as any other judgment 
adopted on the same basis, in accordance with the rules for recognition and enforcement of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation.219 However, provisional measures adopted on the basis of national 
law in the circumstances provided in Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation are not 
recognized or enforced on the basis of the rules for recognition and enforcement provided in 
the Regulation. They are recognized on the basis of national law rules, bilateral and multilateral 
conventions.220 
 In Purrucker I the CJEU confirmed that the enforcement of provisional measures 
granted in accordance with Article 20 of the Regulation is not conducted according to the rules 
in the Regulation.221 The CJEU clarified in Purrucker II that the lis pendens rule is not 
applicable when the court first seized in matters of parental responsibility is seized only for the 
adoption of provisional measures and the court seized second for an action aiming at the same 
measures is the court of another Member State having jurisdiction on the substance of the 
matter.222 
 The CJEU takes this position having in mind the fact that the enforcement procedure is 
not governed by the Regulation, but by national law.223 In such situations it is of the essence 
that national authorities apply rules which secure efficient and speedy enforcement of decisions 
issued under the Regulation so as not to undermine its objectives.224 One of the objectives 
determined by the CJEU was that provisional measures cannot be used to defeat enforcement, 
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as was the situation is the Detiček case.225 With such situations the misuse of provisional 
measures increases and the gap widens between the Member States and potentially erodes the 
trust between them.226 Nevertheless, as much as the Practice Guide tries to give a detailed 
overview of rules of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and is a really helpful tool in the 
implementation of the regulation, it still it does not clarify Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. For this reason, some Member States tried to define specific guidelines regarding 
the conditions that must be met for provisional measures to be recognized and enforced by the 
regulation.227 For example the German Federal Court gave the following guidelines:  
(1) Should a court with jurisdiction as to the substance of a matter pursuant to Articles 8 et seq. Brussels 
IIa Regulation order provisional measures on parental responsibility, the recognition and enforcement of 
those measures in other Member States is governed by Articles 21 et seq. of the Regulation. Should a 
court, on the other hand, order provisional measures only on the basis of Article 20, then Articles 21 et 
seq. do not apply. In such a case, recognition and enforcement of the measures are governed by national 
law or by international conventions being in force in the Member State of enforcement. Should, finally, 
the requirements of Article 20 not have been fulfilled, a provisional measure falling into the material 
scope of Brussels IIa Regulation cannot be recognised and enforced in another Member State.  
(2) When differentiating whether provisional measures have been ordered by a court with jurisdiction as 
to the substance of the matter under Articles 8 et seq. Brussels IIa Regulation, the deciding factor is not 
whether the court ordering the provisional measures actually had such jurisdiction but whether the court 
had the intention to base its jurisdiction on Articles 8 et seq. (and not only on Article 20 in combination 
with national law).  
(3) Should a judgment ordering provisional measures not contain a clear foundation with regard to the 
jurisdiction of the court, and if jurisdiction is not self-evident from the judgment, it is to be assumed that 
the judgment has not been based on the jurisdiction rules of Articles 8 et seq. Brussels IIa Regulation 
(and cannot be recognised and enforced, therefore, according to Articles 21 et seq. of the Regulation in 
other Member States).228  
 These guidelines represent the most detailed explanation of the complex structure and 
relations between provisional measures and the recognition and enforcement of such decisions 
on the basis of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. Therefore other EU authorities are more than 
welcome to provide for such clarifications of provisional measures and their enforcement in 
relation to the Brussels IIbis Regulation.   
  
 2.1.2.2 Foreign decisions which are disputable for recognition and enforcement 
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 In legal theory229 and in the legal practice,230 there is debate on what foreign decisions 
are suitable for recognition and enforcement. Some of these debates are centered on the 
enforceability of some of the decisions that were mentioned before.231 Regarding the subject 
matter, there is consensus that only decisions in civil and commercial matters are suitable for 
recognition and enforcement. There is a limitation on the recognition of foreign decisions in 
criminal matters, in that only decisions on damages arising out of criminal proceedings can be 
recognized and enforced.232 Also, tax decision and orders qualify as administrative decisions 
and are not recognized and enforced.233 
 From the point of view of the authority which renders the decisions, it is accepted that 
judicial and arbitral decisions are recognized and enforced. However, some decisions of other 
authorities, which in the country of origin are equaled with court decisions, can be recognized 
and enforced abroad. For example, it is debated whether decisions of administrative authorities 
can be recognized and enforced.234 
 Another debated kind of decision which is ambiguous regarding recognition and 
enforcement is the interim decision.235 The debate is whether this type of decision has a 
substantive legal effect, that is, whether they are legally binding.236 Some authors237 state that 
interim decisions have substantive legal effects; that is, they are legally binding or suitable for 
recognition and enforcement. Other authors, however, argue that interim decisions lack this 
quality.238  
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2.2 Basic doctrines for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions 
 
 There are several theoretical approaches that attempt to determine the doctrinal 
foundations of the recognition and enforcement. The principle of territoriality and the rise of 
the sovereignty among the countries provided for the limitations of the authority of judgments 
to within State boundaries. Due to these facts, no foreign judicial decision could be executed 
proprio vigore in another country.239 In this respect the doctrines of state sovereignty and 
territoriality tried to lay the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of the reasons for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
 2.2.1 Doctrine of comity 
  
 The first attempt to breach this ‘sovereignty’ gap between countries was developed by 
the Dutch authors John Voet, Paul Voet and Urlich Huber. Their doctrine was founded on two 
principles: comity and reciprocity.240 The starting point of Huber’s maxims, given in a chapter 
of  his work ‘Praelectiones Iuris Civilis’ entitled ‘De conflictu legum diversarum in diversis 
imperiis’241 is that all laws are territorial and have no force or effect of proprio vigore beyond 
the limits of the enacting state, but bind all persons within the territory. Following these two 
maxims Huber gives his third maxim which indicated that the ‘sovereign’ of a state may ‘by 
way of comity’ recognize rights acquired under the laws of another state.242 He was the first to 
introduce the notion that the recognition in each state of so called foreign-created rights was a 
mere concession that the state made on grounds of convenience and utility, and not as the result 
of binding obligation or duty.243 What convenience and the tacit consent of nations might 
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prescribe was evidently a question for the courts, and so the term ‘comity’ came soon to be 
understood as judicial comity.244  
 The teachings of Huber were accepted in England245 and in the United States. For 
example, it was held that English courts are bound to give effect to foreign judgments under 
the rules of the law of nations or of international comity.246 In the United States the principle 
of comity was defined by the US Supreme Court in the case Hilton v Guyotas follows: 
 [N]o law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority 
is derived. The extent of which the law of one nation... shall be allowed to operate within the dominion 
of another nation, depends upon... the ‘comity of nations’... ‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a 
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But 
it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial 
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
247
 
The other principle of reciprocity is founded on the idea that States will and should grant 
others recognition of judicial decisions only if, and to the extent that, their own decisions would 
be recognized.248 For example, Savigny believed that reciprocity would tend to unify conflict 
of laws rules. The idea which underlies reciprocity is to appeal to the self-interest of the foreign 
legislatures or courts in order to induce them to change a policy which is considered 
undesirable.249 
Both of these principles are not founded on duty but on prudence and politeness.250 The 
weak aspect of the doctrine of comity is that it does not explain anything and leads to the 
inadequate rule of reciprocity as a condition of recognition of foreign judgments.251 This 
doctrine was vigorously criticized for its uncertainty, vagueness, and difficulty of application 
by Bustamante252 and Dicey.253 Although the fight to modernize and improve the doctrine of 
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comity has generally been abandoned, there have been attempts by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, proposing more modern and more clearly defined concept of comity expressed through 
‘justice, necessity and convenience’.254  
 
 2.2.2 Doctrine of obligation 
 
Another theory, present in the common law countries, which supplanted the ‘doctrine of 
comity’ is the ‘doctrine of obligation’.255 This theory is based on the idea that the foreign 
judgment if made by a court of competent jurisdiction creates a contractual (or quasi-
contractual) obligation.256 In such legal relationships (contractual and quasi-contractual) if the 
foreign court has adjudicated a certain sum to be owed from one person to another, the liability 
to pay that sum becomes a legal obligation that may be enforced in another country with an 
action of debt.257 Therefore the judgments are recognized in order to do justice to the parties.258 
As it was stated in Schibsby v Westenholz: 
[T]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the 
defendant to pay the sum for which judgment is given, which the courts in this country are bound to 
enforce; and consequently that anything which negatives that duty, or forms a legal excuse for not 
performing it, is a defence to the action.
259
 
This theory, which is influential in the common law countries, represents the opposite of 
the ‘doctrine of comity’ (which focusses on the public relations between States) which 
emphasizes the private law relations between the parties.260 The disposal of the doctrine of 
comity in favor of the doctrine of obligation can be seen in Russell v. Smith261 where it was 
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held that the enforceability of a foreign money judgment follows from the legal character of 
the adjudicated obligation as a debt and is no longer subject to investigation on the merits. It 
is, therefore, irrelevant whether or not the foreign country in which the judgment was rendered 
grants reciprocal treatment to English judgments. The recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment takes place ex debito justiciae and reciprocity has nothing to do with it.262 The effect 
of this theory is that what is enforced is not the judgment itself, but the obligation it produces.263 
So because the liability to pay the sum becomes a legal obligation that may be enforced with 
an action of debt (in England), once the judgment is proved the burden lies on the defendant to 
show why he should not preform the obligation.264 
This doctrine has been criticized in two aspects. Firstly, it bases its explanation on the 
existence on a fictitious contract, and this does not justify the recognition of divorcee decrees 
and other judgments in rem.265 Secondly, it has been criticized in that it fails to reveal the policy 
considerations underlying the rules on recognition and enforcement and is more concerned with 
explaining in theoretical terms why we are recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments than 
with explaining in theoretical terms which foreign judgments should be recognized and 
enforced.266 
 2.2.3 Doctrine of acquired (vested) rights 
 
 This doctrine is based on the assumption that rights acquired in one country must be 
recognized and legally protected in others.267According to this theory, developed by Joseph 
Beale when opposing Joseph Story’s comity doctrine, is that the courts do not enforce the 
judgment itself, but the vested rights it creates.268 The main problem of this doctrine is that it 
presupposes a right as acquired, but still it does not address situations where the problem is 
whether or not the right is acquired.269 This theory lacks information about how and under what 
limitations foreign claims are to be recognized and enforced as vested rights.270 
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 The doctrine of acquired (vested) rights has been highly criticized both in England and 
in the United States.271 The basic disapproval theorists have regarding this theory is that it does 
not give any explanation for the fundamental principle for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.272At first glance, there are similarities between the doctrine of acquired 
rights and the doctrine of obligations, however the English authors have highlighted that the 
doctrine of acquired (vested) rights and the doctrine of obligations are different because the 
right which the foreign judgment creditor seeks to enforce in England is a right created by 
English law and not by foreign law. In England for example the proper determination of the 
jurisdiction is decided by the English rules and with that provides that the judgment must be 
valid according to the law of the enforcing state before any effect can be given to the 
judgment.273 So according to this, the court does not enforce the foreign vested right but creates 
a new right.274 In the United States in later stages this theory was completely undermined by 
later authors such as Currie and Brilmayer.275  
 2.2.4 Doctrine of res judicata 
 
 The doctrine of res judicata does not address the public law aspect of the recognition as 
is provided by the doctrine of comity or the private law duty as is provided by the doctrine of 
obligation; instead it goes further and reasons that the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments is derived from the res judicata principle. Res judicata requires that there be an end 
to litigation; that those who have contested an issue, here or abroad, be bound by the result of 
the trial, and that matters once tried will be considered forever settled between the parties.276 
Although at first glance this doctrine seems very consistent and logical, it fails to comply with 
one very important aspect of the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions: the public 
policy exception.277  
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2.3 Historical development of the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
decisions in Europe 
 
For centuries, European legal systems have attempted to refine their legal distinctions 
so as to account for the immense variations in real-life fact patterns.278 However, countries, 
kingdoms, principalities, and city-states have always been pragmatic in their approach to 
external affairs. Driven by this pragmatic component in their international relations, they have 
written and signed a number of international agreements among themselves in which there are 
examples that concern jurisdiction and composition of courts279 but also international 
agreements regarding enforcement of judgments.280  
Some of the first questions about foreign legal relations were questions about the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments281 and covered not only foreign trade issues 
but also the very important issues of divorce decrees and nullity of marriage.282 Historically, 
‘exequatur’ represented a way in which civil authority gave a certain power to an Papal Bull 
or other papal documents issued in the form of a decree or privilege (solemn or simple), and to 
some less elaborate ones issued in the form of a letter about a particular territory.283 Early in 
the era, before the emergence of the notion of national sovereignty firstly developed by the 
Dutch comity doctrine284 and the introduction of nationalism in private international law,285 
territoriality as a general problem in civil procedure was not a central issue. Countries had 
developed techniques such as letter of rogatory (requisitio) by which one court requested 
another to depose a witness or enforce a judgment.286 With the emergence of nationalism 
among the countries and the codification of the private law and procedure, the territorial effect 
and the limitations of this type of legislation was becoming evident. Such a strong influence 
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from the territoriality principle led to distancing from the pragmatic approaches regarding 
recognition and enforcement in the pre-nationalism era287 and towards the acceptance of the 
view that within its territory, a nation-state is free to determine whether to recognize foreign 
judgments, and if so, under what conditions.288 It was considered that ‘exequatur’ represented 
an exponent of national sovereignty and exercise of state power in the area of forced execution. 
Later, this application of the principle of comity in some countries was changed with the more 
drastic approach of non-recognition of foreign judicial decisions unless obligation arising out 
of an international treaty exists.289 
With such a situation in Europe, together with the exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction 
existing in the Civil Codifications,290 cross-border recognition of foreign decisions drastically 
reduced and the danger of repeated litigation and conflicting decisions greatly increased. This 
circumstance lay the foundations for the development of transnational cooperation, first and 
foremost with the signing of bilateral international treaties.291 The later phase of the 
development of cross-border recognition saw the possibility of signing multilateral 
international treaties under the patronage of the newly-developed Hague Conference of Private 
International Law.292 Due to the work and the influence of this international organization, 
especially in the period after World War II, transitional cooperation achieved significant 
improvement. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions, once considered to 
be in the exclusive power of the states, now is becoming much more unified and increasingly 
influenced by the developments of the European Union.293 Also, the role of the ECHR and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR plays a significant role in this context.294 
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are void under the law of rendition state or if violated the ius gentium vel natural. Another author observed that in 




290 Article 14 of Code Civil. 
291 The agreements between France and Sadrinia (1760) renegotiated with Italy in 1860, France and Switzerland 
(1828, renegotiated 1869), France and the Grand Duchy of Baden (1846), Spain and Italy (1831), Italy and Serbia 
(1880), Spain and Switzerland (1898), France and Belgium (1899, Austria-Hungary and Serbia 1881. 
Baumgartner, S. P., (n 280) 54. 
292 On the development of the Hague Conference see, Droz G., A Comment On The Role Of the Hague Conference 
On Private International Law, Law and Contemporary Problems, (1994); Lipstein K., One Hundred Years of 
Hague Conferences on Private International Law, International and Comparative Law Quaterly, (1993), pg.553-
649; Van Loon J.H.A., ‘The Hague Conference on Private International Law: An Introduction’ in Peter J. van 
Krieken, David McKay (eds.) The Hague: Legal Capital of the World (TMC Asser Press 2005) 520 
293 Text to n 450 Part II ch V sec 5.1. 
294 Text to n 1015 Part II ch V sec 5.2. 
44 
 
2.4 Systems of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments  
2.4.1 General 
 
 For the party who was not satisfied in the country where the decision was rendered i.e. 
the country of origin of the judicial decision, one question stands: whether this judgment is 
enforceable in another country for example in the place where the defendant is found or where 
some of his property is situated. In such situations the principle of territorial sovereignty of the 
countries does not allow for the foreign judicial decisions to have proprio vigore effect in 
another country.295 Because of that, the permission for enforcement (exequatur) is regarded as 
a natural prerequisite for the enforcement of judgments emanating from the courts of another 
country.296  
 Historically and comparatively there were different approaches and solutions regarding 
the integration of foreign legal acts in domestic legal systems. On the basis of these different 
solutions, legal theorists tried to create criteria for their categorization.297 Wolff divided the 
enforcement systems into two groups: The first group of systems is the German and English 
group, where the foreign judgment which fulfills the conditions for recognition can be enforced 
if the admissibility of execution has been pronounced by an ‘executive judgment’ of the Courts 
(German). The English is prima facie evidence system, where a foreign judgment which fulfils 
the conditions on which its recognition depends, that judgment only constitutes a good cause 
of action (the judgment to be enforced is not the foreign judgment itself but the judgment 
delivered upon it by English court)298 Finally, the second group was referring to the French 
system, where the French court is allowed before giving the exequatur to re-examine the case 
completely in order to make sure that both in fact and in law the judgment is satisfactory. Based 
on that examination, the Court has power not only to grant or refuse exequatur but also to alter 
the judgment by reducing the amount awarded (revision au fond).299 
 The early Yugoslavian doctrine had similar method of categorization of the systems of 
recognition and enforcement, basing it on the still- developing global doctrine regarding 
                                                 
295 Fawcett J and Carruthers J., (n 256) 514. 
296 Kramer, E.X., ‘Harmonisation of Civil Procedure: Interaction with Private International Law’ in Kramer, X.E., 
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297 Dika M., Knezevic G., Stojanovic S., (n 116) 276. 
298 In small number of cases English law had allowed direct enforcement of a foreign judgment without the 
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recognition and enforcement. Eisner provided for different systems in regard to the recognition 
vis a vis the enforcement. He differentiated between countries which observe recognition and 
enforcement as different processes and which make a distinction between the finality and the 
enforceability of the foreign judicial decision.300 As for the enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions, he categorized the countries into ones that did not provide for enforcement of foreign 
judicial decisions and did not give effect to the titre exécutoire (Sweden, Finland, Norway, 
Netherlands and USSR). The second category of countries generally did not provide for direct 
enforcement of the foreign decision, but referred the parties to a new process in the country of 
enforcement in which the foreign decision represented an important (prima facie) evidence 
(England) or them (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Austria, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia 
and others) for whom the decision represented the compulsory basis (actio ex judicato or actio 
judicati) of that new process (contrôle limite). The third group of countries (France, Turkey 
and Greece) were those which could conduct a revision of the merits (revision au fond).301  
Cigoj differentiated between systems which do not allow for recognition and enforcement at 
all and ones which enable recognition of foreign judicial decisions without any procedure being 
required.302 Also he made a distinction between systems which provide procedure for 
substantive (revision au fond) and formal revision.303 Regarding the course of proceedings of 
recognition and enforcement, he categorized the systems as ones which provide for actio 
iudicati, others which contain the delibazione type of procedure, and finally the system where 
the recognition can arise as an incidental question and system of registration.304   
 The later authors had a more defined and coordinated approach to the categorization. 
Pak created three systems for recognition and enforcement with subcategories.305 The first, 
which had restrictions regarding the intervention in the operative part of the judgment (limited 
and unlimited control); the second system where the foreign decision represents a solid 
evidence (prima facie); and the third system that does not recognize foreign judicial decision 
except when there is an international agreement.306 Dika/Knezević/Stojanović categorize the 
legal systems on two criteria: the method of inspection of the foreign decision and the form of 
incorporation into the domestic legal system. According to the first criteria, the authors divide 
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the legal systems as systems of revision au fond and systems of limited control. The system of 
revision au fond has a subcategory known as the system of limited control. Regarding the 
second criteria, these authors divide the legal systems into systems where foreign legal acts can 
have direct effects and systems where the incorporation of foreign legal acts can be provided 
only in form of domestic legal act.307 Zivković/Stanivuković have a similar approach to the 
categorization as Dika/Knezević/Stojanović but categorize the legal systems of recognition and 
enforcement only on the second criteria; that is, only on the method of incorporation of foreign 
legal acts.308 According to them, legal systems can be categorized into four groups: first, 
systems where the foreign decision creates legal effects in the domestic system from the 
moment when the domestic court recognizes it in special exequatur proceedings; second, 
systems where the foreign decision can have direct effect without a special procedure being 
necessary (if it fulfills the necessary domestic requirements) but for enforcement of foreign 
decisions it is necessary to have a recognition and enforcement procedure; third, mixed systems 
where exequatur proceedings are necessary, with the exception being foreign decisions 
concerning status of persons which do not require for enforcement; and fourthly, systems which 
refuse to recognize foreign decisions unless there is international agreement between the 
countries about the decisions in question.309 Varadi/Bordaš/Knežević/Pavić divide legal 
systems into five types of systems in terms of recognition and enforcement. The first is the 
system of limited control, the second the system of unlimited control, the third the system of 
revision au fond, the fourth  prima facie evidens system, and the fifth, systems which refuse to 
recognize foreign decisions unless there is international agreement between the countries about 
the decisions in question.310 Džunov divided the systems for recognition and enforcement into 
five categories: countries which do not recognize foreign judicial decisions, prima facie 
evidence systems, systems of limited control, systems of unlimited control, and systems of 
revision au fond. Also, he provides for a separate categorization of the systems regarding the 
course of proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions (simple 
exequatur procedure, delibazione procedure and prima facie evidence procedure).311 
Gavroska/Deskoski follow systematization developed by Džunov.312 
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 The differences in the categorization of the legal systems related to recognition and 
enforcement, and the categorization itself, are general and it must be said that there are systems 
which have modifications or solutions which do not fit in any of these categories. On the basis 
of the two criteria given by Dika/Knezević/Stojanović (the method of inspection of the foreign 
decision and the form of incorporation in the domestic legal system), five systems can be 
detected: the system of limited control of the foreign judgment (contrôle limite); the system of 
unlimited control of the foreign judgment; the system of revision of the foreign judgment 
(revision au fond); the prima facie evidence system; and finally systems that don’t recognize 
foreign judgments unless an international agreement exists.  
 
 2.4.2. The System of limited control of foreign judgment (contrôle limite) 
 
 The system of the limited control of foreign judgments is today the most common 
system found in most of the Central and South European countries.313 This system is based on 
self-restriction of the country of enforcement not to inspect the applied substantive law, but 
limits itself only to the inspection of the conditions provided in its legal acts. The country of 
enforcement can conduct an inspection of the formal requirements and the possible violations 
of the procedural rights of the person against whom the recognition and enforcement is 
sought.314 In limited situations the court can examine some substantive aspects mostly relating 
to violations of the public policy.315  
 Regarding the second criterion, incorporation in the domestic legal system, the country 
of enforcement can select only two possible outcomes: to recognize the foreign judgment as it 
is, or not to allow recognition.316 The court of enforcement cannot rectify, nullify, or return the 
foreign decision to the country of origin for reviewing and re-considering. This represents the 
second limitation of the court of enforcement.  
 2.4.3. The System of unlimited control of foreign judgments 
  
 The system of unlimited control of foreign judgments today is mostly abandoned.317 It 
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is very similar to the system of limited control regarding the second criterion (incorporation in 
the domestic legal system), however, the court of enforcement can carry out a more detailed 
examination of the factual situation and the law which was applied. The recognizing court is 
not limited only to the more formal (procedural) requirements for the recognition, but it can 
conduct a full-scale examination of the facts of the case and the applied substantive law. 
Nevertheless, this court is limited regarding the method of incorporation of the foreign 
decision: it can only incorporate the decision as a whole or it can refuse the recognition. 
 2.4.4. The System of revision of foreign judgments (revision au fond) 
 
 In the past, French courts, in exercising a pouvoir de revision (power of revision) not 
only did they examine the requirements for recognition and enforcement, but they also 
evaluated the merits of the foreign judgment and refused to grant an exequatur if, in their view, 
the foreign court decided the case incorrectly based either on the law or on the facts.318 The 
burden of proving that the judgment was wrong in the aspect of the merits was placed on the 
party seeking the exercise of this power.319 Regarding the second criterion, the French court 
were generally not permitted to modify the foreign decision, but only to grant or deny  the 
exequatur; however, they could reduce the amount or they could refuse exequatur for one 
separable provision of the judgment and could grant exequatur for the rest.320  
 For a long period of time, this system was abandoned in the realm of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in France regarding personal status, however it was 
present in aspect of money judgments. With the decision of the Cour de Cassation, in the 
Munzer case on 7 of January 1967, this system was totally abandoned in France.321 
Nevertheless, it continued to be present in Bolivia and in Belgium until the new PIL act was 
enacted in 2004.322 Today this system is non-existent.    
 2.4.5. The System of prima facie evidence  
 
 As was previously stated,323 in England a foreign judgment which fulfils the conditions 
on which its recognition depends only constitutes a good cause of action (the judgment to be 
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enforced is not the foreign judgment itself but the judgment delivered upon it by English 
court).324 These new proceedings are initiated by a new lawsuit (action rei iudicati). The 
consequences of this new proceeding are that the exception rei judicatae is ruled out, but the 
foreign decision represents a prima facie evidence in the new proceedings.325  
 2.4.6. The Systems that don’t recognize foreign judgments unless 
international agreement exists 
 
  Lastly, there are countries (like Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, 
Finland Russia and Sweden) which do not recognize or enforce foreign judicial decisions 
unless an international agreement (bilateral or multilateral) exists between the country of 
enforcement and the country of origin of the foreign judicial decision.326 However, in some of 
the countries (Sweden and Netherlands) this aspect is not absolute. In certain areas with special 
national legal acts, these countries provide for recognition and enforcement after the fulfillment 
of certain conditions.327  
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2.5. Legal Sources 
 Recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions in the EU is regulated by different 
legal sources. There are several types of rules that apply to the exequatur of a foreign judgment. 
If the party seeks recognition and enforcement of a judgment in an EU country and this 
judgment is rendered by a national court of another EU country, in this case the recognition 
and enforcement is regulated by EU rules. The most significant EU sources that refer to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are: 
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings;328  
 Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels 
I’);329  
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) № 1347/2000 (‘Brussels 
IIbis’);330  
 Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims;331  
 Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure;332  
 Regulation (EC) No. 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure;333  
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and co-operation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations(Maintenance Regulation);334  
 Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on 
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the creation of a European Certificate of Succession(Succession Regulation);335  
 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (Brussels Ibis).336  
 All of these EU mechanisms have their base in Article 65 of the EC Treaty as a tendency 
for the improvement of the internal market.  
 The other set of rules refer to the judgment that is rendered by courts of non-EU 
countries. The recognition and enforcement in these cases can be regulated either by 
international agreements or by national rules. There are large numbers of bilateral agreements 
that the EU countries have signed in which are contained rules regarding recognition and 
enforcement.337 Also there is a fair number of multilateral agreements regarding the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in family matters. The event with the most significant role in 
the harmonization of these rules is the Hague conference on private international law. Its most 
important conventions are:   
 Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the powers of authorities and the law 
applicable in respect of the protection of infants;  
 Hague Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal 
Separations;  
 Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
Relating to Maintenance Obligations;  
 Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity 
of Marriages;  
 Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption;  
 Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect to Parental Responsibility and Measures for 
the Protection of Children;  
 Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults;  
 Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child 
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance with the Protocol to the Convention 
from 2007.
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Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation  
  
 In recent years, the private international law of the European Union has extended to 
legal relations that do not primarily concern economic aspects and the common market. There 
is increased regulation of cross-border family law relationships, a field that was traditionally 
resolved under national legal rules or by international agreements. Today in the EU this field 
is regulated not only by those legal sources mentioned above1 but also by a much broader group  
of rules that follow the legal, regulatory and administrative developments in the EU. That has 
created a complex system of national, international and regional legal sources that can be 
applied in a single situation. In addition, there has been a great change in the structure of the 
family itself. Globalization today cannot be observed only as an economical phenomenon. It 
has a great influence on many other social aspects and the family is not an exception. Its 
influence can be observed in the concept of family itself, which has taken on a momentum and 
today is undergoing a redefinition of its structure. This is strongly influencing family law, 
although only recently has this area of law been regarded as traditional because its complex 
mix of religious, social and cultural characteristics. Such tendencies have a direct influence on 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
 This part of the dissertation will examine the current status of the recognition and 
enforcement of family law decisions in the European Union, especially the ones which are 
recognized and enforced according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation. It is very important here 
to emphasize that the purpose of the Regulation is not to unify the rules of substantive law and 
of procedure of the different Member States, nevertheless it is also important to note that the 
national rules and their application is restrained so they do not in any way impair the 
effectiveness of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.2  
 The fragmentation of the international law is particularly present in private international 
law of the EU. Certain family law relationships between the Member States are regulated with 
different legal sources. Some of them are on an EU level. Another are regulated with bilateral 
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and multilateral international agreements. Maintenance represents one of the border line issues 
that is debated if it represents family law issue or other civil law issue. Because traditionally 
maintenance issues were excluded from the scope of application of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation and was generally regulated by the Brussels I Regulation or as it is in present time 
with the Maintenance Regulation, this issues will not be addressed in the thesis.    
 For a more comprehensive understanding of the functioning of the whole Brussels IIbis 
system, this part will firstly analyze the scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, than the 
jurisdictional rules, thirdly the common provisions of the Regulation (ascertaining of the 
jurisdiction, lis pendens and provisional including protective measures). Fourthly, large part of 
this part is dedicated to the recognition and enforcement of the decisions in matrimonial matters 
and in matters regarding parental responsibility. Also, this part will cover the abolishment of 
the exequatur on certain decisions. Lastly, the position of the ECtHR regarding the child 
abduction cases and the relationship between the ECHR and the CFR of the EU in these cases 






Chapter I Scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
1.1 General 
  
 The Brussels IIbis Regulation is an EU instrument that regulates private international 
family law issues which were excluded from the Brussels I Regulation. Brussels IIbis 
Regulation covers two large areas of family law issues with cross-border dimensions: 
matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility. The scope of this Regulation is 
given in Article 1 where it is stated that Brussels IIbis Regulation applies in civil matters 
relating to:  
 divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment;3 
 the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental 
responsibility4  
 For more precise implementation the scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is narrowed 
and the following issues are excluded:  
 the establishment or contesting of a parent-child relationship;  
 decisions on adoption, measures preparatory to adoption or the annulment or 
revocation of adoption; the name and forenames of the child;  
 emancipation; maintenance obligations;  
 trusts or successions;  
 measures taken as a result of criminal offences committed  by children.5 
 The Brussels IIbis Regulation applies only to civil proceedings in matrimonial matters 
and parental responsibility issues. Regarding judicial proceedings, the application of Brussels 
IIbis Regulation is undisputable. Nevertheless, because of the great divergences in family law 
relations in the Member States of the European Union,6 the aspect of ‘civil proceedings’ must 
be interpreted broadly, meaning that the interpretation of ‘civil proceedings’ refers to the 
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inclusion and acceptance of other non-judicial proceedings.7 For the most part it includes 
administrative proceedings occurring in matrimonial matters8 and excludes private and 
religious proceedings, because these proceedings do not have the binding effect necessary in 
the civil law.9  
The other aspect of the regulation is that it is applicable in civil matters. The 
interpretation of this term must be given in ‘autonomous understanding’.10 This position in not 
something new11 and the CJEU has repeatedly held that, in order to ensure, as far as possible, 
that the rights and obligations which derive from the Brussels Convention for the Contracting 
States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, the terms of the provision 
should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States 
concerned. It was then concluded that: 
 [C]ivil and commercial matters’ must be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted 
by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Brussels Convention and, second, to the general 
principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems.12  
This view of the CJEU regarding the term ‘civil and commercial matters’ opens the 
possibility for the broadening of the term in its understanding to measures which, from the 
point of view of the legal system of a Member State, fall under public law.13 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation distinguishes between two types of family law cases- 
matrimonial (divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment) and parental responsibilities 
(attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility). The 
Regulation further gives a detailed list of parental responsibility issues that are referred to in 
Art.1 (2):  
(a) rights of custody and rights of access;  
(b) guardianship, curatorship and similar institutions;  
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(c) the designation and functions of any person or body having charge of the child's person 
or property, representing or assisting the child;  
(d) the placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care;  
(e) measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or 
disposal of the child's property.  
On the other hand, Article 1(3) of Brussels IIbis Regulation expressly excludes from its 
scope the establishment or contesting of a parent-child relationship, adoption, the name and 
forenames of the child, emancipation, maintenance obligations, trusts or successions, and 
measures taken as a result of criminal offences committed by children. 
 
1.1.1 The Material Scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation  
 1.1.1.1 Matrimonial matters covered by the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
Early, in the development of the European community it was observed that the proper 
formation of the internal market cannot be achieved without adequate legal protection, because 
the economic life of the Community can be met with disturbances and difficulties, unless 
recognition and enforcement is possible through various rights arising from the existence of a 
multiplicity of legal relationships.14 From this assumption, it was concluded that:  
[l]egal protection and in the end legal certainty in the common market are essentially dependent 
on the adoption of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement.15  
This has proven to be particularly important in family law matters because the 
achievement of the free movement of persons and increasingly frequent establishment of 
family links between individuals who are nationals and residents of different countries demand 
judicial responses, taking account of the various elements involved.16 
On the other hand, the European Union went beyond mere economic integration and 
has involved itself in a great number of matters that fuse different legal, social, lingual 
circumstances. One of these matters are family matters. From the beginning of the European 
integration process it was recognized that there are ‘extreme divergences’ between systems of 
law regarding family matters even when the European community consisted of 6 Member 
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states17 and these divergences had become even more apparent  in 1998 by the time  the EU 
consisted of 15 Member States.18 Today the European Union consists of 29 Member States. 
One possible approach is the unification of substantive family laws of the EU Member States. 
However, this approach is far-reaching. Some efforts have been attempted for the unification 
and harmonization of family law in Europe by the Commission on European Family Law 
(CEFL)19 but great discrepancies are still present between the countries in the aspect of family 
law. 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation applies to matrimonial matters. These matters per se 
relate to divorce, legal separation and marriage annulment, or as one commentary stated, about 
‘dissolution and weakening of the marital bond.’20 The provisions of the Regulation concerning 
matrimonial matters were taken over and remain practically unchanged from the Brussels II 
Regulation, which itself was based on the provisions of the Brussels II Convention.21 This 
position of the legal sources provides for continuity and relates the decisions and the literature 
devoted to the Convention and the Brussels II Regulation to the present Regulation regarding 
matrimonial matters. 
1.1.1.1.1 The term ‘marriage’  
 
The meaning of the term ‘marriage’ since the definition of ‘Lord Penzance’ in the case 
Hyde v. Hyde has considerably changed.22 Today its meaning is not easy to define because the 
meaning of the term ‘marriage’ is burdened by the recent developments or changes in the 
conceptual understanding of marriage with questions such as: the proper form of marriage, 
heterosexual/homosexual marriages, and registered partnerships.  
The Brussels IIbis Regulation is using the term ‘marriage’ assuming exclusion informal 
bonds and factual relationships.23 However if formless marriages24 are considered equal to 
marriage by the applicable national law, in such cases they can be taken into account. The term 
                                                 
17 Jenard Report, (n 14) 10. 
18 Borras Report (n 8) 29. 
19 For the work of CEFL visit their web site (www.ceflonline.net) 
20 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 57. 
21 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation [2015] 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/brussels_ii_practice_guide_en.pdf> accessed 12 June 2015, 9.  
22 [I] conceive that marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary 
union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others [L.R.] 1 P. & D. 130, March 20 1866.  
23 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 57. This refers to the factual 
relationships under article 12 of the Slovenian marriage and Family relationships act, (Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 69/2004 – abridged text) and the legal consequences of these stable relationships involving 
de facto cohabitation)  
24 For example, Islamic marriages.  
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‘marriage’ is to be interpreted autonomously25 as any other term in the Regulation.  
The two most controversial questions of the interpretation of the term ‘marriage’ are 
whether the Brussels IIbis Regulation covers registered partnerships and whether it applies to 
same -sex marriages.  
The answer to the question about whether the registered partnerships fall into the scope 
of Brussels IIbis Regulation cannot be found in the Regulation itself, because it does not 
provide a definition of the term ‘marriage’. The answer to this question also cannot be found 
in the Borras report because it does not provide an interpretation of the term ‘marriage’.26 This 
leaves space for argument on whether the drafters of the Regulation had only the traditional 
marital bond in mind, or if they wanted to incorporate the more modern forms of bonds between 
partners, such as registered partnerships. If we examine this problem through the historical 
method, we cannot say that the European legislators were unaware of this problem.27 In the 
Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in civil and commercial matters, the European legislators clearly emphasized the 
needs  for  future measures that had to be undertaken separately in ‘areas of family law covered 
by the Brussels II Regulation, and family situations arising through relationships other than 
marriage.’28 
The CJEU in a judgment from 31 may 2001 in the Case D. and the Kingdom of Sweden 
v. Council of the European Union29 undoubtedly drew the line between registered partnership 
and marriage and decided that registered partnership should be treated as being equivalent to 
                                                 
25 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9), 57 
26 As Borras refers to this question ‘…the reference is only to the ‘marital bond’ and the text [of the Regulation] 
deliberately refrains from specifying whether it is a traditional marriage or a homosexual union… There is 
deliberately no attempt to be more specific either in the text itself or in the Borras report.’ Borras A., 'From Brussels 
II to Brussels IIbis and Further' in Boele-Woelki K., Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and 
Application in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 2007) 9. 
27 Denmark was the first state to recognize a legal relationship for same-sex couples, establishing ‘registered 
partnerships’ in 1989 until 2012 when the law was replaced with the same-sex marriage act. The following 
countries and teritories in Europe followed such development: Iceland (1991; initially opposite-sex only, since 
2006 gender-neutral); Norway (1993-2009; same-sex only); Sweden (1995-2009; same-sex only); Iceland (1996-
2010; same-sex only); Greenland (1996; same-sex only); Netherlands (1998; gender-neutral); France (1999; 
gender-neutral); Belgium (2000; gender-neutral); Germany (2001; same-sex only); Finland (2002; same-sex 
only); Luxembourg (2004; gender-neutral); Andorra (2005; gender-neutral); United Kingdom (2005; same-sex 
only); Czech Republic (2006; same-sex only); Slovenia (2006; same-sex only); Switzerland (2007; same-sex 
only); Greece (2008; initially opposite-sex only, since 2015 gender-neutral); Hungary (2009; same-sex only); 
Austria (2010; same-sex only); Ireland (2011-2015; same-sex only); Isle of Man (2011;same-sex only); 
Liechtenstein (2011; same-sex only); Jersey (2012; same-sex only); Gibraltar (2014; gender-neutral); Malta (2014; 
gender-neutral) Croatia (2014; same-sex only); Andorra (2014; same-sex only); Cyprus (2015; gender-neutral); 
Estonia (2016; gender-neutral); Italy (2016; gender-neutral). 
28 Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil 
and commercial matters (OJ C 12 of 15 January 2001) 3 and 7. 




marriage. Within this decision, the CJEU firstly accepted that generally the term ‘marriage’ 
means a union between two persons of the opposite sex.30 Secondly, it recognized that there 
are increasing numbers of Member states that have introduced in their legal systems various 
statutory arrangements that grant legal recognition to various forms of unions between the 
partners of same or opposite sex and which have same or comparable certain effects both 
between the partners and as regard third parties.31 Then the CJEU concluded that the European 
community cannot interpret legal situations distinct from marriage in the same way as 
marriage, when these situations are treated differently even among the different Member 
States.32 In the outcome of the D. case the Commission accepted that Dutch ‘same-sex 
marriages’ fall within the concept of marriage as defined in the Stuff Regulation.33 This lead to 
a new Stuff Regulation34 which provides for the same treatment for all registered partnerships.35  
The situation with the same-sex marriages in the Brussels regime was slightly different. 
When Brussels II Convention and the Brussels II Regulation were drafted, same-sex marriages 
were unknown in the European Union. During the time of the drafting of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, same-sex marriages were generally a new legal phenomenon, only being known in 
the Netherlands, which had adopted a law allowing same-sex partners to conclude marriage.36 
Two years later Belgium was the second country in Europe in which same-sex partners could 
conclude marriage.37 Thereof, the European legislator was familiar with the developments in 
the Netherlands and in Belgium, however it did not include them in the Regulation and decided 
to preserve the traditional marriage concept as a basis of the aforementioned legal 
instruments.38 On the other hand, the concept of marriage in the Brussels IIbis Regulation has 
to be interpreted autonomously in a European context, not as it is understood in the national 
laws of the EU Member states. A broad interpretation of the inclusion of same-sex marriages 
in the term ‘marriage’ was given in the Stuff Regulation.39 However, Commissioner Vitorino 
                                                 
30 ibid para 34. 
31 ibid para 35. 
32 ibid para 36 and 37. 
33 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 64. 
34 Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending the Staff Regulations of officials of 
the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Communities 
[2004] OJ L 124/1. 
35 The privileges are only granted when the couple has no access to legal marriage in a Member State (Article 
1d(1) and Annex VII, art.1(2)(c) of the Stuff Regulation). 
36 Law of 21 December 2000, Staatsblad 1 January 2001. See Antokolskaia M. and Katharina Boele-Woelki, Dutch 
Family Law in the 21st Century: Trend-Setting and Straggling behind at the Same Time, vol 6.4 Electronic Journal 
of Comparative Law, (December 2002), <http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-5.html> accessed 27 June 2014. 
37 Law of 13 February 2003, Belgisch Staatsblad 28 February 2003. 
38 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 58. 
39 Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission regarding the Written Question P-32438/01 of Mrs 
Buitenweg (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (OJ C 93 E, 18/04/2002), 132. 
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in another answer to written question E-3261/01,40 drew a distinction between the interpretation 
of the term ‘marriage’ in the Stuff Regulation (which is based on substantive community law 
(art.1a41 of the Stuff Regulation and Art.9 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights)) 
and that of Brussels II which is a private international law instrument.42 Continuing his answer 
the Commissioner concluded that:  
[A]s regards the relations between ‘spouses’, its purpose is to establish rules on jurisdiction and 
to allow recognition in a Member State of a divorce, a separation or an annulment of marriage given in 
another Member State in accordance with the law which is applicable according to its private 
international law. Even if it cannot be excluded that the regulation applies to procedures concerning the 
divorce of a same sex couple, this does not translate into an obligation on the courts neither to pronounce 
or recognize the divorce nor to recognize the marriage.43  
To include same-sex marriages in the term ‘marriage’ assumes a wide consensus 
between the Member States of the EU regarding this question. Practically it will mean that non-
recognition on the basis of public policy would not be possible.44 Thirteen European countries45 
of which 11 Member States of the EU have recognized same sex marriages and twenty 
European countries legally recognize some form of civil union.46 Still, there are a significant 
differences between member states in this field.47 At present, it is better not to have a wide 
teleological interpretation and assimilation of registered partnerships and same sex marriages 
into the term ‘marriage’, and keep the conjugal character of this term in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. The situation regarding registered partnerships is much clearer and there is greater 
consensus that these relationships fall outside the scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.48 
However, adaptation to the factual situation will be necessary in near future, and the European 
legislature will need to adopt new instruments that will cover registered partnerships. 
Regarding the inclusion of same-sex marriages in the scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, it 
will have to wait until more countries of the European Union adopt it in their national legal 
                                                 
40 OJ C 28 E, 06/02/2003, p.2 
41 Present Article 1d. 
42 Answer given by Mr Vitorino on behalf of the Commission regarding the Written Question E-3261/01 of Mr 
Swibel (OJ C 28 E, 06/02/2003), 2. 
43 ibid. 
44 Boele-Woelki K., Gonzales Beilfuss C., 'The Impact and Application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in the 
Member States: Comparative Synthesis' Boele-Woelki K., Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact 
and Application in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 2007) 29. 
45 Belgium, Denmark, Finland (effective from 2017), France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
46 Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. 
47 Borras A., From Brussels II to Brussels II bis and Further, (n 26) 9. 
48 Curry-Summer I., All’s Well That Ends Registrated: The Substantive and Private International Law Aspects of 
the Non Martial Registrated Relationships in Europe, (Antwerp-Oxford: Insentia 2005) 428. 
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systems and with that create a common ground for understanding this new legal phenomenon 
in a European context.49 
1.1.1.1.2 Factual Relationships 
 
For more than 35 years the legal tradition in Republic of Slovenia has equalized 
marriage and cohabitation in martial and family relations. This favorable approach towards 
factual relationships dates from 1922 when Slovenia was part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
The oldest legal act giving a certain legal status to cohabitants was the Yugoslav Act of 
Insurance of Workers, which allowed the cohabitant of the deceased worker to gain material 
support, if she lived with him for at least one year in cohabitation and if a child was born to 
them in cohabitation.50 
Article 12 (1) of the Marriage and Family Law Relations Act of Slovenia (Zakon o 
zakonski zvezi in družinskih razmerjih)51 provides that:  
[A] durable living community of a man and a woman who have not concluded marriage shall 
have the same legal consequence for them under this Act as if they had concluded marriage, provided 
that there is no reason by which marriage between them would be invalid; in other fields such a 
community shall have legal consequences if the law determines so.52  
The legal consequences of cohabitants living in valid cohabitation is transferred to other 
fields of law such as: succession, tax law, social security, civil procedural law, criminal 
procedural law, insurance, etc.53 
The position of the cohabitants in other countries that have emerged from Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is more or less similar. Croatia which is now a Member 
State of the EU in its Family Act54 describes that the:  
[P]rovisions of this Law regulating the effects of cohabitation shall be applied to a relationship 
between an unmarried woman and unmarried man which lasts at least three years or less, under the 
condition that a child has been born during the period of cohabitation.55  
These factual relationships have certain family law legal effects regarding personal, 
                                                 
49 Pintens, W., Marriage and Partnership in the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Johan Erauw, Vesna Tomljenović, Paul 
Volken (eds) Liber Memorialis Petar Šarčević, (Sellier. European Law Publishers, 2006) 344. 
50 Workers Insurance Act of 1922, Sluzbene novinie (Official Gazette of the Kingdome of Yugoslavia) 117/1922  
For more see Drakšić M., Vanbračna zajednica, Naučna knjiga, Beograd, 117.  
51 Official Gazette SRS, no. 15/76 (Consolidated version with the amendments Official Gazette RS-MP, no. 69/04) 
52 See Article 12(1) of the Law on Marriage and Family Relations of Republic of Slovenia 
53 Kraljić S. 'Summary and analysis of the current laws regulating marital and quasi-marital relationships in 
Slovenia' in Lynn D. Wardle, A. Scott Loveless (eds) Marriage and Quasi-marital Relationships in Central and 
Eastern Europe, (BYU Academic Publishing, 2008) 102. 
54 Family Act of Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette of Republic of Croatia no.75/14. 
55 Article 11 paragraph 1 of Family Act of Republic of Croatia. 
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maintenance, and property matters and also have effects in other fields of law.56   
However, factual relationships do not fall into the scope of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, because they do not involve a change in legal status and they do not require a 
formal approval for their dissolution.57  
1.1.1.1.3 Divorce 
 
Divorce is now part of all legal systems of the Member States of the European Union.58 
In the time of the drafting of the Brussels I Convention, the differences between the legal 
systems of the Member States regarding the status and legal capacity of natural persons, 
especially regarding divorce, were so drastic that there was fear that the Convention would 
become ineffective because of the excessive use of public policy by the courts.59 Because of 
the complexity of the issue and the fact that they did not directly affect economic integration, 
they were excluded from the scope of the Brussels I Convention.60 
The problems of the recognition of cross-border marriages between Germany and 
France61 fueled the need in the European Community for an extension to the Brussels I 
Convention which would cover status matters.62 The solution to this problem was envisaged in 
a Brussels II Convention which would cover matrimonial and parental responsibility issues 
regarding jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments on the basis of the Brussels I 
Convention.63 The Brussels II Convention was formally adopted in May 1998.64 As the 
Convention of 28 May 1998 was not ratified before the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, 
its provisions were not applicable.65 The Amsterdam Treaty changed the legal basis for judicial 
                                                 
56 See also Vidic J., 'Legal Effects of Concubinages in Former Yugoslavian Republics (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia 
and Macedonia)' and Korać A., 'Pros and Cons: Family Policy and Legislative Dilemmas in Regulating De Facto 
Unions', in Lynn D. Wardle, A. Scott Loveless (eds) Marriage and Quasi-marital Relationships in Central and 
Eastern Europe, (BYU Academic Publishing, 2008) p.223-249   
57 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 59; Pintens W., (n49) 335, 338. 
58 Last Member State of the EU to introduce divorce in its legal system was Malta. It amended its Civil Code 
which introduced divorce legislation in Malta with effect as of the 1 October 2011 (Civil Code (Amendment) Act, 
Act No. XIV of 2011) 
59 Jenard Report (n 14) 10. 
60 Borras Report (n 8) 29. 
61 Cuniberti, G., The Liberalization of the French Law of Foreign Judgments, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly ICLQ, (2007) vol.56, 934. 
62 Status matters or legal capacity of natural persons were excluded out of the Brussels Convention (see Article 1 
of the Convention). 
63 Shúilleabháin, M., Cross-Border Divorce Law: Brussels II Bis, (Oxford University Press, 2010) 3. 
64 The Member States on 28-th of May 1998 signed the Brussels II Convention and the Protocol on its 
interpretation by the Court of Justice (Official Journal C 221 of 16.07.1998). Explanatory reports on the 
Convention and the Protocol were approved on the same day however the Convention was not ratified by the 
Member States, see Shúilleabháin, M.,(n 63) 3. 
65 Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission of the European Communities on the Proposal for a Council 
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cooperation in civil matters, which was incorporated into the EC Treaty (Article 65) and 
ultimately led to the Convention being converted into a Community instrument. 
The present Brussels IIbis Regulation applies to divorce judgments irrespective of their 
form or grounds.66 It is specifically stated in recital (8) of the Regulation67 that reasons for 
grounds are excluded from the Regulation. This recital also excludes from the scope of the 
Regulation property consequences of marriage and any other ancillary measures. This in the 
view of the Member States presents a problem because the divorce proceedings extend to 
relations such as: maintenance relations, ancillary measures, common domicile etc.68 All of 
these consequences of the dissolution or the weakening of the marital bond leads to the 
‘depecaģe’ or ‘splitting up’ of the issues related to them69 and are regulated by other EC 
instruments or international conventions, in absence of such instruments within national private 
international law. 
As was stated above, the Brussels IIbis Regulation is confined to relations which are 
related to the dissolution or weakening of the marriage bond. The decisions which are related 
to the dissolution or weakening of the marital bond are in general constitutive judgments.70 It 
is only applicable to positive judgments, that is to say those that do in fact grant a divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment.71  
1.1.1.1.4 Legal Separation 
 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation also applies to legal separation. This legal phenomenon 
is generally known to Member States72  that belong to the Romanic family of Law or where 
Catholicism and canon law have greater influences.73 Legal separation is not a divorce, but a 
                                                 
Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in 
matters of parental responsibility for joint children COM (1999) 220 final, 4. 
66 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 68. 
67 Recital (8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
'[j]udgments on divorce… should apply only to the dissolution of matrimonial ties and should not deal with issues 
such as the grounds for divorce, property consequences of the marriage or any other ancillary measures. 
68 Boele-Woelki K., Gonzales Beilfuss C., (n 44) 28. 
69 Borras A., From Brussels II to Brussels II bis and Further, (n 26) 9; Boele-Woelki K., Gonzales Beilfuss C., 
'The Impact and Application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in the Member States: Comparative Synthesis' (n 
44) 28; Anoveros B., 'The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Reguation in Spain' in Boele-Woelki K., 
Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and Application in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 
2007), 284 and McEleavy P.,'The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Reguation in United Kingdom' in 
Boele-Woelki K., Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and Application in the Member States 
(Antwerpen-Oxford, 2007) 311. 
70 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 65. 
71 Borras Report (n 8) 48. 
72 Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania and the 
United Kingdome. 
73 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 69. 
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‘weakening’ of the marital bound by a decision of a competent authority.74 Legal separation, 
unlike divorce, does not dissolve the marriage. The duty of support and the obligation of fidelity 
remain in most cases, but the duty of cohabitation is suspended. Legal separation exists in 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Lithuania, Poland and Malta.75 In the legal systems that have accepted this 
legal institution, it is possible to convert the separation into divorce.76 
1.1.1.1.5 Marriage annulment 
 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation is also applicable in situations of marriage annulment. 
Generally, marriage annulment is part of the legal systems of most of the Member States with 
Sweden and Finland being the only exceptions. Sweden77 and Finland78 have abolished 
marriage annulment and in these countries only divorce proceedings are available. However, 
their proceedings correspond to annulment proceedings in any other legal system. In such cases 
if a divorce proceeding is pending in Sweden and Finland on whatever ground, the court in 
another Member State will stay its proceedings under Article 19(1) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation (lis pendens rule) and will not be able to decide on a subsequent annulment claim. 
Also their annulment in the form of divorce will be recognized in another Member State. 79 
In Slovenia in its national legislation, void marriages are not predicted but all marriages 
with some kind of deficiency are treated as voidable, with a distinction being made between 
absolute voidability80  and relative voidability.81 It is provided that only action for divorce and 
                                                 
74 The consequence of such act is that the duties of the marriage are redefined, the obligation of the spouses to live 
together and to build marriage community ends etc. See Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 69. 
75 SEC (2005) 331 of 14.03.2005: Commission Staff Working Paper: Annex to Green Paper on applicable law and 
jurisdiction in divorce matters. 
76 See Article 5 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation  
77 Wermelin-Börjeson B., 'The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Sweden' in Boele-Woelki 
K., Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and Application in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 
2007) 298. 
78 Helin M., 'The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Finland' in Boele-Woelki K., Gonzalez-
Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and Application in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 2007) 92. 
79 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 70. 
80 For example, in Slovenia absolute conditions for nullity are: majority, if the spouses are under 15 years, if there 
is existing marriage, if the marriage is lacking of conjugal character, if the marriage was concluded without free 
consent, if the person or persons are mentally disturbed or legally incompetent, if the persons are closely related, 
if the marriage is concluded without the intention of the marital pair to live together or if it is concluded between 
adopter and adoptee. (Marriage and Family Relations Act, Part2 (2) and (4)). 
81 In Slovenia conditions for relative nullity are: Conclusion without free will, if one year has passed since the 
force or the error was recognized, and the couple have lived for this time (article 39 MFRA); majority, if the 
person is above 15 years (Articles 23 and 24 MFRA); relatives, if the center for social work allows it (Article 23 
and 24 MFRA).  
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action for annulment of the marriage can be initiated and therefore action for declaration of 
either existence or non-existence or nullity of marriage is not possible.82 Other Member States 
such as Slovakia distinguish between void and voidable marriages. 83   
In the Brussels IIbis Regulation there is no clear standpoint on whether the term 
annulment covers only voidable marriages or it can be applied to void marriages. Additionally 
it is debated whether declaratory judgments which are related to the marriage annulment fall 
under the scope of this Regulation, or as in the case of divorce only the constitutive judgments 
do.84 
The term ‘annulment’ as any other term in the regulation needs to be interpreted 
autonomously. In cases of marriage annulment the Brussels IIbis Regulation should cover void 
and voidable marriages.85 However, there is the problem of which type of decision to use (or 
even whether there is a need for a judgment at all) regarding void marriages. Because these 
marriages are considered nonexistent, they are ipso iure null and are not required for 
nullification. It is considered that a declaratory judgment can, at most determine the nullity or 
the validity of the marriage.86 This presents a problem because regarding the type of judgments, 
as stated in Article 2(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and in the Borras Report, the term 
judgment should refer only to constitutive judgments which create a new legal status.  From 
the standpoint of the national legal systems, this could be a problem, especially of those systems 
that distinguish between void and voidable marriages. Some of the circumstances which are 
considered to be grounds for void marriages in others states will represent grounds for voidable 
marriage. The exclusion of such matters from the scope of the Regulation would represent a 
potential conflict of application.87  
 
1.1.1.2 Parental responsibility issues covered with the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
The second aspect of civil matters covered by the scope of application of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation are issues that are related to parental responsibility. These issues include 
                                                 
82 Galič A., 'The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia' in Boele-Woelki K., 
Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and Application in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 
2007) 262. 
83 Matrimonium nullum and non matrimonium. See Hatapka M., 'The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation in Slovakia' in Boele-Woelki K., Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and Application 
in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 2007) 250. 
84 See Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 71. 
85 ibid 72. 
86 ibid 70. 
87 Hatapka M., The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovakia (n 83) 250. 
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attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction, or termination of parental responsibility.88  The 
term ‘parental responsibility’ is a term generally used in international instruments89 and is 
considered to have different meaning in the Member States90 but with a common core of 
meaning.91 
The United Nation Convention on Rights of the Child was the first international 
instrument which referred to the parents ‘responsibilities for the upbringing and development 
of the child.’92 This concept was used then as a basis for the substitution of the term 
‘relationship subjecting the infant to authority’ used in the Hague Convention of 5 October 
1961 concerning the powers of authorities and the law applicable in respect to  the protection 
of infants for  the term ‘parental responsibility’ in the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect to  
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children.93 Although by then it was 
a well-established term,94 the definition of ‘parental responsibility’ in the 1996 Hague Child 
Protection Convention would be important for the Brussels IIbis Regulation because it would 
be used as a basis for the definition provided in it. .95 
With Regulation 1347/2000 (Brussels II Regulation), the EU then transformed the 
Brussels Convention of 1998 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in matrimonial matters (the Brussels II Convention) according to the newly required 
competences as given under the Amsterdam Treaty. This Regulation applied to civil 
proceedings relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment96 and in civil 
                                                 
88 Article 1(1)(b) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
89 United Nations Convention on the rights of the child (Art.18 (1)); Hague Convention on the International 
protection of children 1996, European Convention on the exercise of children’s rights 1996, etc. 
90 Boele-Woelki K., Gonzales Beilfuss C., The Impact and Application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in the 
Member States: Comparative Synthesis (n 44) 31. 
91 The concept in all of the Member States encompasses care, protection, maintenance of the personal relationship, 
education, legal representation, the determination of child’s residence, and the administration of the child’s 
property. Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 73. 
92 Article 18(1) UN Rights of the child Convention. 
‘1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common 
responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, 
have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child 
will be their basic concern.’ 
93 Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention prepared by prof. Paul Lagarde, 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session (1996), tome II, Protection of children, 
<https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl34.pdf > accessed 20.05.2015 par.14, p.543. 
94 Article 26(1)(b) of the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption. 
95 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9), 73. Also for the relationship 
between the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention and the Brussels IIbis Regulation see text to n 122 Part II 
ch II sec 2.2. 
96 Article 1(a) Brussels II Regulation.  
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proceedings relating to parental responsibility for the children of both spouses on the occasion 
of the matrimonial proceedings but which were connected to divorce, legal separation or 
marriage annulment.97 In the Brussels II Regulation there were two limitations. Firstly the 
Brussels II Regulation took on parental responsibility issues only if they were in a close 
conjunction with divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment.98 The second limitation was 
that it applied only to the children of both spouses, thus excluding children of one of the 
spouses.99 
These limitations were the reason for the EU legislators to adopt the new Brussels IIbis 
Regulation only two years after the adoption of the Brussels II Regulation.100 The new 
Regulation now ensures equality of all children and applies to all decisions issued by a court 
of a Member State in matters of parental responsibility, regardless of whether the parents are 
or were married and whether the parties to the proceedings are or are not both biological parents 
of the child in question.101 Also the Regulation does not require a link between parental 
responsibility proceedings and matrimonial proceedings. In the context of the term ‘parental 
responsibility’ a definition is given on the basis of the definition provided in the 1996 Hague 
Convention.102 It then  enumerates a  list of matters qualified as ‘parental responsibility’ matters 
that are included and excluded from the scope of application, which generally correspond with 
Articles 3 and 4 of the 1996 Hague Convention.103  
The term ‘parental responsibility’ in the Brussels IIbis Regulation is elaborated on in 
more detail as being the opposite of the same term regarding matrimonial matters. It covers the 
attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction, or termination of parental responsibility. Its 
autonomous interpretation in the Regulation is reaffirmed in Article 2(7) where a definition is 
given stating that the term ‘parental responsibility’ means: 
 [a]ll rights and duties relating to the person or the property of a child which are given to a 
natural or legal person by judgment, by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect. The 
term also shall include rights of custody and rights of access.104  
The idea of the EU legislators was to clarify  the rights and duties included in the term, 
so it went even further specifying precisely: rights of custody and rights of access; 
                                                 
97 Article 1(b) Brussels II Regulation. 
98 See Article 3(3) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
99 See Recital 11 of Brussels IIbis Regulation 
100 See Recital (5) and (6) of Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
101 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 8. 
102 Article 1(2) of the Hague Convention 1996. 
103 Article 3 and 4 of the Hague Convention 1996. See also Borras A., From Brussels II to Brussels II bis and 
Further, (n 26) 10. 
104 Article 2(7) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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guardianship, curatorship and similar institutions; the designation and functions of any person 
or body having charge of the child's person or property, representing or assisting the child; the 
placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care; measures for the protection of 
the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of the child's property.105 This 
list of matters qualified as ‘parental responsibility’ is not exhaustive, but merely illustrative.106 
For example, Article 1(2) (d) provides that the placement of a child in a foster family or in 
institutional care is a civil matter which falls within the regulation’s scope of application,107 
but does not mention taking a child into care.108 However in the case C. it was ruled that taking 
a child into care and placement are decisions which relate to parental responsibility and that:  
[t]he exclusion of a decision to take a child into care from the scope of Regulation No 2201/2003 
would be likely to undermine the effectiveness of that regulation in Member States in which the 
protection of children, including their placement, requires the adoption of several decisions. Moreover 
since, in other Member States, such protection is afforded by means of a single decision, there is a risk 
that the equal treatment of the children concerned would be compromised.109 
All of these legal issues which are defined by Brussels IIbis Regulation are given an 
autonomous definition which is independent of the law of Member States. It follows from the 
need for uniform application of European Union law and from the principle of equality that the 
terms of a provision of that law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member 
States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an 
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union, having regard to the context of 
the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question.110  
From the material scope of the Regulation the legislators excluded: the establishment 
or contesting of a parent-child relationship; decisions on adoption, measures preparatory to 
adoption, or the annulment or revocation of adoption; the name and forenames of the child; 
                                                 
105 Article 1(2) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
106 Practice Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation, (updated version 2005) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/divorce/parental_resp_ec_vdm_en.pdf> accessed 22 March 2013, 8. This is also 
evident from the wording of Article 1(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, where it is stated ‘The matters referred 
to in paragraph 1(b) may, in particular, deal with…’ (Case C‑435/06, C. [2007] ECR I-10141 Opinion of AG 
Kokott delivered on 20 September 2007 para23). 
107 Case C-523/07, A., [2009] ECR I-02805, par. 24. 
108‘…taking children into care and placement are closely linked, so that in most legal systems they do not even 
constitute separate decisions. On its own, taking into care can be at most an interim measure. In general, however, 
it is a measure ancillary to the placement of a child in a foster family or an institution. Likewise, the placement of 
a child against the will of his parents can be carried out only if the authorities first take the child into care. Thus, 
significant practical difficulties would arise if the regulation’s scope of application included only placement and 
not taking into care.’ Case C‑435/06, C. [2007] ECR I-10141 Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 20 September 
2007, para 28. 
109 Case C‑435/06, C. [2007] ECR I-10141 para 36. 
110 Case C‑400/10 J.McB. v L.E. [2010] ECR I-08965, para 41 and the case-law cited. 
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emancipation; maintenance obligations; trusts or successions; and measures taken as a result 
of criminal offences committed by children.111 
 
1.1.2 Territorial Scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation  
The territorial scope of application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation generally 
corresponds with Article 52 TEU (ex Art.299 EC Treaty) and applies to every Member State of 
the European Union except Denmark. Denmark refrained from the communitarisation of the 
measures under Title V of Part III of the TFEU, Art.67 et seq. (ex Title IV of Part III of the EC 
Treaty, Arts 61 et seq.) The Regulation is therefore not applicable in Denmark.  
Regarding jurisdiction, the necessary territorial element linking the dispute and the 
forum is for the habitual residence of one of the spouses or of the child to be in found in one of 
the Member States.112 The territorial connecting factor regarding the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments is that the judgment is rendered by a court located in a Member State 
to which the Regulation extends.113 
 
1.1.3 Temporal scope of Brussels IIbis Regulation 
The temporal scope of Brussels IIbis Regulation is provided in article 64, in which a 
distinction is made between temporal applicability to jurisdictional issues114 and to the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments.115 In most of cases the temporal scope is limited in 
the aspect that it does not have retroactive effects.116 For the most of the EU Member States117 
the date when the regulation went into effect was 1 March 2005, as for Bulgaria and Romania 
this was 1 January 2007 and for Croatia it was 1 July 2013.118 
This principle of non-retroactivity is applied in the cases regarding legal proceedings 
instituted, to documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments, and to 
                                                 
111 Article 1(3) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
112 Articles 3 and 8 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. These jurisdictional are not exclusive, jurisdiction can be 
determined according to the nationality/domicile of both of the spouses (Article 3(1)(b)), choice of court 
agreement (Article 12(1)) or presence of the child (Art.13).  
113 Articles 21(1) and 28 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
114 Article 64(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
115 Articles 64(2) -(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
116 de Boer Th.M., What We Should Not Expect From a Recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR), Issue 1, (2015) 12. 
117 Except Denmark 
118 Jessel-Holst C., 'Dilemmas in application of EU international family law in most recent EU Member States' in 




agreements concluded between the parties119 after the date of application of the Regulation as 
provided in article 72.120 Regarding recognition and enforcement a more detailed and complex 
system is provided in Article 64(2)-(4). Also here the principle of non-retroactivity is applied 
with an exception given in Article 64(2) which extends the even more favorable rules on 
recognition and enforcement as implemented by the Regulation under specified circumstances 
to judgments given before the regulation entered into force.121 
  
                                                 
119 Article 64(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
120 Article 72 states: 
‘This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 August 2004. 
The Regulation shall apply from 1 March 2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which shall apply 
from 1 August 2004. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with 
the Treaty establishing the European Community.’ 
121 For more on the transitional provision system provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation see, Magnus U. and 
Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 434-445. 
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Chapter II The Relationship between the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
and the Hague Conventions 
 
One specific problem of the European Union is the correlation and coordination of legal 
sources that cover subjects that can be resolved under two or sometimes more international 
agreements and specific EU Regulations. These matters are specific because the Member States 
of the European Union are at the same time signatories to these international agreements and 
they are also bound by EU Regulations.122 This problem can be resolved by the establishment 
of a ‘hierarchical correlation’ between these legal sources.123 One of these matters, that is 
regulated by a large number of international agreements and EU Regulations, is the position of 
the child in the determination of parental responsibilities in the cases that fall under the scope 
of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention124 and the pathological aspect of the 
determination of parental responsibilities in cases of child abduction, which fall under the scope 
of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention.125 
2.1 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention  
The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
abduction (1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention) has been ratified by all the Member 
States of the European Union and continues to apply in cases of child abduction between 
Member States. On the other hand, the 1980 Hague Convention is supplemented by certain 
provisions of the Regulation,126 where in relations between Member States, the rules of the 
Regulation prevail over the rules of the Convention in so far as it concerns matters governed 
                                                 
122 See for example about the relations between the EU law and ECHR, Chalmers D., Davies G. and Monti G., 
European Union Law (second edition), Cambridge University Press, (2010), 228-266; Barnard C., Peers S. (ed.) 
Spaventa E., European Union Law, Oxford University Press, 2014, pg.226-254; Kaczorowska A., European 
Union Law, Routledge, 2013, pg.213-237.  
123 For the position of the EU law and the International agreements see more: K. Lenaerts and E. de Smijter, The 
European Union as an actor under International Law 19 Yearbook of European Law, 19(1999-2000);Wessel A.R.,  
'The European Union as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities’in 
Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (eds) Law and Practice of EU External Relations - Salient Features of a 
Changing Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008); Govaere, I., Capiau, J., & Vermeersch, In-
Between Seats:The Participation of the European Union in International Organizations, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 9(2), 155-187.(2004) ; Klamert M.& Maydell N., Lost in Exclusivity: Implied Non-exclusive  External 
Competences in Community Law, European Foreign Affairs Review 13: 493–513, 2008; Ракић Б., 
Фрагментација Међународног права и европско право – на западу нешто ново, Aнали Правног факултета 
у Београду, Година LVII, бр. 1/2009 
124 The Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and 
Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children 
125 The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
126 See Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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by the Regulation.127 
When the Brussels II Regulation was drafted, there were two different views among the 
Member States regarding the future of international child abduction. The first view was to 
create EU rules for the return of children which would be applicable only to EU countries, and 
the other view considered that such an approach would undermine the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention, which by then was signed and ratified by 74 states.128 The result of 
these differences was Article 37 of the Brussels II Regulation, by which precedence of the 
Regulation over some international agreements was determined.129 The Hague Abduction 
Convention wasn’t among these international agreements, because it was tendentiously left 
out. The Regulation itself referred to a conformal application of both instruments.130 However, 
this position was changed in Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
 The relationship between the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention is regulated in Article 60 of the Regulation, which provides for 
precedence of this EU instrument over enlisted international agreements, which includes the 
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. In this article, supremacy is conferred to the 
Regulation over the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. This ultimately leads to 
different outcomes on the return of children.131 However this result is just a starting point. 
Essentially, the Brussels IIbis Regulation adopts a compromise between the different positions 
of the Member States concerning this question. It actually ‘adapts’ the Hague Abduction 
Convention for the needs of the EU Member States.132 Instead of creating new rules for the 
return of abducted children that will be applicable in the EU, the rules of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation are founded on the basis of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention133 with 
an additional task of  strengthening the procedure for the return of abducted children. It remains 
in force between the Member States,134 however matters that are covered by the rules of the 
                                                 
127 Text to n 807 Part II ch V sec 5.2.2.1. 
128 Schulz A., The New Brussels II Regulation and the Hague Conventions of 1980 and 1996, International Family 
Law Journal (2004) 23. 
129 See Article 37 Brussels II Regulation. 
130 Article 4 provides ‘The courts with jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 3 shall exercise their jurisdiction 
in conformity with the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, and in particular Articles 3 and 16 thereof.’ 
131 Ballesteros, M.H., International Child Abduction in the European Union: The Solutions Incorporated by the 
Council Regulation, 34 Revue générale de droit 343 (2004), 348. 
132 Lamont R., The EU: Protecting Childrens Rights in Child Abduction, International Family Law Journal (2008) 
127.  
133 In the Rinau Case, it is reaffirmed that the guiding principles of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention 
‘were taken over’, meaning that they were adopted (togeather with the Brussels Convention) in matrimonial 
matters and matters of parental responsibility. See, Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271, para 48. 
134 Art. 62 Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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Brussels IIbis Regulation have precedence over the rules of the Hague Abduction Convention. 
As for the rules not covered by the Regulation, the Convention rules apply. It can be said that 
the instruments are ‘complementary’.135   
This position was also reaffirmed in the Rinau case.136 In the case it was stated that the 
1980 Hague Convention was adopted in the interest of children and that the guiding principles 
of the Convention with respect to matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility 
are also implemented in the Regulation.137 Further, AG Kokott in the opinion delivered on 29 
January 2009 Case C-523/07, held the position, which was rendered in the Rinau case,  that: 
 [B]oth provisions pursue the aim that abducted children should return immediately to the State 
in which they had their habitual residence before the unlawful removal. That coordination also makes a 
uniform understanding of the concept of habitual residence necessary.138 
It can be concluded that the Brussels IIbis Regulation adopts the guiding principles of 
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. This is especially important because it provides 
continuity of the uniform understanding of the concepts provided in the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention, the case law, and the relevant writings by distinguished scholars.  
2.2 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention  
This Convention has the broadest scope of the Hague Conference’s children 
conventions139 and contains three types of rules. Firstly there are the procedural rules that refer 
to the determination of the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement; secondly there 
are the conflict of law rules that refer to the determination of the applicable law, and thirdly, 
the substantial number rules that refer to the cooperation between the authorities.140 The 
rationae materiae given in Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention is two -folded: On one hand it is 
illustrative141 (but it is a rather complete enumeration of the measures of protection which fall 
under the scope of the Convention), and on the other hand the matters which are excluded from 
the scope of the Convention are given in a numerus clausus manner, meaning that the  issues 
                                                 
135 McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union: Symbiotic relationship or forced 
partnership?, 17, J.Priv. Int’l. L, 2005 p.17. 
136 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271.  
137 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 48, 49 and 62 
138 Case C-523/07 A. [2009] ECR I-02805 Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 29 January 2009 para 30. 
139 Fawcett J and Carruthers J., Cheshire, North & Fawcett, Private International Law, Oxford University Press 
14th ed. (2008) 1136.  
140 Sajko, K., Haška Konvencija o dječjoj zaštiti od 19.Listopada 1996; Značajni segment budućeg Hrvatskog 
Prava, Novejše tendence razvoja otroškega prava v evropskih drñavah - prilagajanje otroškega prava v republiki 
Sloveniji, Maribor, (1997) 41. 
141 Article 3 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention uses the phrase ‘…may deal in particular 
with…’meaning that the ‘measures for protection’ are not exhaustive and are enumeration of issues on which 
these measures might bear, as some kind of examples that might be contained in the meaning of Article 3. (Lagarde 
Report, (n 93) 547, para18). 
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which are excluded in Article 4 are exhaustive.142 The measures provided in the Convention 
are refer to: 
a) the attribution, exercise, termination or restriction of parental responsibility,143 as well 
as its delegation; 
b) rights of custody, including rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, 
in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence, as well as rights of 
access including the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than 
the child's habitual residence; 
c) guardianship, curatorship and analogous institutions; 
d) the designation and functions of any person or body having charge of the child's 
person or property, representing or assisting the child; 
e) the placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care, or the provision 
of care by a kafala or an analogous institution; 
f) the supervision by a public authority of the care of a child by any person having charge 
of the child; 
g) the administration, conservation or disposal of the child's property.144 
The issues which are excluded from the scope of application are given in Article 4 of the 
Convention and they refer to:  
a) the establishment or contesting of a parent-child relationship; 
b) decisions on adoption, measures preparatory to adoption, or the annulment or 
revocation of adoption; 
c) the name and forenames of the child; 
d) emancipation; 
e) maintenance obligations; 
f) trusts or successions; 
g) social security; 
h) public measures of a general nature in matters of education or health; 
i) measures taken as a result of penal offences committed by children; 
j) decisions on the right of asylum and on immigration. 
                                                 
142 Lagarde Report, (n 93) 549, para 26. 
143 For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘parental responsibility’ includes parental authority, or any 
analogous relationship of authority determining the rights, powers and responsibilities of parents, guardians or 
other legal representatives in relation to the person or the property of the child. (Article 1(2) of the 1996 Hague 
Child Protection Convention). 
144 Article 3 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention. 
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This coverage of issues given in the scope of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention results in for minimum risks of leaving gaps in the coverage.145 The ratione 
personae is given in Article 2 of the Convention, and establishes application of the Convention 
towards children from the moment of their birth until they reach the age of 18 years.  
The Brussels IIbis Regulation and the 1996 Child Protection Convention are very 
closely connected. The Convention acted as a primary foundation for those parts of the 
Regulation that regard with parental responsibility.146 It is in force among most of the Member 
States147 and other non-EU states.148 The Convention does not contain a adhesion clause for 
the Regional Economic Integration Organizations (REIO) and thus the Member States of the 
European Union must ratify the Convention themselves and also on the behalf of the European 
Union.149 The Brussels IIbis Regulation takes precedence over the 1996 Child Protection 
Convention, in the case that the child’s habitual residence is in a Member State.150 In another 
situation, when a judgment is rendered in another Member State, the recognition and 
enforcement is conducted on the basis of the rules in the regulation, even if the child was 
habitually resident in a country that is a member of the 1996 Child Protection Convention but 
is not a Member State of the European Union.151  
 The 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention is particularly important in the EU 
because the Brussels IIbis Regulation is limited regarding the determination of the applicable 
law in parental responsibility issues. The main focus of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is the 
determination of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and 
cooperation between the Member States of the EU. The 1996 Child Protection Convention, 
however, contains conflict of law rules for the determination of the applicable law in the cases 
of child protection. Such rules are not provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. This means 
that between the Member States of the EU, the determination of the applicable law is still 
determined by the 1996 Convention, even if the jurisdiction is based on the Regulation.152               
                                                 
145 Lagarde Report, (n 93) 549, para 26. 
146 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9), 430.  
147 Except for Italy which has signed it but still not ratified it. (Last seen on 24.02.2014 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70). For more on the position of the EU as a 
Member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law see, van Loon H., Schulz A., The European 
Community and the Hague Conference on Private International Law in Bernd Martenczuk and Servaas van Thiel 
(eds.) Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations, (2008).  
148 Albania, Armenia, Australia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, Lesotho, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uruguay. USA have singed the Convention, but still have 
not ratified it (last seen on 24.02.2014 http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70).  
149 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 111. 
150 Art. 61 (a) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
151 Art. 61 (b) Brussels IIbis regulation. 
152 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 432. 
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Chapter III Jurisdictional regime in the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
3.1 General 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation is constructed to maintain and develop the EU as an area 
of freedom, security, and justice in which free movement of persons is assured. In order to do 
so, it contains unified rules on jurisdiction in the areas of matrimonial matters and parental 
responsibility with the purpose being to assure the free movement of persons and the 
functioning of the internal market.153 This ultimately leads to faster and simpler cross-border 
litigation within the EU. The jurisdictional rules in the Brussels IIbis Regulation regarding 
matrimonial matters are given in Chapter II Section 1, articles 3, 4 and 5 while the jurisdictional 
rules regarding parental responsibility issues can be found in Chapter II Section 2, Articles 8-
15. To have more detailed understanding of the jurisdictional system of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, this chapter will follow the systematization of the regulation. Firstly it will analyze 
the jurisdictional rules for matrimonial matters, then the jurisdictional rules regarding parental 
responsibility issues will be addressed. Additionally, this chapter will deal with rules regarding 
continuing jurisdiction of the child’s habitual residence, jurisdiction in cases of child’s 
abduction, prorogation of jurisdiction, jurisdiction based on the child’s presence, residual 
jurisdiction, and rules regarding the transfer of the jurisdiction.  
3.2 Jurisdiction regarding matrimonial matters 
Article 3 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is the main provision that sets the rules on 
international jurisdiction in matrimonial matters. This rule contains seven alternative 
jurisdictional criteria, and it is divided into two categories, the first being based on habitual 
residence154 and the second being based on nationality or domicile.155 The ‘habitual residence’ 
criteria determines jurisdiction with the courts of the Member State in which: 
 both spouses have their habitual residence; 
 the spouses had their last habitual residence, if one of the spouses still lives 
there; 
 the respondent habitually resides;  
 in the case of joint application, one of the spouses is habitually resident. 
                                                 
153 Recital (1) and (4) of the Brussels II Regulation. 
154 Article 3(1)(a) of Brussels IIbis Regulation 
155 Article 3(1)(b) of Brussels IIbis Regulation 
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 The other two ‘habitual residence’ criteria are subject to specific conditions, namely the 
elapsing of a certain period of time.  The jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Member States 
where: 
 the applicant habitually resides for a period of at least a year immediately prior 
to the application; 
 the applicant habitually resides for a period of at least six months immediately 
prior to the application, and providing that he/she was a national of said Member 
State (domicile, concerning UK and Ireland). 
 The second category is based on nationality/domicile criteria. The jurisdiction is based 
in the territory of a Member State where both of the spouses have their nationality (in the case 
of UK and Ireland, have their domicile). Article 4 and 5 are jurisdictional rules that cover a 
smaller area:  the cases of counterclaims and conversion of legal separation into divorce. In the 
case regarding counterclaims, the Regulation adopts the classic solution-the court having 
jurisdiction to hear a claim or proceeding in accordance with Article 3 of the Regulation also 
has jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim.156 Article 3(1) (a) and (b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 
lays out a number of grounds for jurisdiction, without establishing any hierarchy. All the 
objective grounds set out in Article 3(1) are alternatives and there is no order of precedence 
between these jurisdictional criteria.157 In that context, the CJEU in the case Hadadi concluded:  
[T]he system of jurisdiction established by Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning the dissolution of 
matrimonial ties is not intended to preclude the courts of several States from having jurisdiction. Rather, 
the coexistence of several courts having jurisdiction is expressly provided for, without any hierarchy 
being established between them.158 
The structure and the jurisdictional criteria of Article 3 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
has been taken from the Article 2(1) of the Brussels II Regulation. Both of these s rules are 
substantially similar159 to the rules provided in Article 2(1) of the Brussels II Convention. In 
most of the cases these rules are based on the „habitual residence’ criterion and accordingly 
they can apply to a national of a non-Member State who is a resident in the EU.  
According to Article 6, the jurisdictional criteria in the Brussels IIbis Regulation are 
exclusive160 and a spouse who is habitually resident in the territory of a Member State or is a 
                                                 
156 Article 4 of Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
157 Case C-168/08, Laszlo Hadadi (Hadady) v. Csilla Marta Mesko, married name Hadadi (Hadady) [2009] ECR 
I-06871 para 48. 
158 ibid para 49. 
159 Shúilleabháin, M.N., (n 63) 133. 
160 One ambiguity could arise because of the same term used in different context in Article 22 of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 24 of the recast). More appropriate term for Article 6 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation would 
be ‘exhaustive’ because the term ‘exclusive’ would confer more to situations such as those provided in Article 22 
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national of a Member State, or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her 
‘domicile’ in the territory of either the U.K. or Ireland, may be sued in another Member State 
only (exclusively) in accordance with Articles 3, 4 and 5. If jurisdiction cannot be established 
in the courts of a Member State on none of the connecting factors provided in the Regulation, 
then the jurisdiction will be determined by the national jurisdictional rules.161 To use these 
rules, the applicant must be a national of a Member State, habitually resident in another 
Member State, or the respondent must habitually reside outside the Member States and must 
not be a national of a Member State (domicile in UK and Ireland case).162  
The term of this type of jurisdiction is ‘residual’ in view of its nature and the place it 
occupies in relation to the grounds of jurisdiction established by the Regulation.163 This concept 
being understood as referring to cases where the European law currently does not provide 
uniform grounds of jurisdiction, but rather borrows the rules of national law.164 Two general 
restrictions appear. Firstly, where, in divorce proceedings, if a respondent is not habitually 
resident in a Member State and is not a national of a Member State, the courts of a Member 
State cannot base their jurisdiction to hear the petition on their national law, if the courts of 
another Member State have jurisdiction under Article 3 of Brussels IIbis Regulation165 and have 
to declare of their own motion under Article 17 that it has no jurisdiction.166 Secondly, the 
national rules on residual jurisdiction which establish this right differ and do not always 
guarantee access to court on the basis of the nationality of one of the spouses.167 This may 
result in cases arising that are not admissible in any court in a given Member State or in a third 
country.168 For example, German courts have international jurisdiction when (1) one spouse is 
German or was German when the marriage took place; (2) one spouse is stateless and is 
                                                 
of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24 of the recast). However, the jurisdictional systems in the Brussels I and 
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163 Borras Report (n 26) 43. 
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habitually resident in Germany; or (3) one spouse is habitually resident in Germany, except 
where any judgement reached in their case could not be recognized in any of the States to which 
either spouse belongs169; Austrian courts  have jurisdiction where (1) one of the spouses has 
Austrian citizenship or (2) the defendant has its habitual residence in Austria or (3) the claimant 
has its habitual residence in Austria. Austrian jurisdiction is also applied if the spouses either 
had their last common residence in Austria or the claimant has no citizenship or at the time of 
marriage had Austrian citizenship170; in France according to Article 14 of the Civil Code, 
French courts can have jurisdiction if the petitioner had French nationality.171 According to 
Article 48(1) of the Slovenian PILP Act, if the defendant’s permanent residence is in Slovenia 
then Slovenian courts shall have jurisdiction. But even when the defendant lacks domicile in 
Slovenia, the courts of Republic of Slovenia shall have jurisdiction (1) if both spouses are 
Slovene citizens, regardless of where they have their permanent residence; (2) if the applicant 
is a Slovene citizen with permanent residence in Slovenia; (3) if the last joint permanent or 
temporary residence of the spouses was in Slovenia and the plaintiff still has residence in 
Slovenia172; or (4) if both spouses are foreign citizens and their last joint permanent residence 
was in Slovenia, but the defendant does not object to jurisdiction and if the regulations of the 
country of the spouses’ citizenship permit such jurisdiction.173 
Overall the solutions given in these rules are inflexible, mandatory, and strict and do 
not leave any degree of discretion to the judge174 and because of that they have been largely 
criticized.175 The main problem lies in the alternative, rather than hierarchical jurisdictional 
criteria which together with the disharmonized conflict-of-law rules176 causes ‘rush to the court’ 
in the EU by the spouses. Further, with Article 19 which establishes the priority of the court 
first seized (lis pendens rule), the situation becomes unsolvable. In such situations ‘rush to the 
court’ is seen as obstacle in the mitigation of the consequences of divorce, where the spouses 
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are positioned to plead in front of court that can apply substantive rules to  which the defendant 
does not feel closely connected or which fail to take into account his/her interests.177 In line 
with this reasoning is the possibility of introducing of party autonomy in matrimonial matters, 
where the spouses could designate the competent court by common agreement. There is an 
ongoing trend in the PIL regulations of the EU (Maintenance Regulation178 or Succession 
Regulation179) where such possibility is being introduced.180 This will allow the spouse to 
determine the legal system to which they have a close connection. However, they will have to 
demonstrate a connection with that system, which will make party autonomy in certain aspects 
limited.181  During the negotiations and the drafting of the Matrimonial Property Regulation 
the possibility was also introduced.182 Although this regulation didn’t came into force, the rules 
still give some guidelines where the future working on the concept of party autonomy in the 
new Brussels IIbis Regulation could find inspiration. 
 
3.3 Jurisdiction regarding parental responsibility issues 
The jurisdictional rules regarding parental responsibility issues are given in Chapter II 
Section 2, articles 8-15 in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. In most cases, the main connecting 
factor and the main jurisdictional criterion, is the place where the child has his/her habitual 
residence. It is the main jurisdictional criteria for determining the forum in which parental 
responsibility is decided,183 and is of great importance in child abduction cases.184 Further, as 
a criterion it is of paramount importance in determining the continued jurisdiction of the child's 
former habitual residence185 and also on the jurisdiction based on the child’s presence.186 So 
for the purpose of proper determination of the jurisdiction of courts of Member States, 
according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation, it is of essence to choose the modalities of the 
determination of the child’s habitual residence. 
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3.3.1 ‘Child’s habitual residence’ in the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
In legal theory there have been several attempts to propose a definition and to explain 
the legal institution of the ‘child’s habitual residence.’ Its main significance is that this legal 
institution is a modern one and is not burdened by several definitions and redefinitions.  It is 
accepted that the determination of habitual residence is a matter of facts rather than legal 
definitions.187 In fact, one of the main reasons why this institution is preferable over the 
domicile is that there is a need to avoid the confusion which has arisen due to an unclear 
understanding of the circumstances, which are the primary contributor to the establishment or 
loss of domicile.188 As one commentary explains:  
[t]his has been a matter of deliberate policy, the aim being to leave the notion free from technical 
rules which can produce rigidity and inconsistencies between different legal systems.189  
On the other hand there is a certain paradox where in all of the cases in which there is 
a need to determine the habitual residence (especially in common law countries), they tend to 
define the subject, as well as create a list of factors or circumstances which will together amount 
to the creation or loss of habitual residence in a certain territory.190 These circumstances, 
together with the absence of definitions in the Hague Conventions, create space for a different 
understanding of habitual residence before the courts of different legal systems.  It is to the law 
of the forum to determine, in each factual situation, whether the parents or child/children have 
habitual residence.  The vast number of judicial decisions allows for the proper understanding 
and the correct determination of habitual residence.  
Legal theory and practice together take the same approach. For example, according to 
Cheshire, North и Fawcett there is no certain definition for habitual residence, and in support 
of this argument it refers to the court decision rendered by ‘Lord Scarman’ in the case Barnet 
London Borough Council, ex p Shah191 that holds that there is no difference in principle 
between the traditional concept of ordinary residence and the more contemporary concept of 
habitual residence and that they both refer to:  
[a] person’s abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntary and for settled 
                                                 
187 The reporter of the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention, didn’t refer to this concept since it was ‘well established 
concept in the Hague Conference’ and it is ‘a question of pure fact’. See Perez-Vera report, Actes et Documents 
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purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of short or of long duration.’192 
A similar approach was taken in a CJEU case, Swaddling v. Adjudication Officer,193 
where the Court stated that the Member State in which the person resides is  
[t]he State in which the persons concerned habitually reside and where the habitual center of 
their interests is to be found’.194   
In this case the Court elaborated in detail on the circumstances that should be of 
particular focus in the determination of the habitual center of interest such as: the employed 
person's family situation; the reasons which have led him to move; the length and continuity of 
his residence; the fact (where this is the case) that he is in stable employment; and his intention 
as it appears from all the circumstances.195  
In another statement given by Lord Slynn in an opinion of the House of Lords, 
regarding the case Nessa v Chief Adjudication Officer,196 it was held that there is no actual 
definition of habitual residence and that the fact-finding approach must be applied. The factors, 
among others, which have to be taken into account in determining habitual residence are steps 
like bringing possessions, doing everything necessary to establish residence before coming, 
having a right of abode, seeking to bring family, and ‘durable ties’ with the country of residence 
or intended residence.197 
Perhaps the most influential definition of the term ‘habitual residence’ comes from the 
English case of reBates. In this case, at first the court concluded that the notion of habitual 
residence has to be freed from technical rules, which can produce rigidity and inconsistencies 
between legal systems, and that the facts and circumstances of each case should be assessed 
without resorting to presumptions or presuppositions.198  
Then it gave the following definition:  
[T]here must be a degree of settled purpose.  The purpose may be one or there may be several.  
It may be specific or general.  All that the law requires is that there is a settled purpose. That is not to say 
that the propositus intends to stay where he is indefinitely.  Indeed his purpose while settled may be for 
a limited period.  Education, business or profession, employment, health, family or merely love of the 
place spring to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular abode, and there may well be many 
others.  All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of 
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continuity to be properly described as settled.’199   
The United States’ approach is similar to the course taken by the English courts. In the 
understanding of the term habitual residence, the American legal system has a more practical 
approach. The American approach opposes giving the term ‘habitual residence’ a strict 
definition and is in favor of instructing the court to interpret the expression ‘habitual residence’ 
according to:  
[t]he ordinary and natural meaning of the two words it contains [as] a question of fact to be 
determined by references to all the circumstances of any particular case.200  
The term should be interpreted from the child’s perspective201 and in the context of his 
family and social environment in which his or her life has developed.202 The main factors that 
predetermine the habitual residence are based on cultural, educational and social experiences. 
The place of habitual residence shouldn’t ordinarily be determined by the expectations of either 
parent or by future plans.203  
In Feder v. Evans-Feder,204 the court stated its definition of habitual residence as 
follows: 
[W]e believe that a child's habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically 
present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree of settled purpose’ 
from the child's perspective.  We further believe that a determination of whether any particular place 
satisfies this standard must focus on the child and consists of an analysis of the child's circumstances in 
that place and the parents' present shared intentions regarding their child's presence there.205  
The European Union avoids proposing a definition of habitual residence in its legal 
sources. The predominant understanding of habitual residence comes from the Explanatory 
report concerning Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, prepared by Professor Alegria Borras (OJ C 221, 
16.7.1998). This definition is in compliance with the above-mentioned definitions given on 
numerous occasions by the European Court of Justice. It states that the habitual residence is  
[t]he place where the person had established, on a fixed basis, his permanent or habitual center of 
interests, with all the relevant facts being taken into account for the purpose of determining such 
residence.206 
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3.3.1.1 National definitions 
  
Several states have adopted a definition of habitual residence in their national Private 
International Law Acts.  
The Swiss Private International law act207 from 1987 holds a simple definition of 
habitual residence. The habitual residence of a natural person is the place where that person  
[H]as his place of habitual residence in the State in which he lives for an extended period of 
time, even if this time period is limited from the outset.208 
In its Code of Private International Law209 Belgium has adopted a definition on habitual 
residence of natural persons. It provides that habitual residence is  
[t]he place where a natural person has established his main residence, even in the absence of 
registration and independent of a residence or establishment permit; in order to determine this place, the 
circumstances of personal or professional nature that show durable connections with that place or indicate 
the will to create such connections are taken into account.210 
A similar definition is given in the Bulgarian PIL Code.211For the purpose of the Code  
[h]abitual residence of a natural person’ shall denote the place where the said person has settled 
predominantly to live without this being related to a need of registration or authorization of residence or 
settlement. For determination of this place, special regard must be had to circumstances of personal or 
professional nature arising from sustained connections of the person with the said place or from the 
intention of the said person to establish such connections.212 
The PIL Act of Macedonia213adopted a definition for habitual residence, but it is only 
applicable in the determination of the applicable law in non-contractual obligations: 
[F]or the purposes of this Law the habitual residence for a natural person is the place where the 
person has established a permanent center of his/her activities, and it is not necessary to be filled any 
documents associated with registering or obtaining a residence permit from the competent national 
authorities. In determining the habitual residence, especially should be considered the circumstances of 
a personal or professional character, arising from permanent connections with the place or intention to 
make such connections. In every case, the natural person has his/her habitual residence in one country, 
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if he/her stays in that country longer that 6 mounts.214 
In its PIL Code,215 Montenegro envisaged a definition of habitual residence  
[F]or the purpose of this law the habitual residence of natural person is the place in which the 
person has settled predominantly without this being related to a need of registration or authorization of 
residence or settlement and without taking into account if the residence is temporally predetermined. In 
determining the habitual residence, especially should be considered the circumstances of a personal or 
professional character, arising from permanent connections with the place or intention to make such 
connections.216 
In its draft of the PIL Code,217 Serbia also envisaged a definition of the habitual 
residence.  
1. Habitual residence of natural persons is the place in which the person habitual center of 
 interests is and in which it ordinary resides, without this being related to a need of registration  or 
 authorization of residence by relevant authority or settlement or obtaining a residence permit. 
2. In determining the habitual residence, as referred in paragraph 1, especially should be considered the 
circumstances of a personal or professional character, referring to permanent connections with the place 
or intention to make such connections.218 
  
3.3.1.2 Practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the determination 
of the Childs habitual residence  
 
 In the judgment of 02.04.2009 regarding the A. case219 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) referred to the problem of ‘habitual residence’. In December 2001, 
the children C, D and E settled in Sweden accompanied by their mother, Ms. A, and their 
stepfather, Mr. F. Previously, D and E had been taken into care by municipality X in Finland. 
The reason for their being taken into care was their stepfather’s violence, but that measure was 
subsequently discontinued. In the summer of 2005, the family left Sweden to spend the 
holidays in Finland. They stayed in Finnish territory, living in caravans, on various campsites, 
and the children did not go to school. On 30 October 2005, the family applied to the social 
services department of the Finnish municipality Y for social housing. By decisions of the 
Welfare Committee of 16 November 2005, adopted on the basis of Law 683/1983, the children 
C, D and E were taken into immediate care in Finland and placed in a foster-family on the 
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grounds that they had been abandoned. Ms. A and Mr. F applied for the decisions relating to 
the urgent taking into care to be quashed. By decisions of 15 December 2005, the Welfare 
Committee rejected the application and, under Paragraph 16 of Law 683/1983, took the 
children C, D and E into care and ordered them to be placed in a childcare unit. Ms. A brought 
an action before the courts, seeking to have those decisions quashed, and requested that her 
children be returned to her custody. The courts dismissed the action and upheld the contested 
decisions. Ms. A lodged an appeal against that decision before the Supreme Administrative 
Court (Finland), alleging that the Finnish authorities lacked competence. In that connection, 
Ms. A stated that the children C, D and E had, since 2 April 2007, been Swedish nationals and 
that their permanent residence had for a long time been in Sweden. Therefore, she argued the 
case fell within the jurisdiction of the Swedish courts. The Supreme Administrative Court 
decided to stay the proceedings and to refer some questions to the European Court for a 
preliminary ruling. The second question that was proposed stated: 
 [H]ow is the concept of habitual residence in Article 8(1) of the regulation, like the associated 
Article 13(1), to be interpreted in Community law, bearing in mind in particular the situation in which a 
child has a permanent residence in one Member State but is staying in another Member State, carrying 
on a peripatetic life there?  
 The European Court of Justice reached the following conclusion: The concept of 
‘habitual residence’ under Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as 
meaning that it corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child 
into a social and family environment.220 To that end, in particular the duration, regularity, 
conditions and reasons for the stay in  the territory of a Member State and the family’s move 
to that State, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of attendance at school, linguistic 
knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child in that State must be taken into 
consideration. It is for the national court to establish the habitual residence of the child, taking 
account of all the circumstances specific to each individual case.221 
 To reach such a conclusion, the European Court of Justice (basing its assumptions on 
the differences between the Article 8(1) and Article 13 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation) first 
affirmed that mere physical presence in a Member State was not sufficient to establish the 
habitual residence of the child.222 Following that assumption in the same case the CJEU in 
paragraph 34 of argued for:  
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[n]eed for uniform application of Community law and from the principle of equality’ and that the ‘terms 
of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for 
the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform 
interpretation throughout the European Community’.  
After reaching for the uniform application of Community law and the principle of autonomous 
and uniform interpretation, the CJEU concluded that’…it is for the national court to establish 
the place of the children’s habitual residence,’223  having in mind the guidelines that are given 
by the CJEU. In this context, the CJEU in the Mercredi case delved even further into the details 
by providing that since the articles of the Regulation which refer to ‘habitual residence’ make 
no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining the 
meaning and scope of that concept, the meaning and scope must be decided in the light of the 
context of the Regulation’s provisions and the objective pursued by it.  Of particular attention 
is the objective stated in recital 12 in the preamble to the Regulation that the grounds of 
jurisdiction established in the Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the 
child, and are particularly based on the criterion of proximity.224 
 The habitual residence should be established on the basis of all the circumstances 
specific to each individual case,225 but an exception was made with the case-law of the Court 
relating to the concept of habitual residence in other areas of European Union law and that this 
could not be directly transposed in the context of the assessment of the habitual residence of 
children for the purposes of Article 8(1) of the Regulation.226 
 The child’s habitual residence should correspond with the place where the child has 
some degree of integration in a social and family environment.227 This position was further 
defined by adding several general indicators such as duration, regularity, conditions and 
reasons for the stay on the territory of a Member State and the family’s move to that State. 
Also, several specific indicators such as the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of 
attendance at school, linguistic knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child 
in that State must be taken into account.228 In the end, the judgment of the CJEU directly 
referred to the Opinion of the Advocate General and broadened the indicators for determination 
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of the child’s habitual residence to include the parents’ intention to settle permanently with the 
child in another Member State, which is manifested by certain tangible steps such as the 
purchase or lease of a residence in the host Member State. Another indicator that was 
mentioned that could be taken into account was the lodging of an application for social housing 
with the relevant services of that State.229 The short-term stay or the ‘peripatetic life’ as it was 
referred to in the judgment does not constitute a situation which could lead to change of habitual 
residence from one State to another.230  
 A more precise interpretation of habitual residence was given in the opinion of AG 
Kokott regarding this case.231 This opinion again affirmed the autonomous interpretation of the 
term ‘habitual residence’ and the differences between habitual residence and mere presence.232 
 What was important about this opinion was that it directly and undoubtedly linked the 
Hague Conventions and their case-law with the Brussels IIbis Regulation, stating that: 
 [c]oordination also makes a uniform understanding of the concept of habitual residence necessary.233  
 This opened the doors for the enormous data base of cases from the Hague Conference 
to be used for uniform understanding and determining habitual residence.234 
 In this opinion, the Advocate General positions the concept of habitual residence in 
Article 8(1) of the Regulation at the actual center of interests of the child.235 The understanding 
of the habitual residence of the children in family law is distinguished from that of other 
cases236 since in these cases the emphasis is on the intention of the person concerned.237 This 
is evident in the distancing from the proposed understanding of habitual residence given in the 
Borrás Report.238 The basic indicators are categorized according to the duration and regularity 
of residence and according to the familial and social situation of the child. 
 The duration of the residence is the factor that distinguishes presence from habitual 
residence. There is no time frame given in the Regulation so this should be determined based 
on the circumstances of the individual case. There is a direct link between the age or the 
maturity of the child239 and the familial and social circumstances that influence the duration of 
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the transformation from mere presence into habitual residence.240 
 Regarding the regularity of the stay, the residence does not have to be uninterrupted. 
Temporary absence of the child, for instance during the holidays, does not call into question 
the continuation of habitual residence. However, if a return to the original place of residence is 
not foreseeable in view of the actual circumstances, habitual residence can no longer be 
assumed.241 Another factor that influences the duration of the transformation from mere 
presence into habitual residence is the lawfulness of the stay. If the move is lawful, habitual 
residence can shift to the new State even after a very short period.242The intention of the parents 
is also an important circumstance. An indication that the habitual residence has shifted may be 
in particular the corresponding common intention of the parents to settle permanently with the 
child in another State. The parents’ intention may manifest itself, for example, in external 
circumstances such as the purchase or lease of a residence in the new State, notifying the 
authorities of the new address, establishing an employment relationship, and placing the child 
in a kindergarten or school. As a mirror image, abandoning the old residence and employment 
and notifying the authorities of departure suggest that habitual residence in the former State is 
at an end.243If the move is unlawful (as in the cases of international child abduction) the 
duration of the transformation is a longer period. Although under article 10 there is continuing 
jurisdiction of the courts of the former habitual residence, it is ascertained that in a longer 
period of time under some strict conditions transfer of habitual residence from one State to 
another can occur.244 
 The second category of indicators is referred to as ‘Familial and social situation of the 
child’. These indicators provide the court with a clear picture of the stability (or lack thereof) 
which distinguishes habitual residence from mere presence. In its opinion the Advocate 
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General stated that ‘It is for the referring court to obtain an overall picture of this, taking 
account of all factors, whose relevance may vary according to the children’s age.’245The 
concrete manifestation of familial situation are the persons with whom a child lives at the place 
of residence or is in regular contact, in other words parents, siblings, grandparents or other 
close relatives246; and for the social situation , circumstances such as school, friends, leisure 
activities and, above all, command of language are taken into consideration.247  
The CJEU referred to the concept of ‘habitual residence’ in C. case.248 In this case the 
Supreme Court of Ireland asked for a preliminary ruling on whether the existence of the French 
proceedings relating to the custody of the child preclude, in the circumstances of this case, the 
establishment of habitual residence of the child in Ireland and whether  the Irish courts are 
entitled to consider the question of habitual residence of the child in the circumstance that  she 
has resided in Ireland since July 2012, at which time her removal to Ireland was not in breach 
of French law?249 In other words the CJEU was asked whether a lawful removal could have 
turned into a wrongful detention250 and with therefore whether the Irish courts are entitled to 
consider the question of habitual residence. 
It was considered by the CJEU that Articles 2(11) and 11 of the Regulation must be 
interpreted as meaning that where the removal of a child has taken place in accordance with a 
judgment which was provisionally enforceable and which was thereafter overturned by a 
judgment which fixed the residence of the child at the home of the parent living in the Member 
State of origin, the court of the Member State to which the child was removed, seized of an 
application for the return of the child, must determine, by undertaking an assessment of all the 
circumstances of fact specific to the individual case, whether the child was still habitually 
resident in the Member State of origin immediately before the alleged wrongful retention. As 
part of this assessment, it is important that account be taken of the fact that the judgment 
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authorizing the removal could provisionally be enforced and that an appeal had been brought 
against it.251 However, those factors are not necessarily conducive to a finding that the child’s 
habitual residence was transferred, since that judgment was provisional and the parent 
concerned could not be certain, at the time of the removal, that the stay in that Member State 
would not be temporary.252 
It can be concluded that the favorable aspect of the application of habitual residence as 
a jurisdictional criterion in family matters, is its adaptability to the needs of a mobile society, a 
characteristic that is absent in the criteria of domicile or nationality.253 However, to properly 
apply it in practice, it needs consistent application in cross-border cases, because its incorrect 
use could lead to parallel litigations and essentially to legal uncertainty. 
3.3.2 General jurisdiction for parental responsibility issues in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation 
 
Article 8 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation spells out the rule on international jurisdiction 
regarding parental responsibility issues. The general rule contained in Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation establishes that the courts of the Member State of the habitual 
residence of the child at the time when the court is seized254 shall have jurisdiction. It can be 
seen that the determination of the child’s habitual residence is of great importance, because it 
fixates the jurisdiction to the court which is most competent to hear the case due to its proximity 
with the child.255 The use of this criterion is considered to be particularly appropriate, because 
in practice it is essential that the authorities in the place where the child actually lives should 
be responsible for his/her physical welfare and be involved in determining his/her financial 
needs.256 
Article 8(2) however allows in specific situations when the interest of child prevails 
that the case can be heard before the courts which are not in the place of the habitual residence 
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of the child. This refers to the situations provided in Articles 9, 10 and 12 which are relocation 
disputes (article 9), child abduction cases (article 10) and regarding ‘prorogation of 
jurisdiction’ (article 12). In all of these specific cases the courts which are applying the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation in relation to parental responsibility issues must take into consideration and 
be in line with the principle of mutual trust. Also their judgments must be precise and they have 
to make it clear on which basis they have ascertained their jurisdiction.257 
The general rule and its exceptions are very similar to ones provided in 1996 Hague 
Convention on protection of Children258 but with additional elements.259 In general, the 1996 
Hague Convention was modeled on the experience from the application of The Hague 1961 
Convention concerning the powers of authorities and the law applicable in respect of the 
protection of infants.260 The basic goal of such rules was to eliminate all competition between 
the authorities of different States in taking measures of protection for the person or the property 
of the child.261 With such a position of the jurisdictional criteria, the place where the child’s 
habitual residence is established is the most relevant factor in determining the jurisdiction in 
cases which fall under the scope of 1996 Hague Childs Protection Convention. The main 
method for how to archive this goal was to centralize jurisdiction in the authorities of the state 
of the Child’s habitual residence and avoid all competition of authorities to have concurrent 
jurisdiction.262 In this way, the Child’s habitual residence becomes the main jurisdictional 
criteria in the determination of the forum which is best suited to protect the child’s person or 
its property, subject to only limited exceptions and which is in compliance with the principle 
of best interest of the child which guarantees that in most of the cases the responsible court will 
be the court which is best connected to the child.263 The exceptions to article 8 are the cases 
where the situation has changed, so the jurisdiction must be changed accordingly (Articles 5(2), 
7 and 14), or the child lacks habitual residence (Article 6).  
The 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention also holds rules that refer to transfer (or 
request for transfer) to a Court better placed to hear the case (Articles 8 and 9), attraction of 
jurisdiction with the divorce court (Article 10), jurisdiction in cases of urgency (Article 11), 
provisional measures of territorial effect (Article 12) and the lis pendens rule (Article 13). Other 
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jurisdictional rules in the Convention provide for certain exceptions of the general 
jurisdictional criteria (the child’s habitual residence), in situations for category of children who 
have left their countries because of conditions (disturbances) which were arising there, and 
who often are not accompanied and, in any case, are temporarily or definitively deprived of 
their parents and are internationally displaced.264 For these children normal jurisdiction 
attributed by the Convention to the authorities of the State of their habitual residence is here 
inoperative, since these children have by hypothesis broken all links with the State of their 
previous habitual residence, and the precariousness of their stay in the State where they have 
provisionally found refuge does not allow it to be considered that they have acquired a habitual 
residence there.265 The authorities of the State on the territory on which these children are 
present will have the general jurisdiction which in normal situations would be attributed to the 
authorities of the State of the child’s habitual residence. This position is given also to the 
children whose habitual residence cannot be established.266 
 
3.3.3 Continuing jurisdiction of the child's former habitual residence 
 
When a child moves from one Member State to another, it is often necessary to review 
the access rights, or other contact arrangements, to adapt them to the new circumstances.267 
Article 9 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation has in mind the problems that arise due to the 
complications relating to access and visitation rights. 268 The rationale behind this rule it is that 
the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident prior to the move retain 
jurisdiction during a three-month period following the move for the purpose of modifying a 
judgment on access rights issued in that Member State before the child moved, where the holder 
of access rights pursuant to the judgment on access rights continues to have his or her habitual 
residence in the Member State of the child's former habitual residence. If the holder of access 
rights accepts the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of the child's new habitual 
residence by participating in proceedings before those courts without contesting their 
jurisdiction, then the continuing jurisdiction of the child’s former habitual residence ceases to 
exist.269 So for the jurisdiction of the court of the former habitual residence to continue to be 
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competent for the purpose of modifying a judgment on access rights issued in that Member 
State before the child moved the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
1. The access rights to be modified must have been conferred in a judgment; 
2. It applies only to ‘lawful’ moves of a child from one-member state to 
 another; 
3. It applies only during the three-month period following the child’s move; 
4. The child must have acquired habitual residence in the ‘new’ Member State 
 during the three-month period; 
5. The holder of access rights must still be habitually resident in the Member 
 State of origin; 
6. The holder of access rights must not have accepted the change of 
 jurisdiction; 
7. It does not prevent the courts of the new Member State from deciding on 
 matters other than access rights.270  
The idea behind this rule it not to restrain a person from moving within the European 
Union. What it does it provides a guarantee that the person, who can no longer exercise access 
rights as before, does not have to seize the courts of the new Member State, but can apply for 
an appropriate adjustment of access rights before the court that granted them during a period 
of three months following the move. The courts of the new Member State (where the child has 
relocated) do not have jurisdiction in matters of access rights during this period.271 
 
3.3.4 Jurisdiction in cases of child’s abduction 
 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation contains jurisdictional rules regarding child abduction 
cases. Article 10 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation was influenced by Article 7 of the 1996 Hague 
Child Protection Convention. These two articles generally correspond with slight differences 
between them. The rules in the 1996 Hague Convention provide that in case of wrongful 
removal or retention of the child, the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually 
resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention shall retain their jurisdiction.272 
This jurisdiction remains  until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another State, and 
a) each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal 
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or retention; or b) the child has resided in that other State for a period of at least one year after 
the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge 
of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still pending, 
and the child is settled in his or her new environment.  
The 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention and the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention are closely interconnected with the primacy of the 1980 Convention.273  However 
there is a significant difference between 1980 Hague Abduction Convention and 1996 Child 
Protection Convention. The difference is in the possibility of shifting the jurisdiction only on 
the basis of a issuing of a non-return order274 or the settlement of the jurisdictional issue in the 
aftermath of the wrongful removal or retention.275 In the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention, 
there are several conditions under which a non-return order can be issued.276 Acquiescence is 
one of these conditions. Normally an issuing of a non-return order on the basis of  the 1980 
Child Abduction Convention led to shifting of the jurisdiction from the place where the child 
had his/her habitual residence to the country of the abduction because this led to the acquiring 
of a new habitual residence.277 According to Article 7 of the 1996 Child Protection Convention, 
a non-return order is not enough to give jurisdiction to the courts of the new habitual residence. 
Only acquiescence can have such an effect,278 or passive inactivity from the person, institution 
or other body having rights of custody over the child and settlement of the child in the new 
environment for a period of at least one year after the knowledge of the whereabouts of the 
child. 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation has gone into further details, subdividing the conditions 
of general inactivity into few hypotheticals.279 The rules in Article 10 are generally positioned 
between two opposite objectives. The first is that the Regulation doesn’t want to promote the 
unlawful removal or retention of a child and that such conduct cannot lead to an alteration of 
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its habitual residence. It wants to discourage the abductor from finding a better forum that will 
decide on parental responsibility issues.280 That’s why these rules are drafted so they can 
prohibit forum shopping. The only effective remedy is to maintain and defend as inviolable the 
initial jurisdiction of the court seized as to the substance; that is, the court of the habitual 
residence of the child before the removal and retention happened.281 The second objective is 
that there must be some moment in time that will transform involuntary residence in a certain 
territory to habitual residence. It wouldn’t be logical, for example, for a person not to acquire 
habitual residence although he/she resides in that territory for years. 
The basic idea in the Brussels IIbis Regulation for determining jurisdiction in child 
abduction cases is that the court of the state where the child was habitually resident immediately 
before the wrongful removal or retention will retain jurisdiction on substantial issues regarding 
the child at least for a year after  the abduction happens  (and the unlawful change of the child’s 
habitual residence occurred), and during that period there is no agreement of the holders of the 
right of custody on this newly developed situation.282 
In fact, Article 10 provides that in the case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, 
the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the 
wrongful removal or retention shall retain their jurisdiction. This rule corresponds with the first 
objective of the Article 10, to deter the abductor from finding a more suitable forum and to 
block the advantage he/she might gain by the removal and retention.283  
The second objective of this Article is to recognize the factual situation. This factual 
situation requires that in some cases the jurisdiction of the courts of the State where the child 
has acquired new habitual residence can be acceptable. Such a position is shown in the 
exceptions given in Article 10(a) and (b). Both of these exceptions require that the child has 
acquired new habitual residence in another Member State.  
The first exception given in Article 10(a) provides explicitly that each person, 
institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention. 
Acquiescence of the left-behind parent with the newly developed situation of the removal or 
retention of the child in a new Member State is a one of the conditions of issuing a non-return 
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order by the court where the child is removed or retained according to the 1980 Hague 
Abduction Convention.284 However there is a considerable difference between 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention and the regime established by the 1996 Hague Child protection 
Convention and which was later taken as basis of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The difference 
is in the possibility of shifting of the jurisdiction only on the basis of a issuing of a non-return 
order.285 In the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention, there are several conditions under which a 
non-return order can be issued.286 Acquiescence is one of these conditions. In the 1996 Child 
Protection Convention287 and Brussels IIbis Regulation in Article 10, a non-return order is not 
enough to give jurisdiction to the courts of the new habitual residence. Only acquiescence can 
have such an effect.288 
The second exception given in Article 10(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
necessitates two additional requirements to the basic prerequisite of this rule that the child had 
acquired new habitual residence. The first requirement is that the child has resided in that other 
Member State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having 
rights of custody had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the 
child is settled in his or her new environment. This condition is also positioned to be on fixed 
basis. The other conditions are given alternatively and if one of these conditions is fulfilled 
then the jurisdiction can shift from the court of the former habitual residence to the court of the 
new habitual residence. These conditions are: 
(i) within one year after the holder of rights of custody had or should have had 
knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return has been lodged before the 
competent authorities of the Member State where the child has been removed or is being 
retained; 
(ii) a request for return lodged by the holder of rights of custody has been withdrawn 
and no new request has been lodged within the time limit set in paragraph (i); 
(iii) a case before the court in the Member State where the child was habitually resident 
immediately before the wrongful removal or retention has been closed pursuant to Article 
11(7); 
(iv) a judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child289 has been issued 
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by the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before 
the wrongful removal or retention.      
The first three of those situations involve, de facto, tacit acquiescence of the holders of 
a right of custody (that is, usually, the parent left behind), in so far as no application for return 
of the child has been made in the Member State of wrongful removal, and that such an 
application has been either withdrawn or refused without the applicant taking further steps in 
the proceedings in the Member State of former habitual residence, in accordance with Article 
11(7) and (8) of the Regulation.290 The fourth situation is that of a judgment on custody that 
does not entail the return of the child is issued by a court of the Member State of former habitual 
residence. This involves not the tacit acquiescence of that court to the transfer of jurisdiction, 
but rather a judgment that endorses the acquisition by the child of a new habitual residence in 
another Member State, which will lead to the transfer of jurisdiction. Thus, although the 
transfer of jurisdiction takes place automatically under Articles 8 and 9 of the Regulation where 
a child changes habitual residence by moving lawfully from one Member State to another, to 
achieve the same result in the case of wrongful removal, the court of the Member State of 
former habitual residence must legalize that removal by approving it.291 
These two divergent positions of Article 10 are based the fundamental principles 
regarding child abduction cases.292 The rule upholding the jurisdiction of the court of the former 
habitual residence is consistent with the fundamental principle of the Regulation – namely that 
of depriving the unlawful act of the abducting parent of any legal effect, while the exception is 
consistent with another fundamental principle, since it is a rule of jurisdiction ‘shaped in the 
light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity’.293 The balance 
between these two principles is the genuine aim of Article 10: a balance between allowing the 
court that is now closest to the child to assume jurisdiction and preventing the abductor from 
reaping the benefit of his or her unlawful act.294  
The result of the rule given in Article 10 of the Brussels IIbis is the fact that the non-
return order is not a key aspect in transfer of the jurisdiction from one Member State to another. 
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If a person lodges his request for return of the removed or retained child in the provided time 
limit of one year, the only way in which  a shift of the jurisdiction can occur is if person, 
institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention, 
or the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before 
the wrongful removal or retention decide not to include a mandate for the return of the child in 
a judgment on custody rights.295 In all other cases the court of the Member State where the 
child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention shall retain 
their jurisdiction, and is the final arbiter in the cases of child abduction.296  
 
3.3.5 Prorogation of jurisdiction 
 
The basic principle in Article 12 is to establish an alternative forum for parental 
responsibility proceedings.297 As was stated previously298, the main rule for determining 
jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility in Brussels IIbis Regulation is the court of the 
Member State where the child has his/hers habitual residence. Another peculiar aspect of these 
cases is that the proceedings relating to parental responsibility are stripped of the link that was 
imposed with the Brussels II Regulation that parental responsibility issues are addressed only 
if they are in a close conjunction with divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment.299 In 
that aspect, Article 12 provides that a Court of a Member State, other than that in which the 
child’s is habitually resident,  be seized in any matter of parental responsibility if the matter is 
connected with a pending divorce proceedings, or the child has a substantial connection with 
that other state.  
 The rules in Article 12 paragraph (1) and (2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation provide 
that the jurisdiction of the divorce court can concentrate both questions (matrimonial and 
parental responsibility matters), even when the child’s habitual residence is in another Member 
State, but only under specific certain circumstances. Article 12(1) gives to the courts seized of 
an application for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction over matters 
relating to parental responsibility that are connected with that application for divorce, legal 
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299 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 19. 
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separation, or marriage annulment. The divorce court can have its jurisdiction seized in any 
matter of parental responsibility if three different conditions, listed in sub-paragraphs (a) and 
(b) are met. The first condition is that at least one of the spouses has parental responsibility 
over the child. Sub-paragraph (b) provides for two different conditions: that the spouses and a 
holders of parental responsibility accept the jurisdiction of the divorce court whether by express 
acceptance or unequivocal conduct, which is determined by the court at the time that it is 
seized300 and that the jurisdiction of that court is in the ‘superior interest of the child.’301 
 Article 12(2) admits that the extension of the jurisdiction of the court seized of a divorce 
to paternal responsibility is temporary in nature. The jurisdiction conferred in the preceding 
paragraph ceases as soon as: (a) the judgment allowing or refusing the application for divorce, 
legal separation or marriage annulment has become final; (b) in those cases where proceedings 
in relation to parental responsibility are still pending on the date referred to in (a), a judgment 
in these proceedings has become final; or (c) the proceedings referred to in (a) and (b) have 
come to an end for another reason. 
It’s logical to presume that in most of the cases the proceedings relating to matrimonial 
maters and parental responsibility issues will be dealt in same proceedings and before the same 
forum. The jurisdictional grounds given in article 12 are competing and not exclusive, meaning 
that the courts of the State of the habitual residence of the child are not deprived of their 
jurisdiction in the circumstances described in article 12. This can lead to parallel proceedings 
which are resolved by Article 19 (lis pendens rule).302 
 The second situation in Article 12(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation stipulates that the 
Courts of Member States before which proceedings other than for divorce, legal separation or 
marriage annulment have been initiated on grounds of jurisdiction set out in Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation,303 shall also have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility, 
                                                 
300 Text to n 398 Part II ch IV sec 4.3 and n 304 Part II ch III sec 3.3.5. 
301 There is an omission from the drafters and the translators in the English version of the regulation regarding the 
term ‘superior interest of the child’ provided in Article 12(1)(b) and ‘best interest of the child’ in Article 12(3)(b). 
In other language versions of the regulation this two terms are the same and from that it can be concluded that 
there was no intention to make any distinction of this term, Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation [2015], Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 31. 
302 Text to n 359 Part II ch IV sec 4.2. 
303 In the Case C-656/13 L v M. of 12 November 2014 a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU asking as to 
whether Article 12(3) must be interpreted as establishing jurisdiction over proceedings concerning parental 
responsibility even where no other related proceedings (that is, ‘proceedings other than those referred to in 
paragraph 1’) are pending. The CJEU concluded ‘…that the prorogation of jurisdiction provided for in Article 
12(3) of Regulation No 2201/2003 in matters of parental responsibility may be applied without it being necessary 
for those proceedings to be related to other proceedings already pending before the court in whose favour the 
prorogation of jurisdiction is sought.’ From that it gave the answer to the question that ‘…for the purposes of 
proceedings in matters of parental responsibility, the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State which is not that of 
the child’s habitual residence to be established even where no other proceedings are pending before the court 
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even if the child is not habitually resident in that Member State, if additional conditions are 
fulfilled. Three conditions are required in order to confer jurisdiction: the first is that there is 
exists a substantial connection between the child and the court seized. The child has a 
substantial connection with the Member State in question in particular, if one of the holders of 
parental responsibility is habitually resident there or that the child is a national of that State. 
These circumstances are not exhaustive, and it is possible to base the connection on others. 
Secondly, all parties to the proceedings accept the jurisdiction of those courts expressly or 
otherwise unequivocally at the time the court is seized.304 The third condition is that the 
jurisdiction is in the best interests of the child. This jurisdiction in matters of parental 
responsibility, ascertained on the basis of Article 12(3), ceases following a final judgment in 
those proceedings.305 
 Article 12(4) states that when  the child has his or her habitual residence in the territory 
of a third State which is not a contracting party to the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and cooperation in respect to  parental 
responsibility and measures for the protection of children, jurisdiction under this Article shall 
be deemed to be in the child's interest, in particular if it is found to be impossible to hold 
proceedings in the third State in question. 
 
                                                 
chosen.’ 
304 In the same Case C-656/13 L v M. of 12 November 2014, the referring court asked the CJEU whether 
‘…jurisdiction of the court seised by one party of proceedings in matters of parental responsibility has been 
‘accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings’ within the 
meaning of that provision where the defendant in those first proceedings subsequently brings a second set of 
proceedings before the same court and, on taking the first step required of him in the first proceedings, pleads the 
lack of jurisdiction of that court.’ The CJEU found that according to the actual wording of Article 12(3)(b) of 
Regulation No 2201/2003, the jurisdiction of the court chosen must have ‘been accepted expressly or otherwise 
in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings at the time the court is seised’. Article 16 of that 
regulation states that a court is deemed to be seised, in principle, at the time when the document instituting the 
proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court. Consiquently it was concuded that ‘The clear 
wording of that provision, read in the light of Article 16, thus requires the existence to be shown of an agreement, 
express or at least unequivocal, on the prorogation of jurisdiction between all the parties to the proceedings, 
at the latest at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with 
the court chosen’. The CJEU concluded that such position of the Regulation does not allow to consider the 
fulfilment of this condition in the case where the court in question is seised on the initiative of only one of the 
parties to the proceedings, another party to the proceedings brings other proceedings before the same court at a 
later date, and that other party, on taking the first step required of him in the first proceedings, pleads the lack of 
jurisdiction of the court seised. Case C-656/13, L v M, R and K, par.53-59. However, some scholars find that this 
requirement that an agreement on jurisdicition has been accepted by the parties 'at the time when the court is 
seised' can be modeled in another way. They propose elimination of such requirement and argue that the consent 
could be given in another point (time when the parties are filing their response or even tacitly by acceptng the 
jurisdiction), see de Boer, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 116)18. 
305 Case C‑436/13, E. v B. of 1 October 2014 para 50. 
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3.3.6 Jurisdiction based on the child's presence 
 
Article 13 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation details specific situations where it is either 
impossible or irrelevant to use habitual residence as connecting factor.306 This article 
corresponds with Article 6 of the 1996 Hague Convention.307 There are two hypothetical 
scenarios in this rule. In the first scenario, it is a rule creating ‘forum necessitates’ where no 
court in Member State can hear the case and the court of the place where the child is present 
acts as a jurisdiction out of necessity.308 It argues for a rule that the child’s habitual residence 
cannot be established and jurisdiction cannot be determined on the basis of Article 12 of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, meaning that the jurisdiction of the matrimonial matters cannot be 
extended to parental responsibility matters. The outcome of this rule is that the mere presence 
of the child in a territory of a State is considered to be as sufficient to give jurisdiction to the 
court of that State. The second scenario is similar and it refers to refugee children or children 
internationally displaced because of disturbances occurring in their country309 with the same 
outcome- the court where the child is present shall have jurisdiction.  
It’s important to make a distinction between this jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the 
courts in urgent cases to take the provisional measures provided in Article 20.310 The nature of 
these two rules is different. Article 20(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation enables a court which 
does not have jurisdiction as to the substance to take, exceptionally, where urgency so requires, 
a provisional measure or a protective measure in respect to assets or persons in its territorial 
jurisdiction. The provision is not a criterion of general jurisdiction, but rather a permission to 
take action under the dual pressures of the child being in danger and the need for urgent action 
to take the child out of danger.311 These measures are subject to three conditions: the measures 
concerned must be urgent; they must be taken in respect to the persons or assets in the Member 
State where the court seized of the dispute is situated, and they must be provisional.312 Those 
                                                 
306 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 159. 
307 Lagarde Report (n 93) 555 
308 ibid.  
309 Article 6(2) Brussels IIbis Regulation. The characterization of these category of children is adopted from the 
1996 Child Protection Convention which itself adopted the term from the Recommendation by the Special 
Commission of the Hague Conference on 21 October 1994 concerning the application to these children of the 
Convention of 29 May 1993 on intercountry adoption. The category of children is limited to those who left their 
countries because of the conditions which were arising there, and who often are not accompanied and, in any case, 
are temporarily or definitively deprived of their parents. This category does not concern, children who were 
internationally displaced, such as runaway or abandoned children. (Lagarde Report (n 93) 555) 
310 Text to n 401 Part II ch IV sec 4.4. 
311 Case C‑403/09 PPU, Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 
9 December 2009 para 82 and 83. 
312 Case C-523/07 A. [2009] ECR I-2805 para 47. 
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measures are applicable to children who have their habitual residence in one Member State but 
stay temporarily or intermittently in another Member State and are in a situation likely seriously 
to endanger their welfare, including their health or their development, thereby justifying the 
immediate adoption of protective measures. The provisional nature of such measures arises 
from the fact that, pursuant to Article 20(2) of the Regulation, they cease to apply when the 
court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter has taken the 
measures it considers appropriate.313 
Article 13(1) on the other hand is a rule that provides a forum necessitatis to the child 
in situations where no other forum in the Member States exists that can hear the case. To apply 
this rule the child must lack a habitual residence. It must be total lack of habitual residence. If 
for example, the child has his/her habitual residence in a third State, then the conditions given 
in article 13(1) are not fulfilled and the courts of the Member State where the child is present 
cannot seize jurisdiction on the basis of Article 13. Moreover if the second condition of Article 
13(1) is not fulfilled that the jurisdiction cannot be determined on the basis of Article 12 of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, (jurisdiction of the matrimonial matters extended to parental 
responsibility matters) then the national rules of the Member States will determine the 
jurisdiction.314  
Another peculiar aspect of this rule is that it is of its temporary nature. When the child 
acquires a new habitual residence, then the necessity for any specific jurisdiction based on the 
mere presence of the child disappears and the courts are deprived of the jurisdiction given by 
virtue of article 13(1).315 The place where the child acquires new habitual residence is also 
irrelevant in that respect. If the child acquires new habitual residence in a Member State then 
other rules for parental responsibility of the Regulation apply and if the child acquires new 
habitual residence in third State, then the court can hear the case, basing its jurisdiction on 
specific rules of the regulation (for example Article 12), or could have limited jurisdiction for 
provisional measures.  
Article 13(2) is also different from Article 20. The same distinction made between 
Article 13(1) and Article 20 also applies in the case of Article 13(2) with special notice to the 
nature of Article 13(2). The rationale of Article 13(2) is that the refugee children or children 
internationally displaced because of disturbances occurring in their country have severed their 
link with the State of their previous habitual residence and they still have not obtained new 
                                                 
313 Case C-523/07 A. [2009] ECR I-2805 para 48. 
314 On the basis of Article 14 of Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
315 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 160. 
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habitual residence in the Member State where they are present.  
 For these children, the normal jurisdiction attributed by the Regulation to the authorities 
of the State of their habitual residence is here inoperative, since these children have by 
hypothesis broken all links with the State of their previous habitual residence, and the 
precariousness of their stay in the State where they have provisionally found refuge does not 
allow it to be considered that they have acquired a habitual residence there.316 It is important 
in some situations (which are not of an urgent nature) such as designating a legal representative, 
organizing the children’s protection, etc. to confer the jurisdiction to the authorities where the 
child is present. However, in these cases the emergency is not a ground for jurisdiction.317 It 
was considered that submitting such cases under the jurisdiction for protective measures or 
even broadening the jurisdiction, based on urgency, to cover these circumstances would 
weaken the system by creating incitement to utilize urgency jurisdiction in all circumstances.318 
 
3.3.7 Residual Jurisdiction  
 
If no court has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 8 to 13, the court may found its 
jurisdiction on the basis of its own national rules on private international law. Such decisions 
are then recognized and declared enforceable in other Member States pursuant to the rules of 
the Regulation. 
Article 14 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is in connection with the rule of residual 
jurisdiction in matrimonial matters and in correlation with Article 7 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. The purpose of these rules is to set a hierarchy between community and national 
grounds of jurisdiction.319  
3.3.8 Transfer to a Court better placed to hear the case (Forum Non Conveniens) 
 
Article 15 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is a rule that introduces forum non 
conveniens doctrine320 in the area of parental responsibility issues. This rule, under certain strict 
conditions and by way of exception, allows the transfer of a case from a court of one Member 
State to a court of another Member State, when the court first seized considers that the other 
                                                 
316 Lagarde Report (n 93) 555. 
317 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 161. 
318 Lagarde Report (n 93) 555. 
319 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 160. 
320 For more on Forum non conveniens doctrine see Fawcett J. and Carruthers J., (n 139) 426. 
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court is better placed to hear the case. It is very unusual for the European jurisdictional system 
to have this sort of rule and to allow discretionary judicial cooperation among Member States 
and between Member States and third States, a position which was reaffirmed by the CJEU in 
the C-281/02, Owusu vs. Jackson case.321  Rules such as these are generally found in the 
common law legal systems where the court can have some practical considerations of 
procedural convenience322, powers which the courts in the continental law legal systems are 
not given.  
The origin of this article can be traced to articles 8 and 9 of the 1996 Hague Convention, 
but have been modified from an EU perspective.323 Article 15(1) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation provides, by way of exception (if this is in the best interests of the child), that the 
courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they 
consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, 
would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part of it: (a) stay the case or the part 
thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other 
Member State in accordance with Article15(4); or (b) [directly] request a court of another 
Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with Article15(4). This transfer to a Court 
better placed to hear the case can be activated in three ways: (a) upon application from a party; 
(b) of the court's own motion; or (c) upon application from a court of another Member State 
with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with Article15(3). In the first 
and the second situation, a transfer made of the court's own motion or by application of a court 
of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties. Article 15(3) contains 
numerus clausulus of what is considered to be a ‘particular connection’ to a Member State. The 
child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State, if that Member 
State: (a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in Article 
15(1) was seised; or (b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or (c) is the place of the 
child's nationality; or (d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or (e) 
is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the 
protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property. 
In the situations when the court of the state of origin stays the case or the part thereof 
in question and invites the parties to introduce a request before the court of another Member 
                                                 
321 C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v N. B. Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and Others [2005] ECR 
I-1383. 
322 Fawcett J. and Carruthers J., (n 139) 428-440 
323 Lagarde Report (n 93) 559-563.  
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State, by virtue of Article 15(4), the court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State 
shall be seized. If the courts are not seized by that time, the court which has been seized shall 
continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. In some specific circumstances, the courts of the ‘receiving State’, may, if this is 
in the child’s best interest, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seizure. In this situation, 
the court first seized shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seized shall continue 
to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14.324 
 In order for this rule to properly function, the courts must cooperate, either directly or 
through the central authorities designated pursuant to Article 53.325Finally it should be stated 
that recital (13) which provides for interpretation guidance on this Regulation, does not allow 
for sub-transfers from the court in the receiving Member State to a third court. 
 This rule is complex and there is ambiguity in the understanding of the exceptional 
nature of this article. In the Povse Case326 it was regarded by the Venetian Court that if the 
circumstances are not exceptional, but considered part of an ordinary dispute between parents 
relating to the custody of their child, Article 15 does not apply because this article applies ‘[b]y 
way of exception’.327It was rightfully concluded by AG Sharpstone that it does not seem correct 
to exclude the application of Article 15 of the Regulation on the grounds that the proceedings 
are concerned with an ordinary dispute between parents relating to the custody of their child.328 
The introductory words ‘[b]y way of exception’ do not require, that the circumstances must 
be exceptional before the provision may be applied. Rather, they allow a court having 
jurisdiction to derogate from the general rules of jurisdiction and to transfer the case, or a part 
thereof, to a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, 
if it considers that the latter court is better placed to hear the case and that the transfer will be 
in the best interests of the child – a situation which will, in principle, be exceptional.329  
 Another aspect of Article 15 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is that it does not allow a 
court to assume jurisdiction of its own motion. Article 15(5) clearly specifies that before it can 
assume jurisdiction in that way, a court must be seized ‘in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 
                                                 
324 Article 15(5) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
325 Article 15(6) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
326 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 para 28 and in more details Case C‑211/10 
Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 June 2010 para 101. 
327 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 





1(b)’ – that is to say, directly or indirectly, on the initiative of the court having jurisdiction, 
which stays the proceedings and invites the parties to seize the court of another Member State, 
or itself requests that court to assume jurisdiction. Although it is true that a transfer request, 
made by a court of another Member State with which the child has a ‘particular connection’, is 
possible under paragraph 2(c), the outcome of that request is a matter for the court having 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the case – and therefore for the court of the Member State of 
(former) habitual residence.330 
 Article 15 is a part of the Brussels IIbis Regulation jurisdictional system. This rule is 
very closely connected to Article 8 and is a counterbalance to the perpetuatio fori principle 
introduced by it.331 Article 8 wants to preserve the jurisdiction of the place where the child had 
his/hers habitual residence even if the child established habitual residence in another Member 
State. Thus, Article 15 ads some flexibility to the Brussels IIbis Regulation, by allowing a 
transfer to a court which is better placed or which has established proximity with the child. Due 
to these characteristics, the jurisdictional system provides for the both aspects; on the one hand 
it introduces stability, with the main jurisdictional criterion and the limited exceptions, and on 
the other it gives flexibility trough Article 15 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. What is 
significant is that there is genuine trust between the authorities which will position the child’s 
best interest before everything and not their own struggle for dominance, but these ideas stretch 






                                                 
330 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 
June 2010 par.107. 
331 Final Report Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, Analytical annexes, (n 6) 29-30. 
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Chapter IV Common provisions  
Section 3 of the second chapter of the Brussels IIbis Regulation contains provisions that 
generally refer to three situations: firstly, regarding the ascertaining of the jurisdiction, 
secondly, the question of lis pendens, and thirdly, provisional including protective measures. 
The order of the articles adopted in the Brussels IIbis Regulation is slightly different from the 
one adopted in the other European Private International Law instruments preceding  the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, such as the Brussels Convention332 and the Brussels I Regulation.333 
The PIL instruments that were adopted later than the Brussels IIbis Regulation also have a 
different approach to these questions. The Maintenance Regulation334 adopts generally the 
same structure of these rules as the Brussels IIbis Regulation, while the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation holds the same structure as the Brussels I Regulation.335 The structural logic of 
these rules points towards inconsistency in the case of Brussels IIbis Regulation because Article 
16 is in correlation with Article 19, while Article 17 is related with Article 18. These three 
situations are positioned in the same section in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, while in the 
Brussels I Regulation and in the Brussels Ibis Regulation they are positioned in three different 
sections.336 In the repealed Brussels II Regulation, the structure was the same as in the Brussels 
Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. For the purpose of better elaboration of these 
aspects, the ‘old’ Brussels II Regulation structure will be kept and explained in that manner. 
 
4.1 Ascertaining jurisdiction 
One of the vulnerabilities of the having multiple jurisdictional criteria as in the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation is that it could lead to forum shopping.337 This availability of a large number 
of potential forums is perceived differently between the Member States. Those who  are in  
                                                 
332 Articles 19-24 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (Consolidated version OJ C 27, 26.1.1998, p. 1–27). The text was amended by the 
Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland - hereafter referred to as the `1978 Accession Convention' - by the Convention 
of 25 October 1982 on the accession of the Hellenic Republic - hereafter referred to as the `1982 Accession 
Convention' - and by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic - hereafter referred to as the `1989 Accession Convention'. 
333 Articles 25-31 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
334 Articles 9-14 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
335 Articles 27-35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
336 Sections 8, 9 and 10 of Brussels I Regulation and Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
337 Boele-Woelki K., Gonzales Beilfuss C., The Impact and Application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in the 
Member States: Comparative Synthesis (n 44) 33. 
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favor of  favor divortii policy are fond of such an approach,338 while others with more strict 
attitudes towards divorce such as Ireland339 and Malta340 fear that this could lead to people 
circumventing their rigid divorce rules. The awareness of the great differences between the 
family laws of the Member States led the EU legislators early in the period of the drafting the 
Brussels II Convention to compose a rule that gave power to the courts of a Member State 
which were first seized to examine their jurisdiction and to declare of their own motion that 
they have no jurisdiction if they finds that they has no jurisdiction, and a court of another 
Member State has jurisdiction on the basis of the Convention.341 The reasoning was that the 
great number of  alternatives in the Convention could lead to attempt by the spouses of filing 
an application in front of a Court of a Member State by whose  conflict-of-law rules legislation 
would be applied  which most favorable for their interests, or, in other words, could lead to 
forum shopping.342 
Article 17 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is identical to Article 9 of the Brussels II 
Regulation. However the declaration that this rule is a cure for ‘forum shopping’ is rightfully 
criticized.343 The large number of alternative jurisdictional grounds provided in Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation produces the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction. Effectively, the 
large number of jurisdictional grounds, together with Article 19 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, creates rush to the court with the winner being the one commencing the 
proceedings first.344 Therefore, one of the prerequisites for forum shopping is that there needs 
to be ‘live’ jurisdiction, which happens when the court seized and the courts concerned do have 
jurisdiction if jurisdiction is ascertained according to the respective jurisdictional rules.345 This 
is not the case in Article 17. The conditions for application of Article 17 are that the court 
seized lacks jurisdiction over a case under the Regulation and cumulatively a court of another 
Member State has jurisdiction over that case by virtue of the Regulation. The positive aspect 
for the parties in such a case is that the court has the responsibility to investigate and determine, 
on its own motion (ex officio), whether the jurisdiction lies with the court on the basis of the 
                                                 
338 Helin, M., 'The Impact and Application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Finland' in Boele-Woelki K., 
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jurisdictional rules of the Regulation. The consequence of this rule is that the court must declare 
that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the pending proceedings. In Case A. the CJEU gave 
guidance on what a court should do in such circumstances:  
[w]here the court of a Member State does not have jurisdiction at all, it must declare of its own 
motion that it has no jurisdiction, but is not required to transfer the case to another court. However, in so 
far as the protection of the best interests of the child so requires, the national court which has declared of 
its own motion that it has no jurisdiction must inform, directly or through the central authority designated 
under Article 53 of the Regulation, the court of another Member State having jurisdiction.346 
So Article 17 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is not just a rule that intends to provide a 
cure for ‘forum shopping’. Its aim is to strengthen the jurisdictional system provided in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation as a whole347 against attempts of the parties to circumvent it.348 
Article 17 needs to be in correlation with Article 18 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. Article 
18, in combination with Article 17, establishes a European minimum standard of protection for 
the respondent in order to guarantee a fair trial and the respondents’ right to a legal hearing.349 
The first rule guarantees that the case will be heard in front of a proper court that has jurisdiction 
by virtue of the Regulation, while the latter rule guarantees that the respondents’ rights to a 
legal hearing and the right of a fair trial will be respected. 
Article 18 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation intends to guarantee the right of the 
respondent to be heard before a competent court and the opportunity to receive an effective 
defense.350 It applies in three cases. First, the general gist of this rule is that where a respondent 
habitually resident in a State other than the Member State where the action was brought does 
not enter an appearance, the court with jurisdiction shall stay the proceedings so long as it is 
not shown that the respondent has been able to receive the document instituting the proceedings 
or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defense, or that 
all necessary steps have been taken to this end. The second and the third scenario are referring 
to two other instruments Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service 
in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters 
and the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. In the cases where the document 
instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document had to be transmitted from one Member 
                                                 
346 Case C-523/07 A. [2009] ECR I-2805 para 71. 
347 This article is closely connected with Article 7 and Article 14 (See, Case C-68/07, Kerstin Sundelind Lopez v 
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State to another pursuant to Regulation 1348/2000,351 instead of the rule given in Article 18(1) 
of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, Article 19352 of Regulation 1348/2000 will apply.353 In the 
third scenario, when the provisions of Regulation 1348/2000 are not applicable, for the Member 
States of the Hague Service Convention,354 Article 15 of the Convention355 will apply. These 
                                                 
351 Now superseded by Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of 
documents). For more on this regulation see Galič A., Service Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters – From 
the Hague Conventions to the EU 1393/2007 Regulation, Зборник Радова Правног Факултета у Нишу, No.65 
(2013) 59-77. 
352 Article 19 of Regulation 1348/2000 states: 
Defendant not entering an appearance 
1. Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document has had to be transmitted to another Member State for the 
purpose of service, under the provisions of this Regulation, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall 
not be given until it is established that: 
(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the Member State addressed for the 
service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory; or 
(b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by 
this Regulation; 
and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant 
to defend. 
2. Each Member State shall be free to make it known, in accordance with Article 23(1), that the judge, 
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, may give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has 
been received, if all the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this Regulation; 
(b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed 
since the date of the transmission of the document; 
(c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it 
through the competent authorities or bodies of the Member State addressed. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective 
measures. 
4. When a writ of summons or an equivalent document has had to be transmitted to another Member State for the 
purpose of service, under the provisions of this Regulation, and a judgment has been entered against a defendant 
who has not appeared, the judge shall have the power to relieve the defendant from the effects of the expiration 
of the time for appeal from the judgment if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have knowledge of the document in sufficient time to 
defend, or knowledge of the judgment in sufficient time to appeal; and 
(b) the defendant has disclosed a prima facie defence to the action on the merits. 
An application for relief may be filed only within a reasonable time after the defendant has knowledge of the 
judgment. 
Each Member State may make it known, in accordance with Article 23(1), that such application will not be 
entertained if it is filed after the expiration of a time to be stated by it in that communication, but which shall in 
no case be less than one year following the date of the judgment. 
5. Paragraph 4 shall not apply to judgments concerning status or capacity of persons. 
353 Article 19(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
354 Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil or Commercial Matters. The Status Table of the Member States is available at 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17> accessed 26.09.2014.  
355 Article 15 of the Hague Service Convention states: 
Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, 
under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given 
until it is established that - 
a)  the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of 
documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or  
b)  the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by 
this Convention, 
and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant 
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three scenarios have a hierarchical system, which positions the second paragraph to take 
precedence over the third356and the third to take precedence over the first. Generally, the rules 
in the Regulation 1348/2000 and in the Hague Service Convention are more detailed, while the 
rule in the Brussels IIbis Regulation is more general. This hierarchy is logical, because the 
nature of these instruments is different. The Service Regulation and the Hague Service 
Convention are specifically relating to cross-border service, while in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, this is just one of the aspects of the jurisdiction. 
The impact of Article 18 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation must be viewed as being the 
first safeguard of the respondent’s right to receive the document instituting the proceedings or 
an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defense, or that all 
necessary steps have been taken to this end. The obligation to stay the proceedings is on the 
competent court. The second safeguard regarding the party’s right to be served is given in the 
recognition stage of a foreign judgment of a Member State. One of the grounds on which a 
judgment shall not be recognized is default of service.357 Therefore, the intention of Article 18 
is that court can thus satisfy itself that international jurisdiction is well-founded and thus avoid 
possible causes of refusal of recognition wherever possible.358 It does so by providing that the 
competent court could, on its own motion, stay the proceedings until respondents’ rights are 
respected. 
 
4.2 Lis Pendens rules 
The lis pendens mechanism is designed to avoid parallel actions and consequently the 
possibility of irreconcilable judgments on the same issues.359 In the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
the objective of this rule is to provide, on the basis of the basic principle of prior temporis, a 
                                                 
to defend. 
Each Contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge, notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph 
of this Article, may give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if all the following 
conditions are fulfilled - 
a)  the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this Convention, 
b)  a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed 
since the date of the transmission of the document,  
c)  no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it 
through the competent authorities of the State addressed. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case of urgency, any 
provisional or protective measures. 
356 See Article 20(1) of the Regulation 1348/2000 and Article 20(1) of the Regulation 1393/2007. 
357 Articles 22(b) and 23(c) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
358 Borras Report (n 8) 45. 
359 For more on lis pendens and other options of declining jurisdiction, see Shúilleabháin, M.N., Cross Border 
Divorce Law, (n 63) 188-230. 
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solution for the various possibilities in family law, which differ from those in property law.360 
Rules regarding lis pendens are one of the mechanisms through which Member States attempt 
to prevent the problem of ‘forum shopping’. This problem arises because of the different fora 
in front of which the parties can engage in proceedings. The system archetype of concurrent 
proceedings is caused by the inherent differences, both in procedure and substance, among the 
State’s legal orders, with the result being that each litigant is naturally drawn to introduce an 
action before his or her domestic courts whenever the possibility of so doing so arises, rather 
than submitting to the jurisdiction of a foreign court chosen by his or her opponent.361 
Generally the lis alibi pendens solution is mainly adopted in the civil law 
jurisdictions.362 The common law countries are more in favor of the ‘forum non conviniens’ 
doctrine.363 This doctrine allows courts that have jurisdiction over a case to stay or dismiss the 
case upon a determination that the case may be more appropriately heard in another court.364 
The difference between these two doctrines lies in the role that is given to the judge. Generally 
the role of the judge in the civil law countries is more passive and is in conflict  with the idea 
behind ‘forum non conviniens’ that the judge can  exercise discretion to stay or dismiss a case 
in favor of a foreign court if  the interest of justice is best served if the trial takes place in 
another court.365  
Article 19 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation establishes the lis pendens rule and 
‘dependent actions’. Its goal is to avoid bringing about contending matrimonial proceedings 
and, as a consequence, the possibility of irreconcilable judgments on the same issue rendered 
by courts in different Member States.366 So the possible conflict of concurrent proceedings in 
the Brussels IIbis Regulation is solved by Article 19, which establishes a rule based on the 
principle of ‘Qui prior est tempore potior est iure’. According to this rule, proceedings brought 
before the court first seized take precedence over all other competing actions. Hence, the aim 
behind this provision is to prevent and avoid complex and prolonged arguments over the better 
or more convenient forum when there are competing jurisdictions within the EU. However, 
this rule creates utter unfairness in the problem of ‘forum shopping’.367 As a rule, it is envisaged 
to give support to the idea of developing European legislation in the family law field that is 
                                                 
360 Borras Report (n 8) 46. 
361 Marongiu Buonaiuti, F., Lis Alibi Pendens and Related Actions in Civil and Commercial Matters within the 
European Judicial Area, Yearbook of Private International Law, vol.11(2009) 513. 
362 Brand A. R., Challenges to Forum Non Conveniens, International Law and Politics, Vol.45 (2013) 1009. 
363 ibid. 
364 ibid. 
365 ibid 1005. 
366 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 222. 
367 ibid 223.  
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based on the necessity to impose clear and simple rules to establish the primary jurisdiction 
and to ensure that once that primary jurisdiction is established it is given the fullest support in 
the discharge of its consequent responsibilities.368 Nevertheless in the cases with a foreign 
element where the temptation for the parties is first to maneuver and then to fight to establish 
the jurisdiction which one believes will be more generous and the other believes will be less 
generous,369  the problem of ’forum shopping’ is specially emphasized and the rush to the court 
creates great advantages both in procedural and in substantive aspects. It can rightfully be said 
that this rule favors social interests and highlights its own efficiency and predictability over the 
values which are focused on individual interests such as equity and fairness.370  
Lis pendens and the dependent action mechanism in the Brussels IIbis Regulation can 
find their counterparts in Articles 27-31 of the Brussels I Regulation. The base of this rule was 
originally taken from Articles 21-23 of the Brussels Convention371 and was drafted having in 
mind Article 13 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention.372The rule itself was amended 
in the Brussels Convention by Article 8 of the 1989 Accession Convention, because in the 
version form 1968 the second court was required to decline jurisdiction in the event that another 
court had previously been seized.373 It was considered that this approach was too radical,374 
because it could lead to situations where the second seized court would decline jurisdiction in 
favor of another court and then the first seized court could decide that it did not have 
jurisdiction and with this create legal uncertainty.  As a result of this, Article 21 of the Brussels 
Convention was amended so that the court other than the court first seized could of its own 
motion stay its proceedings (rather than decline) until the jurisdiction of the other court has 
been established. This common ground375 of the lis pendens rules of the Brussels I Regulation 
                                                 
368 Prazic v. Prazic (2006) 2 FLR 1124, 1136. 
369 Wermuth v. Wermuth (No.1) (2003) 1 FLR 1022 
370 Brand A., R, (n 362) 1010. 
371 Which are the same as those in Brussels I Regulation 
372 Article 13 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention states: 
(1)  The authorities of a Contracting State which have jurisdiction under Articles 5 to 10 to take measures for the protection of 
the person or property of the child must abstain from exercising this jurisdiction if, at the time of the commencement of the 
proceedings, corresponding measures have been requested from the authorities of another Contracting State having jurisdiction 
under Articles 5 to 10 at the time of the request and are still under consideration. 
(2)  The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply if the authorities before whom the request for measures was 
initially introduced have declined jurisdiction. 
On this issue also see, Borras Report (n 8) 46. 
373 Article 21 of the 1968 Brussels Convention.  
374 Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
done at Lugano on 16 September 1988 (Jenard/Möller Report), Official Journal of the European Communities, 
No. C 189/57. 
375 cf Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance Ltd and Deutsche Ruck Uk Reinsurance Ltd and Pine Top 
Insurance Company Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Company [1991] ECR I-03317 where the CJEU has stated 
that lis pendes rules in the Brussels I regime are intended ‘to prevent parallel proceedings before the courts of 
different Contracting States and to avoid conflicts between decisions which might result therefrom.’ Such aspect 
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and the Brussels IIbis Regulation allows, when applying Article 19 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, regard to be given to the rulings of the CJEU referring to the lis alibi pendens rules 
in the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation.376  
Article 19 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation originates from the predecessors of the 
Brussels regime and it is similar to its counterparts, however it has been modified for its 
material scope and it has been drafted differently. Article 19(1) refers to applications for 
divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment between the same parties but it does not 
cover any proceedings relating to parental responsibility. Article 19(1) covers two situations, 
firstly regarding proceedings relating to the same subject-matter and where cause of action is 
brought before courts of different Member States and secondly proceedings which do not relate 
to the same cause of action, but which are ‘dependent actions’ that are brought before courts 
of different Member States.377 This means that the ‘material scope’ of Article 19(1) is wide, 
covering  all of the matrimonial legal issues covered by the Brussels IIbis Regulation (divorce, 
legal separation or marriage annulment), and when one of these proceedings are pending in one 
Member State, subsequent action on any of these three issues cannot proceed in another 
Member State.378 
In contrast to Article 19(1), Article 19(2) applies if several proceedings relating to 
parental responsibilities relate to the same child and involve the ‘same cause of action’. For 
the mechanism in Article 19(2) to have effect, the proceedings in the two Member States must 
both be proceedings on the substance of the matters of parental responsibility that were 
raised.379 If, for example, the proceedings in one Member State are for issuing provisional and 
protective measures under Article 20,380 then any proceedings in another Member State raised 
subsequently which deal with the substance of parental responsibility issues in relation to the 
same child will not be subject to the rule in Article 19(2). This aspect was considered in the 
Purrucker II case,381 where the Amtsgericht Stuttgart referred to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling on whether the provisions of Article 19(2) dealing with lis pendens and related actions 
applied in two cases. The first case was where the court in one Member State was seized only 
of an action to obtain an order for provisional measures within the meaning of Article 20 of the 
                                                 
was reaffirmed in the Borras Report where it was stated that the Article in the Brussels II Convention on lis 
pendens are based on Article 21 of the Brussels Convention. See Borras Report (n 8) 45.  
376 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 224. 
377 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 15. 
378 Shúilleabháin, M.N. (n 63) 188. 
379 ibid 38. 
380 Text to n 401 Part II ch IV sec 4.4. 
381 Case C-296/10, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Valles Perez [2010] ECR I-11163. 
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Regulation. The second case was where a court of another Member State that has jurisdiction 
as to the substance of the matter within the meaning of the Regulation was the second court 
seized by the other party of an action with the same object: seeking to obtain a judgment as to 
the substance of the matter of parental responsibility, whether on a provisional or on a final 
basis. To these questions, the CJEU answered that the provisions of Article 19(2) are not 
applicable in either circumstance.382 The reasoning behind this is that, as the provisional 
measures are not enforceable in the other Member State [according to the rules of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, there is no possibility of the judgments conflicting.383 
Article 19(3) covers the situation where the court first seized accepts the jurisdiction. 
The consequence of such an action is that the court second seized is mandated to stay the 
proceedings pending before it, if it regards the cause of both proceedings as identical. It was 
disputed in the Purrucker II case about the duration of the time that the court second seized 
should wait before making a decision as regards the question whether the court first seized has 
jurisdiction on the substance of the matters raised. The CJEU indicated that  
[n]otwithstanding efforts made by the court second seised to obtain information by enquiry of 
the party claiming lis pendens, the court first seised and the central authority, the court second seised, 
lacks any evidence which enables it to determine the cause of action of proceedings brought before 
another court and which serves, in particular, to demonstrate the jurisdiction of that court in accordance 
with Regulation No 2201/2003, and where, because of specific circumstances, the interest of the child 
requires the handing down of a judgment which may be recognised in Member States other than that of 
the court second seised, it is the duty of that court, after the expiry of a reasonable period in which 
answers to the enquiries made are awaited, to proceed with consideration of the action brought before it. 
The duration of that reasonable period must take into account the best interests of the child in the specific 
circumstances of the proceedings concerned.’384 
Article 19 is a single article that contains rules for lis pendens and for related actions. 
This characteristic is slightly different from the other Regulations.385 They all contain separate 
rules for lis pendens and for related actions.386 The lis pendens rules are referring to concurrent 
proceedings that presuppose identical proceedings,387 both as concerns the cause of action and 
the parties388.  Whether for related or unrelated actions, the actions present a close connection 
                                                 
382 Case C-296/10, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Valles Perez [2010] ECR I-11163 para 86. 
383 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 39. 
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385 Brussels I Regulation Brussels Ibis Regulation, Maintenance Regulation, etc. 
386 See Article 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation, Articles 29 and 30 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 
12 and 13 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
387 Although the ‘identical’ aspect can be apprised with a certain degree of flexibility.  
388 Marongiu Buonaiuti, F., (n 362) 513. 
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to one another that is expedient to having them treated jointly in order to prevent the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments that may arise if they were treated separately.389 
Generally, this articles aim is to achieve same preventive form of coordination among 
the jurisdictions, which is also the aim of the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. 
In fact it can be said that the rules relating to lis alibi pendens and related actions may foster 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments390 because they tend to provide order to 
the establishment of jurisdiction by the courts of Member States based on the prior tempore 
principle, and they prevent refusal of recognition because of the existence of a contrast between 
judgments. But Article 19 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation cannot be interpreted in isolation 
from the other rules. Articles 22 and 23 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (grounds for non-
recognition relating to matrimonial matters and parental responsibility issues) approach the 
problem of irreconcilable judgments from another standpoint. Articles 22 and 23 represent a 
cure for the problem of irreconcilable judgments, a last resort so this problem could be avoided, 
while the lis pendens and the related action rule is more of an attempt to prevent parallel 
proceedings and irreconcilable judgments.391 Article 19 (1) and (2) give power to the court first 
seized to determine in which Member State proceedings might be brought, so in a way it can 
be said that these are rules concerning jurisdiction – jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. By 
contrast Article 19(3), which provides that the court second seized shall decline jurisdiction in 
favor of the first seized court if that court has established jurisdiction, is a rule concerning the 
recognition of foreign judgments- foreign judgments within the Community establishing 
jurisdiction.392 
Eventually, the rules provided in Article 19 would come to be seen in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation system as rules which have not e prevented but rather have resulted in ‘forum 
shopping’ and ‘rush to the Court’393 especially in matrimonial matters. This rule in conjunction 
with Article 3 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, where more than one Court can have  
jurisdiction on matrimonial matters, and also with the limited number of Member States where 
the Rome III Regulation applies, creates a fertile ground for financial disadvantages and 
physical inconvenience for the respondent.394 In the cases of parental responsibility, some of 
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these negative aspects have been mitigated thanks to the rule on transfer on jurisdiction.395 In 
such cases, a Court of a Member State can decline jurisdiction to one court in favor of another 
court which is in a better position to hear the case. This has provided for more a flexible 
approach to the question of lis pendens. If such possibility is present regarding the parental 
responsibility issues, which are issues that are equally if not more sensitive, there is a possibility 
of future introduction of such a rule regarding  matrimonial matters,396 although the current use 
of the rule for transfer of jurisdiction regarding parental responsibility issues remains limited 
in the Member States.397   
  
4.3 The Seizing of a Court 
Article 16 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is essentially a provision of a definition and 
its goal is to establish materially uniform approach as to how to ascertain the point of time 
when a court is deemed to be seized. This rule employs an autonomous notion and formula of 
EU law. It was introduced because of the generally bad experiences with the Brussels I 
Convention where the lack of an autonomous definition of ‘seizing’ of court created a fertile 
ground for confusion and conflicting decisions.398 
The approach taken in article 16 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is that it does not 
introduce any notion of seizing to be applied universally throughout the Member States in their 
procedural laws, nor does it attempt to unify the existing definitions of seizing in national law. 
Article 16 takes into account the divergences in national law as to the definitions of seizing 
between the national laws of the Member States and tries to reflect these divergences in its two 
alternatives. Also, it only establishes a position when a certain court is seized and does not 
attempt to refer to the position of ‘first seized’ court.399 
 Article 16 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation requires that a court will be seized at the 
time that the proceedings were formally initiated, but only if subsequently the necessary 
initiation procedures will have been completed. There are two alternatives to this position: 
Article 19(a) provides that a court is only seized by the filing of the claim if subsequently the 
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claim is served and Article 19(b) provides that a court is only seized by service of the claim if 
subsequently the claim is filed.400  
4.4 Provisional, including protective measures (Article 20) 
Provisional, including protective, measures are frequently used in cases decided 
according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation.401 As legal instruments, they generally represent 
measures that are intended to produce effects for only a limited period - until a certain event 
occurs or a certain period of time elapses.402 Such measures are particularly vital in urgent 
cases,403 where a provisional arrangement in respect to person or assets may prove essential 
while the substance is decided elsewhere.404 Family law cases are considered very delicate and 
sensitive especially where children are involved. The decisions in family law cases compared 
to other civil law issues are considered to be more changeable, because the circumstances in 
cases involving children can change rapidly and something that is favorable towards them at 
one time can prove to be harmful in other time. Therefore, it is for the Courts to follow the 
development of new circumstances and act accordingly so they can be responsive to and protect 
the children’s best interest.  
On the other hand, very often circumstances necessitate prompt and decisive acts by 
the authorities of a Member State where the children are situated and not by those that, 
according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation, have the jurisdiction. In these cases, a court that 
lacks jurisdiction regarding parental responsibility issues must act promptly and take measures 
in order to protect the integrity of the children or their assets. At the same time, these measures 
also lack a finality in the proportion that parental responsibility decisions have. Therefore, this 
sub-chapter will analyze the provisional including the protective measures in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation and will try to highlight the positive and negative aspects in order to answer the 
question on how to properly restrain the Courts that take such measures from occupying the 
jurisdiction of courts which have rightfully determined jurisdiction to be theirs according to 
the rules of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
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 4.4.1. General 
 
Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation enables an applicant to seek provisional, 
including protective, measures from a court even if, under the Regulation, another court has 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the case. Article 20(2) provides that the taken measures will 
be of temporary nature; they cease to apply when the court entrusted with jurisdiction under 
the Regulation as to the substance of the matter has taken the appropriate measures.  
The origin of this rule can be found in the Brussels II Convention and in the Brussels II 
Regulation. Article 12 of the Brussels II Regulation and of the Brussels II Convention contain 
substantially similar provisions to Article 20(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. Also Article 
31 of the Brussels I Regulation contains a similar rule.405 Such common ground among these 
rules provides for the case law and the legal writings of these legal sources to be used in the 
interpretation of Article 20 of Brussels IIbis Regulation.406 The difference between these rules 
and the rule in Brussels IIbis Regulation is in the temporal limitation provided in Article 20(2). 
Another rule from the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention also served as a model 
for Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. Article 11 of the 1996 Convention contains 
rules for provisional measures taken in cases of urgency. It provides that in all cases of urgency, 
the authorities of any Contracting State in whose territory the child or property belonging to 
the child is present have jurisdiction to take any necessary measures of protection,407which 
lapse as soon as the authorities of the State of habitual residence have taken these measures 
required by the situation.408  
However, Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and Article 11 of the 1996 Hague 
Convention have significant differences. Firstly, the provisions in Article 11 and Article 12409 
of the 1996 Hague Convention are jurisdictional rules,410 while the position of Article 20 in the 
jurisdictional system of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is different. Namely, Articles 8 to 15 of 
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the Brussels IIbis Regulation sets out a comprehensive list of rules on jurisdiction in relation 
to matters of parental responsibility. According to the nature of such cases, many decisions will 
be of a provisional character, as AG Sharpstone stated:  
[i]t is of the nature and essence of family law that, as children grow up and circumstances 
change, substantive decisions on parental responsibility may need to be varied (or indeed reversed). 
Consequently, no such decision is definitive or final in the sense that a decree of divorce is definitive or 
final. And all decisions on parental responsibility produce their effects only for a limited period, in that 
they necessarily lapse when the child reaches the age of majority.
411
  
Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation makes it clear that those jurisdictional rules 
do not prevent courts of a Member State from taking urgent provisional measures under 
national law in respect of persons in that State, even if a court of another Member State has 
jurisdiction as to the substance, and it also makes clear that such measures will cease to apply 
when the latter court has taken appropriate action. This rule does not seek to regulate all 
provisional measures. Also this provision does not seek to confer any substantive jurisdiction. 
It merely allows, in specified circumstances, another court, which is temporarily better placed 
for that purpose than the court having substantive jurisdiction, to take urgently necessary 
provisional measures which remain subordinate to the measures decided on by the court of 
jurisdiction.412In this context, AG Bot reached, in its Opinion on the Detiček Case, a similar 
conclusion: that Article 20 is not a criterion of general jurisdiction, but rather a permission to 
take action under the dual pressures of the child being in danger and the need for urgent action 
to take the child out of danger.413Another argument in this manner, can be found in the 
structural position of Article 20 in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. It is positioned as the last 
article of Chapter II of the Regulation, separately in a different section with title ‘Common 
provisions’ and is set up as the opposite of the rules of jurisdiction, which are given in Sections 
I and II and under a  different section title.414 This is not the case in the 1996 Hague Child 
Protection Convention. Article 11 of the 1996 Hague Convention is the same chapter with all 
of the other jurisdictional rules, and it bears the same title ‘Jurisdiction’.415 
                                                 
411Case C-256/09 Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez [2010] ECR I-07353 Opinion of AG Sharpston 
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Secondly, the 1996 Hague Convention provides for the recognition and enforcement of 
measures adopted in accordance with Article 11 and the measures thereof.416 It should be borne 
in mind that, under the rules laid down in that convention – more specifically, in Article 23(2) 
(a) on recognition, and Article 26(3), which refers back to Article 23(2) on enforcement – 
review of the international jurisdiction of the court which adopted the measure is permissible. 
That is not true of the system of recognition and enforcement provided for in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, since Article 24 of that regulation prohibits any review of the jurisdiction of the 
court of the Member State of origin.417 
To properly understand Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, it is vital to 
elaborate on the circumstances under which it can be applied. In a recent Study on the 
assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation,418  the main problems identified in the application 
of Article 20 were found in the lack of clarity on the definition and scope of the provisional 
measures as well as the impossibility of applying provisional measures in matrimonial matters 
cases.419 So these ambiguities ask for a clearer position of the provisional measures in the 
system of the Brussels IIbis Regulation through two necessary aspects: first, the scope of this 
rule must be determined and secondly, the limits of this rule must be explained in detail.  
The ratio tempori of this rule applies from the moment the dispute occurs or even the 
moment when the proceedings on the merit are no longer pending, until the court of the 
Member State that has jurisdiction as to the substance takes measures it considers 
appropriate.420 It is in the nature of these measures to give power to the court to take the 
necessary measures to protect the person or assets from the point in time when these 
‘exceptionally serious and directly linked to the child’ situations occur until the point when the 
court that has jurisdiction as to the substance takes over and assures that protection. Therefore, 
the temporal scope of application of this rule is positioned between these two points in time. 
The territorial scope of application of Article 20 is the same as that of the Regulation. It applies 
only between the Member States that find the Regulation applicable. In other countries 
(Denmark or other countries), the Regulation does not preclude provisional measures being 
adopted by courts on the basis of other international instruments. The fragmentation of the 
ratione materiae of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is evident. Today this Regulation is not the 
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only set of rules that covers cross-border family law relations in the EU. The Maintenance 
Regulation and other possible future regulations are creating the fragmentation of this area of 
law and thus it makes difficult to accept the extensive interpretation of the material scope of 
Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, which argues that it covers provisional measures 
outside the scope of the Regulation itself.421 Also within the Brussels IIbis Regulation, it is 
questionable whether such rules can be applied to matrimonial matters or they can be applied 
only regarding parental responsibility issues.422  
 
 4.4.2. Conditions for application of Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation 
 
Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation does not specifically explain the conditions 
for the application of provisional including protective measures in cases covered by the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation. Generally, it states that:  
[I]n urgent cases, the provisions of this Regulation shall not prevent the courts of a Member 
State from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets in that 
State as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if, under this Regulation, the court 
of another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.  
The limits of Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation were first given in the Case C-
523/07 (A. case), where it was stated that the adoption of measures in matters of parental 
responsibility by courts of Member States which do not have jurisdiction as to the substance of 
the matter is subject to three cumulative conditions, namely: (1) the measures concerned must 
be urgent; (2) they must be taken in respect to persons or assets in the Member State where the 
court seised of the dispute is situated, and (3) they must be provisional.423  
4.4.2.1 The measures must be urgent 
 
The first prerequisite is that the measures taken by the court that doesn’t have 
substantive jurisdiction are of an urgent nature. However, this term is not specifically explained 
in the Regulation. This can be problematic, because the application of this rule is based on the 
criterion of urgency and not on the criterion of proximity, the basis for the grounds on 
jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility.424 In specific situations this criterion for a 
                                                 
421 Opposite of this approach see Borras Report (n 8) para 59. 
422 Final Report Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 Analytical annexes (n 6) 45. 
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424 Recital (12) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
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limited time prevails over the other criteria and allows a court of a Member State to apply lex 
fori irrespective of any criterion of initial jurisdiction.425 The sole jurisdictional system of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation is positioned as such way that it discourages  forum shopping in 
matters relating to parental responsibility by maintaining and defending as inviolable the initial 
jurisdiction of the court seized as to the substance of the case.426 The Brussels IIbis Regulation 
was structured in a manner such that it has a general rule of jurisdiction and has limited 
exceptions to the general rule, and for the provisional measures it lifts the level of urgency only 
in exceptional cases.427 This structure allows the court that has most proximity to the case 
(which is the court of the habitual residence of the child) to maintain its jurisdiction, but 
nevertheless it acknowledges that there will be some situations, which are exceptionally serious 
and directly linked to the child’s situation,428 that can allow a court to take appropriate measures 
in cases of urgency. Because Article 20 is a rule that functions as an exception and can allow a 
court of a Member State to take measures irrespective of the court which has jurisdiction as to 
the substance, its interpretation has to be very strict and very narrow.429 
The characterization of a situation as urgent, an action conducted by national law, can 
produce ambiguity and inconsistency of the implementation of the Regulation,430 so the CJEU 
in several preliminary rulings developed an explanation of the term ‘urgent situations’. In the 
A. Case, the court referred to this situation as one in which the children:  
[a]re in a situation likely seriously to endanger their welfare, including their health or their 
development, thereby justifying the immediate adoption of protective measures.431  
In Detiček case, the CJEU stated that:  
[i]t must be considered that the concept of urgency in that provision relates both to the situation 
of the child and to the impossibility in practice of bringing the application concerning parental 
responsibility before the court with jurisdiction as to the substance.432  
Also in this case, the CJEU made a distinction between change of circumstances in the 
situation of wrongful removal and retention and the criterion of urgency, disallowing the 
                                                 
The grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the present Regulation are shaped 
in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. This means that jurisdiction 
should lie in the first place with the Member State of the child's habitual residence, except for certain cases of a 
change in the child's residence or pursuant to an agreement between the holders of parental responsibility. 
425 Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 Opinion of the AG Bot para 84. 
426 ibid para 74. 
427 As the example given in the Practice Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation (n 106) 11. 
428 Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 Opinion of the AG Bot para 85. 
429 Case C-523/07 A. [2009] ECR I-02805 Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 29 January 2009 para 56; Case C-
403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 Opinion of the AG Bot para 94-95. 
430 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 253. 
431 Case C-523/07 A. [2009] ECR I-02805 para 48. 
432 Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 para 42. 
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circumvention of the principles on which the Regulation is based. 433 Moreover, AG Bot in the 
Opinion on this case specified that:  
[I]t is very clear that this necessary exception to the general rule of jurisdiction can be justified 
only in exceptional circumstances, such as those which arise when there is an imminent danger which 
can be prevented only by urgent action in response to a situation which either produces the danger or is 
incapable of averting it.434  
[S]o this limitation to the criterion of urgency is positioned between the ‘the dual pressures of 
the child being in danger and the need for urgent action to take the child out of danger.435 
 
4.4.2.2 The measures must be taken in respect to persons or assets in the Member 
State where the court seized of the dispute is situated 
 
The second condition in the application of Article 20 is that the provisional measures 
must be taken in respect to persons or assets in the Member State where the court seized of the 
dispute is situated. This condition is based on the territoriality principle, which requires that 
the provisional measures taken with regard to the person or assets are filed in front of the court 
where the person and assets are present.436 Such an approach is different from the one taken in 
relation to the Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation, which requires the existence of a ‘real 
connecting link’ with the subject matter of the requested measure.437 The approach outlined  in  
Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation raised two questions that needed to be addressed by 
the CJEU: firstly, which persons need to be present in the Member state of the court seized, 
and secondly, about the relocation of the person/persons. Regarding the first question the CJEU 
has no clear standpoint. In Detiček case, the CJEU provided that:  
[a]s is apparent from the very wording of Article 20(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, provisional 
measures must be taken in respect of persons in the Member State in which the courts with jurisdiction 
to take such measures are located. A provisional measure in matters of parental responsibility ordering a 
change of custody of a child is taken not only in respect of the child but also in respect of the parent to 
whom custody of the child is now granted and of the other parent who, following the adoption of the 
measure, is deprived of that custody.438 
Latter, in the Purricker case, AG Sharpstone in its opinion took quite the opposite 
standpoint and concluded:  
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[I]t might appear, from paragraphs 50 to 52 of the judgment in Detiček, that, for a provisional 
measure concerning parental responsibility to be taken in the circumstances set out in Article 20, not 
only the child but also the persons previously and/or newly exercising that responsibility must be present 
in the Member State concerned. However, I agree with the view expressed at the hearing by a number of 
those present that such an approach would be incorrect, and that it is the presence of the child alone 
which determines whether urgent provisional measures may be taken with respect to him or her.’439  
This position is much closer to the goal of Article 20, which it wants to achieve. 
Specifically, Article 20 is based on the criterion of urgency and not on the criterion of proximity 
as the grounds on which jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility are based. It is 
envisaged as a rule that allows a court that does not have jurisdiction as to the substance to 
temporarily take necessary measures as to the persons or assets which are located in its territory, 
until the court that has jurisdiction as to the substance ‘joins’ in the protection of the person(s)  
and assets. It is not envisaged as a rule that permanently grants rights. Only the persons and 
assets directly involved are subject to this rule and it is only applied for specific urgent cases. 
. So only the presence of the child who is in some kind of urgent situation determines what 
kind of measures are needed for his/her protection. 
Regarding the second question, it is accepted that the relocation should have no impact 
on the applicability of Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.440 Nevertheless, such 
decisions in these kind of situations raise the question of enforcement in another Member State. 
The standpoint of AG Sharpstone, which was also the standpoint taken in the Purrucker case, 
was to distinguish between provisional measures adopted by a court of a Member State on the 
basis of competence derived by that court, from the rules on substantive jurisdiction in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation and provisional measures adopted by a court of a Member State on 
the basis of national law in the circumstances set out in Article 20 of Brussels IIbis 
Regulation.441 If the court adopted provisional measures:  
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[o]n the basis of competence derived by that court from the rules on substantive jurisdiction in 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and [in] matters of parental 
responsibility must be recognized and enforced in other Member States in the same way as any other 
judgment adopted on the same basis, in accordance with Article 21 et seq. of that Regulation.442  
But if the court adopted the measures:  
[o]n the basis of national law in the circumstances set out in Article 20 of Regulation No 
2201/2003 the measures do not have to be recognised or enforced in other Member States in accordance 
with Article 21 et eq. of the Regulation.443  
This restrictive approach was made less rigorous with the aspect that the:  
[r]egulation does not, however, preclude their recognition or enforcement in accordance with 
procedures derived from national law, in particular those required by multilateral or bilateral conventions 
to which the Member States concerned are parties.444  
4.4.2.3 The measures must be provisional 
 
There is an inherent risk445 present in the situations where proceedings of a provisional 
nature might lead de facto to measures of a more permanent nature if some kind of temporal 
limitation is not presented in this rule. Article 20(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation states that 
measures provided under this article cease to apply when the court of the Member State having 
jurisdiction under the Regulation as to the substance of the matter has taken the measures it 
considers appropriate. This limitation however raises two questions: what is the length for 
which this provisional measures remain in force and what if the court that has jurisdiction as 
to the substance of the case does not take actions for the protection of the persons or assets?  
The Brussels IIbis Regulation is an EU act and as such, an autonomous interpretation 
of its rules is exercised and implemented.446 Article 20 is no exception to this ‘autonomous’ 
interpretation, and its temporal limitation and implementation stands, irrespective of the 
domestic law of the seized court. But on the other hand, the measures are taken on the basis of 
the provisional measures known in the national legal system and in some cases these measures 
can be decided on without a specific time limit. As such, the requirement of Article 20 regarding 
temporal limitation is not to a priori position a specific time frame, but to limit generally the 
court that takes them in the respect that these measures are not definite. The most effective 
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length of these measures, however, depends on the parties and on the actions taken by the court 
that has jurisdiction as to the substance of the case.447 
 As for the cases where the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the case does 
not take appropriate measures for the protection of the persons or assets the result could be 
prolongment of the provisional measures and also to them becoming de facto permanent 
measures.448 Generally this kind of development is not desirable in the implementation of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, because such an implementation of Article 20 leads to circumvention 
of the general rules of jurisdiction. For this jurisdictional system to be properly implemented, 
actions preventing such circumvention are not only taken on the court level but also regarding 
persons concerned, who can take proactive measures by filing proceedings on the merits and 
resolve this kind of dispute in a more permanent manner. 
 Provisional including protective measures represent an important tool in the 
implementation of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, especially regarding parental responsibility 
issues. Moreover, their frequent use provided for several references of the CJEU to some 
aspects of Article 20. In these aspects, the CJEU has provided some guidelines and principles 
with which Article 20 is to be applied, but still the complexity of this rule asks for a further 
explanation or some form of detailed guidelines for its application by the relevant authorities. 
This is particularly important because sometimes these provisional measures can become final 
measures and they could lead to the circumvention of the whole jurisdictional regime. In this 
context, the elaboration of the CJEU about the measures in matters of parental responsibility 
which were rendered by courts of Member States which do not have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter must be in accordance with three cumulative conditions, namely: (1) 
the measures concerned must be urgent; (2) they must be taken in respect to persons or assets 
in the Member State where the court seized of the dispute is situated, and (3) they must be 
provisional. Furthermore, the elaboration by the CJEU on these aspects gives the Courts of 
Member States more formality and rigidity in the implementation of Article 20 as a rule, which 
is something different and could potentially endanger the jurisdictional rules in the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation.  
 Another aspect regarding the provisional including protective measures which can be 
seen as problematic is the enforcement of such measures. While domestic enforcement is 
generally seen as unproblematic, the cross-border enforcement of these measures has always 
                                                 




been highly debated and seen from different angles. Because of the nature of the EU, some 
kind of ground rules for the enforcement of such measures within the EU have been given in 
the relevant PIL regulations, but there are still large differences between the Member States in 
the understanding and the implementation of such rules. In that context the most problematic 
aspect of the enforcement of provisional including protective measures in parental 
responsibility issues is whether such measures are adopted on the basis of Article 20 or if they 
are rendered by court that assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the jurisdictional regime in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation. This difference influences whether recognition and enforcement of 
such measures can be conducted according to the rules in the Brussels IIbis Regulation or other 
national or international legal sources. Such position strongly necessitates the Courts to 
properly apply the whole private international law system established by the EU. In this context 
some particular guidelines given by the relevant authorities are highly welcomed, such of those 
given by the German Federal Court.449 
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Chapter V Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
according to Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
5.1 The system of exequatur in the area of Private International Law of the 
European Union 
 
Some of the main objectives of all European instruments regarding recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is to achieve the ‘free movement of court decisions’, to 
create a ‘genuine judicial area’ within the ‘area of freedom security and justice’ and recognizing 
and enforcing all judgments given in Member States in the European Union without a formal 
recognition procedure.450 The basis for the functioning of the whole EU legal system and with 
that the system for recognition and enforcement in the EU is mutual trust.451 It is often reiterated 
that ‘mutual trust is cornerstone of judicial co-operation in the EU’.452 This position is even 
reassured by the ECtHR; it states that the Brussels regime in the EU ‘is based on the principle 
of 'mutual trust in the administration of justice' in the European Union’.453 
This shows how important ‘mutual trust’ is for recognition and enforcement procedures 
in the EU. The understanding of the term ‘mutual trust’ must be derived from its definition as 
a basic fact of social life that is the understanding of trust as a component of human behavior. 
Trust is described as ‘confidence in one’s expectations for other peoples’ behavior’.454 So trust 
directly influences the perception of complexity of life with all its incidents and possibilities. 
Trust is a behavior meant to reduce complexity to the degree that decisions about present 
alternatives of actions can be taken with a view to the future.455 On the other hand, trust is 
reduced where control is guaranteed.456 In this context law plays important role in society, 
because it provides certainty by control.457 So from a sociological point of view, law and trust 
represent functional equivalents.458 In context of recognition and enforcement within the EU, 
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the search for better procedures represents a search for the balance between trust and control. 
The principle of ‘mutual trust’ from the perspective of the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign decisions in the EU459 is manifested through the principle of ‘mutual recognition’. 
However, ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual recognition,’ understood as terms and principles, are not 
synonyms. Mutual recognition of judgments is a goal, an objective,460 while the principle of 
mutual recognition is a legal principle of EU law461, a cornerstone of the internal market, and 
a fundamental principle in judicial cooperation on civil matters.462 On the other hand, mutual 
trust is an obligation of all the authorities of a Member State to trust the authorities of the other 
Member State and therefore to assume their decisions,463 and is the cornerstone in the 
construction of a true European judicial area.464 So in a way, mutual trust is a factual and 
political ground for the implementation of mutual recognition: and on the other hand when 
mutual trust exists, mutual recognition should be improved.465 
Currently in EU law there are five systems of recognition and enforcement. The first 
system is the classical model of exequatur which was firstly implemented by the Brussels 
Convention and then transposed into the Brussels I Regulation. Later it was applied in a 
modified version according to the subject matter of the regulations in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, the Insolvency Regulation466 and the Succession Regulation.467 This system, for 
the purpose of enforcing a judgment rendered by the courts of another Member State, entails 
intermediate measures. It envisages that the competent authority of the Member State of 
enforcement issues a declaration of enforceability after some formalities are satisfied. This 
declaration then can be appealed by the party against whom enforcement is sought by invoking 
limited grounds of refusal.468 
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The second model in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, which will be explained in more 
detail in this chapter, allows for the first time in the history of the European Union free 
circulation of decisions (abolishment of exequatur), limited to cases of child abduction and 
access rights. For these decisions, the court of origin certifies the judgment as enforceable, 
provided that certain requirements are fulfilled. This certified judgment is then enforceable in 
the Member State of enforcement, without having to issue a declaration of enforceability and 
is without the possibility of an appeal. The other two procedures for the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions relating to matrimonial matters and matters relating to parental 
responsibility are undergoing the classical exequatur procedure, very similar to the procedure 
provided in the Brussels I Regulation.  
The third model of recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions in the EU is 
specific. With this model, certain instruments regarding specific types of legal issues 
(uncontested claims, small claims, and preservation of accounts) were created. Regulation (EC) 
No 805/2004 creates a European enforcement order for uncontested claims,469 which abolishes 
the traditional grounds of refusal, including public policy, and replaces them with particular 
minimum standards to be reviewed by the court of origin.470Later, on this basis, three special 
procedures were created, the European Order for Payment Procedure,471 the European Small 
Claims Procedure472 and lastly adopted the European Account Preservation Order.473Such 
harmonized procedures result in a issuing of European titles that are enforceable through the 
European Union.  
 The forth model is provided in the Maintenance Regulation.474 Generally, its distinction 
is that there are two types of procedures, one for the Member States which are bound475 to the 
2007 Hague Protocol to Maintenance Convention,476 for which a similar model that provides 
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79). 
475 Most of the EU Member States except Denmark and the United Kingdome 
476 Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. 
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for a review mechanism in case the defendant did not provide an appearance in the situation of 
default service or force majeure and second, the use of the classical exequatur model for the 
Member States which are not bound by the Hague Maintenance Protocol.  
 The fifth model was constructed for the new Brussels I bis Regulation477 by which for 
a foreign judgment to be enforced in a Member State, a declaration of enforceability is no 
longer required. However the initial expectations for the complete abolition of exequatur which 
was intended to be introduced for civil and commercial matters478 were not fulfilled.479 The 
final result from the long negotiations was that the Brussels Ibis Regulation generally abolishes 
exequatur but permits an application by any interested party for refusal of recognition 
(including refusal on public policy grounds), and application by the person against whom 
enforcement is sought for refusal of enforcement. In that context, exceptions to recognition and 
enforcement were preserved, but only if expressly invoked by application.480   
                                                 
477 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 351, 
20.12.2012, p. 1–32). 
478 More on the abolishment of exequatur in Brussels Ibis Regulation see, Kramer X., Cross-Border Enforcement 
and the Brussels I-bis Regulation (n 468) 344-373; Dickinson A., The Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Recast) ('Brussels I bis' Regulation) European Parliament, September 2011; Sydney Law 
School Research Paper No. 11/58. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930712; Dickinson A., ‘Free 
Movement of Judgments in the EU: Knock Down the Walls but Mind the Ceiling’ in E. Lein (ed.) The Brussels I 
Review Proposal Uncovered, London: British Institute for International and Comparative Law, (2012); Nielsen 
P.A., The new Brussels I Regulation, Common Market Law Review (CMLRev) 2013; Cuniberti G. and Rueda I., 
Abolition of Exequatur. Addressing the Commission’s Concerns, Rabels Zeitschrift (2011) 303. 
479 See Chapter III Articles 36-57 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
480 Scott M. J., A question of trust? Recognition and enforcement of judgments, Nederlands Internationaal 
Privaatrecht (NIPR), (2015) 29. 
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5.2 Procedures of recognition and enforcement of judgments according to 
the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
The Recognition and enforcement of judgments in the Brussels IIbis Regulation is 
stipulated in Chapter III (Articles 21-52) and it is systematically divided into five sections. This 
Regulation establishes a system which is based on the giving over of the central role in making 
decisions to the court of the member state that has jurisdiction.481 The role of a court of another 
member state is limited.482 As it is stated in the Opinion of AG Sharpstone regarding the Povse 
case, the recognition and enforcement of judgments of the court exercising jurisdiction under 
Brussels IIbis Regulation should be ‘almost automatic’.483 
There are two separate procedures for recognition and enforcement of decisions that 
are suitable to be recognized and enforced according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation, where 
suitability is determined on by whether or not they fall under the scope of the Regulation. The 
first procedure is the classical exequatur procedure which applies for matrimonial matters and 
parental responsibility cases, and the second is the procedure which abolishes the exequatur 
limited to the cases of child abduction and access rights. The exequatur procedures are similar 
but differ in the grounds for non-recognition and in the enforcement.484 However these 
procedures are considered classical exequatur procedures by issuing a declaration of 
enforceability.485 In addition, the Brussels IIbis Regulation consists of a different kind of 
procedure that was novel at the time when the regulation was adopted:  a procedure which 
presents the abolition of the exequatur procedure, meaning that the certified judgments relating 
to certain child abduction cases and access rights cases are enforceable in the Member State of 
enforcement, without needing to issue a declaration of enforceability and without possibility 
of an appeal. This chapter will examine firstly the exequatur procedure in matrimonial matters 
and later the procedure for issuing a declaration of enforceability regarding parental 
responsibilities matters. Thirdly, it will address the special procedure relating to child abduction 
cases and cases of access rights.  
                                                 
481 Scott M. J., A Question of Trust? (n 480) 27. 
482 Text to n 532 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.2. 
483 Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, [2010], ECR I-06673 para 40 and see also Case C-211/10 
PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, [2010], ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpstone delivered on 16 June 2010, 
para 31. 
484 The divorce decisions are of a constitutive nature and the marriage annulment decisions are of a declaratory 
nature which do not require enforcement. 
485 Kramer X., Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis Regulation (n 468) 349. 
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5.2.1 Classical exequatur (application for a declaration of enforceability) 
procedure in the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
The origin of the rules for recognition and enforcement in the present EU instruments 
which apply for the classical model of exequatur can be traced back to the 1968 Brussels 
Convention, which served as a model in the drafting of the future EU mechanisms regarding 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments between the Member States, primarily 
influencing the Regulation Brussels I and later the Brussels II and IIbis Regulation.486  
The idea of having a unified procedure for recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in matters covered by Brussels IIbis Regulation is founded on the principle of mutual trust and 
on the premise that the grounds for non-recognition should be kept to the minimum required.487 
Also, this unified procedure produces another desired effect for the recognition and 
enforcement of family law decisions- it provides an easily accessible instrument known to all 
persons and it has as a consequence a procedure which can be used in all Member States of the 
EU.488  
However, such a procedure has some limitations. Firstly, the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
is only applicable for recognition of judgments among the Member States of the European 
Union, excluding Denmark.489 This follows from the wording of Article 21(1).490 Secondly, the 
recognition and enforcement applies only to judgments on matrimonial matters and matters of 
parental responsibility, which are judgments that fall under the scope of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation.491 The term ‘judgment’ is defined in Article 2(4) as ‘judgment’ on divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment, as well as a judgment relating to parental responsibility, 
pronounced by a court of a Member State. Because the ratione materiae of the Regulation has 
limited prospects, this limitation on the collateral aspects decided by a court seized of 
matrimonial matters or matters of parental responsibility, such as matrimonial property, 
                                                 
486 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 18; Borras Report (n 8) 49; 
Kramer X., Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis Regulation  (n 468) 347; Michaels R., ‘Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL] 2;  
Larobina M. and Pate, R., The Status of Recognition and Enforcement Of Judgments in The European Union, 
Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice Volume 3(2), (2011) 10; Malatesta, A., Towards the Abolition 
of the Exequatur in Europe: an Overview of the EC Regulations, Liuc Papers n. 219, Serie Impresa e Istituzioni, 
(2008) 2.  
487 Recital 21 Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
488 Shúilleabháin, M.N., (n 63) 245. 
489 Article 2(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
490 Article 21(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
‘A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special 
procedure being required.’ 
491 Text to n 3 Part II ch I sec 1.1. 
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maintenance obligations, and others492 is followed in the recognition and enforcement 
procedures. These other collateral aspects of matrimonial/parental rights proceedings are 
recognized and enforced according to other EU instruments,493 multilateral or bilateral 
agreements,494 or according to the rules provided in the national law of the Member States.  
Thirdly, it is without significance for the recognition and enforcement procedures if the 
judgment is called by a different name, such as decree, order or decision.495 Such a position in 
the Brussels IIbis Regulation provides that every judgment relating to matrimonial matters or 
parental responsibilities that, regardless of its title, fulfils the preconditions for recognition, 
must be recognized under the rules of the Regulation.496  
Fourthly, the provisions laid down in Article 21 et seq. of Regulation No 2201/2003 do 
not apply to provisional measures rendered by a Court on the basis of Article 20 of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation. However they can apply to such measures if these measures were rendered 
by Courts that ascertained jurisdiction under the rules of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.497 
 
5.2.1.1 Recognition of foreign decisions relating to matrimonial matters according 
to the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
Most of the decisions which fall under the above-described meaning of the term 
‘matrimonial matters’498 are of a constitutive and declaratory nature, which do not require 
enforcement. Their recognition in the Brussels IIbis Regulation can proceed as a main cause of 
action499 or as an incidental question.500 Article 21(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation allows a 
judgment given in a Member State to be recognized in the other Member States without any 
special procedure being required. This produces the effect that foreign judgments are 
recognized automatically unless it has been decided that they cannot be recognized.501 Also, 
the possibility is open for rendering a decision on recognition or non-recognition in situations 
regarding issues that are not central but incidental to the main issue.502 In the  situation that  the 
recognition of a judgment is raised as an incidental question, the question about whether the 
                                                 
492 Recitals 9-11 
493 Maintenance Regulation. 
494 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, 2007 Hague Maintenance Convention, etc. 
495 Article 2(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
496 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9)258 
497 Text to n 195 Part I ch II sec 2.1.2.1.4 and text to n 401 Part II ch IV sec 4.4. 
498 Text to n 14 Part II ch I sec 1.1.1. 
499 Article 21(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
500 Article 21(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
501 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9)258. 
502 Article 21(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
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Member State should stay the proceedings until the application for a declaration of 
enforceability is applied for under Article 21(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is decided by  
the procedural rules of every Member State.503 
The procedure for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments as a main 
cause of action is unified and simplified with the provisions provided in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation.504 In matrimonial matters the proceedings for recognition of a judgment of another 
Member State can be simplified to the point that a foreign judgment can be implemented in the 
legal system even without the participation of a court505 or it can be recognized by a competent 
court of a Member State, but using a very simplified procedure.506 
 
5.2.1.1.1 Updating civil-status records 
 
Regarding the updating of the civil status, the procedure has been significantly 
simplified. In particular if no appeal is lodged or no further appeal can be made against the 
judgment in the Member State of its origin, there is no special procedure required to update the 
civil status records of a Member State on the basis of a judgment.507 Generally, it is conducted 
without a court process508 and only with a copy of the judgment that confirms their change of 
status509 and a certificate provided in the form of Annex I of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.510 
This out-of-court simplified procedure, can be seen as a novel in civil law countries because in 
most of them511 to update of a civil status, prior recognition of the judgment relating to divorce, 
legal separation or marriage annulment is required.512  
 
5.2.1.1.2 Recognition  
 
Article 21(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, sets the court procedure for recognition 
                                                 
503 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 261. 
504 ibid 290. 
505 The out of court process is in a very narrow field of updating of a civil status (Article 21(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) 
506 Article 21(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
507 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 15. 
508 Borras Report (n 8) para 63. 
509 Article 37 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
510 Article 39 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
511 See European Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil status 
documents - challenges for civil registrars to circumvent problems stemming from the legal void 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/462500/IPOL-
JURI_NT(2012)462500_EN.pdf> accessed 12 January 2014. 
512 Shúilleabháin, M.N. (n 63)243 
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of a judgment.513 It is envisaged as an ex parte procedure,514 primarily suited for those 
situations which are used in the context of enforcement515 in accordance with the procedures 
for application for a declaration of enforceability conducted according to Section 2 (Articles 
28-36 of the of the Regulation). This procedure is the same for judgments relating to 
matrimonial matters and judgments relating to parental responsibilities issues. However this 
section will examine only the procedure and the grounds for non-recognition of decisions 
regarding matrimonial matters.516 
Any party that has legal interest in a cross-border recognition within the EU, can apply 
for that decision to be recognized or not to be recognized in another Member State.517 The term 
‘interested party’ is to be interpreted according to the applicable law and is given very broad 
sense, meaning that a member of the family518 or even public authorities such as public 
prosecutors519 can apply for (non-) recognition. This ‘interested party’ should apply to the 
courts of the Member States which have local jurisdiction for recognizing such judgments and 
according to Article 68 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation are nominated for this purpose by each 
Member State.520 For example, in Republic of Slovenia this would be the district courts 
(Okrožno sodišče), in Italy the appellate courts (Corte d'appello), and in Austria district court 
(Bezirksgericht) etc. This is different from the jurisdiction for the updating of a civil status, 
which is determined by the national law of the Member State where recognition is sought.521  
The formal requirements that the ‘interested party’ or the person seeking a recognition 
of a judgment should provide take the form of two documents: an authenticated copy of the 
respective judgment and a certificate using the standard form provided by Annex I of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation.522 No formality of legalization is required for these documents.523 
Another document is optional, but only for the situations when the decision was given in 
                                                 
513 The term ‘judgment’ is defined in Article 2(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and has broader meaning 
covering other decisions such as decrees, orders etc. 
514 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 293; Shúilleabháin, M.N., (n 
63) 244. 
515 n 484 Part II ch V sec 5.2 and text to n 498 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1. 
516 For recognition and enforcement of parental responsibilities issues see text to n 680 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.2. 
517 Article 21(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
518 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 260. 
519 Borras Report (n 8) 50. 
520 Information relating to courts and redress procedures pursuant to Article 68 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ C 
85, 23.3.2013, p. 6–8). 
521 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 260. 
522 Article 37(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
523 Article 52 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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default.524 In these cases despite the above-mentioned documents, the person seeking 
recognition, should accompany also the original or certified true copy of the document which 
establishes that the defaulting party was served with the document instituting the proceedings 
or with an equivalent document or any document indicating that the defendant has accepted the 
judgment unequivocally. In a manner this rule determines autonomously what documentation 
is needed for recognition,525 and clears away the uncertainty of the different rules which are 
applicable under the national laws of the Member States.526 However, it is still for the national 
law of the Member State where the judgment has been rendered according to the principle of 
locus regit actum to ‘establish the authenticity’ or to meet the requirements of authentication, 
because there is no need for an original of the judgment, but a copy can suffice.527 One of the 
tendencies of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is not to create additional obstacles for the 
recognition of foreign judgments and in that context it does not require translation of the 
documents, but allows on request by the competent Court for a translation to be provided and 
certified by a competent person.528   
According to Article 38(1) of the Regulation, the minimum documents required for a 
party that has a legal interest for a foreign decision on divorce, legal separation and marriage 
annulment to be recognized in another Member State is a copy of the judgment.529 If the other 
documents (certificate and proof of service) are not provided when the party is applying for 
recognition, the court may specify a time for their production, accept equivalent documents or, 
if it considers that it has sufficient information before it, dispense with their production.530 
The recognizing court of a Member State must act without delay.531 Generally the court 
has very limited powers on which it could not recognize the foreign judgment. The grounds on 
are given in article 22(for matrimonial matters), article 23(for parental responsibilities) and 
article 24 (prohibition of review of jurisdiction of the court of origin).532 In the regulation there 
is strict prohibition of the révision au fond regarding the foreign judgment533 and the court must 
examine only the specific procedural requirements and cannot entertain reviewing the 
judgment in the substantive aspects. Also the recognition cannot be opposed because divorce, 
                                                 
524 Article 37(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
525 And also for issuing a declaration of enforceability, because the documentation is the same. 
526 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 328. 
527 ibid. 
528 Article 38(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
529 Article 38(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
530 Article 38(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
531 Article 31(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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legal separation and marriage annulment is not allowed in the Member State where recognition 
is sought.534 These grounds for non-recognition will be explained later in this chapter.535 The 
interested party can apply for recognition or non-recognition.536 If the party is pleading for non-
recognition, presumption of recognition exists and this party has the burden to prove that a 
ground for non-recognition exists.537 There is no difference if the recognition was raised as a 
main cause of action538 or as an incidental question.539 In both of these situations the same 
grounds apply. During this stage, the procedure is ex parte, and the respondent cannot make 
any submissions on the application.540 This rule does not preclude the situations when the court 
receives some submissions other than the ones given in Article 37. In those situations when the 
court receives broader submissions then the one required by the Court, it could also take them 
into account.541 Simply put, the main aim of Brussels IIbis Regulation is not to turn the 
proceedings into inter partes proceedings at this stage.542  
The Court in which a declaration is sought may stay the proceedings, if an ordinary 
appeal against the judgment has been lodged in the Member State where the judgment has been 
given.543 Although they pursue same goal, Article 27 is different from Article 35 of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation. In the first place, Article 27 is predicted as a rule which allows the court that 
is conducting the recognition procedure to stay the proceedings on its own motion, while 
according to Article 35, the party appealing against the decision authorizing enforcement must 
apply for a stay of the proceedings. Secondly, under Article 27 the stay may only be granted if 
an appeal ‘has been lodged.’ It is not enough that the time limit for the appeal has not yet 
expired.  In contrast, under Article 35, the power to stay proceedings also applies to cases where 
an ordinary appeal has not been lodged if the time limit for such an appeal has not yet 
expired.544 
 The idea behind this rule is that the judgment should be res judicata, given that there 
could be considerable inconvenience if possible subsequent changes could be made by appeal 
in the Member State of origin. This rule gives the power to the court of recognition to stay the 
                                                 
534 Article 25 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
535 See text to n 595 ch V sec 5.2.1.1.4. and text to n 734 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.2.2. 
536 Article 21(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
537 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 264. 
538 Article 21(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
539 Article 21(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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541 Thessaloniki District Court, (Case 511/1994) (as cited by Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on 
Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 301). 
542 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 301. 
543 Article 27 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
544 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels I Regulation (n 391) 629. 
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proceedings until the proceedings in the Member State on appeal are finished. However, it does 
not impose an obligation to stay the proceedings, leaving it to the full discretion of the court 
and imposing no mandatory duty to stay the proceedings. It presupposes that an ‘ordinary 
appeal’ has been lodged in the Member State of origin of the judgment. The aspect of ordinary-
extraordinary appeals was addressed by the European Court in the Riva case545 where it was 
concluded that the meaning of the term ‘ordinary appeal’ should have an autonomous 
connotation and should mean:  
[a]ny appeal which forms part of the normal course of an action and which as such constitutes a 
procedural development which any party must reasonably expect.546  
 
5.2.1.1.3 Appeal against decision on (non-) recognition 
 
The decision of the Court on the application for a declaration of recognition or non-
recognition can be appealed by either party. This appellate procedure is exclusively governed 
by Article 33 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and it is exhaustive.547 This means that there are 
no other opportunities to appeal against decisions that are provided in the national laws of the 
Member States.548 With this article, the string of protection of the parties is continued and their 
right to appeal a first instance decision in the EU legal sources is guaranteed, starting with the 
Brussels Convention,549 then with the similar rules given in the Brussels II Convention,550 and 
finally with the direct source of this procedure, which was transposed from the Brussels I 
Regulation551. It is generally positioned in line with Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, especially with the fact that in the 
first instance the procedure for the recognition is conducted ex parte and the respondent doesn’t 
have a chance to present his side.552 Without such a possibility, the parties would be deprived 
of the protection of human’s rights standards, specifically the right to a fair trial.553 
Both parties, the applicant and the respondent, can appeal the decision. The applicant 
can appeal on a negative declaratory decision on the application, and the respondent can appeal 
on a positive outcome allowing the foreign decision to be recognized in the Member State. This 
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549 Articles 36-40 of the Brussels Convention. 
550 Articles 25-29 of the Brussels II Convention. 
551 Article 43 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
552 Text to n 514 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.2. 
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appeal can be given in a limited time frame. An appeal against a declaration of enforceability 
must be lodged within one month of the service thereof. If the party against whom enforcement 
is sought is habitually resident in a Member State other than that state in which the declaration 
of enforceability was given, the time frame for appealing shall be two months and shall run 
from the date of service, either on him or at his residence.554 In that context two criteria become 
relevant for the determination of the time limits for the appeal. The first is the moment when 
the decision was properly served to the respondent and the second is the place where the 
respondent is habitually resident. 
What is considered proper service must be understood according to the national law of 
the respondent’s habitual residence.555 The service itself has two functions for the process.556 
Firstly, it safeguards the respondent: it protects his/her rights, especially the right to appeal. 
This is slightly different from the aspect of simply making him/her factually knowable of the 
decision. This position is upheld in the Brussels Convention,557 the Brussels I Regulation558 
and the Brussels IIbis Regulation.559 From the actual wording of this article it can be concluded 
that for the applicant it suffices to be notified by the relevant authorities about the decision, 
while for the respondent the term ‘service’ is used in a formal sense.560 This formal service as 
a rule guarantees that he/she receives notice of the enforcement order and is able to appeal 
against it.561 The second function of the service is that it performs an evidentiary function and 
enables the period for bringing an appeal to be calculated accurately.562 
Regarding the habitual residence of the respondent, three scenarios are possible.563 
Firstly, if the respondent is habitually resident in the Member State where the exequatur 
proceedings were commenced, the time limit for lodging an appeal is one month from the 
service.564 The second scenario involves the respondent being habitually resident in another 
Member State other than the one where the exequatur decision was given. In this  situation the 
time limit is two months from the date of service no matter if it was given in personam or at 
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his/her residence.565 The third scenario, relates to the situation when the respondent is 
habitually resident in a country outside the EU. In such circumstances, the appeal must be 
lodged within one month of the service. There can be no extensions of time because of the 
distance.566 This is problematic, because in these situations the EU Service Regulation is 
inapplicable and the service should be commenced according to multilateral treaties,567 
bilateral treaties, or national rules on service abroad.568  
The party who is appealing the decision for the recognition should lodge the appeal in 
front of the court that is identified by the Member States as the one that has competence over 
these matters.569 There is a difference in the categorization of the Courts that are competent to 
hear the appeal. Some Member States have appointed different courts570 from the one that 
originally recognized the foreign decision and others have appointed the same court,571 but the 
principle that the first instance court cannot be involved in the appeal proceedings remains the 
same,  and this aspect is resolved internally in every court separately.572 Other Member States573 
have notified different courts for the applicant and for the respondent. Article 33(2) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation is applied ex officio and is exclusive, meaning no other court of the 
Member State can hear an appeal on a decision for (non-) recognition given according to the 
Regulation.574 
The relationship between the national law procedures of the Member States and the 
appellate procedure in the Brussels IIbis Regulation is best exemplified in Article 33(3) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation. What this rule does is that it actually gives the principles and the 
model upon which this procedure will take place and it refers to rules governing procedure in 
contradictory matters. These complementing principles given in Article 33(3)-(5) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation might be modifying national rules in some Member States, but the 
details of the procedure are to be governed by the national law rules of the Member States.575 
This can be seen in the fact that there cannot be interference in the contradictory nature of the 
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proceedings because of some restrictions in the national law rules.576 Again, this derives from 
the whole exequatur procedure in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The first instance procedure, 
which is generally conducted without the presence of the respondent, must be balanced by his 
or her presence in the later stages of the procedure. So this is the time when the respondent 
could use his right to present his/her point. To deny the respondent this right would generally 
oppose Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the right to a fair trial. Article 33(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
guarantees that each party has the opportunity to exercise its rights to a fair trial and that this 
appellate instance would not be decided without hearing the respondents’ arguments (in the 
case when the appeal is lodged on his/her request) or to the applicants’ arguments (in the case 
when there was a decision that deices non-recognition). Nevertheless, in both situations the 
court of the Member State is obliged to produce contradictory proceedings and cannot dismiss 
the appeal without proper hearing. This could happen only in evident and beyond reasonable 
doubt situations577 when the procedural economy and efficiency overwhelm the case and the 
court cannot waste any resources to implement full contradictory proceedings.  
If the appeal is brought by the applicant on the basis of Article 33(4) of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, the party against whom this enforcement is sought shall be summoned to 
appear before the appellate court. If he or she fails to appear, then the provisions of Article 18 
(Examination as to admissibility)578 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation shall apply.  Again with 
this article the contradictory aspect of the appellate proceedings is underlined, especially in 
those circumstances when the decision in the first instance was in favor of the respondent and 
he/she lacks the interest to participate in the proceedings. Nevertheless, there is an obligation 
for him/her to appear in these proceedings. If he/she doesn’t appear, then the minimum 
standards of protection of Article 18 need to be guaranteed. The court will check if he/she has 
been properly served, and if there was proper service (but still the respondent lacks to appear) 
then he/she is held responsible for the lack of appearance.579 
This judgment on appeal can only be contested on limited grounds which are 
established by every Member State in a list of notified proceedings.580 Such limited grounds 
for appeal against an appellate decision is predicted to be one of the points of law which is 
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578 Text to n 350 Part II ch IV sec 4.1. 
579 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 310. 
580 Article 34 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
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present in the national law of the Member States.581 Consequently, further appeals on point of 
facts and fact-finding are not permitted by Article 34.582 There are various procedures 
according to the national law of the Member States such as: Revisionsrekurs (Austria), appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Cassation (Bulgaria), pritožba na Vrhovno sodišče Republike 
Slovenije (Slovenia), pourvoi en cassation (France), Rechtsbeschwerde (Germany), Ricorso 
per cassazione (Italy) and etc.583 In any aspect, this appeal does not have suspensory effects.584 
The only way in which there can be a suspensory effect as to the enforcement of the 
judgment is if some of the conditions in Article 35 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation are satisfied. 
This conditions refer to situations where an appeal is lodged against the decision of a court of 
that state declaring a foreign judgment enforceable585 or against judgment given on appeal 
concerning such a decision.586 Accordingly the courts of all appellate instances can stay the 
proceedings.587 The reasoning behind this rule is to ensure flexibility and avoid the potentially 
irreversible consequences of enforcement588 even in the third instance. Another condition, 
which differs from Article 27 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, is that an ordinary appeal589 was 
lodged or if it is still possible to lodge (if the time for such appeal has not yet expired).590 A 
peculiar aspect of this rule is that in this stage the application for stay of proceedings can be 
submitted by the party against whom the enforcement is sought and not by the court of its own 
motion.591 As was in the case in Article 27, the court has full discretion whether to stay the 
proceedings. Also in its powers is the possibility to specify the time within which an appeal is 
to be lodged in the case when the time for an appeal has not yet expired.592 
If the procedure for recognition of decision in matrimonial matters has been finished 
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589 The meaning of ‘ordinary appeal’ is the same as for Article 27 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. See text to n 
545 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.2. 
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and the foreign decision was recognized in the Member State, then it is considered that the 
marriage has been terminated by the divorce.  As for the cases of legal separation, it is 
considered that the spouses have been legally separated, and in the case of marriage annulment, 
the marriage has been annulled.593 This situation is conclusive and binding for all Member 
States. But in situations where the grounds for non-recognition provided in Articles 22-26 were 
fulfilled, then the legal situation remains the same, and the Courts in the Member State of 
recognition may be approached for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, if they can 
have the jurisdiction, under the Brussels IIbis Regulation jurisdictional rules.594 
 
5.2.1.1.4 Grounds for non-recognition of judgments relating to divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment  
  
As was stated above,595 a decision of a Member State regarding matrimonial matters can 
be recognized or can be denied recognition in another Member State only according to the 
conditions set in Articles 22-26 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. These grounds on which a 
court of a Member State may not recognize a foreign judgment are given in Article 22 (for 
matrimonial matters), article 23(for parental responsibilities)596 and Article 24 (prohibition of 
review of jurisdiction of the court of origin).597 As also was stated previously,598 revision au 
fond is expressly excluded599 and the recognition cannot be opposed because divorce, legal 
separation and marriage annulment are not allowed in the Member State where recognition is 
sought.600 
Article 22 sets forth the grounds for recognition of foreign judgments relating to divorce, 
legal separation or marriage annulment. These rules are given as negative assumptions meaning 
that recognition is generally admitted unless existence is determined of certain circumstances 
that prevent the recognition. According to Article 22, a judgment relating to a divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment shall not be recognised: 
 if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in 
which recognition is sought;601 
                                                 
593 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 275. 
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 where it was given in default of appearance, if the respondent was not served with the 
document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient 
time and in such a way as to enable the respondent to arrange for his or her defence 
unless it is determined that the respondent has accepted the judgment unequivocally;602 
 if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in proceedings between the same parties in 
the Member State in which recognition is sought;603 
 if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a 
non-Member State between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfills 
the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State in which recognition 
is sought.604  
5.2.1.1.4.1 Public policy (ordre public)  
  
 Article 22(a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation details the first ground on which a 
decision from a Member State would not be recognized in another Member State. This 
condition refers to situations where the foreign decision is utterly wrong and its recognition is 
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is being 
sought. So, unsurprisingly,605 the first ground is ordre public or public policy. Within the 
national contexts it is very difficult directly to define the meaning ordre public (public policy), 
because of the differences in the understanding of the meaning of this legal institute in the 
different legal systems.606 The main function of public policy is to protect the fundamental 
values of the forum state against unacceptable results which may derive either from the 
application of foreign law or from the recognition of foreign judgments.607 However, in the 
area of Private International Law of the EU, one question comes to the forefront about the 
limits of the public policy, which is: what values should be considered or protected with the 
public policy exception - fundamental principles and norms of the domestic legal systems of 
EU Member States and/or the European principles.608 In answering this question a much 
                                                 
602 Article 22(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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broader aspect has to be given, because the interconnections of these values is extends beyond  
the borderlines of the national legal systems.609 There is a consensus in the EU that the ECHR610 
and the CFR611 significantly influence the determination of the content of the public policy 
clause.612 The shared values are sometimes referred to as ‘European public policy’.613 This 
aspect was especially utilized by the CJEU in the Krombach case,614 where for the limits of the 
public policy exception, it was determined that the Member States are free to determine what 
public policy requires, however, it is imperative that the outer limits of the defense are 
controlled by the CJEU as a matter of interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation.615 It was also 
concluded that  
[T]he Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles 
of law whose observance the Court ensures.... For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international 
treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which 
they are signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms has particular significance.616  
 In this case the CJEU also stated that, if the Court of the Member State where 
recognition is sought should refuse to recognize a foreign decision, it should have in mind that 
only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in another Contracting State 
would be at odds to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which 
enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes on a fundamental principle, should the public 
policy exception be used.617 This provides for use of the public policy exception, more 
restrictively, as a kind of ‘European public policy’ or ‘ordre public européen.618 This 
assumption may be drawn from the goal that the Brussels IIbis Regulation wants to achieve, 
which is ‘creating an area of freedom, security and justice.’619 In that context, this position 
introduces a two- folded specification on the implementation of the public policy exception. 
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Firstly, it gives a larger dimension of the issues it covers, and in doing so, it values (more 
restrictively) the seriousness of the violation of the public policy not only in limited national 
level standards, but in a larger, regional dimension.  A more unified implementation of these 
standards has been introduced through the practice of the ECtHR, especially in the 
implementation of the Article 6(1) of the ECHR and the standards provided by the CJEU in the 
implementation of the public policy exception in the Private International Law legal sources in 
the EU. The second part of the specification gives a broader protection by  this ‘Europisation’ 
of  public policy, namely excluding  nationality as a primary factor in the connection with the 
forum (Inlandsbezeiehnung),620 and establishing  instead equal treatment of all EU citizens, as 
long as they have created some territorial connection with the Member State of the EU through 
domicile or habitual residence. 
 The first guiding principle of Article 22(1) in the implementation of the public policy 
exception as a ground for non-recognition of decisions from other Member States in 
matrimonial matters is that it applies only to situations which are covered by the subject matter 
of matrimonial matters in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. This is especially important in the case 
of same-sex marriages, which are becoming more frequent in the national courts of the Member 
States.621 For example, because of the divergent understanding on  this subject, for a divorce 
that was given in the Netherlands, 622 the marriage can also be dissolved in Belgium623 on the 
basis of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, while in Greece it is considered that same-sex marriages 
are non-existent and Article 22(a) will be applied.624 It is very questionable whether invoking 
of Article 22(a) for non-recognition of foreign matrimonial decisions is justifiable in 
situations/Member States where there is no clear standpoint on the subject matter of 
matrimonial matters and the inclusion of same-sex marriages in the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
If same-sex marriages fall under the scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, then the invoking 
of Article 22(a) would be used by those Member States that do not provide such an institute in 
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their legal systems.625 As a guideline in such situations, the standards provided in the Krombach 
case626 could be used.627Until the CJEU makes their standpoint clear, the relations between 
countries that do not recognize same-sex marriages fall outside the scope of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation and they should still be decided according to the national PIL rules.628 
 One situation has been accepted to be a ground for invoking public policy defense in 
most of the EU Regulations and that is fraud.629 Legal fraud can happen630 but in general it is 
very rare. So it is without a doubt that obtaining a decision by fraud and then applying for a 
recognition in other Member State constitute an offence against the public policy of the State 
addressed.631 However, giving this reason to invoke the public policy exception as a ground for 
non-recognition is radically limited in the Brussels IIbis Regulation.632 The first example of the 
limitation of fraud has to do with the principles derived from the application of the public policy 
exception from the Brussels I Regulation. Schlosser in his report observed that:  
[t]he legal systems of all Member States provide special means of redress by which it can be contended, 
even after the expiry of the normal period for an appeal, that the judgment was the result of a fraud.633  
 Accordingly, the Court of recognition should see if: 
[p]roceedings for redress can be, or could have been, lodged in the courts of the State of origin against 
the judgment allegedly obtained by fraud.634  
 This aspect was confirmed in the Interdesco S.A. v Nullifire Ltd case635 where the 
English Court held that where a judgment was challenged on public policy grounds, it was 
preferable for the issue to be resolved by remedies available in the foreign jurisdiction and it 
would only be if none were available that English Courts would consider the issue.636 In Régie 
Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Maxicar and Formento,637 the CJEU reaffirmed the position 
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that the defendant should exhaust the remedies in the Court of origin.638 Additionally,  fraud as 
a ground for invoking public policy defense is limited by the regulation itself, as stated in  
Articles 24(prohibition of review of the jurisdiction) and Article 26 (Non-review as to the 
substance), which provide for additional limitations. 
 The second guiding principle in the implementation of the public policy ground for 
non-recognition of decisions from other Member States in matrimonial matters is given in the 
wording itself of Article 22(a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. As is the case for  the 
predecessors of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, this exception applies only to cases which are 
utterly wrong, or in the words of the EU legal sources, ‘manifestly contrary’ to the public policy 
of the Member State.639  
 Some limitations of public policy derive from other rules in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, namely articles 24-26. Article 24 provides for the first limitation of the public 
policy exception: prohibiting the Court where recognition is sought to review the jurisdiction 
of the Court of origin. This rule is particularly important because it prohibits the Court of 
recognition to apply the public policy exception and thus not to grant recognition, because the 
Court of origin didn’t properly apply Articles 3-7 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation or didn’t stay 
the proceedings according to Article 19.640 With this rule, the principle of mutual trust is 
enhanced by imposing ‘trust’ on the determination of the jurisdiction by the court of origin, 
nevertheless the fact that this rule is explicitly imposed brings up some collisions between the 
ideas behind this principle. 
 The second limitation is based on the notion that there are diverse family laws among 
the Member States of the EU. Although in very different manners, all of the Member States 
have introduced the dissolution of the marriage by divorce.641 However, there are still 
differences between the states regarding legal separation and marriage annulment.642 Article 25 
limits the public policy exception and prohibits non-recognition of foreign decisions if  the law 
of the Member State in which such recognition is sought would not allow divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment on the same facts(for which another Member State would 
allow it). The objective of Article 25 is simply to ensure that differences between legislation in 
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the Member States cannot result in non-recognition.643 The ratio of this rule is designed to meet 
the concerns of States with more tolerant internal provisions on divorce who fear that the 
judgments given by their courts might not be recognized in another State because they are 
based on grounds unknown in the legislation of the State in which recognition is sought. The 
provision therefore limits indiscriminate use of public policy.644 
 In any of the circumstances, the Court of the Member State where the recognition is 
sought, may not review the judgment as to its substance.645 This prohibition of révision au fond 
is established so the recognition procedure may not become a procedure where the court in the 
State in which recognition is sought can rule again on the ruling made by the court in the State 
of origin.646 Eventually, the Court of the Member State of recognition can evaluate (in order to 
find out whether the public policy has been violated) only the results of the foreign decision 
and can decide  if they are incompatible with the public policy of that state,647 but it cannot 
review the foreign decision as to its substance. This means that the Court cannot look at the 
errors as to the facts, or argue that the Court of origin misunderstood the evidence or mis-
applied the law.648 
 The practical significance of the application of the public policy exception for the 
recognition of foreign decisions according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation is very small. Only 
five cases of it have been reported.649 It seems that the reasoning of Professor Borras that the 
public policy exception is ‘something Member States do not want to give up even though 
experience demonstrates that the corresponding provision in Article 27(1) of the Brussels 
Convention has been of no practical significance’650 is more than applicable in the recent 
developments in the newest EU private international law Regulations.651  
5.2.1.1.4.2 The defense of the party was obstructed or denied 
  
 One of the aspects that the court of recognition traditionally ‘controls’ is the aspect of 
fair trial or the natural justice defense. Article 22(b) qualifies it as a ground for non-recognition 
in such situations when the judgment in the Member State of origin  
                                                 
643 Borras Report (n 8) 53. 
644 ibid. 
645 Article 26 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
646 Borras Report (n 8) 53.  
647 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 267. 
648 Shúilleabháin, M.N. (n 63) 258. 
649 Hess B.and Pfeifer T., (n 608) 156. 
650 Borras Report (n 8) 50. 
651 See Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
153 
 
was given in default of appearance, if the respondent was not served with the document which instituted 
the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the 
respondent to arrange for his or her defense unless it is determined that the respondent has accepted the 
judgment unequivocally.652  
 This rule must not be examined in isolation from the other rules of the Regulation, 
because the protection of the rights of the parties to a fair trial, and especially providing their 
rights to a defense, is predicted to be secured in different stages of the proceedings.653 Article 
22(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is the last resort for situations where court of origin has 
disrespected all of the safeguards provided in the regulation and the standards of the ECtHR 
and has rendered a decision given without proper service to the respondent or sufficient time 
to prepare his position in the case. Such situations are simply intolerable and cannot be 
recognized in the Member State of recognition.  
 The protection of the respondent’s rights to a fair trial does not start with Article 22(b) 
of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The first instance of the protection of these rights of the 
respondent is Article 18 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, which intends to guarantee the right 
of the respondent to be heard before a competent court and the opportunity to an effective 
defense.654 So for this aspect of protection of the respondent’s right for notification, Article 
22(b) serves as a ‘double check’.655 Another safeguard for the rights of the respondent, 
especially when the judgment was given in default, is Article 37 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. This technical rule lays out the formal requirements that the applicant must provide 
when applying for recognition. Among other requirements (a copy of the judgments which 
satisfies the conditions necessary to establish authenticity and a certificate in accordance with 
Annex I of the regulation), if the judgment was given in default then another document must 
be provided which establishes that the defaulting party was properly served or any document 
indicating that the defendant has accepted the judgment unequivocally.656  
 Such rules are not unfamiliar in EU regulations which cover cross-border cases. The 
counterparts of Article 22(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation can be found in Article 34(2) of 
the Brussels I Regulation,657 Article 27(2) of the Brussels Convention and Article 15(1) (b) of 
the Brussels II Convention. However, the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels IIbis 
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Regulation contain a difference in one exemption from the rule regarding the actions of the 
respondent/defendant in the aftermath of the rendering of the decision. Namely, the exemption 
of the rule contained in the Brussels I Regulation provides that the rule applies:  
[u]nless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible 
for him to do so.658  
 On the other hand, the exemption in the Article 22(1) (b) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation states:  
 [u]nless it is determined that the respondent has accepted the judgment unequivocally.’659  
 These two exemptions are rather different. The exemption in the Brussels I Regulation 
provides for situations where the parties cannot apply for non-recognition on the basis of 
Article 34(2) if they had opportunity to challenge the judgment in the Member State of Origin, 
but failed to do so. This is not the case in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, where the respondent 
can apply for non-recognition of the decision because of unrighteous service in the Member 
State of recognition, even if he had opportunity to challenge the judgment in the Member State 
of origin. The protection of the rights of the respondent which was not properly served under 
the Brussels IIbis Regulation is much broader and allows for direct application for non-
recognition on the basis of Article 22(1)(b) in the Member State of recognition, without 
returning to the Member State of origin first.660   
 All of these rules have the same goal:  the protection of the rights of both parties during 
the proceedings and the assurance that they will have the opportunity to present their position 
in front of the Court. The rules protect the procedural aspects of service of documents, and 
create sufficient time for the preparation and arrangement of the defense. 661  
 Regarding the service, the national law of civil procedure will decide which documents 
have to be served to the respondent in order to start the proceedings. The intention is just to 
make sure that the respondent is treated fairly in the proceedings, meaning that he/she is served 
with the document that institutes the proceedings or an equivalent.662 If the respondent is 
situated in the Member State where the proceedings have been initiated, then the national 
procedural law of that Member State regarding service will be applied in the dispute. However, 
if the respondent is located in another Member State (except Denmark) then the Service 
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Regulation663 will apply regarding service. Another option, if the respondent is in Denmark or 
any other non-EU State which is part of The Hague Service Convention,664 then this same 
convention will apply. Lastly, if the respondent is residing in a country which is not a member 
of The Hague Service Convention, then other bilateral/multilateral international agreements 
will apply or as a last resort, the national rules of service of documents for persons living 
abroad.665 
 After proper service has been conducted on the basis of some of these legal sources, 
sufficient time should be given to the respondent to prepare for appearance in front of the court. 
There is no prescribed period for this time limit so that it will be deemed ‘sufficient’, but the 
standards should be given according to the circumstances of the dispute, namely, the 
whereabouts of the respondent, and on whether or not he/she lives in the same country where 
the proceedings have been initiated, or he/she lives abroad. If the person lives in the same 
country, then the period and the efforts for the preparation of the case would be less time-
consuming (same language, familiar legal surrounding, etc.). However, if the respondent lives 
in a different country than the one where the proceedings were initiated, in such circumstances, 
a longer period for preparation for  appearance in front of the Court should be given,  because 
of the technical details that need to be settled (translations, hotels, transportation, etc.) and the 
legal aspects (attorney, preparation for the case, etc.).666 And lastly, , the documents that are  
served to the respondent need to be precise and clear, so that he/she has proper understanding 
of the matter raised in front of the Court.667 
 If there are flagrant irregularities which would disable the respondent to properly 
represent his/her case in front of the Court of the Member State where the proceedings were 
initiated, then this rule confers absolute right of objection on the part of the respondent who is 
not served at all or is served inadequately, relying on article 22(1)(b) in the recognition stage 
in the Member State of recognition. This rule applies unless the respondent makes an 
appearance at the court.668 If the respondent has accepted the judgment unequivocally669 then 
                                                 
663 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 on the service of documents now superseded by Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial 
documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents). For more on this regulation see Galič A., Service 
Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters – From the Hague Conventions to the EU 1393/2007 Regulation (n 351). 
664 Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil or Commercial Matters. 
665 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 273. 
666 ibid. 
667 ibid. 
668 Shúilleabháin, M.N. (n 63) 266. 
669 Tacit acceptance is insufficient unless special circumstances reveal that the foreign decision is expressly 
accepted. (Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 273). 
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he/she cannot rely on this ground for non-recognition and thus the result is that the judgment 
must be recognized, as is the normal consequence of the proper operation of the Regulation.670 
Examples of such conduct are entering into another marriage671 or applying for the updating of 
civil status records on the basis of foreign decisions relating to divorce or marriage 
annulment.672  
 
5.2.1.1.4.3 The foreign judgment is in a conflict with a judgment in a member 
state in which the recognition is sought 
 
As was stated above,673 Articles 22(c) and 23(e) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
approach the problem of irreconcilable judgments from another point in time. It is undeniable 
that the rules on lis pendens will cover a majority of the cases of concurrent proceedings. 
However it is very possible 674 that because of unawareness of the Courts of the Member States, 
when the proceedings between the same parties are processed, the second seized court will not 
stay the proceedings. If the proceedings are concluded, then a judgment on matrimonial matters 
between the same parties can be given. For these cases, Article 22(c) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation applies and does not allow for a recognition of a judgment that was given between 
the same parties to be recognized in the Member State where the recognition is sought, because 
of the existence of a conflicting judgment between the same parties, even if the judgment 
rendered by Court of a Member State of recognition was given later than the judgment that 
needs to be recognized.675 
5.2.1.1.4.4 The foreign judgment is in a conflict with a judgment given in 
another Member state or in a third state 
 
Article 22(d) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is similar to Article 22(c), but it 
additionally refers to the situations when two decisions on matrimonial matters are given in 
other Member States or Non-member States between the same parties. In such circumstances, 
                                                 
670 Borras Report (n 8) 51. 
671 ibid. 
672 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 273. 
673 Text to n 391 Part II ch IV sec 4.2. 
674 Although in proceedings relating to matrimonial matters (because of the nature of these proceedings), it is very 
unimaginable that the second seized court will not stay the proceedings, however hypothetically the proceedings 
may continue because the Courts would assume that the other Court is second seized. (Shúilleabháin, M., (n 63) 
269). 
675 Such aspect is highly criticized in the legal doctrine, see Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on 
Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 274. 
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the earlier decision will prevail if it fulfils the conditions for recognition in the Member State 
where recognition is sought. Both, Article 22(c) and Article 22(d) can be criticized for the fact 
that they represent very strict and almost mechanical rules, however their advantage is that they 
provide the certainty of avoiding ‘limping marriages’.676 
 
5.2.1.1.5 Authentic Instruments  
 
 The Brussels IIbis Regulation contains a separate provision for the recognition and 
enforcement of authentic instruments.677 Generally the Brussels IIbis Regulation seeks to 
ensure that authentic instruments and agreements between parties that are enforceable in one 
Member State are treated as equivalent to ‘judgments’ for the purpose of the application of the 
rules on recognition and enforcement.678 In that context, Article 46 provides that documents 
which have been formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments and are enforceable 
in one Member State, and also agreements between the parties that are enforceable in the 
Member State in which they were concluded, shall be recognised and declared enforceable 
under the same conditions as judgments. 
 This position is different from that of the Brussels I Regulation. While Article 57 of the 
Brussels I Regulation provided only of a declaration of enforceability regarding these 
instruments, Article 46 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation maintains that authentic instruments 
must undergo the full procedure of recognition and enforcement as judgments. Due to this,, 
authentic instruments come under  the complete  control of  the conditions for the non-
recognition of foreign judgments. The justification for such a different position lies in the 
nature of these two EU instruments. It was considered that authentic instruments are given 
different levels of significance in the field of family matters in different Member States.679  
 
                                                 
676 Shúilleabháin, M.N., (n 63) 269. 
677 The meaning of ‘authentic instrument’ was given in CJEU Case C- 260/97 Unibank A/S. v Flemming G. 
Christensen [1999] ECR I-3715. Maintenance Regulation in Article 2(3) provides for definition of ‘authentic 
instruments’ where the term means:  
a) a document in matters relating to maintenance obligations which has been formally drawn up or registered as 
an authentic instrument in the Member State of origin and the authenticity of which: 
(i) relates to the signature and the content of the instrument, 
and 
(ii) has been established by a public authority or other authority empowered for that purpose; or, 
(b) an arrangement relating to maintenance obligations concluded with administrative authorities of the Member 
State of origin or authenticated by them. 
678 Recital 22 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
679 Borras Report (n 8) p.49. 
158 
 
5.2.1.2 Recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions relating to parental 
responsibility matters, according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
The fifth recital of the Brussels IIbis Regulation undoubtedly underlines that all 
decisions on parental responsibility are covered by the Brussels IIbis Regulation (including 
measures for the protection of children) independently of any link with matrimonial 
proceedings, because the idea is to ensure equality of all children.680 However, pragmatism 
comes to the forefront in the next Recital, where it is concluded that:  
[o]ften, parental responsibility issues will arise in proceedings on matrimonial matters.681 
Section 2 of Chapter III of the Brussels IIbis Regulation holds the title ‘Application of 
declaration of enforceability’. The name of this section is different from the traditional one, 
‘enforcement,’ which is the name used in a majority of the EU procedural legal sources.682 This 
section differs from the one in Article 47 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation,683 and addresses the 
circumstance in which a foreign judgment is rendered enforceable in another Member State.684 
It stipulates that a judgment on the exercise of parental responsibility in respect to  a child given 
in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State and has been served shall be 
enforced in another Member State when, on the application of any interested party,685 it has 
been declared enforceable there.686 Both the meaning of the term ‘judgment’687 and ‘parental 
responsibility’688 are to be understood as provided in Article 2 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation: 
in  light of the systematic and autonomous meaning given through the method of concept 
definitions.689 
There are two preconditions given in Article 28 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation for the 
possibility of an application for a declaration of enforceability: firstly, that the decision on 
parental responsibility is ‘enforceable’ in the Member State of origin and secondly, that the 
                                                 
680 See Recital (5) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
681 Recital (4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
682 Chapter III Section 2 of Brussel I Regulation is named ‘Enforcement’; Tittle III Section 2 of the Brussels 1968 
Convention is also named ‘Enforcement’.  
683 Which rules refer to the ‘enforcement procedure’ 
684 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 293. 
685 For the understanding of the meaning of ‘interested party’ see text to n 518 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.2. 
686 Article 28(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
687Article 2(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation  
the term ‘judgment’ shall mean a divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, as well as a judgment relating 
to parental responsibility, pronounced by a court of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, 
including a decree, order or decision. 
688 Article 2(7) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation  
the term ‘parental responsibility’ shall mean all rights and duties relating to the person or the property of a child 
which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment, by operation of law or by an agreement having legal 
effect. The term shall include rights of custody and rights of access. 
689 Text to n 110 Part II ch I sec 1.1.1 and text to n 104 Part II ch I sec 1.1.1.2. 
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decision has been served. The aspect of enforceable judgments is correlated with the aspect of 
the res iudicata effect of the judgments. However, this aspect is very peculiar in the case of 
judgments relating to parental responsibility, which are final insofar as there is no longer a 
regular remedy.690 They can be changed as soon as the judgments have adjusted to the 
circumstances, which were changed to fit the best interest of the child.691 Therefore for the 
applicant to apply for a declaration of enforceability, the judgment doesn’t need to be res 
iudicata, as in a majority of the Member States. Judgments can be enforceable even if they are 
subject to a pending appeal. Such a position was given in the Coursier v. Fortis Bank SA692 (a 
Brussels Convention case), where the term 'enforceable': 
[r]efers solely to the enforceability, in formal terms, of foreign decisions and not to the 
circumstances in which such decisions may be executed in the State of origin.693 
The second precondition given in Article 28 of the Brussels IIbis regulation for the 
application for declaration of enforceability is that the judgments has been properly served to 
the other party. The service of the judgment to the other party is attested by a certificate that 
accompanies the judgment and which, on the basis of Article 39, is issued by the Court that 
rendered the judgment. It confirms that the judgments were served to the other party and at 
which address and on what date.694 The service of the judgment is conducted according to the 
rules of the Member State of Origin.695 
The applicant according to Article 29 applies for a declaration of enforceability to the 
courts of the Member States which, on the basis of Article 68 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
were nominated for this purpose by each Member State.696 In such a situation, local jurisdiction 
is determined in reference to the place of habitual residence of the person against whom 
enforcement is sought or in reference to the habitual residence of any child to whom the 
                                                 
690 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 
June 2010 para 61; Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 4 October 2010, Case C‑296/10 Bianca 
Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez [2010] ECR I-11163, para 118 et seq; Magnus U. and Mankowski P., 
Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 277. 
691 ‘The fact that this ruling on the question of custody of the child provides for a review or reconsideration at 
regular intervals, within a specific period or in certain circumstances, of the issue of custody of the child does not 
mean that the judgment is not final.’, Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 para 46. 
692 Case C-267/97 Eric Coursier v Fortis Bank and Martine Coursier, née Bellami [1999] ECR I-02543. 
693 Case C-267/97 Eric Coursier v Fortis Bank and Martine Coursier, née Bellami [1999] ECR I-02543, para 29. 
694 Annex II of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, point 9.2 
695 If there is need for a service of the judgment in another member State other EU rules apply such as Service 
Regulation. (Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 294). 
696 Information relating to courts and redress procedures pursuant to Article 68 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ C 
85, 23.3.2013, p. 6–8) 
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application relates.697 If, in a certain situation, the person against whom enforcement is sought 
or the child is not habitually resident there, then in such cases the local court for the place of 
enforcement will have the jurisdiction.698  
The procedure for issuing a declaration of enforceability is governed by the law of the 
Member State of enforcement and is accompanied by the relevant documents specified in 
Article 37 and 39 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.699 The applicant must give an address for 
service or designate a representative ad litem.700 After the filing of the application, the court 
shall give its decision without delay. Neither the person against whom enforcement is sought 
nor the child shall, at this stage of the proceedings, be entitled to make any additional 
submissions on the application.701 This means that during this stage, the procedure is ex parte, 
and no edits to the application can be made.  However, this power isn’t absolute; and is reversed 
in particular cases so that the defendant, who is seeking recognition, to make additional 
submissions.702  
Article 31 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation enumerates the grounds for refusal of the 
application, given in Articles 22, 23 and 24.703 These grounds on which the Court will not 
recognize the foreign judgment are given in article 22(for matrimonial matters), article 23(for 
parental responsibilities) and article 24 (prohibition of review of jurisdiction of the court of 
origin).704 Also, the court may not implement the principle révision au fond regarding the 
foreign judgment.705  
                                                 
697 Article 29(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
698 Article 29(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
699 Text to n 656 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.4.2 and text to n 694 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.2. 
700 Article 30 (2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
701 Article 31(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
702 In Rinau Case the CJEU concluded ‘…in so far as it provides that neither the person against whom enforcement 
is sought, nor the child is, at this stage of the proceedings, entitled to make any submissions on the application, is 
not applicable to proceedings initiated for non‑recognition of a judicial decision if no application for recognition 
has been lodged beforehand in respect of that decision. In such a situation, the defendant, who is seeking 
recognition, is entitled to make such submissions.’ Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 107. 
703 Article 31(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
704 Article 31(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
705 Article 26 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The position of this rule was highlighted in the CJEU judgment 
Case C‑455/15 PPU P v Q. of 19 November 2015 where the Court was asked to refer to the question ‘Should the 
[referring court], in accordance with Article 23(a) of [Regulation No 2201/2003] or any other provision and 
notwithstanding Article 24 of that regulation, refuse to recognise the judgment of the [Šilutės rajono apylinkės 
teismas (District Court, Šilutė)] of 18 February 2015 … and consequently continue the proceedings in the custody 
case pending before the [referring court]?’. These question was imposed on the ambiguity contained in the Article 
24 for which the CJEU stated that ‘The jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin may not be reviewed. 
The test of public policy referred to in Articles 22(a) and 23(a) may not be applied to the rules relating to 
jurisdiction set out in Articles 3 to 14.’ The problem had arisen due to the fact that Article 15 is also a jurisdictional 
rule which refers to the question of 'forum non convininens’. As such the CJEU has concluded that ‘…alleged 
breach of Article 15 of that regulation by a court of a Member State does not allow a court of another Member 
State to review the jurisdiction of that court, despite the fact that the prohibition in Article 24 of the regulation 
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After the Court preforms this ex parte procedure, then the decision is given to the 
applicant,706 who can appeal the decision on the application for a declaration of 
enforceability.707 Generally, the idea behind this position of ‘fully ex parte procedure’708 in the 
Brussels Regime is not to have ‘a reduction in the element of surprise’709 which is necessary in 
an enforcement procedure if the respondent is not to have the opportunity of withdrawing his 
assets from any measure of enforcement. This aspect of ‘surprise’ is less important in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, with some exceptions granted in child abduction cases.710  
The appellate procedure is the same as the one followed for the recognition of decisions 
regarding matrimonial matters.711 Again as was stated in the case of matrimonial matters, 
Article 35 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation gives the only suspensory effect to the enforcement 
of the judgment if some of the conditions are satisfied.712 In two distinct situations, according 
to article 36, partial enforcement can authorized by the Court. The first situation refers to the 
ex officio partial enforcement and the second situations entails partial enforcement on 
application for partial enforcement by the applicant. In ex officio partial enforcement, where a 
judgment has been given in respect to several matters and enforcement cannot be authorized 
for all of them, the court shall authorize enforcement for one or more of them.713 From this 
provision it can be concluded that the first aspect in the ex officio partial enforcement is that 
the judgment itself consists of several matters of parental responsibilities714 which can be 
separated and the second aspect is that the other parts of the judgment must not be 
enforceable.715In application for partial enforcement, partial enforcement is made through 
application by the applicant for partial enforcement.716 In such a situation, the judgment again 
must be severable, but differs from Article 36(1) in the aspect that it is not necessary for the 
rest of the judgment to be unenforceable.717 
                                                 
does not refer expressly to Article 15.’ With that the CJEU has made it clear that a Court of a Member State cannot 
use Article 23(a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation to refuse to recognize a foreign decision of a Member State in 
cases where it considers that another Court wrongfully determined the jurisdiction based on Article 15 of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
706 Article 32 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
707 Article 33 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
708 Jenard Report (n 14) 50. 
709 ibid. 
710 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 302. 
711 Text n 547 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.3. 
712 Text n 584 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.3. 
713 Article 36(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
714 Article 28(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
715 For example, situations which do not fall under Brussels IIbis Regulation, or are not satisfying the requirements 
for enforcement (Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 324). 
716 Article 36(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 






The enforcement procedure is not regulated in detail in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
but is left to the national law to govern.718 However, it is very important from the perspective 
of the goals that the regulation tries to achieve, that the national authorities apply rules which 
secure efficient and speedy enforcement of decisions issued under the Regulation.719 Such 
efficient and speedy enforcement is important regarding all parental responsibility decisions, 
but in the cases where the declaration of enforceability is abolished (access rights and child 
abduction cases) it is particularly important, because the goal for abolishing the intermediate 
procedure is to even more promptly restore the status quo, which was disturbed with the 
wrongful removal or retention.  
Enforcement does not apply to provisional measures. As was previously stated 720 and 
also in the Purrucker I Case,721 provisional measures which were rendered on the basis of 
Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation are not enforceable in another Member State on the 
basis of provision from the Brussels IIbis Regulation. This aspect also extends to the situations 
where an enforceable order granting provisional measures of parental responsibility in favor of 
a parent has been made and declared enforceable in one Member State and an attempt is made 
by the other parent to defeat the enforcement of that order in another Member State by seeking 
there provisional measures in favor of themselves.722 In such a case, the CJEU has also made 
clear that the court in that other Member State is simply not entitled to order such measures 
and would be required under the Regulation to enforce the original order.723  In that case, the 
CJEU held that if a provisional judgment in matters of parental responsibility which was 
delivered by the court with jurisdiction as to the substance724 was declared enforceable in the 
Member State where the child is present, the change of circumstances resulting from a gradual 
process such as the child’s integration into a new environment are not enough, under Article 
20(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, to entitle a court not having jurisdiction as to the substance 
to adopt a provisional measure amending the measure in matters of parental responsibility taken 
                                                 
718 Article 47 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
719 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 69. 
720 Text to n 221 Part I ch II sec 2.1.2.1.4 
721 Case C-256/09 Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez [2010] ECR I-07353 para 100. 
722 See also Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193. 
723 Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 para 61. 
724 It was the Tribunale di Tivoli. 
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by the court with jurisdiction as to the substance.725 Such prolongation of the enforcement 
procedure in the requested Member State can contribute to the creation of conditions that would 
allow the former court to block the enforcement of the judgment that had been declared 
enforceable. This interpretation suggests that the prolongation of the enforcement procedure 
would ultimately undermine the very principles on which that Regulation is based on.726 
Article 47(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation provides that any judgment delivered by 
a court of another Member State and declared to be enforceable in accordance with Section 2 
or certified in accordance with Article 41(1) or Article 42(1) [of the Brussels IIbis Regulation] 
shall be enforced in the Member State of enforcement under the same conditions as if it had 
been delivered in that Member State. In particular, a judgment which has been certified 
according to Article 41(1) or Article 42(1) cannot be enforced if it is irreconcilable with a 
subsequent enforceable judgment.727 Such a position provides that the Courts of Member 
States, in  situations when they are enforcing a decision from other Member State, must be very 
careful and observant and they must obey the very strict limits given implicitly in the terms of 
the provision, and not  to  second-guess or try to circumvent the decision in the court of 
origin.728 Some aspects of ‘the same conditions as if it had been delivered in that Member State’ 
clause have the practical meaning that the procedural arrangements under which the return of 
the child must take place will be under the ‘same conditions’ and will on no account provide a 
substantive ground of opposition to the judgment of the court which has jurisdiction.729 
The CJEU referred to these notions in the Povse Case. It concluded that it is not for the 
court in the Member State of enforcement under Article 47(2) to go beyond procedural matters 
in the enforcement of the certified judgment and certainly not to entertain any plea in law as to 
the substance of the matters at stake730 which, under a proper application of the Regulation, 
can only be heard in the courts of the Member State of origin and in accordance with the rules 
of its legal system. Likewise, an application to suspend enforcement of a certified judgment 
can be brought only before the court which has jurisdiction in the Member State of origin, in 
accordance with the rules of its legal system.731 In this context the CJEU stated that  
[T]o hold that a judgment delivered subsequently by a court in the Member State of enforcement 
can preclude enforcement of an earlier judgment which has been certified in the Member State of origin 
                                                 
725 Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 para 47. 
726 ibid para 47. 
727 Article 47(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
728 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 70. 
729 Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010], ECR I-06673 para 73. 
730 ibid. 
731 ibid para 74. 
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and which orders the return of the child would amount to circumventing the system set up by Section 4 
of Chapter III of the regulation. Such an exception to the jurisdiction of the courts in the Member State 
of origin would deprive of practical effect Article 11(8) of the Regulation, which ultimately grants the 
right to decide to the court with jurisdiction and which takes precedence, under Article 60 of the 
regulation, over the 1980 Hague Convention, and would recognise the jurisdiction, on matters of 
substance, of the courts in the Member State of enforcement.732 
Another aspect that the CJEU addressed in the Povse Case referring to enforcement of 
judgments according to Brussels IIbis Regulation was the issue of change of circumstances and 
its effect on the enforcement. It that aspect the CJEU stated that:  
[a] significant change of circumstances in relation to the best interests of the child constitutes 
an issue of substance, which may, in appropriate cases, cause the decision of the court which has 
jurisdiction over the return of the child to change. However, in accordance with the division of 
jurisdiction referred to more than once in this judgment [par.70 et seq.], such an issue must be resolved 
by the court with jurisdiction in the Member State of origin. Moreover, that court, within the system 
established by the regulation, also has jurisdiction to assess the best interests of the child, and that is the 
court which must hear an application for any suspension of enforcement of its judgment.733  
From this assumption it was concluded that the enforcement of a certified judgment 
cannot be refused in the Member State of enforcement because, as a result of a subsequent 
change of circumstances, it might be seriously detrimental to the best interests of the child. 
Such a change must be pleaded before the court which has jurisdiction in the Member State of 
origin, which should also hear any application to suspend enforcement of its judgment.734 
 
  
                                                 
732 ibid para 78. 
733 ibid para 81. 
734 ibid para.83. 
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5.2.1.2.2 Grounds for non-recognition of judgments relating to parental 
responsibility (Article 23)  
  
Article 23 lists the grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments relating to parental 
responsibility. It is modeled according to Article 15(2) of the Brussels II Regulation with some 
small differences.735 As was the case with Article 22, these rules are also given as negative 
assumptions. According to Article 23, a judgment relating to parental responsibility shall not 
be recognized: 
 if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in 
which recognition is sought, taking into account the best interests of the child;736  
 if it was given, except in case of urgency, without the child having been given an 
opportunity to be heard, in violation of fundamental principles of procedure of the 
Member State in which recognition is sought;737  
 where it was given in default of appearance if the person in default was not served with 
the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in 
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable that person to arrange for his or her 
defence, unless it is determined that such person has accepted the judgment 
unequivocally;738  
                                                 
735 Article 15 (2) of the Brussels II Regulation 
A judgment relating to the parental responsibility of the spouses given on the occasion of matrimonial proceedings 
as referred to in Article 13 shall not be recognised: 
(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is 
sought taking into account the best interests of the child; 
(b) if it was given, except in case of urgency, without the child having been given an opportunity to be heard, in 
violation of fundamental principles of procedure of the Member State in which recognition is sought; 
(c) where it was given in default of appearance if the person in default was not served with the document which 
instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable that 
person to arrange for his or her defence unless it is determined that such person has accepted the judgment 
unequivocally; 
(d) on the request of any person claiming that the judgment infringes his or her parental responsibility, if it was 
given without such person having been given an opportunity to be heard; 
(e) if it is irreconcilable with a later judgment relating to parental responsibility given in the Member State in 
which recognition is sought; 
or 
(f) if it is irreconcilable with a later judgment relating to parental responsibility given in another Member State or 
in the non-member State of the habitual residence of the child provided that the later judgment fulfils the 
conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State in which recognition is sought. 
736 Article 23(a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
737 Article 23(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
738 Article 23(c) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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 on the request of any person claiming that the judgment infringes on his or her parental 
responsibility, if it was given without such person having been given an opportunity to 
be heard;739 
 if it is irreconcilable with a later judgment relating to parental responsibility given in 
the Member State in which recognition is sought;740  
 if it is irreconcilable with a later judgment relating to parental responsibility given in 
another Member State or in the non-Member State of the habitual residence of the child, 
provided that the later judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in 
the Member State in which recognition is sought;741  
 if the procedure established  in Article 56 has not been complied with.742 
 
5.2.1.2.2.1 Public policy 
 
Similarly to the systematization of the grounds for non-recognition of judgments 
relating to matrimonial matters, the public policy exception in the case of parental 
responsibility judgments is positioned as the first ground for non-recognition of such 
judgments.743  However, this rule more closely mirrors article 23(2) (d) of the 1996 Hague 
Child Protection Convention.744 The formulation of the public policy exemption in article 23(a) 
of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is tailored for these cases because, firstly, the recognition of a 
judgment relating to parental responsibility can be refused if it manifestly contrary to the public 
policy of the Member State where recognition is sought and secondly, the best interest of the 
child must be taken into account.  
 Regarding the first aspect of the public policy exemption, the understanding of manifest 
violation is no different than the understanding regarding Article 22(a) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation.745 In addition, the recognizing Court must apply Articles 24-26 and restrain itself 
                                                 
739 Article 23(d) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
740 Article 23(e) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
741 Article 23(f) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
742 Article 23(g) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
743 Text to n 605 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.4.1. 
744 Article 23 
(1)  The measures taken by the authorities of a Contracting State shall be recognised by operation of law in all 
other Contracting States. 
(2)  Recognition may however be refused - 
. 
. 
d) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy of the requested State, taking into account the best 
interests of the child;  
745 Text to n 639 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.4.1. 
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from reviewing the jurisdiction and substance of the judgment or to refuse recognition based 
on the fact that the Member State of origin applied different law.746 Article 24 applies even in 
situations where the jurisdiction was determined in accordance with Article 15 of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, although this rule is not specifically mentioned in Article 24.747 
 The second aspect, ‘best interest of the child,’ is to be taken into account in the situations 
when the recognition of judgments is refused because of the public policy exemption. This 
necessitates a clear understanding of the ‘best interest of the child’ principle. However, the 
concept of the ‘best interest’ of the child is ambiguous. There is little consensus about what 
criteria constitute a child’s best interests or how these criteria should be applied.748 Generally, 
it is accepted that the definition is left ambiguous intentionally, because the legislators are 
unable to envisage the entire range of complex and various situations a child can be in, and 
instead choose to pass the responsibility to the competent institutions (legal courts, 
administrative structures), which are supposed to evaluate the specific circumstances and to 
decide with accuracy what is the best interest of the child.749 Furthermore, the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation does not contain a definition for it, and neither does the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.750 The guiding principles for determining a child’s best interest are very 
broad. They range from personal aspects of the child itself751 to the aspects of the person or 
persons to whom the child relates personally and who have an impact on the education, growth 
or professional formation of the child.752 Also the particular relations between the child and the 
parent/parents can be taken into account and play important role in the determination of the 
‘best interest of the child’.753 This large number of variable factors that each  represent an 
indicator of what forms  the best interest of the child makes it impracticable to define the 
meaning of the term in advance. Every decision that is made must consider the individual 
child’s developmental and psychological needs.754 That is why the ‘best interest’ standard 
represents a willingness on the part of the court and the law to consider children on a case-by-
case basis rather than adjudicating children as a class or a homogeneous group with identical 
                                                 
746 Text to n 640 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.4.1. 
747 Case C‑455/15 PPU P v Q. of 19 November 2015 para 45.  
748 Kelly J. B., The Best Interests of the Child- A Concept in Search of Meaning, Family and Conciliation Courts 
Review, Vol. 35 No. 4, (1997) 377. 
749 Drăghici A., Tabacu A., Singh A., The Relations of the Minor with the Parents and Extended Family. Assessing 
the Best Interest of the Child. Criteria of Assessment, EIRP Proceedings, Vol 5 (2010) 86. 
750 Article 3(1) of the UN Convention of 20 November 1989 on the Rights of the Child 
751 Age, personality, sex, maturity level, institutionalized education, the child’s social, academic, and 
psychological adjustment, etc. 
752 Parental adjustment, parenting skills, morality issues, criminal record, financial criteria, etc. 
753 Emotional ties to each parent, etc. 
754 Kelly Joan B., (n 748) 385. 
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needs and situations.755 So the best interest of the child has to be evaluated in every single case, 
taking into account the special circumstances of that case.756 
5.2.1.2.2.2 The denial of the right of the child to be heard 
  
 A special emphasis in the Brussels IIbis Regulation has been given to the best interest 
of the child, as well as the right of the child to have his own view on the circumstances that 
involve him/her if the child is mature enough to understand these surroundings. In an 
expressive form, this principle is manifested in the right of the child to be heard.757 This rule is 
in correlation with Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child758 and Article 
24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.759 The application of Article 
24 of the Charter is explained and emphasized in recital 33 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
where it is acknowledged that this legal institute recognizes the fundamental rights and 
observes the principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In 
particular, the Brussels IIbis Regulation seeks to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of 
the child as set out in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
In that context it is predicted that the hearing of the child plays and will play an important role 
in the application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.760 However, the Regulation does not contain 
specific rules that explain how this right will be manifested and instead refers its application in 
practice to the national rules of each Member State.761 
                                                 
755 ‘The best guidelines that can be given to the Court is rather than focusing on parental demands, societal 
stereotypes, cultural tradition, or legal precedent, the best interest standard asks the decision makers to consider 
what this child needs at this point in time, given this family and its changed family structure.’ (Kelly Joan B., (n 
748) 385). 
756 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 281. 
757 Recognition of parental responsibility judgments, Article 23(b); Child abduction cases Article 11(2); when 
issuing certificate concerning rights of access, Article 41(2)(c); when issuing certificate concerning return of child, 
Article 42(2)(a) 
758 Article 12 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with 
the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, 
in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
759 The rights of the child (Article 24) 
1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express 
their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with 
their age and maturity. 
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best 
interests must be a primary consideration 




 Article 23(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation states that a judgment regarding parental 
responsibilities matters shall not be recognized in the Member State of recognition when that 
judgment has been rendered in proceedings, if the child wasn’t given opportunity to be heard. 
It is considered that such a judgment represents the violation of the fundamental principles of 
procedure of the Member State in which recognition is sought. This Article has been modeled 
on the basis of Article 23(2) (b) of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention. However, 
there is no clear model how to properly determine the maturity of the child and similarly, there 
is no proper model detailing how the child should be heard. The assessment should be made 
by by the Court for every case individually, with some guidelines given in the ECtHR case 
Egbert Elsholz against Germany.762  
 Lastly, the only exemption that Article 23(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation itself 
provides is if the judgment was given in case of urgency. In such situations the Court is exempt 
from conducting a hearing of the child in order to protect the child itself or its property. 
Nevertheless, when Courts of Member States are confronted with such situations of urgency, 
the child’s best interest must of course still be guaranteed and protected.    
 
5.2.1.2.2.3 The defense of the party was obstructed or denied 
 
 Article 23(c) is almost identical to Article 22(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and 
holds similar position as Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation and Article 27 of the 
Brussels Convention. Like these rules, article 23(c) is intended to protect a person from a 
judgment rendered in the Member State of Origin which was given in default of appearance or 
if the person was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an 
equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable that person to arrange 
for his or her defense, unless it is determined that the person has accepted the judgment 
unequivocally. Again, as was the case for Article 22(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, this 
rule must not be seen in isolation of the other provisions of the Regulation. Firstly, Article 18(1) 
provides that the court that established jurisdiction on the basis of articles 8-15 of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation has to stay the proceedings and to allow for the person habitually resident in 
a Member state other than the one where the proceeding was brought to have proper service 
and an effective defense.763 The position of this rule is strengthened in Article 37(2), 
                                                 
762 Egbert Elsholz against Germany [2000], ECHR 2000-VIII 345,366-367 
763 Text to n 350 Part II ch IV sec 4.1. 
170 
 
specifically, by the protection of the person against whom the decision in default of appearance 
was given. In such circumstances, the party seeking or contesting recognition or applying for 
a declaration of enforceability has to provide (together with the other relevant documents 
provided in Article 37) an original or certified true copy of the document which establishes that 
the defaulting party was served with the document instituting the proceedings or with an 
equivalent document, or the provision of any document indicating that the defendant has 
accepted the judgment unequivocally.  
 Regarding service of documents, the state’s national law of civil procedure will decide 
which documents have to be served to the respondent in order to start the proceedings. The 
intention is just to ensure that the respondent is treated fairly in the proceedings, meaning, that 
he/she is served with the document that institutes the proceedings or an equivalent. The 
application of the legal sources regarding service of documents depend on the territory where 
the respondent is situated. If the respondent is situated in the Member State where the 
proceedings have been initiated, then the national procedural law of that Member State 
regarding service will be applicable in the dispute. However, if the respondent is located in 
another Member State (except Denmark) then the Service Regulation764 will apply regarding 
service. Another circumstance presents itself if the respondent is in Denmark or any other non-
EU State which is part of The Hague Service Convention. If they are, then this convention will 
apply. Lastly, if the respondent is residing in a country which is not a member of The Hague 
Service Convention, then other bilateral/multilateral international agreements will apply or, as 
a last resort, national rules of service of documents for persons living abroad.765 
 The standards which were given regarding Article 22(b) apply also for Article 23(c). 
There is no certain length that the time limit should be to amount to ‘sufficient’, but the 
standards should be given according to the circumstances of the dispute, namely, the 
whereabouts of the person: if he lives in the same country where the proceedings have been 
initiated, or he/she lives abroad. Additionally, minor irregularities cannot be seen as situations 
which fall under Article 23(c). Finally, the person must not expressively accept the judgment 
which was given in default, because such conduct represents acceptance of the newly 
established situation and cannot fall under Article 23(c) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
 
                                                 
764 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 on the service of documents now superseded by Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial 
documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents). For more on this regulation see Galič A., Service 
Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters – From the Hague Conventions to the EU 1393/2007 Regulation (n 351). 
765 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 284. 
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5.2.1.2.2.4 The party against whom the recognition is sought was denied right to 
be heard 
  
 Article 23(d) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation applies to situations where a person’s 
right to be heard in a parental responsibilities case was violated and eventually the judgment 
was rendered without the Court having heard the voice/position of that person. In such 
circumstances, on the request of that person, the judgment will be not recognized in the 
Member State of recognition. This rule generally protects the rights which are provided by 
virtue of Article 8 of the ECHR and which can be restricted only in very limited cases.766 What 
is peculiar about this provision is that the person whose ‘right to be heard’ was violated, and 
thus whose parental responsibilities rights were violated, can request767  the Court of the 
Member State of recognition not to recognize the judgment.  
5.2.1.2.2.5 The foreign judgment is in conflict with a later judgment in a 
member state in which the recognition is sought 
  
 As was previously stated, judgments regarding parental responsibility issues are 
peculiar, because they remain open and cannot be categorized as res iudicata.768 Following this 
assumption, Article 23(e) and Article 22(c) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, which generally 
contain same aim of regulating the problem of irreconcilable judgments, are not identical. 
While Article 22(c) as a ground for non-recognition applies to situations where the judgment 
of a Member State of origin is irreconcilable with a judgment in Member State of recognition 
between the same parties, Article 23(e) applies to situations where the foreign judgment is 
irreconcilable with a latter judgment relating to parental responsibilities. This provision exists 
because parental responsibilities judgments may be changed later because they need to be 
adjusted to new circumstances or because of a change in the best interest of the child.769 In that 
manner, latter judgments replace earlier ones.  
 
                                                 
766 Article 8 of the ECHR: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
767 And has the burden of proof. 
768 Text to n 690 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.2. 
769 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 277. 
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5.2.1.2.2.6 Foreign judgment is in a conflict with a judgment given in another 
Member state or in a third state 
  
On first sight, Article 23(f) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation appears to be a counterpart 
of Article 22(d) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, as both relate to irreconcilability of foreign 
judgments. However, these two articles are substantially different. The different understandings 
of the concept of the nature of the parental responsibility decisions as stated in the case of 
Article 23(e) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation770 results in these substantial differences. While 
Article 22(d) is envisaged as a ground for non-recognition in the cases when a judgment on 
matrimonial matters ‘…is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member 
State or in a non-Member State between the same parties…’, Article 23(f) applies in the 
situations where the judgment on parental responsibility issues ‘… is irreconcilable with a later 
judgment relating to parental responsibility given in another Member State…’.  
 Another difference between these two articles is that Article 22(d) refers to judgments 
given in a non-member state. These judgments are recognized according to international law 
instruments and national law rules for recognition in the Member State. In the situation of 
Article 23(f), there is a limitation to this end that the decision originates from the State where 
the child was habitually resident at the time the judgment was given.771 This means that the 
evaluation of whether such judgment will be recognized in a Member State will be based on a 
non-European law, because Article 23(f) requires that the Non-Member State is the State in 
which the child was habitually resident at the time when the judgment was given.  
 
5.2.1.2.2.7 The foreign judgment is in violation of the procedure laid down in 
Article 56 (the placement of a child in another Member State) 
 
Placement measures of a child in a foster family or in institutional care are the 
prototypes of measures of protection.772 In order to ensure equal treatment for all children, the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation covers all decisions on parental responsibility, including measures 
for the protection of children.773This is reaffirmed in Article 1(2) (d) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, which expressly provides that the Regulation applies to ‘the placement of the child 
in a foster family or in institutional care’. The operational part of the measures for placement 
                                                 
770 Irreconcilability with local judgment. 
771 Article 23(f) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
772 Lagarde Report (n 93) 547. 
773 Recital (5) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
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of the child in another Member State is given in Article 56 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
This article provides that consultation of the Central Authority of the requested Member State 
or that of another authority having jurisdiction in that Member State is mandatory where public 
authority intervention is required for domestic cases of child placements.774 In this situation, 
the competent authority must consent to the placement.775 Where no such intervention is 
required, there is merely an obligation to inform the Central Authority of the requested Member 
State or any other Authority having jurisdiction in that Member State.776  
 Article 23(g) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is intended to protect the procedure for 
placement of the child as provided in Article 56. If this procedure is violated in any way,, for 
example if there is no consent by the competent authority of the Member State to place the 
child in a certain place, , there is no obligation to recognize the placement decision of the 
Member State of origin. 
5.2.2 Abolition of the application for a declaration of enforceability relating to 
child abduction and access rights cases according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
  
The classical exequatur procedures in the Brussels IIbis Regulation refer to foreign 
judgments given in a Member State over divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment cases 
and over parental responsibility cases. The matrimonial matters cases are specific because they 
are only undergoing the process of recognition of the foreign judgment. On the other hand, 
parental responsibility cases (especially access rights and custody rights) are not only 
undergoing the process of recognition but also they need to be enforced in another Member 
State. These types of decisions are enforced by issuing a declaration of enforceability. The 
initiation of this procedure according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation is conducted after the 
applicant files an application777 with all of the necessary documents listed in Article 30. Against 
such decision there is possibility of an appeal778. There are two exceptions to the procedure laid 
out in Article 30 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. These exceptions are the cases of access 
rights and child abduction.779 What is peculiar about these cases is that they are recognized and 
enforced in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and 
                                                 
774 Article 56(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
775 Article 56(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
776 Article 56(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
777 Article 28(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
778 Article 33 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
779 Article 40 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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without any possibility of opposing the recognition,780 simply by issuing a special certificate 
on the appropriate standard form that is attached to the Regulation (Annexes III and IV).781 
This special certificate, issued by the judge that has rendered the decision regarding access 
rights and in child abduction cases, certifies that the parties concerned and the child have been 
given an opportunity to be heard.782 When it comes to the cases of access rights, the above-
mentioned preconditions also have to be fulfilled and the service has to be conducted in a proper 
manner. This means that if the decision was given in default, the certificate can be issued only 
if the person defaulting was served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with 
an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable that person to arrange 
for his or her defense, or, if the person has been served with the document but not in compliance 
with these conditions, it is nevertheless established that he or she accepted the decision 
unequivocally.783 In the cases of child abduction, the issuing of the certificate is conditional on  
the hearing of the parties, the procedural action that the court takes into account in issuing its 
judgment, and the reasons for and evidence underlying the order issue pursuant  to Article 13 
of the 1980 Hague Convention.784 
There is no requirement of any special procedure785 for recognition. Such procedures 
for application of declaration of enforceability are governed by the law of the Member state of 
enforcement.786 In all of these situations, the guiding principles behind the Regulation are: that 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State firstly, must be based 
on the principle of mutual trust and secondly, its grounds must be kept to the minimum.787  The 
Regulation is also based on the idea that the best interests of the child must prevail,788 with 
respect for the fundamental rights of the child, as set out in Article 24 of the Charter of 
                                                 
780 Article 41 and 42 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
781 In such circumsances the Court of the enforcement of the Member State is obliged to enforce the judgment 
which is so certified, and it has no power to oppose either the recognition or the enforceability of that judgment. 
Support for that interpretation can be found in the fact that the grounds laid down in Articles 23 and 31 of 
Regulation No 2201/2003 which justify the court of the Member State of enforcement not recognising or declaring 
not enforceable a judgment on matters of parental responsibility, which include a manifest conflict with the public 
policy of that Member State and the violation of fundamental principles of procedure of that Member State which 
require that the child be given the opportunity to be heard, were not repeated as grounds capable of justifying 
opposition by the courts of the Member State of enforcement in the proceedings covered by the provisions of 
Chapter III, Section 4 of that regulation. Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, 
[2010] ECR I-14247 para 57. See also, to that effect, Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 
91, 97 and 99. 
782 Article 41(2) (b) and (c); Article 42 (2)(a) and (b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
783 Article 41(2) (a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
784 Article 42(2)(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
785 Article 21 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
786 Article 30 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
787 Text to n 451 Part II ch V sec 5.1 and Text to n 487 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1. 
788 Recital 12 and 13 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union.789 To that end, the Regulation seeks, in particular, 
to deter child abductions between Member States and, in cases of abduction, to bring about the 
child’s return without delay.790  
The idea of the abolition of the exequatur has been in development for almost 20 years. 
Its origin can be traced back to the summit of the European Council held in Tampere on 15-16 
October 1999(Tampere summit),791 which is known as a starting point of the development of 
the European Union as an area of freedom, security and justice.792 Among the 62 
conclusions,793 regarding cross-border recognition and enforcement the European Council held 
that:  
[E]nhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements and the necessary 
approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial protection 
of individual rights.794  
In civil matters, the Commission was called upon to make a proposal for further 
reduction of the intermediate measures which were still required to enable the recognition and 
enforcement of a decision or judgement in the requested State.795 The idea was that such 
decisions would be automatically recognized throughout the Union without any intermediate 
proceedings or grounds for refusal of enforcement, and could be accompanied by the setting of 
minimum standards on specific aspects of civil procedural law.796 
From that moment on it started to be considered that mutual recognition is a 
‘cornerstone of judicial cooperation.’797 The first instrument that abolished exequatur for 
particular decisions was the Brussels IIbis Regulation.798 This policy initiated legislative 
                                                 
789 ‘Finally, the most important principle governing both the Convention and the Regulation is beyond any doubt 
that of protecting the superior interests of the child...’ with special reference to Article 24(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG 
Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008 para 20. 
790 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 52. 
791 Even before the summit in Tampere, there were considerations about the abolishment of the exequatur, 
nevertheless because of differences of procedural law regarding enforcement it became official EU policy at the 
Tampere summit, Kramer, X., Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis Regulation (n 468) 348. 
792 The Tampere Summit was the first summit in which the head of states and governments of 15 EU Member 
States come together to discuss the justice and home affairs policies of the European Union. European 
Commission, Fact Sheet #3.1 Tampere Kick-start to the EU’s policy for justice and home affairs, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20040617/tampere_09_2002_en.pdf> accessed 12 March 2016. 
793 For the full Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, see 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm> accessed 12 March 2016. 
794 Point 33 of the Presidency Conclusions of the summit in Tampere. 
795 Visitation rights was pointed out as one of the fields, point 34 of the Presidency Conclusions of the summit in 
Tampere. 
796 Point 33 of the Presidency Conclusions of the summit in Tampere. 
797 Kramer, X., Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis Regulation (n 468) 348. 
798 The abolishment of exequatur in family matters was outlined in Programme of measures for implementation 
of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001, C12/1). 
176 
 
activities that at the beginning were expected to lead to abolition of exequatur799 in the new 
Brussels I Regulation.800 The Commission conducted consultations on the basis of the Green 
Paper of 2009801 and proposed only partial abolition, maintaining safeguards in the form of 
extraordinary remedies that permitted a limited review of the jurisdiction to be enforced but 
with no public policy exception.802 However as was stated above,803 the final result is that the 
Council adopted a recast Brussels I Regulation that abolished exequatur generally but permits 
an application by any interested party for refusal of recognition (including public policy)804 and 
application by the person against whom the enforcement is sought for refusal of 
enforcement.805 In this way the possibility of opposing recognition and enforcement was 
maintained in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but limited significantly by the fact that the 
exceptions must be expressly invoked by application.806 
 
5.2.2.1 Child Abduction Cases under the Brussels IIbis Regime 
 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation, as was mentioned above807 establishes a complementary 
mechanism to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention for the return of the wrongfully 
removed or retained children within the European Union.808 From the point of view of the goals 
that both instruments want to achieve, the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention are quite similar to each other.809 The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention provides for the restoration of the status quo with ‘by means of 'the prompt return 
of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State’ as a main objective.810 
                                                 
799 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and The European Economic and Social 
Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters COM (2009) 174 final p.4. For more on evolution of 
the systems for the recognition and enforcement in the EU see text to n 450 Part II ch V sec 5.1. 
800 More on the Brussels Ibis Regulation see text to n 477 Part II ch V sec 5.1. 
801 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2009) 175 final. 
802 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), COM (2010) 748 final. 
803 Text to n 477 Part II ch V sec 5.1. 
804 Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
805 Article 46 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
806 Scott M. J., (n 480) 29. 
807 About the relationship between the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the 1980 Hague Convention on Child 
Abduction, see text to n 122 Part II ch II sec 2.1. 
808 McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union (n 135) 17. 
809 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008 para 
16. 
810 ‘The Convention's objects, which appear in article 1, can be summarized as follows: since one factor 
characteristic of the situations under consideration consists in the fact that the abductor claims that his action has 
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On the other hand, it is shown in the recitals to the Brussels IIbis Regulation, in particular 
recitals 17, 21, 23 and 24, and in the provisions of Article 11, that the Regulation shares the 
same aim of ensuring, in principle and in practice other than in special circumstances, the 
child’s swift and automatic return to the Member State from which he or she has been removed 
and where he or she was habitually resident before the removal.811 
The 1980 Hague Abduction Convention is still in force between the Member States of 
the European Union in one regard.812 But on the other hand, the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
modifies some rules of the Hague Convention for the needs of the European judicial area. 
Generally, the EU restrained itself from imposing ‘comunitarisation’ of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention, but some new rules are different from the older ones. In all of the 
situations where different rules are provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, those rules apply 
instead of the rules given in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. These changed rules 
are given in Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, which supplement the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention in the cases of wrongful removal or retention between Member 
States of the European Union.813 Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is not about 
conferring jurisdiction, but about triggering the application of the return procedure. In that 
context, a clear distinction must be made between the rules of jurisdiction (Articles 8, 9, 10 and 
12) and article 11, especially from the perspective of habitual residence, where for Article 11 
only the habitual residence of the child immediately before the alleged wrongful retention or 
removal is relevant.814 Despite their differences, the understanding of the basic concept of 
‘habitual residence’ is the same, based on the relevant case-law of the CJEU.815 
When a Court of a Member State receives a request for the return of the child pursuant 
to the 1980 Child Abduction Convention, it must apply the rules of the Convention as 
complemented by Article 11(1) to (5) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.816 This means that the 
judge will first determine whether ‘wrongful removal or retention’ has taken place. The 
definition of the term ‘wrongful removal or retention’ is given in Article 2(11) of the Brussels 
                                                 
been rendered lawful by the competent authorities of the State of refuge, one effective way of deterring him would 
be to deprive his actions of any practical or juridical consequences. The Convention, in order to bring this about, 
places at the head of its objectives the restoration of the status quo, by means of 'the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State’. See Perez Vera Report, (n 187) 428. 
811 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008 para 
16. 
812 Schulz A., The New Brussels II Regulation and the Hague Conventions of 1980 and 1996 (n 128) 24. 
813 Stone P., EU Private International Law (second edition, 2010) 421. 
814 Case C‑376/14 C.v M. of 9 October 2014 Opinion of AG Szpunar delivered on 24 September 2014, para 71 
and 72 
815 ibid para 73. 
816 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 53. 
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IIbis Regulation and it is very similar in wording to  Article 3 of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention.817 The term ‘wrongful removal or retention’ understands a child's 
removal or retention where:  
(a) it is in breach of rights of custody acquired by judgment or by operation of law or 
by an agreement having legal effect under the law of the Member State where the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and  
(b) provided that, at the time of removal or retention, the rights of custody were actually 
exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or 
retention. Custody shall be considered to be exercised jointly when, pursuant to a judgment or 
by operation of law, one holder of parental responsibility cannot decide on the child's place of 
residence without the consent of another holder of parental responsibility.818  
So, for the correct application of Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, it is 
essential to determine whether the removal or retention of a child was in breach of custody 
rights under the law of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately 
before the abduction, or, in other words, the wrongfulness of the child’s removal for the 
purposes of applying Brussels IIbis Regulation is entirely dependent on the existence of rights 
of custody (which is conferred by the relevant national law) and the breach of that right with 
the act of removal that has taken place.819 
Article 2(9) of Brussels IIbis Regulation defines ‘rights of custody’ as covering  
[r]ights and duties relating to the care of the person of a child, and in particular the right to 
determine the child’s place of residence.820  
This term (right of custody) has to be given a meaning which is not solely determined 
by the law of the Member State of the habitual residence of the child concerned. It has to be 
given a meaning which is autonomous and must reflect the terms of the Regulation and of the 
Convention.821 On the other hand, it is to the national courts (or by operation of law or 
agreement) to determine who will be attributed with the right of custody individually.822 It 
                                                 
817 Article 3 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention  
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where - 
a)   it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or 
alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or 
retention; and  
b)   at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have 
been so exercised but for the removal or retention. 
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by 
reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of 
that State. 
818 Article 2(11) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
819 Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 44. 
820 See Article 2(9) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
821 Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 41. 
822 ‘An entirely separate matter is the identity of the person who has rights of custody. In that regard, it is apparent 
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follows that Regulation No 2201/2003 does not determine which person must have such rights 
of custody as may render a child’s removal wrongful within the meaning of Article 2(11), but 
rather refers to the law of the Member State where the child was habitually resident 
immediately before its removal or retention to answer the question of who has such rights of 
custody. Accordingly, it is the law of that Member State which determines the conditions under 
which a person acquires rights of custody in respect to his or her child, within the meaning of 
Article 2(9) of Brussels IIbis Regulation, and which may provide that his acquisition of such 
rights is dependent on his obtaining a judgment from the national court with jurisdiction 
awarding such rights to him.823 
In the determination of the existence and exercise of custody rights the Courts of 
Member States are not isolated from other legal sources. They have to consider the 
determination of the existence and exercise of custody rights in terms of the provisions of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(however , the Charter should be taken 
into consideration solely for the purposes of interpreting Regulation No 2201/2003, and there 
should be no assessment of national law as such)824 given that Article 7 corresponds to that in 
Article 8 of the ECHR, which states that everyone has the right to respect for his or her family 
life.825 This means that once the authorities of a Contracting State to the 1980 Hague 
Convention have found that a child has been wrongfully removed pursuant to the Convention, 
they have a duty to make adequate and effective efforts to secure the return of the child. A 
failure to make such efforts constitutes a violation of Article 7 of the CFR (Article 8 of the 
ECHR).826 In this context every contracting State must equip itself with adequate and effective 
measures to ensure compliance with its positive obligations under Article 7 of the CFR (Article 
8 of the ECHR).827 
                                                 
from Article 2(11)(a) of that regulation that whether or not a child’s removal is wrongful depends on the existence 
of ‘rights of custody acquired by judgment or by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect under 
the law of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention’.’ 
Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 42. 
823 Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 42. 
824 Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 52. By such conduct and with the consideration 
of the jurisprudence of the ECHR the European Court of Justice in this case decided that ‘…that Regulation 
No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from providing by its law that the acquisition 
of rights of custody by a child’s father, where he is not married to the child’s mother, is dependent on the father’s 
obtaining a judgment from a national court with jurisdiction awarding such rights to him, on the basis of which 
the removal of the child by its mother or the retention of that child may be considered wrongful, within the 
meaning of Article 2(11) of that regulation.’ Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 64. 
825 By Article 51 of the Charter in the implementation of EU law the EU institutions and the Member States are 
to respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof. (Practice Guide for the application 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 53). 
826 Iglesias Gil and A.U.I v. Spain, Requête no 56673/00, [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 36, para 62. 
827 Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, [2001] 31 E.H.R.R. 7, para 113; Maire v. Portugal, Requête no 
48206/99, [2006] 43 E.H.R.R. 13, para 78; P.P. v. Poland, Application no. 8677/03, para 95; Raw and Others v. 
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Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation represents a complex structural rule that 
highly influences and alters the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. Article 11(1) 
provides that this rule is applicable in situations where a person, institution or other body 
having rights of custody applies to the competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a 
judgment on the basis of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully 
removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention.  
This action of which the object is the return, to the Member State of origin, of a child 
who has been wrongfully removed or retained in another Member State, does not concern the 
substance of parental responsibility.828 Also according to Article 19 of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention, a decision under that convention concerning return is not to be taken 
to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue. Consequently, this position provides 
that return of children and actions relating to parental responsibilities issues don’t have the 
same object or the same cause of action and therefore there cannot be lis pendens between such 
actions.829  
Article 11(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation states that when applying Articles 12 and 
13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, it shall be ensured that the child is given the opportunity to 
be heard during the proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her 
age or degree of maturity. This modification is made also in Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. Differently from the Hague Child Abduction Convention, it provides for a time 
limit where the competent court the court shall, except where exceptional circumstances make 
this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks after the application is lodged, using 
the most expeditious procedures available in national law. 
Another deviation from the rules provided in the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
is given in Article 11(4) and 11(5) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. With these provisions, the 
grounds for issuing a non-return order as given in Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention are modified. These two modifications provide firstly, that a court 
cannot refuse to return a child on the basis of Article 13(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention830 if 
                                                 
France, Application no. 10131/11, para 95. 
828 Case C‑376/14 PPU, C v. M. of 9 October 2014 para 40. 
829 ibid. 
830 Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested 
State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return 
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it is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the protection of the 
child after his or her return.831 Secondly, a court cannot refuse to return a child unless the person 
who requested the return of the child has been given an opportunity to be heard.832 
The subsequent paragraphs of Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, provide for 
the procedure in the situations where a non-return order is given for the return of the wrongfully 
removed or retained child on the basis of Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention. Article 11(6) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, provides that if a court has issued 
an order on non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, the court must 
immediately, either directly or through its central authority, transmit a copy of the court order 
on non-return and all of the relevant documents, in particular a transcript of the hearings before 
the court, to the court with jurisdiction or central authority in the Member State where the child 
was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, as determined 
by national law. The time limit for this transmission of the documents is one month after the 
date of the non-return order.833 On the other hand, Article 11(7) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
sets time limits for the submissions of the parties involved in these  proceedings and states that 
unless the courts in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately 
before the wrongful removal or retention have already been seized by one of the parties, the 
court or central authority that receives the information given in Article 11(6) of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation must notify the parties and invite them to make submissions to the court, in 
accordance with national law, within three months of the date of notification so that the court 
can examine the question of the custody of the child. Without prejudice to the rules on 
jurisdiction contained in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, the court shall close the case if no 
submissions have been received by the court within the time limit. 
Lastly, the final modification of the child abduction cases for the European Union 
member states, given in Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, provides that 
notwithstanding a judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention, any subsequent judgment which requires the return of the child issued by a court 
                                                 




b)   there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise 
place the child in an intolerable situation. Grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
831 Article 11(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
832 Article 11(5) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
833 Article 11(6) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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having jurisdiction under this Regulation shall be enforceable in accordance with Section 4 of 
Chapter III of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, in order to secure the return of the child. This 
modification effectively introduces the abolition of exequatur in child abduction cases. 
All of these modifications are based on three fundamental principles.834 Firstly, the 
Regulation is based on the primacy of the interests of the child and the respect for its rights.835 
Secondly, the Regulation seeks to ensure that any wrongful removal of a child has no legal 
effect, unless subsequently accepted by the other interested parties.836 Thirdly, it requires 
national courts to show a high level of mutual trust, keeping the grounds for non-recognition 
of judgments issued by a court in another Member State to the minimum required and making 
the recognition and enforcement of those judgments almost automatic.837 
These modified solutions given in Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation represent 
solutions complementary to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention.838They supplement 
the existing rules with slightly different rules whose goal is to adjust the return of the 
wrongfully removed or retained children in the EU’s perspective. As was already said,839 The 
Hague Abduction Convention still remains in force between the Member States of the 
European Union and applies in child abduction cases, especially those rules which have not 
been modified. However, the modifications given in Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
apply instead of the original solutions provided in the Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
There are five main modifications. The first modification is the obligation of the courts for a 
prompt procedure, the second is the mandatory obligation for hearing of the child if its old 
enough to express its own views, the third is the mandatory obligation for hearing of the person 
who applied for return order, the fourth is the modification of the procedure in the case of 
rendering a non-return order, and the fifth is the abolition of the exequatur of certified decisions 
on child abduction cases. 
                                                 
834 Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, [2010], ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpstone delivered 
on 16 June 2010 para 27. 
835 That idea is expressed not only in the objective of taking into account, in each case, the best interests of the 
child himself or herself but also, and in particular, in the general rule that it is the courts of the child’s place of 
habitual residence which are best placed to settle any issues regarding custody or parental responsibility and which 
must therefore, in principle, have jurisdiction in the matter. See Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, 
[2010], ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpstone delivered on 16 June 2010 para 28. 
836  To that end, it first lays down an almost automatic mechanism for securing the return of the child without 
delay. Second, it strictly limits the possibilities of transferring jurisdiction to the courts of the Member Sate of 
wrongful removal, allowing those of the Member State of former habitual residence to bypass any judgment of 
non-return made on the basis of Article 13 of the Convention. See Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro 
Alpago, [2010], ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpstone delivered on 16 June 2010, para 29 
837 Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, [2010], ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpstone delivered 
on 16 June 2010 para 31. 
838 McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union (n 135) 17. 




5.2.2.1.1 The Duty of the courts for prompt procedures 
 
The duty of the courts to conduct a prompt procedure (in the cases of child abduction) 
is not a genuine novelty. The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention provides that 
Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to secure within their territories the 
implementation of the objects of the Convention and for this purpose they shall use the most 
expeditious procedures available.840 This goal is again highlighted in Article 11 of the Hague 
Child Abduction Convention where it is stated that the judicial or administrative authorities of 
Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children. The aspect 
of ‘expeditious proceedings’ needs to be understood as being within the timeframe of six weeks 
that is provided for the involved persons and institutions to take all the necessary measures 
which will result in a decision on return or a non-return of the child to the state of its habitual 
residence. However, this timeframe is not so strict and does not impose an obligation on the 
competent authorities to produce a decision in this period of six weeks, only giving right to the 
applicant to ask for a statement of the reasons for the delay .841    
Opposite from this approach taken in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, 
which allows greater space for the competent authorities to take into account all of the 
circumstances, especially those that can be categorized as exceptions from the obligation for 
prompt return of the child in the state where his/her habitual residence is, the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation adopts a new, complementary solution which substitutes for the one in the 1980 
Hague Child Abduction Convention. According to this solution, the court shall, except where 
exceptional circumstances make this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks 
after the application is lodged.842 This article imposes an obligation to the court of the Member 
State where the child has been removed or retained to act expeditiously and to render a decision 
within a timeframe of six weeks. However, there is no specific reference on whether the 
decision should be enforced in this time limit.843 If this opposite interpretation of the aspect is 
adopted, it could lead to insecurities of in the return of the abducted children.  For example, if 
national rules of appeal suspend the enforceability of the decision without imposing any time 
limit on the appeal procedure844, this could ultimately jeopardize the whole return system. 
                                                 
840 Article 2 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
841 Article 11 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
842 Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 




Having this in mind, the position given in the guidelines of the European Commission should 
prevail and the court should seek to ensure that a return order issued within the prescribed six-
week time limit is ‘enforceable’. The reason for this approach is because this rule aims to create 
a more expeditious procedure, which tends to eliminate detailed examinations of the well-being 
of the child and to minimize the uncertainty involved particularly in cases involving the 
unlawful removal and retention of children.845 These two reasons will allow these cases to be 
examined by the court which is in the best position to address these issues; that is, the court of 
the Member State where the child had its habitual residence before the wrongful removal or 
retention took its course.846 Such an interpretation is in line with the approach taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in relation with Article 8 of the ECHR where 
proceedings relating to the return of children and ‘proceedings relating to the award of parental 
responsibility, including the enforcement of the final decision, require urgent handling as the 
passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the child and the 
parent who does not live with it.’847 The ECtHR then provided that the answer to the question 
on whether or not the measures are adequate will be answered ‘by the swiftness of its 
implementation’.848  
The obligation imposed on the court to act expeditiously is welcomed. However, such 
strict application in the Brussels IIbis Regulation can be assessed as too optimistic and 
problematic. The functioning of the whole system for the return of the wrongfully removed or 
retained children does not depend exclusively on the Courts of the Member States. In these 
cases, other relevant public and private authorities are involved whose role is to allow the Court 
to render the right decision for the return of the wrongfully removed or retained children. This 
asks for flawless coordination between the involved authorities in the process of the return of 
the children to the Member State of their habitual residence. 
On the other hand, the imposed obligation of the Court to mandatorily take into account 
the views of the child having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity, as given in Article 
11(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, and the duty to hear the person who requested the return 
of the child,849 represent procedural actions which directly influence the duration of the 
                                                 
845 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 72. 
846 Fawcett J. and Carruthers J. (n 139) 1119. 
847 Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, [2001] 31 E.H.R.R. 7, para 102; Maire v. Portugal, Requête no 
48206/99, [2006] 43 E.H.R.R. 13, par.74; P.P. v. Poland, Application no. 8677/03, para 83; H.N. v. Poland, 
Application no. 77710/01, [2005], para 73; Raw and Others v. France, Application no. 10131/11, para 58. 
848 Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, [2001] 31 E.H.R.R. 7, para 102; Maire v. Portugal, Requête no 
48206/99, [2006] 43 E.H.R.R. 13, para 74; P.P. v. Poland, Application no. 8677/03, para 87; H.N. v. Poland, 
Application no. 77710/01, [2005], para 73; Raw and Others v. France, Application no. 10131/11, para 83. 
849 Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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procedure. The technical aspect and the methods implemented for these rules are left to the 
national law of the Member States. This variance directly affects the time limit of six weeks. If 
the Court issues a non-return order, then the procedure for return of the child expands with 
more procedural actions and prolongs the time limit so that it outlasts the one provided in 
Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
The conclusion can be reached that when acting on an application for return of 
wrongfully removed or retained children, the court must act expeditiously and promptly to 
assure that the child is returned to the place of his/her habitual residence. However, the strict 
time limit given in Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, as well as the 
recommendations of the European Commission to incorporate all of the mandatory procedural 
actions provided in Articles 11(3) and (4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and above all to 
include the appellate procedure in this time frame, lead to conclusion that the six-week time 
limit for the completion of the procedure for the return of the abducted children is to optimistic. 
It is undisputed that there is need for expeditious and prompt procedures in child abduction 
cases because of the harm that the children are exposed to, but it is very optimistic to believe 
that the whole procedure could complete itself within this timeframe of six weeks, especially 
when these cases are often regarded as sensitive and usually the Court of the Member State of 
refugee must take many procedural actions and involve many other relevant institutions.  
 
5.2.2.1.2 Hearing of the child 
 
One of the exemptions for the return of the wrongfully removed or retained children to 
the place of their habitual residence is provided in Article 13(2) of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention. This rule provides that the judicial or administrative authority:  
[m]ay also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned 
and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.850  
However, the position of this rule in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention gives 
full discretion to the relevant authorities to take into account the view of the child.851 
 The Brussels IIbis Regulation specifically provides that the:  
[h]earing of the child plays an important role in the application of this Regulation.852   
This aspect is highlighted in Recital 33 where it is reaffirmed that the‘[r]egulation 
recognizes the fundamental rights and observes the principles of the Charter of Fundamental 
                                                 
850 Article 13(2) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention 
851 Perez Vera Report (n187) 433. 
852 Recital (19) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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Rights of the European Union...'' particularly Article 24 of the Charter, which refers to four 
postulates: 
1) Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being;  
2) They may express their views freely and such views shall be taken into consideration on 
matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity;  
3) In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, 
the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration; and  
4) Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and 
direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.853  
The main guiding principles given in Recitals 19 and 33 that refer to children play an 
important role in the solutions provided in Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.854 Such 
a manifestation of these principles is given in the imposed obligation arising from Article 11(2) 
of the Brussels IIbis Regulation for the Courts of the Member States which are applying the 
Hague Child Abduction Convention, especially Articles 12 and 13, that they:  
[s]hall [emphasis added] be ensured that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the 
proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity.855  
In this way, Article 11(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation imposes that children 
(conditionally if they have reached certain age and maturity) must be given the opportunity to 
be heard in child abduction cases that involves them. With this, the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
reinforces the right of the child to be heard during the procedure.856 
The position of the CJEU in the Zarraga Case regarding this question preceded a large 
debate over the right of the child to be heard, which was ultimately connected to the 
infringement of fundamental rights such as those in Article 24 of the Charter. The arguments 
provided by the German government and the European Commission, which were against the 
possibility of the hearing of the child by the judicial authorities of the Member State of 
enforcement in proceedings which lead to non-return order (on which latter judgment for return 
of the child based on Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation was given by the Court of 
                                                 
853 Clear division of jurisdiction between the courts of the Member State of origin and those of the Member State 
of enforcement established by the provisions of Chapter III, Section 4 of Regulation No 2201/2003 (see, to that 
effect, Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, [2010], ECR I-06673, para 73) rests on the premiss that 
those courts respect, within their respective areas of jurisdiction, the obligations which that regulation imposes on 
them, in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In that regard, since Regulation No 2201/2003 may 
not be contrary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 42 of that regulation, the provisions of which give 
effect to the child’s right to be heard, must be interpreted in the light of Article 24 of that charter (see, to that 
effect, Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 60). Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni 
Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 para 59-60.  
854 Fawcett J. and Carruthers J., (n 139) 1119. 
855 Article 11(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
856 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 55. 
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Member State of origin) to meet the standards for ‘hearing of the child’ as provided in Article 
42(2)(a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, were:  
1. The hearing before the court of the Member State of enforcement and the hearing referred to 
in Article 42(2)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 serve different purposes, since the former relates to the 
return of the child whereas the latter is intended to enable a final ruling to be given on rights of custody 
in respect of the child and therefore has much wider scope. 
2. Accepting the proposition that the condition laid down in Article 42(2)(a) of Regulation No 
2201/2003 is satisfied where the child was heard by the court of the Member State of enforcement would 
have the effect of systematically discharging the court of the Member State of origin from the obligation 
to hear the child and would therefore make it possible to circumvent that provision. This would also be 
contrary to the scheme of that provision, which lays down the obligation, in subparagraph (a), to hear the 
child, and not only the duty, in subparagraph (c), to take into account the evidence underlying the 
judgment of non-return. 
3. According to the Commission, in this case, the time which elapsed between the hearing of 
the child by the court of the requested Member State and the delivery of the judgment ordering the child’s 
return, that is to say almost nine months, did not justify the conclusion that the condition laid down in 
Article 42(2)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 was satisfied.857 
The opposite arguments given by the Spanish Government and Mr. Zarraga, were 
upheld by AG Bot and serving as a unifying component between the 1980 Hague Abduction 
Convention and the new Brussels IIbis model, were: 
1. That the fundamental right of the child to be heard, as implemented in Article 42 of 
Regulation No 2201/2003, must have an autonomous content.858 
2. Article 42(2)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 establishes a right which may be derogated from 
only on the ground referred to in that provision, that is to say where the hearing is ‘inappropriate’ having 
regard to the child’s age or degree of maturity.859 
3. Article 42(2)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 establishes the right of a child to have been 
given an opportunity to be heard. It does not provide that the child must have been heard. This statement 
has two consequences.  
First, a child sufficiently capable of forming his or her own views must have been 
informed that he or she is entitled to express his or her opinion freely. In so far as the hearing 
of a child, in particular a young child, depends in practice on the cooperation of the parent who 
has wrongfully removed or retained the child, the Member States must provide the court with 
the means to overcome any obstacles which that parent may place in the way of the child being 
heard.860 
                                                 
857 Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 Opinion of AG Bot 
delivered on 7 December 2010 para 65. 
858 ibid para 78. 
859 ibid para 84. 
860 ibid para 86. 
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Secondly, that wording implies that the child is also entitled not to express any views. 
The child must not be forced to choose between the parent who has wrongfully removed or 
retained him or her and the other parent. Nor must the child be put in a position which might 
give him or her the impression that he or she is alone responsible for the decision on his/her 
return and, therefore, for any suffering which that decision may cause to one of his or her 
parents. The conditions under which the child’s views are obtained must be suited to the 
circumstances, as well as to the child’s age and maturity, so as to ensure that this does not 
represent a traumatic experience for him or her.861 
4. The opinion expressed by the child at the hearing is not binding on the court of the Member 
State of origin, which has jurisdiction to deliver a judgment under Article 11(8) of Regulation No 
2201/2003.862 
5. The main characteristic of the Brussels IIbis Regulation system in the event of a child’s 
abduction lies in the fact that the proceedings before the court of the Member State of enforcement which 
led to a judgment of non-return and those before the court of the Member State of origin required to 
deliver the final judgment on that return are not separate, competing proceedings. They are the 
complementary components of one and the same set of proceedings, which concern the situation of a 
child whose parents are in dispute over custody and in which two courts in different Member States have 
an overriding duty under Regulation No 2201/2003 to work together to find the solution best suited to 
safeguarding that child’s interests.863 
The position which the CJEU took in the Zarraga Case was that there should not be 
limitations on a hearing of a child, meaning that the Regulation does not provide that the 
hearing must exclusively take place before the court of the Member State of origin.864 It was 
observed that in Recital 33 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation it was emphasized, that, more 
generally, the Regulation recognizes the fundamental rights and observes the principles of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, ensuring, in particular, respect for the fundamental rights of 
the child as set out in Article 24 of the Charter. In that regard, it was derived from Article 24 
of that Charter and from Article 42(2)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 that those provisions 
refer not to the hearing of the child per se, but to the child’s having the opportunity to be 
heard,865 and also that the court which has to rule on the return of a child would assess whether 
such a hearing is appropriate.866 Accordingly, it was ruled that:  
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[w]hile remaining a right of the child, hearing the child cannot constitute an absolute obligation, 
but must be assessed having regard to what is required in the best interests of the child in each individual 
case, in accordance with Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.867  
Following that standpoint, the CJEU in the Zarraga ruled in line with the position of the 
Spanish Government and Mr. Zarraga that  
[i]t is not a necessary consequence of the right of the child to be heard that a hearing before the 
court of the Member State of origin take place, but that right does require that there are made available 
to that child the legal procedures and conditions which enable the child to express his or her views freely 
and that those views are obtained by the court.868 
Another limitation on Article 11(2) comes from its relation with Article 11(3) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation. Article 11(2) has to be viewed together with Article 11(3) and the 
imposed obligation to finish the whole return procedure, including the appellate procedure, 
within the proposed time frame of six weeks. Therefore, to achieve such an optimistic goal the 
procedural action of hearing of the child must be taken in the most prompt and  efficient way  
possible, without a possibility of modification of the national procedures.’869  
This necessity to act quickly is however not a novelty for the most of the Member 
States.870 In the view of these states, this obligation is based on the implementation of Article 
6 and 8 of ECHR and also on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Right of the Child. The 
practical arrangements for the method which will be implemented for the ascertaining the view 
of the child for its position in the child abduction cases vary depending on the national legal 
systems of each Member State. One of the possible methods is the direct hearing of the child 
in the Court. In such cases the judge directly asks the questions which will enable him/her to 
ascertain the factual situation of the child. However, the judge must take into account the age 
and the maturity of the child and other relevant circumstances in each case individually.  In the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, there is not a direct mandate that the child’s view must be taken 
directly by the judge.871  
Another possible method through which the child’s view can be ascertained, is if the 
view of the child is taken by a social worker or other person specialized in working with 
children. It is necessary that this person conduct the hearing of the child and later present the 
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report in which the desires and feelings of the child regarding its own case are noted.872 In this 
way, recognition is given to the diversity of national legal systems and the different legal 
traditions of the EU Member States. However, the main goal must not be forgotten:  the view 
of the child of the position in which he/she has been placed and the necessity for this aspect to 
be taken into account when rendering a decision for the return or non-return in the Member 
State of the child’s habitual residence. If the court chooses the most appropriate method for 
conducting such procedural action and in the safest possible way, then in such a situation the 
child will be free and express its desires and emotions, and in the end feel liberated from the 
feeling of responsibility or guilt.873 
It is possible and favorable for the Courts to use the arrangements established in the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of 
the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (Evidence 
Regulation).874 The Evidence Regulation facilitates cooperation between courts of different 
Member States in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters including family law 
cases.875 A Court of a Member State can follow a request to another competent court of a 
Member State to take evidence which is, under the Regulation, obliged to execute the request 
within a 90-day time limit. If it is not possible for the request to be executed within 90 days of 
receipt by the requested court, the requested court should inform the requesting court 
accordingly, stating the reasons which prevent the request from being executed swiftly.876 Also 
under the rules of the Evidence Regulation, it is possible, in order to facilitate the taking of 
evidence, for a court in a Member State, in accordance with the law of its Member State, to 
take evidence directly in another Member State, if accepted by the latter, and under the 
conditions determined by the central body or competent authority of the requested Member 
State.877Video-conferences and tele-conferences, which are proposed as possible tools in 
Article 10(4) of the Evidence Regulation, can be particularly useful for taking evidence in cases 
involving children.878 
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The solution taken in Brussels IIbis Regulation for the hearing of the child is a step 
forward from the Hague Child Abduction Convention. Although the right of the child to be 
heard and the actual hearing of the child cannot be considered to be identical,  the solution in 
Article 11(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation significantly raises the participation of the child 
in the procedure for his/her return in the Member State of its habitual residence.879 On the other 
hand, these additional procedural actions (which the court must take) increase the consideration 
to slow the procedure down. The modalities and the methods through which these hearings are 
carried by the court or other relevant authorities depend exclusively on the national law of the 
competent authorities. In other words, before a court of the Member State of origin can issue a 
certificate which accords with the requirements of Article 42 of Regulation No 2201/2003, that 
court must ensure that, having regard to the child’s best interests and all the circumstances of 
the individual case, the judgement to be certified was made with all due regard to the child’s 
right freely to express his or her views and that a genuine and effective opportunity to express 
those views was offered to the child, taking into account the procedural means of national law 
and the instruments of international judicial cooperation.880 No matter the manner in which this 
procedural action is taken, it holds the possibility of prolonging the procedure for the return of 
children. There is a real danger of the collision of Article 11(2) and 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, of the necessity of accurately and adequately hearing the child and also themandate 
that it takes place within a timeframe of six weeks. It is to the competent authorities to respond 
to this challenge for conducting the whole procedure in such a short time frame.881 
 
5.2.2.1.3 Hearing of the applicant for the return of the child 
 
The Brussels IIbis Regulation in Article 11(5) provides that a court cannot refuse return 
a child unless the person who requested the return of the child has been given an opportunity 
to be heard. This means that the Court, when rendering a decision for non-return of the child 
in the Member State of its habitual residence, cannot give this decision unless it takes into 
account the views of the person who applied for the return of the child. The purpose of this rule 
is that the Court will be acquainted with the whole factual situation which led to the wrongful 
removal or retention. However, Article 11(5) does not represent a collision with Article 26 of 
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the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the prohibition as for review of the judgment as to its 
substance. Nevertheless, in the circumstances where rendering a decision on the non-return is 
taking place, there is a need for more thorough examination (because of the need for the 
protection of the child’s best interest) for the Court. This means that the position of the 
applicant must be ascertained. The dangers of prolonging the procedure for the return of 
children are real and in those situations, the Court should face this challenge without relegating 
it to the parties concerned. 
     
5.2.2.1.4 Limitations on Article 13(1) (b) of the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention 
 
One of the novelties in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, by which the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention has been modified, is provided in Article 11(4) of the Regulation. This 
provision is not a general rule and is intended to limit the application of Article 13(1) (b) of the 
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention.882 With this rule the Brussels IIbis Regulation goes 
a step further by extending the obligation to order return of the child to cases where a return 
could expose the child to harm, but it to that end it is established that adequate arrangements 
must have been made to secure the protection of the child after the return.883 The basis for this 
modification can be found in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention in Article 36, which 
provides for derogation from the provision in the Convention by subsequent bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, in order to limit the restrictions to which the return of the child may 
be subject. 
The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention is built on the premise that the wrongful 
removal or retention of children is harmful884 but nevertheless in certain instances a 
reestablishment of the status quo ante could endanger the child.885 For such situations several 
grounds for refusal are provided for the obligation of prompt return of the child to his/her place 
of habitual residence prior to the abduction.886 One of these grounds is provided in Article 13(1) 
(b) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and states that:  
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‘the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State are bound to order the return of 
the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that there is a grave 
risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place 
the child in an intolerable situation.’  
The “rigidness” in the civil law countries where judges are limited to order what is 
provided in the statute or what is requested by the parties887 has led to refusal of the return of 
wrongfully removed or retained children, because it was likely that the children would again 
be exposed to domestic violence or some other forms of physical or psychological harm or 
otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation.888 Ultimately this exception became the most 
commonly used justification on behalf of the abducting parent as opposed to the other 
exceptions.889  
To strengthen the strict interpretation of Article 13(1) (b) of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention890 and to encourage a more proactive approach by applicants and 
relevant authorities in the requesting state to address any concerns which might exist,891 Article 
11(4) in the Brussels IIbis Regulation creates a complementary instrument to the Convention 
and tries to diminish this ground for refusal and limit its functioning by reducing its application 
to a ‘strict minimum’. 892 
This strict minimum will require that the party that seeks return according to Article 
11(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation will have to prove that adequate arrangements have been 
made to secure the protection of the child after its return to the Member State of its habitual 
residence.893 These arguments will counteract the claims of the person that wrongfully removed 
or retained the child on the basis of Article 13(1)(b) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention. If the claims of the person applying for return of child are proven, then the Court 
of the Member Sate of refugee cannot render a non-return order based on Article 13(1) (b). The 
Court is supposed to examine these arrangements on the basis of the facts of the case. It is not 
sufficient that procedures exist in the Member State of origin for the protection of the child, 
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but it must be established that the authorities in the Member State of origin have taken concrete 
measures to protect the child in question.894 
This  requirement of taking adequate arrengments for the protection of the child after 
its return to the Country of its habitual residence, called ‘restitution without danger’,895 is not 
unknown to  the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. The Central Authorities are obliged 
to co-operate with each other and promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in 
their respective States to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects 
of this Convention and, among other measures,896 they should either directly or through any 
intermediary provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate 
to secure the safe return of the child.897 This means that the relevant authorities will have made  
all of the neccesery arrangements for the protection of the welfare of children upon return in 
certain cases where their safety is at issue, until the jurisdiction of the appropriate court has 
been effectively invoked.898 The measures which may be taken in fulfilment of the obligation 
under Article 7 h) to take an action or cause  an action to be taken to protect the welfare of 
children, may include, for example: a) alerting the appropriate protection agencies or judicial 
authorities in the requesting State of the return of a child who may be in danger; b) advising 
the requested State, upon request, of the protective measures and services available in the 
requesting State to secure the safe return of a particular child; or c) encouraging the use of 
Article 21 of the Convention to secure the effective exercise of access or visitation rights. It is 
recognised that the protection of the child may also sometimes require steps to be taken to 
protect an accompanying parent.899 This position of cooperation between the relevant 
authorities and the central authorities for rendering neccessary and adequate measures 
(esspecially conditional measures, such as undertakings), which is provided by  the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention and results in  flexible conditioning of the return of the child to 
its country of habitual residence, is usual for common law countries900 while in continental law 
countries it is negligible.  
With Article 11(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation this principle ‘restitution without 
danger’ became part of the EU law and must now  be applied by all Member States of the EU. 
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This will shift the more rigid position of the Member States of the EU which are part of the 
civil law legal systems 901 towards a position provided with Article 11(4) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation of a rule which has to be understood in a broader context, where it will not be 
sufficient that procedures exist in the Member State of origin for the protection of the child, 
but rather it must be established that the authorities in the Member State of origin have taken 
concrete measures to protect the child in question. 902 To assess whether those measures are 
sufficient to ensure safe return for the child, cooperation between the Central Authorities as 
detailed in Articles 53-58 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is of great importance.903 One 
possible solution for further improvement of the child abduction mechanism comes from the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation itself, where the enhanced cooperation between the relevant 
authorities is part of the Regulation and the principles of ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual 
cooperation’ play important roles in child abduction cases. In that context, for the facilitation 
of Article 11(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation rule, Recital 25 provides that:  
[C]entral authorities should cooperate both in general matters and in specific cases, including for 
purposes of promoting the amicable resolution of family disputes and in matters of parental responsibility. 
To this end central authorities shall participate in the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial 
matters created by Council Decision 2001/470/EC of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial 
Network in civil and commercial matters’.  
For this part of the provision, the EJN can play an important role in the building of 
‘actual trust’ between the relevant authorities which at the end would have a positive influence 
on the solution of these complex child abduction situations and on the protection of the ‘child’s 
best interest’. 
 
5.2.2.1.5 The position of the Courts of the Member States in the case of a non-
return order pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention  
 
One of the main characteristics of the new child abduction regime in the European 
Union is the possibility of reviewing the non-return orders in the child’s State of habitual 
residence.904 Article 11(6) and (7) provide for special rules that are complementary to the rules 
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in the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention and basically reinforce their position.905 If a court 
has issued an non-return order pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, the court 
must immediately either directly or through its central authority transmit a copy of the court 
order on non-return and of the relevant documents, in particular a transcript of the hearings 
before the court, to the court with jurisdiction or the central authority in the Member State 
where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, 
as determined by national law.906 This transmission of documents must be conducted within 
a one-month time frame from the day when the non-return order was issued.907 The explicit 
reference to national law indicates, inter alia, that it is for the Member State where the child 
was habitually resident immediately before the removal to determine, with due regard to the 
objectives of the Regulation, which court has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of the return of 
the child, after an order on non-return has been issued in the Member State to which the child 
was removed.908 Even such a position does not preclude Member States from allocating to a 
specialized court the jurisdiction to examine questions of return or custody with respect to a 
child in the context of the procedure set out in Article 11(7) and (8) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, even where proceedings on the substance of parental responsibility with respect to 
the child have already, separately, been brought before a court or tribunal.909 
In such cases, the court or central authority will assist the left-behind parent in having 
the matter reviewed in the State of the child’s habitual residence.910 This Court will 
immediately hold a custody hearing by promptly notifying the parties and inviting them to 
make submissions to the court.911 A three-month time limit is given to the parties to make 
submissions to the Court. For this review mechanism to be activated, it will suffice if just one 
of the parties makes the submission.912 If both parties fail to make submissions within that time 
limit then the court will ‘close the case’.913 On the other hand, if the Court renders a judgment 
on the custody issue and if this judgment requires return of the child, then this judgment will 
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be automatically enforceable914 in the Member State where the child is present.915 These rules 
does not apply when the Courts in the Member State where the child was habitually resident 
immediately before the wrongful removal or retention have already been seized by one of the 
parties. 
From the wording of Article 11(7) and (8) and from the position of the time limit, a 
conclusion can be drawn that it is unnecessary for the non-return order to be enforceable or 
even still in force at the moment when the court of the Member State of habitual residence 
gives its judgment in the context of Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.916 That chain 
of obligations and procedures forms a complete, unbreakable whole, and is set in motion 
automatically as soon as the non-return order is issued. The only factor envisaged as being able 
to interrupt it is the non-receipt of submissions from the parties by the court of the Member 
State of habitual residence917 – which would amount, in effect, to a discontinuance of the 
proceedings by the parent left behind.918  
The ratio of such changes in the child abduction regime of the European Union is the 
positioning of the authorities in the child’s former habitual residence as final arbiter regarding 
the children’s fate. Even the certified judgment cannot be refused in the Member State of 
enforcement because, as a result of a potential subsequent change of circumstances, it might 
be seriously detrimental to the best interests of the child. Such a change must be pleaded before 
the court that has jurisdiction in the Member State of origin and which should also hear any 
application to suspend enforcement of its judgment.919 With this, the Regulation shifts the 
balance to the Courts of the former habitual residence and allows them to order return of the 
child in accordance with Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The direct consequence 
of Articles 11(6) and (7) is increased cooperation between the Courts of the requested Member 
State and the courts of the Member State of Origin.920  
The position of the Court of Refugees, given that it can oppose the return of the children 
in specific, duly justified cases,921 is based on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
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On the other hand, it is recognized in the Brussels IIbis Regulation that such a decision could 
be replaced by a subsequent decision by the court of the Member State of child’s habitual 
residence prior to the wrongful removal or retention. If that judgment entails return of the child, 
the return should take place without any special procedure being required for recognition and 
enforcement of that judgment in the Member State to or in which the child has been removed 
or retained.922 However, this position does not refer to situations where the proceedings for 
return of the child are commenced when the issue of custody rights is sought to be resolved 
(especially about where the child should reside).923In such circumstances it is very unclear if 
the non-return order should be supported if Court of the Member State of habitual residence of 
the child resolves the case in favor of the abducting parent while return proceedings under the 
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention are ongoing.  
The change of the decisions is only supported if they originate from a subsequent 
decision of the Member State of Origin on the certified judgment. The Brussels IIbis Regulation 
establishes a clear division of jurisdiction between the courts of the Member State of origin and 
those of the Member State of enforcement. These rules are intended to secure the rapid return 
of the children. In that context a certificate is issued under Article 42 of the Regulation, which 
gives to the judgment thus certified a specific enforceability that is not subject to any appeal. 
The requested court can do no more than declare such a judgment to be enforceable, since the 
only pleas in law which can be relied on in relation to the certificate are those to support an 
action for rectification or doubts as to its authenticity, according to the rules of law of the 
Member State of origin.924 The only rules of law of the requested Member State that are 
applicable are those governing procedural matters.925  On the other hand, questions concerning 
the merits of the judgment as such, and in particular the question whether the necessary 
conditions enabling the court with jurisdiction to hand down that judgment are satisfied, 
including any challenges to its jurisdiction, or inapplicability of Article 11(8) of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, must be raised before the courts of the Member State of origin. The only legal 
remedy is to appeal against the judgment itself (and not against the certificate) in accordance 
with the rules of the legal system where this judgment is rendered.926 Likewise, an application 
to suspend enforcement of a certified judgment can be brought only before the court that has 
                                                 
922 ibid. 
923 Fawcett J. and Carruthers J. (n 139) 1121. 
924 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 85, 88 and 89. 
925 Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, [2010], ECR I-06673 para 73. 
926 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 
June 2010 para 98. 
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jurisdiction in the Member State of origin, in accordance with the rules of its legal system.927 
The question whether a certified judgment is irreconcilable, within the meaning of the second 
subparagraph of Article 47(2) of the Brussels II bis Regulation,928 with a subsequent 
enforceable judgment can be addressed only in relation to any judgments subsequently handed 
down by the courts with jurisdiction in the Member State of origin.929 In contrario, to hold that 
a judgment delivered subsequently by a court in the Member State of enforcement can preclude 
enforcement of an earlier judgment which has been certified in the Member State of origin and 
which orders the return of the child would amount to circumventing the system set up by 
Section 4 of Chapter III of the Regulation. Such an exception to the jurisdiction of the courts 
in the Member State of origin would deprive Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation of 
its practical effect, which ultimately would grant the right to decide to the court with 
jurisdiction.  This granting of the right to decide would take precedence under Article 60 of the 
Regulation, over the 1980 Hague Convention, and would therefore recognize the jurisdiction, 
on matters of substance, of the courts in the Member State of enforcement.930 As a consequence, 
a judgment delivered subsequently by a court in the Member State of enforcement which 
awards provisional custody rights and is deemed to be enforceable under the law of that State 
cannot preclude enforcement of a certified judgment delivered previously by the court which 
has jurisdiction in the Member State of origin and ordering the return of the child.931 The CJEU 
has extended these effects so that they will occur even if there is evidence that the certificate 
issued by the court under Article 42 contains a false statement.932 
Another potentially problematic aspect of Articles 11(6) and (7) is that they are based 
on the assumption that the Court ‘…has issued an order on non-return pursuant to Article 13 
of the 1980 Hague Convention’. The exceptions in the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention are 
not limited only to Article 13, but also restrictively they are given in Article 20 (public 
                                                 
927 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 
June 2010 para 51. 
928 Article 47 
Enforcement procedure 
1. The enforcement procedure is governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement. 
2. Any judgment delivered by a court of another Member State and declared to be enforceable in accordance with 
Section 2 or certified in accordance with Article 41(1) or Article 42(1) shall be enforced in the Member State of 
enforcement in the same conditions as if it had been delivered in that Member State. 
In particular, a judgment which has been certified according to Article 41(1) or Article 42(1) cannot be enforced 
if it is irreconcilable with a subsequent enforceable judgment. 
929 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 para 67. 
930 ibid para 78. 
931 ibid para 79. 
932 Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 para 74 and 75. 
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policy)933 and Article 12(2) (the child settled in its new environment).934 For example, if the 
child is not being returned to the State of its habitual residence on the basis of Article 12(2) 
then Articles 11(6)-(8) of the Regulation do not apply, because the order for non-return was 
based on a 2 provision other than that of Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention. 
In such circumstances, the substantive jurisdiction will belong to the courts of the child’s 
current habitual residence according to Article 8 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.935 
Even when the non-return order was issued on the basis of Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention, some uncertainties are present. Articles 11(6) and (7) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation are particularly compatible with Articles 13(1)(b)936 and 13(2)937 of 
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. However, there is no certain position given in 
the cases when the non-return order is issued on the basis of Article 13(1)(a).938 In such a 
circumstance, the Court of the habitual residence of the child will according to Article 11(6)  
assume the jurisdiction and will be entitled to be provided with a copy of the court order on 
non-return and of the relevant documents (in particular a transcript of the hearings before the 
court). But Articles 8, 10, 17 and 26 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation preclude the Courts of the 
Member State of origin from reviewing the findings of acquiescence and to require the courts 
to determine the child’s habitual residence at the time of their seizure in the light of that 
finding.939 In such circumstances, the Court of origin may be bound to decline jurisdiction in 
favor of the Court where in which the child had become habitually resident before the 
proceedings in the Member State of origin were instituted.940  
Another peculiar aspect of this EU child abduction regime are the situations where the 
authorities of the Member State of refuge do not respond or do not render a non-return order in 
the time limit provided in Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation while the authorities 
of the Member State of habitual residence of the child render an order for the child’s return.941 
The main question is whether the Court of the Member State of habitual residence is entitled 
to render this decision when the Court of the Member State of refuge hasn’t still rendered a 
non-return order, or if the court of the Member State where the child is actually present has not 
                                                 
933 For more on this exception see, Beaumont P. and McEleavy P. (n 273) 172-177. 
934 For more on this exception see, Beaumont P. and McEleavy P. (n 273) 203-210. 
935 Stone, EU Private International Law (n 813) 474.  
936 Physical and psychological harm of the child. 
937 The child objects its return. 
938 Consent or acquiescence from the disposed parent. For more on this exception see, Beaumont P. and McEleavy 
P. (n 273) 114-131. 
939 Stone, EU Private International Law (n 813) 474. 
940 ibid. 
941 As was the situation in the Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271. 
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taken a decision within a certain period, there is a de facto non-return order capable of 
triggering the application of Article 11(8).942 This problem is closely connected with the lis 
pendens rules.943 According to paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 19, where proceedings relating to 
parental responsibility for the same child and involving the same cause of action are brought 
before courts of different Member States, the court second seized must of its own motion stay 
its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. Where that 
jurisdiction is established, the court second seized must decline jurisdiction in favor of that 
court. In normal cases, as long as proceedings for a return order are pending in the Member 
State where the child is actually present, the court of the Member State of habitual residence 
must not examine the same question. Insofar as the six-week time-limit imposed by Article 
11(3) applies, that result in no way delays the return procedure, whereas the simultaneous 
conduct of two sets of proceedings concerning the same child could give rise to 
complications.944 However, once the court of the Member State where the child is actually 
present has issued its decision, lis pendens no longer applies and there is thus no longer any 
barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of the Member State of habitual residence. 
Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation specifically confirms jurisdiction in the event of 
an initial non-return decision, and there is no reason to rule out that jurisdiction (as conferred 
by Articles 8 and 10) if the initial decision orders the child’s return. The only difference is that, 
in that event, the specific provisions of Article 11(8) will not apply and, in practice, a second 
return order will normally be redundant.945 
For the functioning of this European model of child abduction situations, it will be 
significantly important that all the relevant authorities and especially the Courts of the EU 
Member States act promptly regarding the transfer of the relevant documents. The importance 
of this lies in the fact that this documentation will be necessary for the Court of the child’s 
habitual residence in the assessment of the actual situation when it will make a decision 
regarding the custody rights. On the other side, the EU is consisted of 28 Member States with 
24 different official languages. This can be shown as problematic, because the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation does not contain specific rules about the translations of these documents. The 
solutions for this problem are not specific and provide vague directions such as that the ‘judges 
                                                 
942 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008, para 
65. 
943 Text to n 359 Part II ch IV sec 4.2. 
944 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008 para 
63. 
945 ibid para 64. 
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should try to find a pragmatic solution which corresponds to the needs and circumstances of 
each case’.946 This fact is disturbing because the wording of these documents directly 
influences the procedure by providing the Court with the most important aspect of the non-
return order. In general, the court where the child has been wrongfully removed or retained 
should include the documents on which the judge has based his or her decision, including for 
example any reports drawn up by social welfare authorities concerning the situation of the 
child. The other court must receive the documents within one month after the decision.947 This 
time frame in which translation and transfer of the documents is needed to be accomplished 
directly leans in favor of the 6-week period in which the EU child abduction procedure is 
predicted to be conducted.  
           
5.2.2.1.6 Abolition of exequatur in the Brussels IIbis Regulation regarding child 
abduction cases and decisions on access rights 
 
The greatest novelty in Brussels IIbis Regulation represents the abolition of the 
exequatur proceedings in cases regarding access rights and child abduction. As was elaborated 
above,948 in the Brussels IIbis Regulation there are two distinct procedures for issuing 
declaration of enforceability. These procedures provide for exequatur of foreign judgments that 
are rendered in a Member State regarding matrimonial matters or judgments relating to parental 
responsibility matters. These two procedures are similar, differing in some procedural aspects, 
and most significantly in the grounds for non-recognition and in the enforcement.  
Nevertheless, both of these procedures represent classical exequatur procedures (i.e., 
declaration of enforceability). The Brussels IIbis Regulation consists of a third procedure that 
abolishes the exequatur procedure, meaning that certified judgments relating to child abduction 
cases and access rights are enforceable in the Member State of enforcement without the need 
for an intermediate procedure of issuing a declaration of enforceability and also without the 
possibility of an appeal. The rules for this procedure are given in Section 4 of the third chapter 
(Articles 40-45).  
The idea behind these provisions is the same as the one referred in the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention: that is, not only to protect the custodial parent, but also to enable 
                                                 
946 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 59. 
947 ibid.  
948 Text to n 484 Part II ch V sec 5.2. 
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the child to have a meaningful relationship with both parents.949 Such efforts correspond with 
Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.950  This is why the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation provides for abolition of the exequatur as an intermediate procedure 
regarding two situations: access rights and certain decisions regarding child abduction cases.951 
However, the procedure provided by these rules does not preclude the possibility that the 
person with legal interest can seek recognition and enforcement according to the regular 
procedure provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation.952 As  was highlighted in the Rinau case, 
Article 21(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is intended to make clear that the option afforded 
by that provision to any interested party to apply for a decision that the judgment issued in a 
Member State be or not be recognized does not preclude the possibility, where the conditions 
are satisfied, of recourse to the rules provided for in Articles 11(8), 40 and 42 of the Regulation 
in the event of return of a child following a judgment of non‑return, since those rules take 
precedence over those provided for in Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter III.953 With such a position 
the CJEU has shown that the procedure provided under Article 11(6) to (8) of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation has to be seen as independent of any other procedure for issuing a declaration of 
enforceability under the Regulation. Once an order not to return a child is made on the basis of 
Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, irrespective of whether the order is subject to appeal, 
a subsequent return order under Article 11(6) to (8) of the Regulation has to be enforced under 
Article 42. On this basis, the objective of the Regulation to ensure that the return of a child to 
the Member State of her or his habitual residence can take place when the minimum deadline 
is fulfilled.954  
5.2.2.1.6.1 Access Rights 
 
One of the main policy objectives of the Regulation is to ensure that a child throughout 
her or his childhood can maintain contact with all holders of parental responsibility, even after 
a separation and if they live in different Member States.955 The Brussels IIbis Regulation itself 
gives recognition to these fundamental rights and takes into consideration the principles of the 
                                                 
949 Steward P., Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, Fordham International Law Journal vol 21 (1997) 331. 
950 Article 24 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euroepan Union:  
‘Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both 
his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.’ 
951 Article 40(1)(a) and (b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
952 Article 40(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
953 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 65. 
954 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 62. 
955 ibid 43. 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular, it seeks to ensure respect 
for the fundamental rights of the child as enumerated in Article 24 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.956 To this effect, Article 24 of the Charter includes 
the right of the child to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact 
with both of his or her parents.957 These rules are also in correlation with the principle provided 
in Article 9 and 10 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that the States should  
[r]espect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal 
relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best 
interests’. 958  
Also, such relationships are covered by Article 8 of the ECHR (the right to respect for 
family life). The violation of Article 8 of the ECHR extends to ensuring the exercise of rights 
of contact as it was shown in the cases Shaw v Hungary959 and Prizzia v Hungary 960in which 
a breach was said to have occurred where the authorities in Hungary failed to ensure that the 
applicants could exercise rights of contact with their children.961   
The Brussels IIbis Regulation goes one step further. Access rights are defined in Article 
2(10) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. They include, in particular, the right to take a child to a 
place other than his or her habitual residence for a limited period of time.962 The term used in 
the Regulation is the same as the one provided in Article 3 (b) of the 1996 Hague Child 
Protection Convention,963 which itself is reproduced from the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention.964 However, the term used in the Brussels IIbis Regulation is much broader and 
applies to any access rights, irrespective of who the beneficiary thereof is. According to 
national law, access rights may be attributed to the parent with whom the child does not reside, 
or to other family members, such as grandparents or third persons.965  Moreover, ‘access rights’ 
                                                 
956 Recital (33) of the Brussels IIbis Reulation. 
957 Case C‑400/10 J.McB. v L.E. [2010] ECR I-08965 para 60; Case C-498/14 PPU, David Bradbrooke v Anna 
Aleksandrowicz of 9 January 2015 para 42. 
958 See Articles 9 and 10 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
959 Shaw v. Hungary, Application No 6457/09. 
960 Prizzia v. Hungary, Application No 20255/12. 
961 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 71. 
962 Article 2(10) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
963 Article 3 (c) of the 1996 Hague Convention provides: 
Article 3 
The measures referred to in Article 1 may deal in particular with – 
… 
(b)… as well as rights of access including the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than 
the child's habitual residence; 
964 Lagarde Report (n 93) 547. 
965 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 43. 
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can include any form of contact between the child and the other person, including for instance, 
contact by telephone, skype, internet or e-mail.966 
Article 41 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation provides that decisions regarding right of 
access that have been granted in an enforceable judgment given in one Member State will be 
recognized and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of 
enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been 
certified in the Member State of origin in the proper form provided in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. ‘Proper form’ means that the judgment has been certified967 and the conditions in 
Article 41(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation have been satisfied. The Court of origin must 
verify that the following safeguards have been respected: 
 all parties concerned were given an opportunity to be heard;  
 the child was given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered 
inappropriate due to the age and maturity of the child; and  
 where the judgment was given in default, the defaulting party has been served with 
the document instituting the proceedings in sufficient time and in a manner enabling 
that person to prepare his or her defence, or if the person was served with the 
document but not in compliance with these conditions, it is nevertheless established 
that the person has accepted the judgment unequivocally.968 
Some situations provide that the rights of access involve a cross-border situation at the 
time of the delivery of the judgment.969  In these situations the certificate shall be issued ex 
officio when the judgment becomes enforceable, even if only provisionally.970 If the situation 
subsequently acquires an international aspect,971 either party may at that time request the court 
of origin that delivered the judgment to issue a certificate. At the end, if the procedural 
safeguards have not been respected, the decision will not be directly recognized and declared 
enforceable in other Member States, but rather the parties will have to apply for an exequatur 
to accomplish this end.972 
                                                 
966 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 85. 
967 Certification of the judgments in accordance with Brussels IIbis Regulation means that the court of origin of 
its on motion has issued a certificate using the standard form in Annex III of the Regulation and completed in the 
language of the judgment. See Stone, EU Private International Law (n 813) 480. 
968 Article 41(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
969 One of the parents is a resident of or plans to move to another Member State (Practice Guide for the application 
of the new Brussels II Regulation, (n 106) 25). 
970 Article 41(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
971 For example, because one of the holders of parental responsibility moves to another Member State Practice 
Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation, (n 106) 26. 
972 Practice Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation, (n 106) 25. 
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The purpose of the certificate is not only to indicate whether the above-mentioned 
procedural safeguards have been respected, but it also contains information of a practical 
nature, intended to facilitate the enforcement of the judgment. This includes, for example, the 
names and addresses of the holders of parental responsibility and the children concerned, any 
practical arrangements for the exercise of access rights, any specific obligations on the holder 
of access rights or the other parent and any restrictions that may be attached to the exercise of 
access rights.973 
5.2.2.1.6.2 Child Abduction Cases 
 
The second exception to the regular recognition and enforcement procedure in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation is regarding decisions in child abduction cases. However, not all 
decisions regarding child abduction cases are excluded from recognition and enforcement 
procedures, but only the return of a child entailed by a judgment given pursuant to Article 11(8) 
of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.974 The competent court of the Member State of habitual 
residence may, under the jurisdiction which it already enjoys from Articles 8, 10 and, where 
applicable, 12, order the child’s return in the context of Article 11(8) if a non-return decision 
has been issued pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. This 
judgment of the court with jurisdiction ordering the return of the child falls within the scope of 
the provision of Article 13, even if it is not preceded by a final judgment of that court relating 
to rights of custody of the child.975 In that event, its order will not require a declaration of 
enforceability in accordance with the procedure in Chapter III, Section 2.976 On the other hand, 
this is not the case when the certificate under Article 42 is issued ‘prematurely’ and relates to a 
decision granted in the State of origin before a non-return order is issued in the requested State. 
In such a case, despite the certificate, the procedure for declaration of enforceability is to be 
followed in case there is a need for enforcement.977 So in order not require a declaration of 
enforceability in accordance with the procedure in Chapter III, Section 2, the essential factors 
are that: (a) a non-return order was made; (b) the child has still not been returned; (c) time is 
passing; and (d) the court of the Member State of habitual residence still has sole jurisdiction 
                                                 
973 ibid 44. 
974 Article 40(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
975 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 para 67. 
976 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008 para 
59. 
977 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 paras 68 and 69. 
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to decide on custody, which necessarily implies the power to ensure, by interim order where 
appropriate, the child’s presence with the person to whom it awards custody.978 
The consequence provided by these rules is that a return of a child entailed by an 
enforceable judgment given in a Member State shall be recognized and enforceable in another 
Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility 
of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of origin in 
the proper form provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation.979 As was the case with access rights, 
‘proper form’ means that the judgment has been certified980 and that the conditions in Article 
42(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation have been satisfied. These conditions provide that the 
Court of origin must refuse to issue a certificate unless:  
 all parties concerned were given an opportunity to be heard,981  
 the child was given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered 
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity982 and  
 the court has taken into account in issuing its judgment the reasons for and 
evidence underlying the order issued pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention.983  
 Even if national law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law, 
notwithstanding any appeal, of a judgment requiring the return of the child mentioned in Article 
11(b)(8), the court of origin may declare the judgment enforceable.984 The certificate must 
contain details of measures for the protection of the child after its return to the State of habitual 
residence.985 The language of the certificate and the judgment should be the same986 and it is 
not necessary to translate the certificate, with the exception of item 14 of Annex IV concerning 
the measures taken by the authorities in the Member State of origin to ensure the protection of 
the child upon his or her return.987   
                                                 
978 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008 para 
78. 
979 Article 42(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
980 Certification of the judgments in accordance with Brussels IIbis Regulation means that the court of origin of 
its on motion has issued a certificate using the standard form in Annex IV of the Regulation and completed in the 
language of the judgment. Stone, EU Private International Law (n 813) 480. 
981 Article 42(2)(b) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
982 Article 42(2)(a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
983 Article 42(2)(c) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. See also, Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-
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984 Article 42(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
985 If such measures are provided in the decision.  
986 Article 42(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
987 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 64. 
208 
 
This mechanism of ‘re-evaluation and overriding’ of the non-return orders by the Court 
of the Member State of the habitual residence of the child encounters some specific problems. 
Namely, this exception from the classical exequatur procedure regarding child abduction cases 
does not only refer to the abolition of the intermediate procedures, but it goes even further by 
creating a parallel system of reevaluation of the decisions by the Court of the habitual residence 
of the child with a goal that this court should be the final arbitrator of the child’s future.988 
Additionally, this system is positioned in a way not to encroach upon the parties’ procedural 
rights or interests by discouraging the abducting parent from challenging a non-return order in 
the Member State where the child is actually present and that the left-behind parent will 
normally be the best placed to present his or her arguments before the courts of the Member 
State of habitual residence.989  
This structure is based on the mutual recognition principle, where the custody orders 
(containing a return of the child), which fulfill the necessary conditions and are in the proper 
form, can be certified and can be directly enforceable in all Member States without formal 
application for recognition and without any possibility of recognition being refused. A removal 
of a child to another Member State has therefore no effect on the decision of the court of origin. 
It is not necessary to start a new procedure for the return of the child pursuant to the 1980 
Hague Convention, but merely to enforce the decision of the court of origin.990 
Even in  situations even where  there has been  a potential breach of some fundamental 
rights,  the court with jurisdiction in the Member State of enforcement cannot oppose the 
enforcement of a certified judgment by ordering the return of a child who has been wrongfully 
removed on the ground that the court of the Member State of origin which handed down that 
judgment may have violated Article 42 of Regulation No 2201/2003, interpreted in accordance 
with Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, because  the assessment of whether there 
is such an infringement falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member 
State of origin.991 In doing so, the Court of refuge must immediately, either directly or through 
its central authority, transmit a copy of the court order on non-return and copies of the relevant 
documents, in particular a transcript of the hearings, to  the court to the Court of the habitual 
residence of the child.992 It is for the Court of refuge that has taken the decision to decide which 
                                                 
988 McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union (n 135) 34. 
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documents are relevant. To this end, this Court shall give a fair representation of the most 
important elements, highlighting the factors influencing the decision. In general, this would 
include the documents on which the judge has based her or his decision, including for example 
any reports drawn up by social welfare authorities concerning the situation of the child. The 
other court must receive the documents within one month of the decision.993 This Court or 
central authority that receives the information and documents must notify the parties and invite 
them to make submissions to the court, in accordance with national law, within three months 
of the date of notification, so that the court can examine the question of custody of the child.994 
The Court that rendered the custody decision, which could contain the duty to return the child, 
is obliged to hear the child and the other party and to take into account the reasoning of the 
Court of refuge which issued the non-return order.995 Nevertheless, this final decision can be 
issued, notwithstanding a judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention by the Court of refuge.996 
The return mechanism in the Brussels IIbis Regulation represent a manifestation of the 
concept of ‘mutual recognition’.997 This policy should reflect the integration and the trust that 
exists in the European Judicial Area.998At the core, there are two main rationales for this policy 
stance:  is the economical and the political.999 Regarding the former rationale, this abolition of 
the exequatur increases the economic welfare of the European economic actors and citizens1000. 
Regarding the latter rationale, ‘mutual recognition’ exists to ensure that judgments circulate 
freely within the European Union.1001 In civil and commercial matters, to achieve these goals 
brings certainty and efficiency.1002 However, the implementation of this policy in the aspect of 
parental responsibility issues, namely child abduction cases, creates a certain discomfort.  
The basis for the functioning of this return mechanism is that the Courts and the Central 
Authorities cooperate among themselves. Each case holds its peculiarities and at the same time 
basic principles have to be taken into account by the relevant institutions. This means that the 
Court must apply the rules of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and protect the principles of the 
1980 Child Abduction Convention. This aspect is in conflict with the short time in which these 
                                                 
993 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 59. 
994 Article 11(7) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
995 Article 42(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
996 Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
997 Text to n 460 Part II ch V sec 5.1. 
998 McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union (n 135) 32. 
999 Cuniberti G. and Rueda I., Abolition of Exequatur (n 478) 286-316(31). 
1000 ibid 291. 
1001 ibid. 
1002 McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union (n 135) 32. 
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procedures should be completed. These ‘procedures’ refer not only to the measures that the 
Court should take regarding the case in the Member State of refuge, but also to  the transfer of 
the information and  documents to the Court of habitual residence of the child. Problems may 
arise because of the language barriers which are result of the multi-lingual character of the EU 
and as a consequence represent a problem for direct communication between the relevant 
authorities. This can be a real danger to the proper transfer of the guiding principles according 
to which the Court of refuge rendered the non-return order. They could easily be neglected and 
improperly applied, according to the application guidelines provided in article 42(2) (c) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation.1003 Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation gives discretionary 
power to the Court of habitual residence of the child has the power to determine whether or not 
to issue a certificate of enforceability to the extent that it follows the guiding principles. In such 
an event, procedural steps which have been taken after a non‑return decision has been rendered 
are not decisive and may be regarded as irrelevant for the purposes of implementing the 
Regulation.1004 This position is provided so that the Regulation might achieve its full effect, 
which is the immediate return of the children.1005 
If the Court of habitual residence renders a certified decision, that decision cannot be 
appealed,1006 but only rectified, according to the Member State of origin.1007 Even if national 
law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law, notwithstanding any appeal, of a 
judgment requiring the return of the child, the court of origin may declare the judgment 
enforceable.1008 By excluding any appeal against the issuing of a certificate pursuant to Article 
42(1), other than an action seeking rectification within the meaning of Article 43(1), the 
                                                 
1003 ibid.  
1004 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 80. 
1005 If the position were otherwise, there would be a risk that the Regulation would be deprived of its useful effect, 
since the objective of the immediate return of the child would remain subject to the condition that the redress 
procedures allowed under the domestic law of the Member State in which the child is wrongfully retained have 
been exhausted. That risk should be particularly balanced because, as far as concerns young children, biological 
time cannot be measured according to general criteria, given the intellectual and psychological structure of such 
children and the speed with which that structure develops. See Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-
05271 para 81. 
1006 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 84. 
1007 Article 43 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. In the Rinau case it was stated that this article reflects ‘procedural 
autonomy’ meaning that the enforceability of a judgment requiring the return of a child following a judgment of 
non‑return enjoys procedural autonomy, so as not to delay the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed 
to or retained in a Member State other than that in which that child was habitually resident immediately before 
the wrongful removal or retention. This procedural autonomy of the provisions in Articles 11(8), 40 and 42 of the 
Regulation and the priority given to the jurisdiction of the court of origin, in the context of Section 4 of Chapter 
III of the Regulation, are reflected in Articles 43 and 44 of the Regulation, which provide that the law of the 
Member State of origin is to be applicable to any rectification of the certificate, that no appeal is to lie against the 
issuing of a certificate and that certificate is to take effect only within the limits of the enforceability of the 
judgment. Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 63 and 64. 
1008 Article 42(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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Regulation seeks to ensure that the effectiveness of its provisions is not undermined by abuse 
of the procedure.1009 Moreover, Article 68 does not list among the redress procedures any 
appeal against decisions taken pursuant to Section 4 of Chapter III of the Regulation.1010 Once 
a non‑return decision has been made and brought to the attention of the court of origin, it is 
irrelevant, for the purposes of issuing the certificate provided for in Article 42 of the 
Regulation, if that decision has been suspended, overturned, set aside or, in any event, has not 
become res judicata or has been replaced by a decision ordering return, insofar as the return of 
the child has not actually taken place. If no doubt has been expressed as regards the authenticity 
of that certificate and if it was rendered in accordance with the standard form set out in Annex 
IV to the Regulation, opposition to the recognition of the decision ordering return is not 
permitted and it is for the requested court only to declare the enforceability of the certified 
decision and to allow the immediate return of the child. In doing so, the Court of the refuge is 
put in a position to ‘trust’ the foreign order even if this trust not been reciprocated by the 
authorities of the Member State of habitual residence of the child.1011 However, the Regulation 
seeks from the court of the Member State of enforcement to evince the mutual confidence on 
which the area of freedom, security and justice depends, but it does not ask that court to 
demonstrate blind trust. On the contrary, the system established by the Regulation requires the 
court of the Member State merely recognize and respect the integrity, objectivity and 
independence of a court in another Member State, and which would allow its decisions to  be 
appealed against by the party against whom enforcement is sought, in the same way as it would 
for the courts of its own State.1012  
As much as the rationale of this abolition of exequatur can be accepted, that the child 
must be returned to the place from which it was abducted, still, the imposed mutual trust creates 
a certain discomfort. The principle of mutual recognition corresponds with the principle of 
mutual trust. It is said that where mutual trust exists, mutual recognition should be 
improved.1013 Nevertheless, in child abduction cases the question arises, which should be first? 
Does this statement mean that the Member States should firstly develop increased trust among 
their legal systems and then they should abolish every possibility of opposing enforcement of 
a certified decision, or they should rely on the imposed trust gained through the political sense 
                                                 
1009 Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 para 55.  
1010 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 85; Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre 
Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 para 50 
1011 McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union (n 135) 33. 
1012 Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 1 July 2008, para 
96. 
1013 Arenas García R. (n 460) 362. 
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of the EU institutions transposed in the Brussels IIbis Regulation and it is through its 
implementation that they should build actual trust? The answer seems to fall somewhere in the 
middle. The EU should firstly develop necessary facilities, something that is manifested in the 
enhanced cooperation between the relevant authorities (for example, EJN), the Justice 
scoreboard1014, and the Guidelines for proper implementation of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
measures which should represent a ‘physical’ manifestation of the proper implementation of 
the Regulation by the authorities. These activities taken together can establish actual trust. Then 
for the final stage, full abolition of the exequatur should be introduced and the authorities 
should help the children involved in the cases. Nevertheless, these two processes have been 
ongoing and both of them informed the other. It is left for the future amendments to the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation to gradually accept the differences between the legal systems of the EU and 
their distrust of one another and to build trust as it should be built. This is achieved by showing 
that the ‘other’ legal system applies the same rules properly, as they are applied in the domestic 
court, and caring for what is most significant: the child’s best interest. In such way the trust 
would cease to be imposed and become a reality, something that the EU needs desperately. It 
will be a trust in the fact that the whole EU system functions as a whole and not as a ‘battlefield’ 
where Member States strive to prove whose system is better.    
  
                                                 
1014 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm> accessed 12 March 2015. 
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5.3 Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
regarding recognition and enforcement with particular reference to child 
abduction cases 
5.3.1 General  
 
The position of the Courts of Member States regarding the enforcement of foreign 
decisions is not only influenced by the goals and principles of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
but also by the fact that when faced with a petition for execution, they must act in accordance 
with the positive obligations regarding enforcement which arise out of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).1015 It has been shown that the ECtHR, from the three 
main issues of PIL (jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition and enforcement of foreign 
decisions) has delivered by far the most decisions on the third issue of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.1016 On a general level the ECtHR has provided that there is 
obligation for the Contracting Parties that certain rights guaranteed by the ECHR must be 
recognized and enforced, but there is also an obligation requiring Contracting Parties to deny  
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under certain conditions.1017 These 
requirements arise from the general obligations under Article 6(1) of the ECHR (the procedural 
right to a fair trial), but also from other rules such as Article 1 of the Protocol No.1 ECHR (the 
right to property) and Article 8 of the ECHR which refers to the right of respect for private and 
family life. For the purpose of this sub-chapter and the subject matter of this thesis, the issue 
of Article 1 of the Protocol No.1 ECHR will be left out. 
The wording of Article 6(1) of the ECHR1018 does not specifically indicate that 
recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions is covered by this rule. However, in several 
cases, the ECtHR has derived an obligation to recognize and enforce foreign judgments from 
                                                 
1015 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation (n 9) 390. 
1016 Kiestra R.L., The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Private International Law, T.M.C. 
Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands, (2014), 201. 
1017 ibid. 
1018 Article 6(1) of the ECHR states: 
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in 
the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles 
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.’ 
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Article 6(1) of the ECHR.1019 Beginning with the case Hornsby v. Greece,1020 this right was 
provided for domestic enforcement1021and since then this right has been extended to foreign 
judgments.1022 This obligation to recognize and enforce foreign judgments extends to all civil 
judgments including foreign family law judgments.1023 The ECtHR has not been consistent 
regarding the binding force behind this obligation. Firstly, it derived the obligation from the 
fact that recognition and enforcement are an integral part of the trial and thus such an obligation 
is provided within the right of fair trial.1024 Secondly, in two following cases, the Court instead 
of deriving the obligation to recognize and enforce the foreign judgment from the general right 
of fair trial, it based the violation on the more specific right of access to the Court.1025 Moreover 
in the case of Roman´czyk v. France, the ECtHR treated the obligation to enforce the judgment 
as a positive obligation of the State.1026 Nevertheless, from this obligation to enforce foreign 
judgments according to the ECHR and the position of the Court, a conclusion can be drawn 
that Contracting Parties have to have some system according to which foreign decisions can be 
introduced in domestic legal system.1027 The infringement of this obligation is treated as a 
restriction to Article 6(1) of the ECHR that triggers the reasoning of the Court in such 
situations: it has to review the proportionality of such restrictions specifically.1028 This means 
the belief whether such restrictions can be allowed depends on whether the restriction is 
                                                 
1019 See cases Hornsby v. Greece, 19 March 1997, no. 18357/91; Sylvester v. Austria (dec.), no. 54640/00, 9 
October 2003; McDonald v. France (dec.), no. 18648/04, 29 April 2008; Jovanovski v. The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, no. 31731/03, 7 January 2010; Vrbica v. Croatia, no. 32540/05, 1 April 2010; Roman´czyk 
v. France, no. 7618/05, 18 November 2010; Négrépontis-Giannisis v. Greece, no. 56759/08, 3 May 2011; Pini 
and Others v. Romania, nos. 78028/01 and 78030/01, ECHR 2004-V; Saccoccia v. Austria, no. 69917/01, 18 
December 2008 and Ern Makina Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S v. Turkey, no. 70830/01, 3 May 2007. 
1020 Hornsby v. Greece, [1997], no. 18357/91 
1021 ‘However, that right would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding 
judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that Article 6 para. 
1 (art. 6-1) should describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants - proceedings that are fair, public 
and expeditious - without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions; to construe Article 6 (art. 6) as 
being concerned exclusively with access to a court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to 
situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect 
when they ratified the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 
February 1975, Series A no. 18, pp. 16-18, paras. 34-36). Execution of a judgment given by any court must 
therefore be regarded as an integral part of the ‘trial’ for the purposes of Article 6 (art. 6).’ Hornsby v. Greece, 
[1997], no. 18357/91, para 40. 
1022 Kiestra R.L. (n 1016) 211. 
1023 ibid. 
1024 Hornsby v. Greece, [1997], no. 18357/91, para 40; McDonald v. France (dec.), no. 18648/04, [2008]. 
1025 Jovanovski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 31731/03, [2010] and Vrbica v. Croatia, no. 
32540/05, [2010] para 72-73. In the Case Vrbica v. Croatia the Court found that ‘In these circumstances, the 
refusal of the domestic courts to allow the enforcement of the recognised foreign judgment of 15 October 1991 
rendered in the applicant's favour infringed the proportionality principle and thus impaired the very essence of his 
right of access to a court.’ 
1026 Roman´czyk v. France, no. 7618/05, para 58 




proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.1029 This aspect of the principle of proportionality 
was even stretched to the substantive public policy exception the Court found in the case 
Négrépontis-Giannisis v. Greece1030, where it was concluded that the interpretation of the 
notion of public policy by the Greek courts should not be made in an arbitrary or 
disproportionate manner.1031 
ECtHR has addressed the issue of the relationship between Article 8(1) of the ECHR 
(Right to respect for private and family life) and the enforcement of family law orders in general 
and the execution of return orders in particular.1032 Article 8(1) of the ECHR and its violations 
were initially focused  on public law situations, but were later extended to private law situations 
and have  been relied upon, with success, in child abduction cases and access rights.1033This is 
especially important regarding how the exceptions provided in Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention are to be applied in a manner that is consistent with Article 8 of 
the ECHR and how the Courts of the EU Member States handle child abduction cases where 
the courts of the habitual residence have made use of their power under Article 11 of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation.1034 
5.3.2 The Position of the ECtHR regarding Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention  
 
In a series of cases the ECtHR has held, in general, that returning a child under the 
procedures set out in the Brussels IIbis Regulation and in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention who has been wrongfully removed or retained is not in breach of obligations under 
the ECHR, in particular of Article 8 thereof.1035 With such an approach of supporting the 
functioning of the child abduction regime established by the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the 
                                                 
1029 ibid. 
1030 Négrépontis-Giannisis v. Greece, no. 56759/08, para 90-91. 
1031 Négrépontis-Giannisis v. Greece, no. 56759/08, para 87. 
1032 See, cases Maumousseau and Washington v. France (Application No 39388/05); Lipkowsky and McCormack 
v. Germany (Application No 26755/10); Sofia Povse and Doris Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11); Raban 
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1033 Magnus U. and Mankowski P., Commentary on Brussels IIbis Regulation, (n 9) 390. 
1034 Beaumont P. and others, Child Abduction: Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.64, (2015) 40. 
1035 See, Maumousseau and Washington v. France (Application No 39388/05); Lipkowsky and McCormack v. 
Germany (Application No 26755/10); Sofia Povse and Doris Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11); Raban 
v. Romania (Application No 25437/08). 
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1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, the ECtHR has shown that it supports the restitution 
of the status quo, which was unilaterally disturbed by the wrongful removal or retention. The 
ECtHR has in only a small number of cases, and mostly in exceptional circumstances, held that 
the return of a child after a wrongful removal or retention may constitute a breach of Article 8 
of the ECHR.1036 The most criticized of these cases is the Neulinger Case,1037 where the ECtHR 
conceded that a ‘margin of appreciation’ must be afforded to national authorities to determine 
whether to return a child.1038  Specifically, the ECtHR held that the Court must assess the 
situation at the time of the enforcement of the return order and not at the time when the return 
order was made.1039 Following this position, the ECtHR relied on Article 12 of the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention to justify the non-return.1040 This aspect is a bit worrying and 
problematic because Article 12 provides that if a case is commenced more than one year after 
the wrongful removal or retention, return is not required if the child is settled in its new 
environment.1041 In Neulinger, return proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention were 
instituted in Switzerland well within a year of the abduction, even though it took almost a year 
to learn the whereabouts of the child.1042 But the Grand Chamber applied the ‘well-settled’ 
concept to the length time the child has been in Switzerland since his abduction in 2005, despite 
the fact that the delay in the enforcement of the return order can be traced to the proceedings 
in the European Court itself and its direction not to enforce the 2007 order.1043 
Especially problematic in the Neulinger case was the assessment of the ‘best interest of 
the child.’ The ECtHR has stated that the best interest of the child must be assessed in each 
individual case.1044 Further, the ECtHR elaborated that this assessment should include an ‘in-
depth examination of the entire family situation.’1045 For the application of a such deep 
examination, it would be necessary that the Court examines a series of factors ‘in particular 
[those] of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature.’1046 However, this 
                                                 
1036 See, Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (Application No 14737/09); B. c. Belgique (Requête No 4320/11); 
Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (Application No 41615/07) and X. v. Latvia (Application No 27853/09). 
1037 See, Beaumont and others, Child Abduction: Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
(n 1034) 40 et seq.; Silberman L., A Brief Comment on Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (2010), European 
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2012; HCCH; (2012) 18. 
1038 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (Application No 41615/07), para 145. 
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1041 See Perez Vera Report (n 187) 458-460. 
1042 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (Application No 41615/07) para 29 and 30. 
1043 Silberman L., A Brief Comment on Neulinger (n 1037) 18. 
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aspect of ‘in-depth examination’ is somewhat questionable as to the return mechanism of the 
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, especially because this mechanism is based on the 
promptness of the summary return procedure and the in-depth examination would evidently 
prolong the return of the abducted children.1047 The ECtHR, in the Case X v. Latvia, changed 
the reasoning that was given in Neulinger and required that the national courts carry out an 
‘effective’ examination of any allegations made in connection with refusal of return,1048 under 
the provisions of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. In the understanding of the 
ECtHR, ‘effective examination’ is provided if the two following requirements are met. Firstly, 
the national courts must consider any ‘arguable claims’1049 against return based on the 
exceptions contained in Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention.1050 Secondly, the court must give a decision that is sufficiently reasoned regarding 
those claims, in order to show that those exceptions have been effectively examined.1051 When 
doing this examination, the national court must evaluate these factors in light of Article 8 of 
the Convention.1052 A contrario, the ECtHR considered that  
[B]oth a refusal to take account of objections to the return capable of falling within the scope of 
Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention and insufficient reasoning in the ruling dismissing such 
objections would be contrary to the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention and also to the aim and 
purpose of the Hague Convention.1053 
The ECtHR also provided several guidelines regarding the consideration of the 
allegations of a ‘grave risk’ for the child in the event of return; namely, the allegations  must 
not be ‘automatic or stereotyped’1054 and ‘must be interpreted strictly’1055 as was the case in 
Maumousseau and Washington v. France.1056 
                                                 
1047 Beaumont and others, Child Abduction: Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (n 
1034) 41. 
1048 X. v. Latvia (Application No 27853/09), para 118. 
1049 In the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, Vajić, Hajiyev, Šikuta, Hirvelä, Nicolaou, Raimondi and 
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1050 X. v. Latvia (Application No 27853/09), par.106. 
1051 ibid. 
1052 ibid. 
1053 ibid para 107. 
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1055 ibid. 
1056 ‘In the Court's view, if the first applicant's arguments were to be accepted, both the substance and primary 
purpose of the Hague Convention, an international legal instrument in the light of which the Court applies Article 
8 of the Convention, would be rendered meaningless, thus implying that the above-mentioned exceptions must 
be interpreted strictly (see, to this effect, the Perez Vera Report (n 187) para 34). The aim is indeed to prevent 
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The shifting of the approach by the ECtHR from an ‘in-depth’ examination to an 
‘effective’ examination represents a positive and constructive change regarding the goals that 
both instruments want to achieve. Effective examination standards represent a genuine link 
between the protection of Article 8(1) of the ECHR and the need for a prompt summary 
mechanism for the return of the abducted children. The approach taken in Neulinger, is better 
situated for proceedings that deal with the substance of the issue (custody rights), while the 
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention does not intend the Courts to work with such issues. 
That’s why the ‘effective’ examination lifts that burden off the courts and simply requires that 
the national courts carry out an effective examination of the exceptions contained in 1980 
Hague Child Abduction Convention.1057 With this, the strict application of the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention is reaffirmed while the protection of the best interest of the child 
is also ensured.  
In the X. v. Latvia case, the ECtHR took a positive and pro-Hague Convention approach 
regarding determination and application of the exemptions provided in the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention and assertion of the best interest of the child. However there have been 
some departures from the conventional approach of application of Article 20 of the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention.1058 Article 20 represents a very limited public policy clause 
where the return of the child may be refused if it would not be permitted by the fundamental 
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Generally it is intended is to give ‘moral authority’ to the Convention and to be very 
restrictively applied in extreme cases.1059 However, in the X. v. Latvia case, the ECtHR made a 
dangerous departure and made suggestions to the Latvian Courts on how to apply Article 20 of 
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention in the case, despite the fact that it had not been 
raised in the proceedings before the national courts.1060 It was stated by the ECtHR that  
[T]he Court further emphasises that, in any event, since the rights safeguarded by Article 8 of 
the Convention, which is part of Latvian law and directly applicable, represent ‘fundamental principles 
of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ within the 
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meaning of paragraph 20 of the Hague Convention, the Regional Court could not dispense with such a 
review in the circumstances of this case.’1061 
This approach was rightfully left out by the dissenting opinion’s side. Article 20 of the 
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention is intended to be applicable to human rights 
situations that constitute a reason for refusing to return the child. This is different from the 
obligation proposed by the ECtHR for the Latvian Courts on their own motion to investigate 
whether the mother could return to Australia and maintain contact with the child. With this, the 
ECtHR creates procedural rights as to how the Courts should go about the process of 
determining whether or not a return of the child would be a breach of human rights or if it 
would be contrary to one of the Article 13 exceptions in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention.1062 This obligation cannot be created by the ECtHR on what procedural rights, if 
any, Article 20 imposes, because this is a matter of national and international law and not ECHR 
law.1063 
There is a clear standpoint in the application of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention, also especially emphasized in the Brussels IIbis Regulation, that the Court of the 
Member State where the child had his habitual residence should retain jurisdiction over matters 
regarding his/her well-being, because of its proximity to the everyday life of the child. The 
transfer of the jurisdiction can occur in limited cases. Providing the interpretation that there is 
a bigger interest that is connected with the child, to transfer the jurisdiction with a unilateral 
act, such as wrongful removal or retention, gives lawfulness to the act of the abductor to 
voluntarily choose a forum which in his/her opinion is best suited to hear the case regarding 
the parental responsibility issues. In that context, there is the well-founded risk that if this line 
of thinking goes too far it might have the effect of undermining one of the basic principles of 
both the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the Brussels IIbis Regulation, namely 
that the long-term interest of children should be decided in the Courts of the Member States of 
their habitual residence and that a wrongful removal or retention should in principle not have 
the effect of changing such position except in circumstances such as those set out in Article 10 
(jurisdiction in child abduction cases) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.1064  
 
                                                 
1061 X. v. Latvia (Application No 27853/09), para 117. 
1062 Beaumont and others, Child Abduction: Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, (n 
1034) 47. 
1063 ibid. 
1064 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (n 21) 73. 
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5.3.3 The Position of the ECtHR on Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
The second set of cases are regarding how the Courts of the EU Member States handle 
child abduction cases where the courts of the habitual residence have made use of their power 
under Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The most recent cases over this question are 
Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (Application No 14737/09) and Sofia Povse and Doris 
Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11). In the first case, the ECtHR for the first time dealt 
with the procedure introduced by Article 11(6)-(8) and Article 42 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation. 
In this case,1065 in March 2009 the mother and the child lodged an application against 
Italy with the ECtHR1066stating that the Italian Government had violated their right to respect 
for their family guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. They furthermore pointed out that 
the first applicant’s absence from the hearing of the Rome Youth Court had rendered the 
decisionmaking process in the Italian courts unfair.1067 The ECtHR sought to determine 
whether the decision of the Rome Youth Court from 21 April 2009 constituted an interference 
with the applicants' right to respect for family life, and the decisive issue was regarding the 
interference being  ‘necessary in a democratic society’ within the meaning of Article 8(2) of 
the ECHR.1068 In essence the ECtHR sought to answer:  
[w]hether a fair and proportionate balance between the competing interests at stake – those of 
the child, of the two parents, and of public order – was struck, within the margin of appreciation afforded 
to States in such matters.1069 
The ECtHR stated that the reasoning of the Italian court contained in the decisions of 
21 April 20081070and 21 April 20091071 was rather scant.1072 In the view of the ECtHR, the 
Italian Courts, ‘…in their decisions failed to address any risks that had been identified by the 
Latvian authorities’, 1073even though their reasoning stood that their role was limited by 
Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation to assessing whether adequate arrangements had 
been made to secure the child’s protection after his return to Italy from any identified risks 
                                                 
1065 Which lasted for almost 3 years and different procedures under different legal sources were involved. For 
more comprehensive explanation of the factual situation see, Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (Application No 
14737/09), para 6-45. 
1066 Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (Application No 14737/09), para 1. 
1067 ibid para 3. 
1068 ibid para 91. 
1069 ibid. 
1070 ibid para 28. 
1071 ibid para 37. 




within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention.1074 In general, the ECtHR 
rightfully drew the conclusion that the Italian Courts did not take into consideration the report 
from the expert psychologist, or at least they did not mention this report in the decisions.1075 
After showing some suspicion that the Italian Courts did not take into consideration the 
report of the Latvian psychologist, the ECtHR questioned the ‘adequate arrangements’ that 
needed to be provided under Article 11(4) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation for the protection of 
the child after his/her return in order to override the non-return order given on the basis of the 
Article 13(b) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention.1076 Despite  the verified and 
upheld ‘adequate arrangements’ by the Italian Courts, there were very strong contra arguments 
by the Latvian authorities that raised serious concerns that there were  potential dangers to the 
child’s psychological health.1077 These considerations were based on several factors. Firstly, 
the fact that the child was well adjusted to living with his mother in Riga and that his separation 
from his mother would adversely affect his development and might create neurotic problems, 
illnesses or both and that strong ties had formed between the child and his mother. Secondly, 
the mother was unable to accompany the child to Italy, since she did not have sufficient 
financial means to reside there, was essentially unemployable and didn’t know the Italian 
language. Thirdly, the child and his father had no language in common, they had never lived 
together without the mother, and had not seen each other for more than three years at the time 
when the Rome Court of Appeal dismissed the first applicant’s appeal against the decision of 
21 April 2008. Fourthly, although the child and the father had not seen each other since 2006, 
in the meantime the father had made no effort to establish contact with the child.1078  
                                                 
1074 ibid. 
1075 ibid. 
1076 ‘By a decision of 21 April 2008 the Rome Youth Court upheld the father’s request. It considered that the only 
role left to it by Article 11 (4) of the Regulation was to verify whether adequate arrangements had been made to 
secure the protection of the child from any identified risks within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague 
Convention after his or her return. After considering the first applicant’s submissions, the court noted that the 
father had proposed that Marko would stay with him, while the first applicant would be authorised to use a house 
in Aranova for periods of fifteen to thirty consecutive days during the first year and subsequently for one summer 
month every other year (the first applicant would have to cover her own travel expenses and one half of the rent 
of the house in Aranova), during which time Marko would be staying with his mother, while the father would 
retain the right to visit him on a daily basis. Marko would be enrolled in a kindergarten which he had attended 
before his removal from Italy. He would also attend a swimming pool he had used before his departure from Italy. 
The father furthermore undertook to ensure that the child would receive adequate psychological help and would 
attend Russian-language classes for Russian children. The court considered such an arrangement adequate to fulfil 
the requirements of the Regulation and ordered an immediate execution of its decision to return Marko to Italy and 
to have him reside with his father. The court also pointed out that it would be preferable if the first applicant 
accompanied Marko on his way to Italy but, should that prove to be impossible, his return would be arranged by 
the Italian embassy in Latvia. Due to the urgent nature of the case, the decision was pronounced to be immediately 
executable.’ Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (Application No 14737/09), para 28. 
1077 Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (Application No 14737/09), para 95. 
1078 ibid par.94. 
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These factors in the opinion of the ECtHR seriously raised ‘red flags’ about the position 
of the child in this case. The Italian Courts didn’t even (if they had suspicion about the Latvian 
Report) request a report from a psychologist of their own choosing.1079 They didn’t make 
efforts to inspect the habitat of the child or the living conditions proposed by the father, finding 
out whether they were suitable for the child to live in them in Italy. Those conditions, taken 
cumulatively, left the ECtHR unpersuaded that the Italian courts sufficiently appreciated 
the seriousness of the difficulties which the child was likely to encounter in Italy.1080 
Regarding the adequacy of the ‘safeguards’ of the child’s well-being proposed by his 
father and accepted by the Italian courts as adequate, the ECtHR considered that allowing the 
mother to stay with the child for fifteen to thirty days during the first year and then for one 
summer month every other year after that was a manifestly inappropriate response to the 
psychological trauma that would inevitably follow a sudden and irreversible severance of the 
close ties between mother and child. In the opinion of the ECtHR, the order to drastically 
immerse a child in a linguistically and culturally foreign environment cannot in any way be 
compensated by attending a kindergarten, a swimming pool and Russian-language classes. 
While the father’s undertaking to ensure that the child receives adequate psychological support 
is indeed laudable, the ECtHR didn’t agree that such an external support could ever be 
considered as an equivalent alternative to psychological support that is intrinsic to strong, stable 
and undisturbed ties between a child and his mother.1081 These  ‘adequate arrangements’ in the 
view of the Italian courts were the only ones made; they didn’t consider any alternative 
solutions for ensuring contact between the child and his father.1082 
Following this reasoning, the ECtHR concluded that the interference with the 
applicants’ right to respect for their family life was not ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the ECHR. Accordingly the ECtHR found that there 
had been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR as a result of the order of the Italian Courts 
to return the child to Italy.1083 
In the second case, Sofia Povse and Doris Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11), 
the proceedings trudged through different legal labyrinths for almost 5 years and 4 months (and 
also involved procedures under the Brussels IIbis Regulation).1084 In January 2011 the mother 
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and the child lodged an application against Austria with the ECtHR and in it, complained that, 
under Article 8 of the ECHR, the Austrian courts’ decisions had violated their right to respect 
for their family life. In particular, they argued that the Austrian courts had limited them to 
ordering the enforcement of the Italian court’s return order and had not examined their 
argument that the child’s return to Italy would constitute a serious danger to her well-being and 
lead to the permanent separation of the mother and the child. They submitted, in particular, that 
the child had not had any contact with her father since mid-2009 and did not speak Italian, 
while her father did not speak German. Moreover, they claimed that the mother would not be 
able to accompany the child to Italy or to exercise any access rights, as criminal proceedings 
for child abduction were pending against her in Italy.1085 
The ECtHR was asked to refer to the question of abolition of exequatur provided in 
Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in correlation with infringement of Article 8 of 
the ECHR. At first, in the decision from 18 June 2013, a chamber of the ECtHR applied the 
doctrine of ‘presumption of compliance’ or the ‘Bosphorus presumption’ to the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation regarding the abolishment of exequatur in intra-EU child abduction cases.1086 This 
doctrine had been first introduced in the Bosphorus v. Ireland case.1087 Generally the doctrine 
holds that if a Member State is complying with EU law and has no discretion whilst doing so, 
then the ECHR will not review the application of EU law in question unless it is regarded as 
‘manifestly deficient’ in how it protects human rights.1088 Applying the reasoning provided by  
the Bosphorus presumption to  the Povse case, the ECtHR stated that ‘It is not in dispute that 
the Austrian courts’ decisions ordering the enforcement of the Venice Youth Court’s return 
orders interfered with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life within the meaning of 
Article 8 of the Convention’,1089 but an exception of the infringement of Article 8 exists if such 
interference is ‘in accordance with the law’, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred 
to in Article 8(2), or is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve the aim or aims 
concerned.1090 In determining these three conditions for the exception (Was the interference in 
accordance with the law? Did the interference have a legitimate aim? Was the interference 
necessary?) the ECtHR held that the interference was in accordance with the law1091 and 
                                                 
1085 Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11), para 57. 
1086 ibid para 77. 
1087 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (App. No. 45036/98) ECHR, [2005]. 
1088 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (App. No. 45036/98), para 152-158; 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, (App. No. 30696/09), para 338-40; Michaud v. France (App. No. 12323/11), 
par.102-103.  
1089 Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11), par.70. 
1090 ibid para 71. 
1091 ibid para 72-74. 
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decided that Sofia and Doris Povse’s application for a breach of Article 8 of their ECHR 
rights was inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with 
Article 35 (3) (a) and 4 of the ECHR. 1092  
The aim of ECHR and CFR generally is the same; both protect and guarantee 
fundamental rights and both contain provisions which are intended to protect the rights of the 
child. Nevertheless, they may not share the same methodology in the assessment of the 
existence of a violation, nor give exactly the same weight to the various factors which make up 
the process.1093 It was nonetheless expected that these two legal orders would be addressed 
over the child abduction, because these cases have a high intensity of emotional charge and the 
participants in these proceedings would use almost every legal remedy at their disposal because 
they represent a ‘pathological aspect’ of the custody disputes.  
The Bosphorus case provides a solution and gives a certain order in the interaction 
between ECtHR and CJEU legal orders in that it accepts the change in the dominance of the 
ECtHR over human right issues.1094 This case in a certain way was  inspired by the Solange II 
case-law of the German Constitutional Court1095 and gives input to  the reasoning of the ECtHR 
by developing a translation, a kind of ‘Europeanisation of the Solange.’1096 Bringing along the  
inspiration of  the Solange II, the ECtHR in the case M. & Co. v. Germany [1990] ruled that 
applications against individual EU Member States concerning material acts of Community law 
were inadmissible only under one condition: ‘Provided that within that organization 
fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection.’1097 This principle, which evolved 
during the Bosphorus judgment, was referred to as the ‘principle of compliance’ and provides 
that the ECtHR has no competence to review Community acts as such. Nonetheless, the Court 
recognizes a competence to review these acts indirectly through examining specific 
implementation measures at the national level.1098 In the Michaud v. France Case, the ECtHR 
when applying this ‘principle of compliance’ stated that ‘…the Court may, in the interest of 
                                                 
1092 Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11), para 89. 
1093 Muir Watt H., Muir Watt on Abolition of Exequatur and Human Rights, Online Symposium: Abolition of 
Exequatur and Human Rights, <http://conflictoflaws.net/2013/muir-watt-on-povse/> accessed 10 April 2016. 
1094 Preshova D., ‘Legal Pluralism: New Paradigm in the Relationship Between Legal Orders’ in Marko Novakovic 
(ed.) Basic Principles of PublicInternational Law: Monism & Dualism, Belgrade: Faculty of Law University of 
Belgrade, Institute of Comparative Law and Institute of International Politics and Economics, (2013) 19. 
1095 Solange II, [1986], BVerfGE 73, p. 339 
1096 Groussot X. ‘Constitutional Dialogues, Pluralism and Conflicting Identities’ in M. Avbelj/J. Komarek (eds.) 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, 2012, 319, (as cited by Preshova D., Legal 
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1097 M. & Co. v. Germany, [1990] ECHR (Ser. A), p. 138 
1098 Kuhert K. ‘Bosphorus – Double Standards in European Human Rights Protection?’ Utrecht Law Review 
Volume 2, Issue 2 (2006) 188. 
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international cooperation, reduces the intensity of its supervisory role’.1099 This doctrine now 
represents a ‘bridge’1100 between these two legal orders, moreover because the CJEU gave 
opinion that  
[T]he agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or with 
Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union 
to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’1101  
However, this doctrine of ‘principle of compliance’ is not without criticism. The 
principle is criticized for representing a political gesture on behalf of the ECtHR and for the 
fact that it applies a much lower standard of protection of human rights to EU law than to non-
EU law.1102 
The ‘Bosphorus presumption,’ which allows an overlapping consensus between the two 
legal orders, is now brought into the equation of the Povse v. Austria case for the abolition of 
exequatur in Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.1103 This presumption required that 
the ECtHR inspect three basic aspects: whether the EU protects fundamental rights, did the 
Austrian Courts exercise any discretion or have they just implemented the EU law, and are 
there any circumstances surrounding the case that could show that there was ‘manifestly 
deficient’ protection of human rights. 
 As a starting point, the ECtHR reaffirmed its findings that the EU protects fundamental 
rights in a manner equivalent to that of the ECHR as regards both the substantive guarantees 
offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance.1104 In that regard, the ECtHR 
considered that the ‘principle of compliance’ would apply to this case if the Austrian courts, 
without exercising any discretion, did no more than implement the legal obligations resulting  
from Austria’s membership in the European Union.1105 In observing the rules provided in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, particularly Articles 42 and 11(8) and the fact that the Supreme Court 
asked the CJEU/CJEU for a preliminary ruling during  the first set of proceedings concerning 
                                                 
1099 Michaud v. France (App. No. 12323/11), para 104. 
1100 Requejo M., Requejo on Povse, Online Symposium: Abolition of Exequatur and Human Rights, 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2013/requejo-on-povse/> accessed 12 March 2016. 
1101 Opinion on the draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and identifies problems with regard to its compatibility 
with EU law (2/13) (Press Release No.180, 2014 (18.12.14)) 
1102 Kuhert K. (n 1098) 188; Beaumont and others, Child Abduction: Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, (n 1034) 56. 
1103 There were serious concerns, because if the standpoint of the Pellegrini case (Pellegrini v. Italy, app.no. 
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IIbis Regulation would be incompatible with the ECHR, Requejo M., Requejo on Povse, (n 1100). 
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the enforcement of the Venice Youth Court’s judgment of 10 July 2009,1106 the ECtHR stated 
that:  
 [t]he Austrian courts could not and did not exercise any discretion in ordering the enforcement 
of the return orders. Austria has therefore done no more than fulfil the strict obligations flowing from its 
membership of the European Union.’1107 
From that standpoint it was considered whether there are some circumstances 
surrounding the case which could show that there was ‘manifestly deficient’ protection of 
human rights that could lead to rebutting the presumption of ECHR compliance.1108 The 
applicants had argued that returning the child to Italy would cause her serious psychological 
harm and would constitute a gross violation of the right of both applicants, the mother and the 
child, to respect for their family life.1109 Nevertheless, the ECtHR ruled that the protection of 
human rights under the Brussels IIbis Regulation was not manifestly deficient as the applicants 
had not exhausted their rights in the Italian courts to get the Italian return order changed or 
stayed in light of a change of circumstances.1110 
After considering all of these aspects, the ECtHR decided that the application was 
inadmissible as it was manifestly ill-founded and that it must be rejected. With this the ECtHR 
reaffirmed the ‘Bosphorus presumption’ that when a Member State is applying EU law without 
exercising any discretion it is presumed to be in compliance with the ECHR. 
5.3.4 The position of the ECtHR regarding the Brussels IIbis Regulation child 
abduction regime 
 
These cases have shown how complex the situation is regarding the existence of several 
legal sources that can be applied in a certain case. The ‘Bosphorus presumption’ provides for 
some resolution between ECHR and EU law. Nevertheless, this aspect is just a starting position 
because in essence the national courts (local judges) have to decide this ‘mega-conflict’1111 
between two supra-national regimes which both purport to promote the interests of the child. 
                                                 
1106 Where the CJEU ‘…made it clear that where the courts of the State of origin of a wrongfully removed child 
had ordered the child’s return under Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIa Regulation and had issued a certificate of 
enforceability under Article 42 of that Regulation, the courts of the requested State could not review the merits of 
the return order, nor could they refuse enforcement on the ground that the return would entail a grave risk for the 
child owing to a change in circumstances since the delivery of the certified judgment. Any such change had to be 
brought before the courts of the State of origin, which were also competent to decide on a possible request for a 
stay of enforcement.’ Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11), para 81. 
1107 Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11), para 82. 
1108 ibid para 78. 
1109 ibid para 64. 
1110 ibid para 86. 
1111 Muir Watt H., (n 1093). 
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For example, the local judge, when deciding for return of the child under Article 11(8) Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, must act promptly and thoroughly because this fast-track procedure and the 
abolition  of the exequatur is counterbalanced by the particular duty to properly conduct ‘in-
depth examinations’ as regards the reasons for such refusal (as was the case in Šneersone and 
Kampanella v. Italy, which was reiterated the Neulinger approach) and that the child is heard, 
unless is inappropriate (as was the case in Zarraga). If the Court of habitual residence of the 
child fails to do so, or does it unsatisfactorily, it is open to the applicant to challenge the order 
– including through an individual application to the ECtHR (as indicated in Povse v. Austria 
case).  
The Brussels IIbis Regulation in Article 11(6)-(8) is positioned in such a way that the 
court of origin (the court where the child had his habitual residence before the wrongful 
removal or retention) is the final arbiter regarding child abduction cases. The procedure was 
designed as such because of the restoration of the status quo ante, which is the main goal in 
the child abduction cases.1112 Nevertheless, infringement on human rights in correlation with 
the Charter of the EU and the ECHR can occur in both places, in the country of origin (country 
of the habitual residence of the child prior to the abduction) and the country of enforcement 
(country of refuge). This aspect cannot be disregarded, because the procedure provided in 
Article 11(6)-(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is intended to have limitations in the country 
of enforcement for the reasons of the child’s best interest and the unilateral disturbance of the 
jurisdictional regime by the abducting parent who voluntarily choose that forum. From the 
point of view of the Brussels IIbis regime,1113 such conduct is intolerable and the CJEU allowed 
no exceptions to the concertation of the jurisdiction in the country of origin, (the country of the 
child’s habitual residence prior the abduction) including for human right protection (Article 24 
of the Charter of the EU), reasoning that there are locally available remedies despite the fact 
that the abducting parent and the child are found elsewhere. At the same time, the ECtHR in 
the Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy case evidently left a possibility to the abducting parent 
to raise human rights infringementin the country of enforcement. Between these two 
standpoints, there is the Bosphorus presumption in the Povse v. Austria case, which tries to 
reconcile these two regimes by diminishing the distress of the national courts to be put in a 
position to choose between two competing international obligations1114 and by that to 
                                                 
1112 Perez Vera Report, (n 187) 106. 
1113 Case C‑211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 para 74; Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni 
Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 para 69. 
1114 Muir Watt H. (n 1093) 3. 
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demonopolize human rights protection. Following this presumption, the ECtHR did not find 
justification to rebut it and rejected the application.  
Such a position of the ECtHR regarding the application of Article 11(6) – (8) of Brussels 
IIbis Regulation ultimately leads to the two most essential questions regarding the abolition of 
the exequatur in the Brussels IIbis Regulation: Does the abolition of the exequatur, as a part of 
the child abduction procedure, deprive the child of adequate protection? And secondly, taking 
into consideration the procedure provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation regarding child 
abduction cases, can the abductor and the child still possibly raise human rights infringement 
before the country of refuge, if in particular case the court of origin ordering the return did not 
deal or dealt inadequately with the human’s right challenge? 
Regarding the first question, the CJEU and the ECtHR are in line in the reasoning that 
the court of origin is the forum in which all infringements of are to be addressed. The CJEU 
held this  position in the Zarraga Case and in the Povse (preliminary ruling) case, that questions 
concerning the lawfulness of the judgment ordering return as such, and in particular the 
question whether the necessary conditions enabling the court with jurisdiction to hand down 
that judgment are satisfied,1115 are solely questions for the national courts of the Member State 
of origin to examine, in particular, by Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Article 42 of Regulation No 2201/2003.1116 The ECtHR reached a similar conclusion by 
applying the Bosphorus presumption in the Povse case and providing, firstly, that the Austrian 
Courts (court of enforcement) had no discretion but to order the return of the child; secondly, 
that the CJEU in its preliminary ruling considered that the child and the mother could search 
for adequate humans right protection, namely Article 8 of the ECHR, in front of the Italian 
Courts (court of origin).1117 With these two factors in mind and applying the ‘Bosphorus 
presumption,’ the protection of these rights according to ECHR, which is provided by the 
ECtHR, is equivalent to the protection afforded by the Brussels IIbis Regulation. In the context 
of the Povse case, there is also a condition which is in line with the Bosphorus presumption, 
that the parties must avail themselves of all local remedies and challenge the order in the Court 
of origin (with the possibility of lodging an application with the ECtHR if such an attempt 
fails). All of these factors provide that in the cases with questions which are specific to the 
infringement of human rights and are conducted by the abolition of the exequatur in the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, are to be addressed in the Country of origin. However, this does not 
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preclude the challenge of the return order in the country of enforcement, which is shown by 
the mere fact that Bosphorus presumption is rebuttable, but only in extreme cases.  
This aspect of the rebuttable presumption (praesumptio iuris tantum) under the 
Bosphorus presumption requires quite strict standards of proof of violation and the presumption 
can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of the particular case, it is considered that the protection 
of ECHR rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international cooperation 
is outweighed by the Convention's role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public 
order’ in the field of human rights.1118 So the questions stands, can the abductor and the child 
still possibly raise human rights infringement before the country of refuge, if in that particular 
case the court of origin ordering the return did not deal or dealt inadequately with the human 
rights challenge? If this aspect is seen only through the Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy 
case, then the answer would be yes. But this case does not bring into the equation the Bosphorus 
presumption. What this presumption does, together with all that  was said about the access to 
justice in the court of origin, is mandate that only severe disallowance to such access (which 
includes disallowance of application to the ECtHR) could lead to the possibility of effectively 
raising the access argument in front of the court of enforcement.1119 From another point of view, 
if both safeguards are applied and used, that the parties use all of their remedies in front of the 
Court of origin (provided that they are accessible!) and if that court fulfils its obligations under 
Article 42 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, then there wouldn’t be any need to call for help 
from the courts of the country of refuge under the ECHR.1120  
What is of essence here is the promptness of the procedure. The abolition of the 
exequatur in these cases is engineered so that it provides very swift and prompt procedures for 
the return of the abducted children.1121This direct cross-border enforceability of a court order 
without intermediary enforcement proceedings, which is sometimes described as a ‘nuclear 
missile’1122, assures that all necessary procedural requirements have been fulfilled  in order to 
re-establish the status quo, which means that the child is returned to his/her habitual residence. 
Nevertheless, Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy case has shown that there can be a risk that 
the ECtHR could misapply the need for speed in these cases. First, the requirement for ‘in-
depth examination’ of the entire family situation is too high of a burden for the national Courts. 
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Online Symposium: Abolition of Exequatur and Human Rights, <http://conflictoflaws.net/2013/the-CJEU-and-
echr-judgments-on-povse-and-human-rights-a-legislative-perspective/> accessed 12 March 2016 1-2. 
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The ECtHR, rightfully departed from this requirement of ‘effective examination’ in the X v. 
Latvia case, which allows faster examination, ‘tailored’ to child abduction cases. Secondly, the 
position of the ECtHR in relation to the European Commission in the Šneersone and 
Kampanella v. Italy case can act as a Court of Fourth Instance and redefine the position of the 
Courts of habitual residence.1123 Finally, regarding the fast-track procedure, the preventing of 
the enforcement of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention return orders, as was the case 
in Neulinger, presents worrying aspect, because as the procedure under the ECHR in front of 
the ECtHR can last significantly, it is in collision with the need for a prompt procedure for the 
return of the child. This requires for some fast truck procedures, that can be disposed in the 
prescribed 6-8 week and would be in line with the ‘time is of an essence’ reasoning which is 
highlighted in these cases.  
With all of which was said, the ECtHR and the CJEU have put on the court of origin, 
very important role, to swiftly and thoroughly examine all of the circumstances when applying 
Article 11(6)-(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and to allow access to justice to the parent 
which wrongfully removed or retained the child in the country of refugee. This role is evidently 
not an easy one, but it’s necessary, because here at stake is very fragile right. That is the child 
future, its relation with the environment and its self-awareness. For that there could not be any 
excuses that the role is hard.  
 
  
                                                 




Part III  
The procedure for Recognition and Enforcement of 
foreign judicial decisions in the Republic of Slovenia 
 
Chapter I The historical development, structure and legal sources 
of Private International Law in Slovenia 
 
1. General 
 Recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia is 
regulated in the Private International Law and Procedure Act (PILP act of Slovenia).1 In its 
structure, this legal act has many similarities with the Act Concerning the Resolution of 
Conflicts of Laws with Provisions of Other States in Certain Matters (PIL act of 1982)2 which 
was a law enacted on a federal level in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia(SFRY).3 
The PIL act of 1982 law represented the first codification of private international law rules in 
SFRY. Before that law came into force, private international law legal issues in SFRY were 
either scattered among different acts or they were not regulated.4 Recognition of foreign 
judicial decisions before the enactment of the PIL act of 1982 was provided according to the 
Law on Civil Procedure5 while the enforcement of foreign judicial decisions was left to the 
Law on Enforcement procedure.6 In this legal act it was provided that it is possible to enforce 
any foreign judgment in SFRY which fulfils the conditions provided by law.7 All of these legal 
issues and the legal vacuum that existed over some issues in SFRY were settled with the 
codification and coming into force of the PIL act of 1982.8 
                                                 
1 Private International Law and Procedure Act (Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku), Official 
Gazette RS, no. 56/99. 
2 Act Concerning the Resolution of Conflicts of Laws with Provisions of Other States in Certain Matters (Zakon 
o ureditvi kolizije zakonov s predpisi drugih držav v določenih razmerjih), Official Gazette of the SFRY, 
no.43/1982. 
3 For more comprehensive understanding of the historical development of civil litigation in Slovenia see, Galič 
A., Das Slowenische Zivilprozessrecht Zwischen Transmission, Kontinuität und Trasformation, Ritsumeikan law 
review. International ed., no. 27, (2010) 117-139. 
4 Varadi T. and others, Međunaodno privatno pravo, deseto izdanje, JP „Službeni Glasnik’, Beograd, (2008) 61. 
5 Articles 16 to 22 of the Law on civil procedure, Official Gazette of the FPRY, no.4/57. For more on the 
Yugoslavian system for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions from that period see, Cigoj S., 
Mednarodno zasebno pravo, 1. Knjiga, Splošni nauki, Ljubljana, (1966), pg.93  
6 Official Gazette of the SFRY, no.20/78 
7 Wedam Lukić D., Civilno Izvršilno Pravo, (The introductory lectures of the book in preparation) 
<http://www.pf.uni-lj.si/media/wedam.uvodni.del.pdf> accessed 09 June 2015, 8. 
8 For the historical aspects of the PIL act of 1982 see, Živković M. and Stanivuković M, Međunarodno privatno 
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The similarity between the Slovenian PILP act and the PIL act of 1982 is evident. Both 
laws are systematically divided into six chapters containing rules for international jurisdiction 
(and procedure), conflict of law rules, recognition and enforcement rules and other rules are 
also contained within them. Regarding family law issues, the Slovenian PILP act is strongly 
influenced by its predecessor. This provides for consistent understanding of the rules and the 
use of practical and doctrinal materials in the interpretation of the solutions in both PIL acts.  
The scope of application of both laws, the PILP act of Slovenia and the PIL act of 1982 
is identical and given in Article1 which states that: 
[t]he act contains rules on determination of the applicable law, rules on jurisdiction of courts 
and other authorities in Slovenia, rules of procedure, and rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, as well as decisions rendered by other authorities of foreign states in legal categories that 
refer to status of persons, family, labor, pecuniary and other civil relationships having an international 
character.9 
A large part of these acts is directed towards solutions to private international law 
problems which refer to family relationships. There are special conflict of law rules, 
jurisdictional criteria and rules regarding recognition and enforcement that regulate family law 
issues with foreign elements.  
 Specifically, in the PIL acts, there are rules for the determination of the applicable law 
in a vast number of family law issues such as matrimonial matters,10 matrimonial property 
regimes,11 relationships between parents and children,12 recognition, establishment and 
contesting of paternity or maternity,13 maintenance obligations,14 legitimization,15 adoption,16 
custody rights and provisional measures.17 
The PILP act of Slovenia contains rules for the determination of the jurisdiction of 
courts and other authorities of Slovenia in matters having international elements. The general 
rules determines the jurisdiction of the courts of Slovenia on the basis of the domicile of the 
defendant.18 However in many kinds of family law issues, the rules depart from the general 
jurisdictional criteria and covers many family law issues with specific jurisdictional rules 
                                                 
pravo (opšti deo), Beograd, Službeni glasnik, (2006) 41-42.  
9 cf Article 1 of the PILPA of Slovenia and Article 1 of the PIL act of 1982. 
10Articles 34-37 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
11Articles 38-40 of the PILP act of Slovenia. Also Article 41 covers the determination of the applicable law 
regarding the property regimes in non-martial relationships. 
12Article 42 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
13Article 43 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
14Article 44 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
15Article 45 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
16Articles 46-47 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
17Article 15 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
18cf Article 48 of the PILP act of Slovenia and Article 46 of the 1982 PIL Act. 
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referring to matrimonial property regimes,19 matrimonial matters,20 establishment and 
contesting of paternity or maternity,21 parental responsibility issues,22 maintenance,23 granting 
marriage license to minors,24 adoption,25 custody rights,26 and provisional measures.27 
Recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in the Slovenian PILP act is 
regulated in the fourth chapter and contains the conditions and the procedure for recognition 
and enforcement of all judicial decisions28 or court settlements29 rendered by a foreign court or 
another authority which is in the State of origin equivalent to the judgment or settlement in 
court.30 As was the case with the other PIL issues that are regulated with this law, recognition 
and enforcement applies to all matters which fall under the scope of application given in Article 
1. Although in this aspect the grounds for recognition are referring to all decisions, there are 
several rules specifically mentioning family matters. These rules are related to the exception to 
the ground on non-recognition of decision in the cases of violation of the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Slovenian courts31 and decisions relating to personal status.32 
 
  
                                                 
19Article 67 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
20Articles 68-70 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
21Articles 71 and 72 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
22Articles 73, 76, 77 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
23Articles 74, 75 and 76 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
24Article 82 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
25Article 83 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
26Articles 84 and 85 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
27Article 86 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
28Article 94(1) of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
29Article 94(2) of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
30Article 94(3) of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
31Article 97(2) of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
32Articles 102 of the PILP act of Slovenia. 
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2. Legal Sources 
 Private international law subject matter is complex, covering a variety of legal issues 
which differ from one country to another.33 However the nucleus of private international law 
is regarded to cover three issues: foreign jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition and 
enforcement.34 Also, the rules relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in 
principle differ from country to country.35 Despite the differentiation of the national legal 
sources, there is diversity of legal sources for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judicial decisions which can be found in multilateral and bilateral treaties and for the EU 
Member States in the relevant EU legal sources.36 In all of these legal sources there is a 
common denominator and most of the countries recognize the foreign decisions provided that 
certain requirements are met, but the exact conditions depend on the legal regime concerned.37 
 The recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia, as in the 
majority of the countries, is regulated by both national and international legal sources.38 The 
subject matter of PIL is specific and contains rules that cover a large number of different legal 
issues (status of persons, family, labor, pecuniary and other civil relationships). These legal 
issues are covered by many different national and international legal sources, so this part will 
focus only on the legal sources connected mostly with family law relations.  
 2.1 National legal Sources 
 
 The private international law aspects in Slovenia are regulated in the Private 
International Law and Procedure Act (Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku). 
This law is a general law which covers many different legal issues. One of the specific legal 
fields that is covered with the PIL act of Slovenia are family law issues with a foreign element. 
Nevertheless, these situations are considered to be complex and they are covered with variety 
of legal sources, both national and international. Substantive family law issues are covered in 
the Marriage and Family Law Relations Act (Zakon o zakonski zvezi in družinskih razmerjih).39 
                                                 
33 Kiestra R.L., The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Private International Law, T.M.C. 
Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands, (2014), 15. 
34 ibid. 
35 Text to n 104 Part III ch II sec 3. 
36 Kiestra, R.L., (n 33) 200. 
37 ibid. 
38 Makarov A., ‘Chapter 2: Sources’ in Kurt Lipstein (ed) International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law: 
Volume III: Private International Law, (1972), 3-16 




These issues in Slovenia can be settled either in contentious or non-contentious procedures. 
For those family law issues that are settled in contentious procedure (divorce and parental and 
access rights, when these issues are decided within the framework of divorce litigation)40 the 
Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o pravednem postopku)41 applies. The issues which are decided in 
non-contentious procedure (withdraw of parental rights, the prolongation of parental rights 
beyond the age of maturity, a decision concerning the exercising of parental responsibilities, a 
decision on custody and visitation rights when parents do not live together and cannot agree on 
these issues and etc.)42 are regulated under the Non-Contentious Procedure Act (Zakon o 
nepravednem postopku).43 Enforcement of judgments concerning custody and judgments on 
right of access are contained in a separate chapter in the Enforcement of Judgments and 
Protective Measures Act (Zakon o izvršbi in zavarovanju).44 Lastly, the special and very 
important position which the Center for Social Work has in the settlement of family law issues 
is regulated in the Social Assistance Act (Zakon o socialnemvarstvu).45 
 2.2 International legal sources 
 
 Legal rights and duties arising out of international treaties that are considered binding 
for Slovenia are a part of the legal structure and rank above statutory provisions in the hierarchy 
of legal acts.46 This hierarchy of the legal sources in Slovenia is established in the Constitution 
of Republic of Slovenia (CRS).47Article 8 of the CRS provides that:  
[L]aws and other regulations must comply with generally accepted principles of international law and 
with treaties that are binding on Slovenia. Ratified and published treaties shall be applied directly.’  
 Article 153 of the CRS elaborates even further and determines that  
[L]aws, regulations, and other general acts must be in conformity with the Constitution. Laws must be 
in conformity with generally accepted principles of international law and with valid treaties ratified by 
the National Assembly, whereas regulations and other general acts must also be in conformity with other 
ratified treaties. Regulations and other general acts must be in conformity with the Constitution and laws. 
Individual acts and actions of state authorities, local community authorities, and bearers of public 
                                                 
40 Galič A., 'The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia' in Boele-Woelki K., 
Gonzalez-Beilfuss C. (ed.) Brussels IIbis Its impact and Application in the Member States (Antwerpen-Oxford, 
2007) 261. 
41 Official Gazette RS, no. 27/99 and 36/04. 
42 Galič A., The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia, (n 40) 261. 
43 Official Gazette of RS, no. 30/86. 
44 Official Gazette of RS, no. 51/98 and 75/02. 
45 Official Gazette of RS, no. 03/07. 
46 Sovdat J., The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia and European Union Law, Hrvatska i 
komparativna javna uprava, Vol. 13 No. 3, 2013, 898. See also the case of the Constitutional Court of Republic of 
Slovenia, Rm – 1/97, point 12. 
47 Official Gazette of the RS Nos. 33/91-I, 42/97, 66/2000, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, and 47/13. 
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authority must be based on a law or regulation adopted pursuant to law.  
 These provisions provide that the application of international law in the Slovenian legal 
order is either direct or indirect.48 There are three methods of reception of international law in 
Slovenian legal order: statutory ad hoc incorporation, automatic ad hoc incorporation and 
automatic standing incorporation.49 The main method how the treaties are incorporated in the 
national legal system of Slovenia is on the basis of a law on the ratification of a treaty, which 
is an automatic ad hoc incorporation.50 Also in this context it is notable to give regard to Article 
15 (5) of the CRS which stipulates that: 
[N]o human right or fundamental freedom regulated by legal acts in force in Slovenia may be restricted 
on the grounds that this Constitution does not recognise that right or freedom or recognises it to a lesser 
extent.  
 This provision is especially related to international human rights agreements and refers 
to the ‘self-executing’ character of their norms by which provisions of international instruments 
binding on Slovenia that determine human rights and fundamental freedoms have direct legal 
effects for individuals who can refer directly to them when invoking their rights.51 By this 
provision, the Constitution established the principle of the highest protection of rights, which 
means that a treaty can have priority even over the Constitution if it guarantees a higher level 
of protection of a human right.52 
 Following these articles, it can be concluded that the international agreements are above 
the national legal statutes and other legislative measures but they must be in conformity with 
the CRS.53 With such a position, the international legal sources are positioned above the laws 
and other national legal sources but not above the Constitution, whose position is above the 
international agreements, as was explicitly ruled by the Constitutional Court of Republic of 
Slovenia.54 
                                                 
48 Olaj A., Direct Applicability of Generally Accepted Principles of International Law in Legal Order of Republic 
of Slovenia, Mednarodna revija za javno pravo, XI (3-4), (2013) 143.  
49 For more on the methods of reception of international law in Slovenian legal order see Olaj A., (n 48) 144. 
50 Škrk M., Odnos med mednarodnim pravom in notrnjim pravom v praksi Ustavnega sodišča, Pravnik, 62(/8), 
(20077) 279-280. 
51 Reply by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, 3rd Congress of the World Conference on 
Constitutional Justice ‘Constitutional Justice and Social Integration’ 28 September – 1 October 2014 Seoul, 
Republic of Korea, <http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Seoul/docs/Slovenia_CC_reply_questionnaire_3WCCJ-
E.pdf> accessed 01 June 2015, 8. 
52 ibid. In this context see Article 53 of the ECHR. 
53 The Judge and International Law, Council of Europe Publishing, (1998), 65. 
54 ‘In our constitutional system, international agreements rank above statutory provisions in the hierarchy of legal 
acts. According to the provision of Article 8 of the Constitution, statutes and other legislative measures shall 
accord with international agreements which bind Slovenia. According to the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 
153 of the Constitution, statutes must conform with international agreements currently in force and adopted by 
the National Assembly, and regulations and other legislative measures must also conform with other ratified 
international agreements. To actually ensure such conformity, the constitutioner in indent 2 of paragraph 1 of 
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 Article 3a of the Constitution regulates the transfer of the exercise of part of Slovenian 
sovereign rights to international organizations which are based on respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the principles of the rule of law. Among the things 
which this Article regulates is the position of the legal sources arising out of the European 
Union in the Slovenian legal system. In Article 3a/III it is provided that  
[L]egal acts and decisions adopted within international organizations to which Slovenia has transferred 
the exercise of part of its sovereign rights shall be applied in Slovenia in accordance with the legal 
regulation of these organizations.  
 This provision ensures direct applicability of EU law and recognizes its supremacy over 
national law.55 
 2.2.1 Multilateral agreements in the field of family law relations in Slovenia 
  
 Slovenia is a member of a large number of international organizations which have 
adopted multilateral international treaties. As a member state, Slovenia is part of the following 
international agreements in relation to family law issues: 
  
 2.2.1.1 Council of Europe 
 
 Slovenia acceded to the Council of Europe on 14 May 1993. In the area of cross-border 
family law relations and legal cooperation in civil matters, it is member to the following 
Conventions: 
 European Convention of Human Rights;56 
 European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights;57 
 European Convention on Information on Foreign Law.58 
  
 2.2.1.2 Hague Conference on Private International Law 
 
 Slovenia has been member to the Hague Conference on Private International Law since 
                                                 
Article 160 of the Constitution laid down the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to decide upon the conformity 
of statutes, regulations and by-laws with international agreements adopted by the State. Thus, in the hierarchy of 
legal acts in Slovenia, international agreements rank above statutory provisions. Our legal system, however, does 
not recognize the primacy of international law over constitutional provisions.’ Rm-1/97 of 5 June 1997. 
55 For more on the relation between the EU law and Slovenian legal order see, Sovdat J, (n 46) 907. 
56 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 7/94 (Republic of Slovenia 33/94) 
57 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 86/99, MP, No. 26/99 
58 Slovenia ratified the convention on 01.04.1998 and entered into force on 02.06.1998.  
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18 June 1992. In the area of family law and legal cooperation in civil matters, it has been 
member to the following Conventions: 
 The Hague Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil procedure;59 
 The Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters;60 
 The Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters;61 
 The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction;62 
 The Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption;63 
 The Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children;64 
 The Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of 
Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance;65 
 The Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations.66 
 
 2.2.1.3 International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS)/La Commission 
Internationale de l'État Civil (CIEC) 
 
 The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was a party to the International 
Commission on Civil Status. Slovenia acceded to the following Conventions on 01.12.1992: 
 n° 1 relative à la délivrance de certain sex traitsd' actes de l'état civil destinés à 
l'étranger, signée à Paris le 27.09.1956 (Convention on the issue of certain 
extracts from civil status records for use abroad); 
                                                 
59 Ratified on 08.06.1992 Republic of Slovenia is one of the successor States to the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia which became a Party to the Convention on 11 December 1962. On 8 June 1992 the 
Slovenia declared itself to be bound by the Convention 
60Slovenia ratified the convention on 18.09.2000 and entered into force on 01.06.2001. 
61Slovenia ratified the convention on 18.09.2000 and entered into force on 17.11.2000. 
62Slovenia ratified the convention on 22.03.1994 and entered into force on 01.06.1994. 
63Slovenia ratified the convention on 24.01.2002 and entered into force on 01.05.1994. 
64Slovenia ratified the convention on 11.10.2004 and entered into force on 01.02.2005. 
65 Applicable in Slovenia as a result of an approval by an REIO since 01.08.2014. 
66 Applicable in Slovenia as a result of an approval by an REIO since 01.08.2013. 
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 n° 16 relative à la délivrance d'extraits plurilingues d'actes de l'état civil, signée 
à Vienne le 08.09.1976 (Convention on the issue of multilingual extracts from 
civil status records). 
  
2.2.1.4 United Nations 
 
 Slovenia was accepted as the 176th member state of the UN on 22 May 1992. As an 
independent state it has become a member of the following conventions in the area of family 
law and legal cooperation in civil matters by succession from SFRY: 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989;67 
 The Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, New York, 20 June 
1956. 
 2.2.2 Bilateral agreements in the field of family law relations to which Slovenia is 
a party 
 
 Slovenia is a party to a large number of bilateral agreements. 
 
 Algeria: 
 Agreement on legal assistance in civil and criminal matters (Pogodba o pravni 
pomoči v civilnih in kazenskih zadevah) dated 31 March 1982;68 
 Austria: 
 Agreement on mutual recognition and enforcement of child support obligations, 
(Sporazum o vzajemnem priznanju in izvršitv i odločb v preživninskih zadevah) 
dated 10 October 1961;69 
 Belgium: 
 Agreement on legal assistance in civil and commercial matters (Sporazum o 
pravni pomoči v civilnih in trgovinskih zadevah) dated 24 September 1971;70 
                                                 
67 Ur. l. SFRJ (Official Gazette of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) - International Treaties No. 
15/90) to which Slovenia succeeded with the Act notifying succession to United Nations Conventions and 
Conventions adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, (Official Gazette RS Nos. 9/92, 3/1993, 9/93, 
5/99), which was deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on 6 July 1992, who confirmed the 
succession as of 25 June 1991 (Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ur. l. RS (Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Slovenia) No. 7/93 
68 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 2/83 
69 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 2/63 
70 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no.7/74 
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 Convention on the recognition and enforcement of alimony decisions 
(Konvencija o priznavanju in izvršitvi sodnih odločb o preživljanju) dated 12 
December 1973;71 
 Bulgaria: 
 Agreement on mutual legal assistance dated 23 March 1956 (Pogodba o 
vzajemni pravni pomoči z dne 23.03.1956);72 
 Croatia: 
 Agreement on legal assistance in civil and criminal matters (Pogodba o pravni 
pomoči v civilnih in kazenskih zadevah z dne 07.02.1994) dated 7 February 
1994;73 
 Cyprus: 
 Agreement on legal assistance in civil and criminal matters (Pogodba o pravni 
pomoči v civilnih in kazenskih zadevah) dated 19 September 1984;74 
 Czech Republic and Slovakia: 
 Agreement on regulation of legal relations in civil, family and criminal matters 
(Pogodba o ureditvi pravnih odnosov v civilnih, rodbinskih in kazenskih 
zadevah) dated 20 January 1964;75 
 France: 
 Agreement on facilitating the use of the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure 
(Sporazum o olajšavah pri uporabi Haaške konvencije o civilnem postopku) 
dated 1 March 1954;76 
 Convention on the issue of copies of public register personal data and abolishing 
legalisation (Konvencija o izdajanju listin o osebnem stanju in o oprostitvi 
njihove legalizacije) dated 29 October 1969;77 
 Convention on the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions in civil and 
commercial matters (Konvencija o priznanju in izvršitvi sodnih odločb v 
civilnih in trgovinskih zadevah) dated 18 May 1971;78 
 Convention on jurisdiction and the law applicable to family law (Konvencija o 
                                                 
71 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 45/76 
72 Official Gazette FPRY- IT, no. 1/57 
73 Official Gazette RS- IT, no. 10/94 
74 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 2/86 
75 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 13/64 
76 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 21/71 
77 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 3/71 
78 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no.7/72 
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pristojnosti in o zakonu, ki se uporablja na področju osebnega in družinskega 
prava) dated 18 May 1971;79 
 Greece: 
 Convention on the mutual recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions 
(Konvencija o vzajemnem priznanju in izvršitvi sodnih odločb) dated 18 June 
1959;80 
 Convention on  reciprocal legal relations (Konvencija o vzajemnih pravnih 
razmerjih) dated 18 June 1959;81 
 Iraq: 
 Agreement on legal and judicial cooperation (Pogodba o pravnem in sodnem 
sodelovanju) dated 23 May 1986;82 
 Italy: 
 Convention on the legal and judicial protection of citizens (Konvencija o pravni 
in sodni zaščiti državljanov) dated 6 April 1922;83 
 Convention on mutual legal assistance in civil and administrative matters 
(Konvencija o vzajemni pravni pomoči v civilnih in upravnih zadevah) dated 3 
December 1960;84 
 Macedonia: 
 Agreement on legal assistance in civil and criminal matters (Pogodba o pravni 
pomoči v civilnih in kazenskih zadevah) dated 6 February 1996;85 
 Mongolia: 
 Agreement on legal assistance in civil, family and criminal matters (Pogodba o 
pravni pomoči v civilnih, družinskih in kazenskih zadevah) dated 8 June 1981;86 
 Romania: 
 Agreement on legal assistance dated 18.10.1960 with additional protocol dated 
21.01.1972;87 
 Russia: 
                                                 
79 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 55/72 
80 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no.6/60 
81 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 7/60 
82 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 1/87 
83 Official Gazette of Kingdom of Yugoslavia no. 42/31 
84 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 5/63 
85 Official Gazette RS- IT, no. 11/97 
86 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 7/82 
87 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 8/61 and 4/73 
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 Agreement on legal assistance in civil, parental and criminal matters dated 
24.2.1962;88 
Turkey: 
 Convention on mutual relations in judicial, civil and commercial matters 
(3.7.1934) 
 UK: 
 Convention on regulation of mutual assistance in procedures in civil and 
commercial matters that take place before judicial authorities (Konvencija o 
ureditvi medsebojne pomoči pri vodenju postopkov v civilnih in trgovinskih 
zadevah, ki tečejo ali utegnejo teči pred zadevnim i sodnimi oblastmi) dated 27 
February 1936;89 
   
                                                 
88 Official Gazette SFRY- IT, no. 5/63 
89 Official Gazette of Kingdom of Yugoslavia no. 116/37 
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Chapter II Recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions from non-EU Member States in Slovenia 
 
1. General  
 A foreign judicial decision can be incorporated in the Slovenian legal system only if 
that decision undergoes the process of recognition.90 So without this procedure, foreign 
decisions cannot have the proprio vigore effect in Slovenia. Therefore, all of the foreign 
decisions, if they intend to produce some desired effect either directly through recognition, or 
as it will be in most of the cases, through enforcement, must be recognized and enforced by a 
Court according to the relevant rules, which in the case of decisions coming from non-EU 
Member States (third countries) will be the rules in the PILP act of Slovenia or other binding 
multilateral or bilateral agreements.91 This distinction is rather important because other 
decisions coming from EU Member states will be recognized and enforced according to other 
EU rules.92 
 As was stated above,93 the basic act that regulates recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia is the Private International Law and Procedure Act 
(Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku). This act contains a separate chapter 
(Chapter Four, Articles 94-111) in which the most relevant aspects regarding the recognition 
and enforcement are covered: what types of decisions can be recognized and enforced in 
Slovenia and under which conditions and by which procedures. This sub-chapter will follow 
the following method of elaboration: Firstly, it will address the issues regarding what types of 
decisions are recognized and enforced in Slovenia and which is the competent Court for such 
actions. Secondly, it will consider the conditions under which a recognition can be refused. 
Lastly, it will refer to the procedure for recognition and enforcement.  
 
2. Types of decisions and jurisdiction regarding recognition 
 The first two issues that need to be addressed regarding the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign decisions in Slovenia is what type of decisions can be recognized and which is the 
competent court that is responsible for the recognition? 
                                                 
90Article 94(1) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
91 See text to n 46 Part III ch I sec 2.2. 
92 See text to n 328 Part I ch II sec 2.5. 
93 See text to n 1 Part III ch I sec 1. 
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 The PILP act of Slovenia directly refers to the explanation of the types of decisions 
which are recognized and enforced in Slovenia. Article 94 of the PILP act of Slovenia regarding 
the issue of types of decisions that can be recognized and enforced in Slovenia gives a broader 
meaning to the term ‘foreign decisions’. It does not restrain itself only to the Court decisions94 
but also broadens this aspect with court settlements95 and other decisions made by the relevant 
authority in the country of origin which have the same effect as judicial decisions, provided 
that they refer to the rationae materiae of the PILP act given in Article 1 of the same act.96 This 
aspect is particularly important in the field of family matters because the practice regarding the 
type of decisions is such matters differs in different states based on their traditions.97 The 
intention of Article 94 of the PILP act of Slovenia was to cover a larger area of foreign decision 
which would be eligible for recognition in Slovenia. In that context, courts in Slovenia will be 
faced with diverse family law decisions that need to produce some kind of effect in Slovenia. 
Article 94, by giving a broader meaning to the term ‘foreign decisions’ restrains Slovenia from 
disqualifying foreign decisions because they bear a different name or because the country of 
origin has a different procedure of rendering those decisions.98 Therefore, Article 94 of the 
PILP act of Slovenia is focused on the subject matter of the decision and not on the authorities 
which delivered it or the name of the decision. By such a position, the PILP act of Slovenia 
upholds the sovereignty of the foreign states and the national character of their legal systems. 
Consequently, all types of decisions (declaratory, constitutive and condemnatory), whatever 
their title, can be recognized and have legal effects in Slovenia, but only condemnatory 
decisions can be enforced, because of their nature.99 
 Regarding the second issue ‘jurisdiction of the Courts in Slovenia regarding the 
recognition of foreign decisions’ this issue depends whether the recognition is sought as a main 
question or as a preliminary one. In Slovenia, competence to decide in independent proceedings 
regarding the recognition of foreign judgments is given to the district courts (Okrožna 
                                                 
94Article 94(1) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
95Article 94(2) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
96Article 94(3) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
97 For example, in Norway the divorces are conducted either administratively by the County Governor 
(Fylkesmannen) or very rarely by the Court. See Sverdrup T., 'Norwegian Report concerning the CEFL 
Questionnaire on Grounds for divorce and Maintenance between Former Spouse' CEFL, (2002) 
<http://ceflonline.net/wp-content/uploads/Norway-Divorce.pdf> accessed 02 May 2015, 4. 
98 cf Brussels IIbis Regulation where Article 2(4) states ‘the term ‘judgment’ shall mean a divorce, legal separation 
or marriage annulment, as well as a judgment relating to parental responsibility, pronounced by a court of a 
Member State, whatever the judgment may be called [emphasis added], including a decree, order or decision’ 
99 Wedam Lukić D., Civilno Izvršilno Pravo (n 7) 2; Živković M. and Stanivuković M.(n 8) 388; Kostić Mandić 
M., Recognition and enforcement of foreign court decisions in the new private international law of Montenegro, 
Collected papers, Association of Montenegro Lawyers, nos. 1-2/2015, Podgorica, 
<http://www.pravni.ucg.ac.me/files/Priznanje%20i%20izvrsenje.pdf>  accessed 11 February 2016, 4. 
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sodišca).100 Territorial jurisdiction over the recognition of a foreign judicial decision lies with 
any court that has substantive jurisdiction.101 However, such a position does not preclude the 
possibility that the recognition of the foreign judgment arises as a preliminary question by the 
executing court.102 If no special ruling has been rendered as to the recognition of a foreign 
judicial decision, any court may decide thereon as on a preliminary question, however, with an 
effect referring only to this procedure.103 
  
3. Conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions 
in Slovenia 
 
 Every country is free to impose conditions for recognition and enforcement based on 
its prerogatives derived from their sovereignty. Historically this has led to different systems 
and different conditions for recognition and enforcement.104 Nevertheless, comparatively there 
are certain common requirements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.105 
For example, the most common requirement are that the judgment should be final, that the  
judgment should not violate either procedural or substantive public policy, and that the 
judgment is not contrary to another judgment between the parties.106 Other requirements refer 
to issues of jurisdiction, proper service and some even include a fraud (fraudeá la loi) or choice-
of-law requirement.107 
 The conditions for the recognition of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia coming from 
third countries are given in Articles 95 to 103 of the PILP act of Slovenia. The intention of the 
lawmaker was to provide for controle limite of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia, meaning 
that the Court is limited to the conditions provided in the PILP act and cannot change the 
foreign decision in its substance.108 In that way the Court is put in a position to allow or refuse 
recognition only on grounds for non-recognition in the PILP act of Slovenia.109 
 Another distinction between recognition and enforcement as separate processes of the 
                                                 
100 Article 101, Courts Act, Official Gazette RS, no. 94/07. 
101 Article 108(4) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
102 Galič A., The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia, (n 40) 271. 
103 Article 108(6) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
104 For more historical development of exequatur see text to n 278 Part I ch II sec 2.3. 
105 Kiestra R.L., (n 33) 201. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid. 
108 Kramberger Škerl J., Javni red pri priznanju in izvršitvi tujih sodnih odločb (s poudarkom na procesnih 
vprašanjih), Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXV. Letnik, (2005) 261. For more on the systems for recognition see 
text to n 295 Part I ch II sec 2.4. 
109 Galič A., The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia, (n 40) 277; Wedam Lukić 
D., Civilno Izvršilno Pravo, (n 7) 10. 
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effectuation of foreign decisions in Slovenia arise from Article 103 of the PILP act. This Article 
refers to the conditions for enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia.110 In this 
Article it is provided that in the course of the enforcement of foreign judicial decisions, the 
Court will be limited to the requirements provided in Articles 95 to 101 of the PILP act and 
that the applicant must, in addition to the requirements given in Article 95111 also provide a 
certificate of enforceability of that decision issued under the law of the country of origin of the 
decision.  
 All of these conditions regarding recognition and enforcement are given as positive or 
negative conditions (assumptions). The positive conditions for recognition and enforcement 
are given in Article 95 and 103 of the PILP act, while all the other conditions are given as 
negative.112 This part will firstly analyze the positive conditions (formal requirements) for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions and then it will discuss the negative 
conditions. 
 3.1 Positive conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions in Slovenia (formal requirements) 
 
 The positive conditions which refer to formal requirements for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judicial decisions are given in Article 95 and Article 103 of the PILP 
act of Slovenia. These conditions represent requirements where the recognition and 
enforcement is admitted only if the existence of certain circumstances is determined.113 The 
proof of these requirements needs to accompany the application for the recognition and already 
in that stage of the recognition procedure they need to be fulfilled so the foreign decision can 
be recognized and/or enforced.114 If the court fails to recognize (positively) the existence of 
these requirements, it will refuse the recognition.  
 Article 95 provides that the applicant for recognition of a foreign judicial decision shall 
attach to his application:  
 the foreign judicial decision or authenticated copy thereof and  
 the certificate of a competent foreign court or another authority on finality of 
                                                 
110Article 103 of the PILP act. 
111 The applicant must provide the foreign judicial decision which is to be recognized, certificate of finality of the 
decision and translation in the language of the Court. 
112 Wedam Lukić D., Civilno Izvršilno Pravo, (n 7) 8. 
113 ibid 9. 
114 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., Komentar zakona o međunarodnom privatnom i procesnom pravu, 
Nomos, (1991), 277; Pak M., Međunarodno privatno pravo- Parnični, vanparnični i izvršni postupak sa stranim 
elementom, Beograd, (1983) 328. 
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the decision under the law of the State in which the decision was rendered. 
 This is a very important aspect: because of the diversity of languages existing in the 
world, the party that seeks recognition must produce a certified translation of a foreign judicial 
decision in the language officially used by the Court.115 
 Regarding the enforcement of foreign decisions, Article 103 starts with the same formal 
requirements for the enforcement of the foreign decisions as those which were are stipulated 
in Article 95.116 However, because of the nature of the enforceable judgments, the PILP act of 
Slovenia in Article 103 seeks additional formal requirements, where the applicant for 
enforcement of a foreign judicial decision must also produce a certificate on enforceability 
according to the law of the country of origin. This act will serve as a proof that the foreign 
judgment is enforceable according to the law of the country of origin.117 
 The reason for the creation of these positive requirements is that they represent proof 
that the decision is final and cannot be altered in the Country of origin. However, regarding the 
finality of the decisions in family matters, especially regarding parental responsibility issues, 
it can be difficult to provide for absolute finality, because generally these decisions can be 
altered if new circumstances develop.118 Nevertheless, the formal requirements are particularly 
important and the courts investigate and determine these conditions on its own motion, ex 
officio. The burden to prove the existence of the finality and the enforceability of the foreign 
judicial decision is on the party seeking recognition or enforcement.  
 In contrast, the PIL act of 1982, the predecessor of the PILP act of Slovenia, didn’t 
contain specific rule about the certified translation of the foreign judicial decision in the 
language used by the Court.119Almost all of the later PIL laws enacted after the PIL act of 1982 
contain specific rules regarding the translation of the foreign decision in the language of the 
Court.120 Regarding the formal requirements, they are very similar to the ones provided in the 
Articles 95 and 103 of the PILP act of Slovenia.121 
  
                                                 
115 Article 95(2) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
116 Article 103 of the Slovenian PILP act. 
117 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 317. 
118 Text to n 690 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.2. 
119 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 285. 
120 See Article 101 Macedonian PIL Act; Article 142 Montenegrin PIL act; Article 187 of the Serbian draft PIL 
act. In this context see also Article 119(2) and (3) of the Bulgarian PIL act. 
121See Article 101 Macedonian PIL Act; Article 142 Montenegrin PIL act; Article 187 of the Serbian draft PIL act. 
In this context see also Article 119(2) and (3) of the Bulgarian PIL act. 
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 3.2. Negative conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions in Slovenia  
 
 All the other conditions for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions represent negative conditions. These conditions refer mainly to particular situations 
where the procedural aspects of the rendering of the foreign decision contain deficiencies and 
because of the existence of such deficiencies the foreign judicial decision cannot be recognized 
in Slovenia, and secondarily to the substantive aspect where in exceptional cases the court can 
entertain in an overview of the applied substantive law. However, the substantive aspect of 
these requirements does not mean that the court can entertain in-depth analysis on the 
substantive issues. Slovenia has accepted the controle limite system of recognition and 
enforcement by which the court is restrained from analyzing the application of the substantive 
(material) law of the country of origin. However, a limited amount of such analysis is allowed 
in the case of the public policy exception.122 
 Negative conditions are requirements where the recognition and enforcement is 
admitted unless existence is determined of certain circumstances that prevent the recognition 
and enforcement.123 These negative conditions are formulated as legal obstacles.124 Such an 
understanding can be derived from the actual construction of the wording of the Articles where 
it is stated that ‘A foreign judicial decision shall not be recognized if…’ They are modeled as 
such so they shift the burden of proof from the applicant to the person against whom the 
decision is rendered, because it will be in their favor to prove that some legal obstacles exist 
which will prevent the recognition and enforcement.125 However this doesn’t mean that the 
Court is free from examining the legal obstacles, on contrary, the Court has the duty to examine 
some conditions, but only those which are determined ex officio.126 Eventually if the Court, 
despite its effort, does not prove that these legal obstacles do or do not exist, then it will be 
considered that they do not exist and the application will be upheld.127 It could be said that it is 
presumed that legal obstacles do not exist until their existence is proven.128 
 Some of the conditions the Courts in Slovenia will examine ex officio and some upon 
objection by the party which opposes the recognition and enforcement. The conditions which 
                                                 
122 Text to n 227 Part III ch II sec 3.2.4. 
123 Wedam Lukić D., Civilno Izvršilno Pravo (n 7) 9. 
124 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 330 
125 Varadi and others (n 4) 549. 
126 ibid. 
127 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 549. 
128 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 330 
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the Courts of Slovenia examine ex officio are referring to: 
 exclusive jurisdiction of Slovenian courts (Article 97 of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 final judgment between the same parties on the same subject matter (Article 99 (1) of 
the Slovenian PILP act); 
 public policy (Article 100 of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 reciprocity (Article 101 of the Slovenian PILP act). 
The other conditions, which the Court examines upon objection by the party, are: 
 violations of the right of defense (Article 96 of the PILP act of Slovenia); 
 exorbitant jurisdiction of the courts of the country of origin based exclusively on: 
o the plaintiff’s citizenship (Article 98(1)(1) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
o the presence of the defendant’s property in the State in which the decision was 
rendered (Article 98(1)(2) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
o service in person of the summons or another document instituting the 
proceedings to  the defendant (Article 98(1)(3) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 violation of the agreement on jurisdiction of the Court of Slovenia (Article 98(2) of the 
Slovenian PILP act); 
 In the PILP act of Slovenia there are separate rules for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judicial decisions that refer to the status of persons. These rules are provided in 
Article 102 of the PILP act of Slovenia.  
3.2.1 Violations of the jurisdiction of Slovenian courts 
 
 In most legal systems, the proper determination of jurisdiction is the most important 
condition for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions.129 The affirmation 
of the properly determined jurisdiction is vital for international cooperation between the legal 
systems and this coordination of the legal systems is one of the goals that private international 
law wants to achieve.130 With the positioning of the proper determination of the jurisdiction as 
a condition for recognition and enforcement, legal systems are also providing for a system of 
controlling the coordinating purpose of PIL and control of the assumption that legal orders take 
into consideration the proper determination of the jurisdiction.131 Every country can determine 
their own rules upon which international jurisdiction is determined. Usually most countries 
                                                 
129 Živković M. and Stanivuković M. (n 8) 421. 




determine unilateral jurisdictional rules, which determine jurisdiction of the national courts in 
situations with foreign elements (direct jurisdiction).132 However, rules on jurisdiction are not 
binding upon another State's decision to recognize foreign decisions.133 If the State of 
enforcement claims exclusive jurisdiction in an area, recognition of a foreign decision in that 
area is usually denied.134Another method is the application of the 'mirror principle', where the 
Court of enforcement imposes its grounds of jurisdiction as a standard which the foreign 
judicial decision (the foreign legal system) needs to meet in order for the decision to have effect 
in the country of enforcement.135However, the right proportion of coordination between these 
jurisdictional criteria (or search for ‘natural forum’) is hard to achieve,136 but is vital for the 
facilitation of the international cooperation, because otherwise this can lead to unwanted results 
such as forum shopping and retorsion. The last resort method for how legal systems cope with 
such unwanted results are by providing for conditions that refer to jurisdiction. 
 The Slovenian PILP act does not contain a ‘mirror principle’ rule, but rather contains 
several types of jurisdictional conditions for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
decisions. They refer to the violation of the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Slovenia, 
exorbitant jurisdiction of the country of origin, and lastly violation of the prorogation of 
jurisdiction of Slovenian courts. 
     
3.2.1.1 Exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Slovenia 
  
 Article 97 of the Slovenian PILP act provides that: 
[A] foreign judicial decision shall not be recognized if the exclusive jurisdiction over the matter involved 
lies with the court or some other authority of the Republic of Slovenia.137 
 Exclusive jurisdiction can be provided by the rules of the PILP act or another statute.138 
The Slovenian courts according to PILP act shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the cases that 
refer to: 
 establishment, dissolution and changes in the legal status of companies, provided that 
the principle place of business is in Slovenia (Article 60 of the Slovenian PILP act); 
                                                 
132 See Živković M. and Stanivuković M. (n 8) 421-423 
133 Michaels R., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., Max Plank 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, (2009) 6. 
134 ibid. 
135 See for example Section 328 (1)(1) of the German Code on Civil Procedure- Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 
136 Michaels R., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (n 133) 6. 
137 The provision is identical with Article 89 of PIL act of 1982, Article 104 of the Macedonian PIL act. 
138 Article 50 of the Slovenian PILP act. 
251 
 
 disputes relating to entries into public registers kept in Slovenia (Article 61 of the 
Slovenian PILP act); 
 disputes over filling of applications and validity of inventions and distinctive marks if 
the application was filed in Slovenia (Article 62 of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 permission and carrying out execution of enforcement if the execution is carried out in 
the territory of Slovenia (Article 63(1) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 disputes between the executory and the bankruptcy proceedings if the proceedings are 
instituted before the court of Slovenia (Article 63 (2) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 disputes referring to property rights on immoveable property, disputes over trespassing 
on immoveable property, as well as  disputes relating to lease or rent of immoveable 
property if such property is situated in Slovenia (Article 64 (1) of the Slovenian PILP 
act);139 
 matrimonial disputes when the defendant is a Slovenian citizen and has domicile in 
Slovenia (Article 68 (2) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 disputes relating to recognition or contesting of paternity or maternity when the action 
is brought against a child with Slovenian citizenship and with domicile or temporary 
residence in Slovenia (Article 71(2) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 disputes relating to the care and education of children who are under the care of parents, 
if the defendant and the child are Slovenian citizens and if they both have domicile in 
Slovenia (Article 73 (2) of the Slovenian PILP act);140 
 declaration of a death of a missing Slovenian citizen, irrespective of his domicile 
(Article 78 (1) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 disposal of immovable property of a deceased Slovenian citizen if the property is 
situated in Slovenia (Article 79 (1) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 disposal of immovable property of a deceased foreign citizen if the property is situated 
in Slovenia (Article 80 of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 disposal of immovable property of a deceased person without citizenship, of a deceased 
person whose citizenship cannot be established, or of a deceased person with the status 
of refugee, if the property is situated in Slovenia (Article 81(1) of the Slovenian PILP 
act); 
                                                 
139 This also extends to situation where the rights to immoveable property are subject to non-litigious civil 
procedure (Article 64(2) of the Slovenian PILP act). 
140 This rule applies to other Slovenian authorities (Article 73 (3) of the Slovenian PILP act). 
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 in cases where a minor applying for marriage license is a Slovenian citizen or if the 
persons wishing to enter into marriage are Slovenian citizens and marriage is celebrated 
abroad (Article 82(2) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 over decision for adoption and termination of adoption of a person who is Slovenian 
citizen and has domicile in Slovenia (Article 83(1) of the Slovenian PILP act); and  
 in matters of guardianship relating to Slovenian citizens, irrespective of their domicile 
(Article 84 of the Slovenian PILP act). 
 Nevertheless, particularly important for the recognition and enforcement of 
matrimonial decisions is Article 97 (2) of the Slovenian PILP act which provides that  
[I]f the recognition of a foreign judicial decision rendered in a dispute arising from marriage is requested 
by the respondent, or if such a request is made by the petitioner and the respondent does not object 
thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of Republic of Slovenia shall not impede the recognition 
thereof.  
 This rule is referring to the exclusive jurisdiction of Slovenian courts provided in 
matrimonial disputes when the defendant is Slovenian citizen and has domicile in Slovenia 
(Article 68 (2) of the Slovenian PILP act). Generally the exclusive jurisdiction of Slovenian 
courts represent an absolute legal obstacle for recognition.141 However, Article 97(2) of the 
Slovenian PILP act departs from such a position in that  the exclusive jurisdiction is not a legal 
obstacle for the recognition if the respondent requests recognition of the decision in 
matrimonial matters or if the  request is made by the petitioner and the respondent does not 
object thereto. With this rule the legislator left a possibility of a tacit disposition and with that 
indirectly to derogate the exclusive jurisdiction of the Slovenian courts.142 This makes sense, 
especially in the context of the coordination of different legal orders and different treatment of 
same legal relationship in front of different courts. It can be concluded that the exclusive 
jurisdiction condition for the recognition and enforcement represents an absolute legal obstacle 
for recognition in Slovenia, except in matrimonial matters where it represents relative legal 
obstacle.143 
 This Article was drafted on the basis of Article 89 of the PIL act of 1982. An identical 
rule is contained in the Macedonian PIL act in Article 104. However, the new Montenegrin PIL 
act144 and the Serbian draft PIL act145 have departed from this rule. These PIL acts have 
                                                 
141 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 292 
142 ibid. 
143 This means that the Court can recognize foreign decision in matrimonial matters conditionally if the respondent 
does not object such recognition. See Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 293. 
144 Article 144 and 145 of the Montenegrin PIL act. 
145 Article 185 (b) and (c) of the Serbian draft PIL act. 
253 
 
provided for the combination of the non-recognition of a foreign judicial decision with the 
violation of the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the country of enforcement and a ‘mirror 
principle’ rule. In doing so, these PIL acts have left out the part regarding the exception of the 
exclusive jurisdiction requirement as a legal obstacle in the cases of matrimonial matters if the 
request is made by the petitioner and the respondent does not object thereto.146 Whether such 
a combination of exclusive jurisdiction protection and the ‘mirror principle’ rule promotes the 
idea of ‘natural forum’ is not so clear. On the one hand, such a combination viewed from the 
exclusive jurisdiction protection perspective provides for protection of the territoriality of the 
courts of enforcement in specific cases which are provided with the exclusive jurisdiction and 
with that, protection of the sovereignty of the state of enforcement. From the other point of 
view, the imposing of the ‘mirror principle’ rule means broadening the jurisdictional criteria of 
the state of enforcement towards other sovereignties. It can be even said that such a 
combination imposes double standards, because the court of enforcement offends and defends 
the territoriality and the sovereignty of the courts. However, the need for coordination between 
the legal orders asks for certain measures, which can be achieved by this combination of 
exclusive jurisdiction and the ‘mirror principle’ rule. Nevertheless, proportionality is required 
for balanced implementation of the control of the jurisdictional requirements. There are certain 
preconditions that are required, mainly that the exclusive jurisdictional rules have to be kept to 
a minimum and the importation of standardized jurisdictional criteria. Without this unified 
approach, the combination of exclusive jurisdiction protection and the ‘mirror principle’ rule 
can discoordinate the judicial systems and provide for lack of legal certainty. 
  
 3.2.1.2 Exorbitant jurisdiction of the Country of Origin 
  
 Exorbitant jurisdiction can be defined as a jurisdiction which is prohibited according to 
the accepted rules of international law, because it is based on criteria which do not represent a 
solid connecting ground between the parties, the dispute and the court.147 In international 
litigation, there are commonly accepted jurisdictional criteria which play an important role in 
the coordination between the legal orders. For example, it is accepted that the domicile of the 
defendant is a basic jurisdictional criterion regarding the general jurisdiction. It would represent 
an exorbitant jurisdictional criterion if the general jurisdiction were established according to 
                                                 
146 See Article 144 of the Montenegrin PIL act; Article 185(b) of the Serbian Draft PIL act. 
147Živković M. and Stanivuković M. (n 8) 171. 
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the citizenship of the plaintiff.148 When it is  determined that there is expansion of the 
jurisdiction of other legal systems, the countries usually provide for forum reciprocum vel 
retorsionis, or they do not recognize and enforce foreign judicial decision rendered by courts 
which founded their jurisdiction upon such criteria. The mirror effect of the forum reciprocum 
vel retorsionis is given in Article 51 of the PILP act of Slovenia. This rule provides that the 
Slovenian courts can base their jurisdiction upon criteria which are not given  in the provisions 
of jurisdiction of the Slovenian courts, but on the basis  of jurisdictional criteria of foreign 
states, provided that: 
 the respondent is a foreign citizen; and 
 in that foreign state there is jurisdiction of courts in cases against Slovenian citizens 
based on criteria that are not contained in the provisions of jurisdiction of Slovenian 
courts. 
 However, if this aspect does not deter other legal orders to provide for meaningful 
jurisdictional criteria, then the last resort is Article 98, which provides that Slovenian courts 
would, upon objection of a person against whom the decision was rendered, refuse to recognize 
a foreign judicial decision if the jurisdiction of a foreign court was based exclusively on one of 
the following circumstances: 
 the plaintiff’s citizenship (Article 98(1)(1) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 the presence of the defendant’s property in the State in which the decision was rendered 
(Article 98(1)(2) of the Slovenian PILP act); 
 service in person of the summons or another document instituting the proceedings upon 
the defendant (Article 98(1)(3) of the Slovenian PILP act). 
 With this provision, the legislator protects the domestic legal order from decisions 
rendered by courts of foreign countries which were lacking a reason upon which they based 
their jurisdiction. In this aspect, Article 98 of the PILP act is a two-fold rule which directly 
protects the domestic legal order and indirectly provides for enhanced coordination between 
the countries’ legal orders by providing for some boundaries in the sovereign rights of the 
countries to envisage jurisdictional criteria upon which they will construct their legal order in 
an international context.  
 The PIL act of 1982 didn’t contain a similar condition for recognition of foreign judicial 
decisions. In comparison with the other PIL act, the Slovenian PILP act has more 
comprehensive criteria for exorbitant jurisdiction as a legal obstacle for recognition. For 
                                                 
148Article 14 of the French Civil Code (Code civil) 
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example, the Macedonian PIL act provides only for the criterion of citizenship as a base for 
exorbitant jurisdiction and 149 the Montenegrin PIL act provides a general rule on exorbitant 
jurisdiction,150 while the Serbian Draft of the PIL act contains a similar general rule on 
exorbitant jurisdiction, but also specifying that the Serbian courts will recognize a foreign 
judicial decision if the foreign court based the jurisdiction on jurisdictional criteria which are 
the basis for jurisdiction in the PIL act of Serbia. The Bulgarian PIL act contains a ‘mirror 
principle’ rule which provides that the Court will recognize a foreign judicial decision if the 
foreign Court had jurisdiction according to the provisions of the Bulgarian PIL act, but not if 
the nationality of the plaintiff or the registration thereof in the State of the Court seized was the 
only ground for foreign jurisdiction over disputes in rem.151 The manifestation of the full 
potential of the ‘mirror principle’ rules can be seen specifically in the cases regarding the 
protection of the domestic legal order against exorbitant jurisdictional criteria of the foreign 
courts. These rules fulfill two goals: they protect the domestic jurisdictional regime, but also 
they provide for a certain unification of the jurisdictional criteria. However, as was the case 
with exclusive jurisdiction, certain preconditions (minimum exclusive jurisdiction rules and 
importation of standardized jurisdictional criteria) are required in order for the ‘mirror 
principle’ rules to have its full effect.  
 
 3.2.1.3 Violation of the prorogation of jurisdiction of Slovenian courts 
 
 Party autonomy has been well established as a connecting factor in the situations when 
the parities choose their applicable law.152 This opportunity is often provided for them in the 
cases of contractual obligations.153 However, recent trends show this opportunity being 
provided in non-contractual obligations,154 divorce,155 maintenance obligations156 and 
succession.157 In particular cases, parties can use their procedural party autonomy and 
                                                 
149Article 105(1) of the PIL act of Macedonia. 
150Article 145 of the PIL act of Montenegro.  
151Article 117 (1) of the Bulgarian PIL act. 
152 Varadi and others (n 4) 375 
153Article 3 of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6–16). 
154 See Article 14 of the Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 40–49). 
155 See Article 5 of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (Rome III) (OJ L 343, 29.12.2010, p. 
10–16). 
156 See Article 15 of the Maintenance Regulation which refers to the Hague Protocol on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations of 23 November 2007 where in Article 8 it is provided that the parties may at any time 
designate the applicable law regarding maintenance obligations.  
157 See Article 22 of the Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
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prorogate jurisdiction of a court158 or they can submit their disagreement to arbitration.159In the 
PILP act of Slovenia, this possibility is provided in such a way that the parties can prorogate 
jurisdiction of Slovenian courts (and derogate the foreign jurisdiction) or they can prorogate 
foreign jurisdiction (and derogate the domestic one). The prorogation iurisdictionis is 
conducted by the parties by reaching an agreement of jurisdiction.160 
 Article 98(2) of the Slovenian PILP act represents a safeguard of the parties’ autonomy 
manifested in the jurisdictional agreement of jurisdiction of Slovenian courts. With this 
provision the Court, upon objection of a person against whom a foreign judicial decision was 
rendered, will refuse to recognize the foreign decision in the cases when the court rendering 
the decision failed to observe the agreement on jurisdiction of Slovenian courts. This condition 
is not considered ex officio, but on objection on the parties, namely the party against whom the 
recognition is sought. 
 The PIL act of 1982 didn’t contain a similar condition for the recognition of foreign 
judicial decisions. The Macedonian PIL act followed the rules of the Slovenian PILP act and 
introduced that legal requirement. However, the most recent PIL acts (Belgian, Bulgarian, 
Montenegrin and Serbian draft) have not provided for this specific rule. Instead the Belgian, 
Montenegrin and the Serbian draft of the PIL acts have taken an indirect approach by providing 
that the choice-of-court-agreements have an exclusive jurisdictional character (if not otherwise 
determined by the parties)161and that the foreign judgments will not be recognized if  the Court 
of recognition has exclusive jurisdiction.162 The Bulgarian PIL act gives an exclusive 
jurisdictional character to the choice-of-court-agreements,163 but fails to refer to exclusive 
jurisdiction as a condition for recognition. Instead it only provides for the ‘mirror principle’ 
rule as a condition for the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions, stating that the 
judgments and authentic acts of the foreign courts and other authorities shall be entitled to 
recognition and enforcement where: 
[t]he foreign court or authority had jurisdiction according to the provisions of Bulgarian law, but not if the 
nationality of the plaintiff or the registration thereof in the State of the court seized was the only ground 
                                                 
2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession. 
158 Varadi and others (n 4) 507. 
159 Redfern A. and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, Oxford University press, (2009), 1. 
160 More on jurisdictional agreements Briggs A., Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, Oxford 
University press, (2008). 
161 See Artice 6 of the Belgian PIL act, Article 104 of the PIL act of Montenegro and Article 25 of the Serbian 
draft of PIL. 
162 See Artice 25(1)(7) of the Belgian PIL act, Article 144 of the PIL act of Montenegro and Article 185(b) of the 
Serbian draft of PIL act. 
163Article 23 and 24 of the Bulgarian PIL act. 
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for the foreign jurisdiction over disputes in rem.164 
 The effect of both approaches, the one taken in the Slovenian and the Macedonian PIL 
acts, and the other in the Bulgarian, Montenegrin PIL acts and the Serbian draft of the PIL act, 
is the same- foreign judgments are not recognized if they violate the allowed and rightful 
parties’ choice-of-court-agreement. However, the second approach seems to raise the 
awareness of the Courts and the importance of the choice-of-court-agreement by providing 
them with exclusive jurisdictional character (and also allowing them to opt out if they choose 
to), and protecting this aspect together with the other situations where exclusive jurisdiction is 
provided. In this manner, the Countries are recognizing the parties’ autonomy to freely choose 
the forum in front of which they intend to settle their dispute and obtain a decision which can 
then be recognized and enforced in other countries, a tendency that is in line with the 
development of private international law in general.165 
 Slovenia should follow these developments in private international law. De lege ferenda 
for the prorogation iurisdictions cases there are certain requirements that should be met, 
namely that the Slovenian authorities should provide that the choice-of-court-agreements have 
exclusive jurisdictional character (if not otherwise determined by the parties) and that the 
foreign judgments will not be recognized if there is exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 
recognition. 
 In the context of the jurisdictional requirements de lege ferenda, Article 97 and 98 of 
the Slovenian PILP act should be amended with two rules which will be as following: 
 “A foreign judicial decision shall not be recognized if the exclusive jurisdiction over 
the matter involved lies with the court or some other authority of the Republic of Slovenia.” 
 “A foreign judicial decision shall not be recognized if the courts of the state to which 
the foreign judgment belongs ascertained its international jurisdiction according to 
jurisdictional criteria which are not provided in the Slovenian law for resolving the same kind 
of dispute.” 
3.2.2 Violations of the right of defense 
 
 In most legal systems, the right of the defense of the opposing party (the party against 
whom the foreign judicial decision is to be enforced in the Country of enforcement) is protected 
                                                 
164Article 117 (1) of the Bulgarian PIL act.  
165 See Article 5(1)(d) of the Proposed Draft Text on The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 
Preliminary Document No 1 of April 2016 for the attention of the Special Commission of June 2016 on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments.  
258 
 
in the procedure for recognition and enforcement against severe violations by the judicial 
authorities of the Country of origin.166 However the methods through which this right is 
protected vary. In some countries the protection is qualified under the principle of ‘natural 
justice’ and is protected by public policy;167 other countries specifically refer to proper service 
as a violation of the right of defense, but differ on the standards according to which the violation 
is considered.168Another very important aspect for the recognition and enforcement and the 
protection of the right of defense is the aspect of equality of arms and the hearings of both of 
the parties.  
 Article 96 of the Slovenian PILP act borrows heavily from Article 88 of the PIL act of 
1982, however there are slight differences. Specifically, Article 96 of the Slovenian PILP act 
provides that:  
The court of the Republic of Slovenia shall refuse the recognition of a foreign judicial decision if upon 
objection the person against whom the decision was rendered it has been established that due to 
irregularities in the proceedings he had no opportunity to participate therein.  
 This paragraph is identical to the one in Article 88 of the PIL act of 1982.169 The second 
paragraph provides for in concreto cases when is considered that these legal obstacles 
exist.170Article 96 (2) of the Slovenian PILP act states that  
In particular, a person against whom a foreign judicial decision was rendered shall be considered as 
having no opportunity to participate in the proceedings if the summons, the document or the ruling 
instituting the proceedings were not served upon him in person or if service in person was not even tried, 
except when the person pleaded to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim in the first instance procedure.’  
 In this aspect ‘…if service in person was not even tried…’ Article 96(2) of the Slovenian 
PILP act and Article 88(2) of the PIL act of 1982 differ. This aspect was not provided in the 
                                                 
166 Živković M. and Stanivuković M. (n 8) 423. 
167 See France for example, Article 509 of Code de procedure civile provides ‘Les jugementsrendus par les 
tribunauxétrangers et les actesreçus par les officiersétrangerssontexécutoires sur le territoire de la République de 
la manière et dans les casprévuspar la loi (Judgements rendered by foreign Courts and deeds received by foreign 
officers shall be enforceable on the territory of the French Republic in the manner and under the circumstances 
specified by law).’ In the Cornelissen Cass.Civ February 20th, 2007 n°05-14082, the Cour de cassation ruled that 
French courts must verify that the foreign Judgment meets 3 conditions: The foreign Court has proper jurisdiction 
under French law, the foreign Judgment complies with French procedural and substantive public policies and that 
the foreign Judgment was rendered without fraudulent forum shopping (evasion of the law). Their application is 
cumulative and applicable in situations when France haven’t signed international treaty.  
168 These standards may be judged according to the country of origin (Peru, Germany), country of recognition 
(Brazil) and the Country of the residence or habitual residence of the party which need to be served (Swiss PIL 
act Article 27 (2)(a)). For more on the standards of proper service see Živković M. and Stanivuković M. (n 8) 423. 
169Also this rule has taken over the ambiguous rationae personae whose procedural rights were infringed that is 
‘…the person against whom the decision was rendered…’ This construction provides for wide range of persons 
(not only the parties but also third persons) whose right of fair trial can be infringed (Dika M. and Knežević G. 
and Stojanović S., (n 114) 289). The more appropriate rationae personae of this rule should be ‘… the person 
against whom the recognition is sought…’. See also Kramberger Škerl J., Javni red pri priznanju in izvršitvi tujih 
sodnih odločb, (n 108) 266). 
170 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 287 
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PIL act of 1982.  
 The legal obstacle provided in Article 96 of the Slovenian PILP act against the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judicial decision represents a negative condition and 
the Court examines it upon objection by the party.171 The second paragraph represents a 
presumption according to which the decision which was rendered in a process that consists of 
a violation of the rights of defense of the party against whom the recognition and enforcement 
is sought. Article 96(2) consists several in concreto ‘scenarios’ that have to exist in case a 
defense based on this provision is raised. The first type of scenarios refer to specific situations 
where the summons, the document or the ruling instituting the proceedings, was not served 
upon the person against whom enforcement is sought. The second type of scenarios is regarding 
the situations where service in personam was not even tried. However, from the second 
sentence of the same paragraph it can be concluded that this presumption is rebuttable.172 In 
this case the burden of proof that the person has entertained proceedings on the merits in first 
instance shifts to the person who applied for recognition and enforcement.173 
 In the PIL act of Macedonia, the Slovenian approach was followed. However the in 
concreto scenarios were broadened with other scenarios such as’…if service in person was not 
even tried…’ aspect, but with difference in respect to the reference to the law according to  
which the service needs to be conducted,174 which is contained in the PIL act of Macedonia.175 
The Montenegrin PIL act contains a very similar rule, but it differs slightly by specifically 
referring to the scenario where the right of the defense was obstructed or denied to the party by 
not producing enough time for the preparation for the proceedings.176 The Bulgarian PIL act 
contains a more general rule where as a requirement for the protection of the right of defense, 
the defendant needs to be served with a copy of the statement of action, the parties need to be 
duly summoned and the fundamental principles of Bulgarian law related to defense of the 
parties must not be compromised.177 However, the defendant in the proceedings for recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judicial decision cannot invoke this violation if he could have raised 
it before the foreign court.178 The Belgian PIL act contains merely a general rule that the right 
                                                 
171 Wedam Lukić D., Priznanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb v Republiki Sloveniji, Pravni letopis, Inštitut za 
primerjalno pravo, Ljubljana, (2011) 135-136.  
172Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 291. 
173 ibid. 
174 ‘…in a way provided by the law on procedure of the State in which the decision was rendered…’ Article 103 
of the PIL act of Macedonia. 
175Article 103 (2) of the PIL act of Macedonia. 
176Article 143 (2) of the PIL act of Montenegro. 
177Article 117 (2) of the Bulgarian PIL act. 
178Article 120 (2) of the Bulgarian PIL act. This rule is based on Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. Similar 
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of defense must not be violated.179 The Serbian Draft PIL act contains the most detailed rule, 
providing for several safeguards to the ‘right of defense’ provided to the parties.180 It starts 
with a slight variation of Article 88 (2) of the PIL Act of 1982 and provides that  
The party had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings:  
- if the summons, the document or other act instituting the proceedings were not served upon him in 
person and if service in person was not even tried, except when the person pleaded to the merits of 
the plaintiff’s claim in the first instance procedure. 
 The next aspect refers to the cases where the party had been deprived of real possibility 
in the proceedings leading to the rendering of the decision to present his/her views. Following 
this scenario, the Serbian Draft PIL Act provides that the ‘right of defense’ (similarly to the 
Montenegrin aspect) covers the proper time for the preparation of its position and arguments, 
but also specifies the timeframe – from the time of the service of the act instituting the 
proceedings until the first hearing. Lastly, the Serbian PIL draft provides that the ‘right of 
defense’ also covers personal service to the party that didn’t participate in the proceedings and 
service in person was not even tried.181 
 The right of every person to have a fair trial is a universal right.182 Moreover, the 
protection of this right is extended in the exequatur procedures. The respect of fair trial in the 
country of origin as a prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign decision 
represents a common standard in the national PIL acts and in the international agreements and 
EU Regulations.183 This ‘universal’ aspect of the protection of the right of a fair trial is 
inseparably connected to the duties imposed by the ECHR (namely Article 6(1)).184According 
to the practice of the ECtHR, countries are obliged, before authorizing an enforcement, to 
consider if the parties had been able to have a fair trial in the Country of Origin.185 However, a 
                                                 
rule is also provided in Article 45 (b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Slovenia doesn’t contain similar rule and de 
lege ferenda should provide for such rule.  
179Article 25(2) of the Belgian PIL act. 
180Article 185 (e) of the PIL draft act of Serbia. 
181Article 185 (e) of the PIL draft act of Serbia. 
182 Article 6(1) of the ECHR states: 
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in 
the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or 
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court 
in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice’. 
183 Text to n 652 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.4.2 and text to n 763 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.2.2.3.   
184 Fawcett J.J., The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ), vol. 56, (2007) 5. 
185 Pellegrini v. Italy, [2001] ECHR Rep. VIII 369, although this case raised more questions than answers in 
particular regarding the standards of Article 6(1) of the ECHR which should be applied in cases regarding 
recognition and enforcement, see Kiestra R.L, (n 33) 254-259. 
261 
 
certain ambiguity exists in terms of how this right can be protected. In cases of recognition and 
enforcement in connection with Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the foreign judgments which contain 
some procedural deficiencies, which result in infringement the right of a fair trial, could be 
denied recognition and/or enforcement upon the conditions of public policy and upon the right 
of defense.186 Krombach case187 influenced the national legal systems in the manner that in the 
EU it determined the content of (procedural) public policy by a direct reference to Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and to the CJEU’s case-law.188 Prior to Krombach, 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR was used by German Courts as guidance on the question of proper 
service.189 Thus, such overlapping is a consequence of the broad content of the public policy 
exception, which covers procedural and substantive issues, among which Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR is unavoidable.190 Therefore the understanding of the interconnection between these two 
defenses (public policy and the right of defense) must be provided in a deductive manner (from 
general to specific) where the public policy exception can deal with other aspects which do not 
arise from, for example deficient service, and can have much more broader meanings.  
 In Slovenia the manifest infringement of procedural rights in the country of origin can 
be denied under Article 96 of the PILP act of Slovenia (the right of defense, which is provided 
upon objection by the parties) or under Article 100 (public policy which the court determines 
ex officio).However, there is no clear answer to the question which of these two defenses can 
be applied in certain cases.191In other countries the situation is similar. For example, in 
Germany, some authors state that manifest infringement of procedural rights in the country of 
origin can be covered by the public policy defense ex offcio by the German court.192 Moreover 
the jurisprudence of the Slovenian courts does not provide a precise answer to this question. 
The Slovenian courts have used the ‘public policy’ or the ‘procedural public policy’ defense ex 
officio for situations which could be covered under Article 96; however in all of these cases the 
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accessed 5 May 2016, 13. More on this issue see, Kramberger Škerl J., European Public Policy (With an Emphasis 
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parties also have raised an objection.193 
 During the course of the recognition and enforcement procedure in Slovenia,194 these 
two conditions (public policy and right of defense) are not available at the same time. The PILP 
act of Slovenia in Article 109 states that the court determines whether the requirements set out 
in Articles 94 to 107 have been fulfilled. However, during the adoption of this first ruling 
(which later is served to the party against whom recognition is sought) the procedure is 
conducted ex parte and the Court examines only those conditions which can be examined ex 
officio (exclusive jurisdiction, ne bis in idem, public policy and reciprocity).195 In the context 
of the right to a fair trial provided in Article 6(1) of the ECHR, this means that if it possesses 
sufficient information which can be determined from the decision that needs to be recognized 
in Slovenia (for example, if the party against whom recognition is sought was not allowed to 
participate in the proceedings in the country of origin), the Slovenian court should refuse to 
recognize and enforce this foreign decision based on Article 100, that is, on public policy. In 
such cases the overwhelming interest of the basic principles of Legal State (Rechtsstaat), 
among which is certainly the right of a party to participate in a judicial procedure, provides for 
intervention of the courts on their own motion.196 Such position does not preclude the 
possibility, given according to Article 109(3) of the PILP act of Slovenia, of the party against 
whom the recognition is sought appealing the ruling given by the Court if it didn't find any 
obstacles to recognition. The opposing party can invoke Article 96 of the PILP act of Slovenia 
and provide for certain documents, based on which it can claim that its right of defense was 
obstructed or denied because of the irregularities in the Country of origin.  
 In conclusion, de lege ferenda, Article 96 should be amended with the following rule: 
 “The court of the Republic of Slovenia shall refuse the recognition of a foreign judicial 
decision if, upon objection, the person against whom the recognition is sought it has established 
that due to irregularities in the proceedings he had no opportunity to participate in them. 
 In particular, a person against whom a foreign judicial decision was rendered shall be 
considered as having no opportunity to participate in the proceedings if the summons, the 
document or the ruling instituting the proceedings were not served upon him in person or if 
service in person was not even tried, except when the person pleaded to the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim in the first instance procedure. 
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 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) and (2) of this Article, foreign judicial 
decisions shall be recognized, if the party, having no opportunity to participate in the 
proceeding, failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment in the country of origin 
when it was possible for him to do so.” 
 
3.2.3 Existence of final judgment on the same subject matter between the same 
parties or pending concurrent proceedings 
  
 Article 99 of the Slovenian PILP act and Article 90 of the PIL act of 1982 are identical. 
These rules are modeled to protect the national legal system against irreconcilable judgments 
rendered in other legal systems on same subject matter (between same parties). As was the case 
with the other legal obstacles for recognition and enforcement, Article 99 is also given as a 
negative one, meaning that a foreign judicial decision shall not be recognized if the court or 
another authority in Slovenia rendered a final decision on the same matter or if another foreign 
judicial decision rendered on the same matter was recognized in Slovenia.197 The court shall 
stay recognition of a foreign judicial decision in the cases when, before a Slovenian court, 
proceedings in the same legal matter and between the same parties, which were instituted 
earlier, are still pending until the judgment in these proceedings become final.198 The 
determination of the existence of this legal obstacle is ex officio. 
 Such a position of this Article refers to two different procedural situations. The first 
paragraph is referring to cases where in Slovenia the courts have already rendered a final 
judicial decision regarding the same matter or a foreign judicial decision has already been 
recognized in Slovenia when a request for recognition is made. The second paragraph of the 
same Article is referring to cases where Slovenian courts have seized jurisdiction and 
proceedings are ongoing when request for recognition is made. 
 There are some specifics which must be observed regarding these two situations 
provided in Article 99 of the Slovenian PILP act. Firstly, the time is not of the essence in the 
first situation, while in the second situation the time when the proceedings were initiated gives 
priority to the proceedings. In the first situation, even if the proceedings in the foreign state had 
been initiated earlier, if the judicial decision of the Slovenian courts is final, then nevertheless 
these court still has to refuse to recognize the foreign judicial decision. With this, the finality 
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of the decision rendered from the national legal system has priority over earlier lis pendens in 
front of a foreign court.199 Such position is based on the ne bis in idem principle and the party 
requesting recognition cannot recognize the foreign decision because in the Slovenian legal 
system there is already a judicial decision on the same subject matter (and between the same 
parties).200 Article 99 also extends to a foreign judicial decision which has been recognized 
prior to when the request for recognition of another judicial decision on the same matter (and 
between the same parties) is filed. This aspect is logical and derives from Article 94 of the PILP 
act of Slovenia, where a foreign judicial decision (a court settlement or decision of another 
authority with judicial prerogatives) which underwent the procedure for recognition and is 
recognized in Slovenia is equivalent to a judicial decision of a Slovenian court. On the other 
hand, the party with a legal interest could have prevented such an outcome if it timely requested 
the Slovenian court to stay the proceedings,201 because proceedings involving the same matter 
and between the same parties are pending before a foreign court.202 
 In the second situation (where proceedings on the same subject matter and between the 
same parties are still pending in front of Slovenian courts) the prior tempori potior iure 
principle applies. Therefore, when the interested party has requested a recognition of a foreign 
judicial decision in front of the Slovenian courts, but proceedings on the same matter and 
between the same parties were instituted earlier in front of the Slovenian courts, then the 
recognizing court will stay the proceedings until the judgment becomes final. If the Slovenian 
court renders final judgment, then the request for recognition will be refused based on the fact 
that there is a final judgment on the same matter (Article 99 (1) of the PILP act of RS). This 
rule is intended to have a moderate retorsion character towards the foreign court which did not 
take into consideration the earlier seizing of the jurisdiction of the Slovenian court on the same 
matter.203 
 Secondly, as was stated, Article 99 of the Slovenian PILP act is identical to Article 90 
of the PIL act of 1982. However, several inconsistences are present in this Article. As can be 
seen from the wording of Article 99, paragraphs (1) and (2) defer in the aspect of the identity 
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of the legal matter.204 While Article 99(1) of the Slovenian PILP act refers only to ‘… a final 
decision on the same matter…’Article 99(2) of the Slovenian PILP act speaks of ‘… 
proceedings in the same legal matter and between the same parties…’ This obvious 
inconsistency could lead to differentiation in the elements which would be necessary to prove 
for determining the identity of the legal matter. While in the first paragraph only an objective 
element would be necessary to prove the identity of the legal matter, for the second paragraph 
it would be necessary to prove objective and the subjective elements. However, to properly 
determine the identity of the legal matter, the judicial decision must be consistent in the 
objective element (same subject matter) and subjective element (between the same parties). 
That is why in the determination of the identity of the legal matter the objective and the 
subjective element in both paragraphs of Article 99 must be applied.205 
 The second inconsistency which was largely debated regarding Article 90 (2) of the PIL 
act of 1982 is the different understanding of the situation when the proceedings are initiated, 
or when is the relevant moment in time when the proceedings are considered to be being 
instituted.206 One understanding was that the relevant time is the filing of the initial act (the 
lawsuit) to the court.207Another understanding was that Article 90(2) was referring to the 
moment when the procedure is individualized by service of the lawsuit to the defendant.208It 
also was debated whether the understanding should be only according to lex fori or should the 
foreign law be taken into consideration.209 It is evident that the moment when the proceedings 
are initiated differs among the countries. It is also accepted that the national courts apply their 
own procedural laws. The Slovenian Civil Procedure law accepts the understanding that the 
proceedings are initiated when the lawsuit is serviced to the defendant.210 Also, if we compare 
Articles 99 and 88 of the Slovenian PILP act, Article 88 is referring to ‘process/procedure 
(postopek)’ while Article 99 is referring to ‘proceedings (pravda)’. These two distinct 
procedural moments are different and in the context of the Article, the initiation of the 
proceedings can occur differently in different countries. The relevant moment when the 
proceedings are considered to be initiated in Slovenia is the moment when the lawsuit was 
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served to the defendant. This approach cannot be applied to determine the moment when the 
proceedings were initiated in another country because it can provide for erroneous situations 
or create procedural rights and obligations which were not created in the country in question. 
This moment can be determined only by the law of that country.211 
 Thirdly, although there are not specific references in the Article, the application of 
Article 99 of the Slovenian PILP act extends to decisions from other authorities and not just 
only to judicial authorities. This can be concluded from Article 94 which gives broader meaning 
to the term ‘judicial decision’.  
 The Macedonian PIL act212 and the Montenegrin PIL act213 provided for the same 
solution as the Slovenian PILP act. The systematization of this rule in the Bulgarian PIL Act214 
and the Serbian draft of the PIL act215differs slightly. The rule provided in Article 117 (3) of 
the Bulgarian PIL act regarding the identity of the legal matter is the broadest because it covers 
not only legal matters between same parties in the same subject matter but also refers to the 
same facts. In this aspect, the Serbian rule refers only to the same parties and regarding the 
same subject. Nevertheless, the effect is the same regarding a decision which was rendered by 
the national court: this decision will have priority over the foreign judicial decision 
disrespectfully which proceedings were instituted earlier. On the other hand, when in front of 
the national court (Bulgarian and Serbian) a foreign judicial decision is irreconcilable with 
other foreign judicial decisions, then the time plays important role. In the Serbian case, the 
judgments which were first rendered in proceedings instituted earlier and fulfills the 
requirements for recognition in Serbia has priority over the other decision which recognition is 
sought. The Bulgarian rule provides that foreign judicial decisions will be recognized in 
Bulgaria if no proceedings based on the same facts, involving the same cause of action between 
the same parties, are brought before Bulgarian Court earlier than a case instituted before the 
foreign court in the matter of which judgment recognition is sought and the enforcement is 
applied has been rendered.216 The Bulgarian PIL act does not refer to the conduct of the 
Bulgarian Court when the first instituted concurrent proceedings have not been finished in 
Bulgaria. The Serbian PIL draft act contains provision which states that the Serbian Court will 
stay the proceedings regarding recognition and enforcement until the decision in the 
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proceedings on the same subject matter between the same parties becomes final.217 
 In conclusion, de lege ferenda Article 99 of the PILP act of Slovenia should be amended 
with the following rule: 
 “A foreign judicial decision shall not be recognized if the court or another authority of 
the Republic of Slovenia rendered a final decision on the same legal matter and between the 
same parties or if another foreign judicial decision rendered on the same legal matter and 
between the same parties was recognized in Republic of Slovenia. 
 The Court shall stay the recognition of a foreign judicial decision in cases when before 
the court of the Republic of Slovenia proceedings in the same legal matter and between the 
same parties, which were instituted earlier, are still pending, until the judgment in these 
proceedings becomes final.” 
3.2.4 Public Policy 
 
 Public policy as a condition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisionsby now is universally recognized.218This is not something new. In the famous decision 
of the Boll case219Judge Lauterpacht in his separate opinion stated: 
[I]n the sphere of private international law the exception of ordre public, of public policy, as a reason for 
the exclusion of foreign law in a particular case is generally – or, rather, universally – recognized. (…) 
On the whole, the result is the same in most countries – so much that the recognition of the part of ordre 
public must be regarded as a general principle of law in the field of private international law.220 
 This position is not different in Slovenia, where courts, when deciding upon recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions, are restricted only to examining the requirements 
provided in Articles 94-107 of the Slovenian PILP act.221Therefore it can be stated that Slovenia 
adopts the contrôle limite system for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions.222 This system provides that Slovenian Courts can only inspect the requirements 
provided by law and they only refer generally to procedural aspects.223 The Courts do not 
entertain analysis on whether the Court of origin rightfully determined the applicable law or 
whether it rightfully ascertained the factual situation. As it is now a well-established principle 
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in the EU PIL law,224 the Court of recognition (enforcement) cannot review the foreign 
judgment as to the substance. With it, the revision au fond of the foreign judgment in Slovenia 
is prohibited.225 However, courts are given a certain limited authorization to inspect the merits 
of the decision for the sole purpose of determining whether there are some elements in the 
decision226 which could effectively collide with the Slovenian public policy.227 
 The conformity of the foreign judicial decision with domestic public policy is 
determined in two aspects. Firstly, the conformity of the foreign judicial decision is determined  
having in mind the decision as a whole with all of its elements, meaning when analyzing the 
foreign judgment the courts are not only limited to the dispositive of the judgment but also they 
carry out a more comprehensive approach with incorporated explanations and other procedural 
aspects of the judgments.228 With this approach, the public policy exemption incorporates 
substantive and procedural public policy.229 Secondly, the interpretation of the public policy 
test must be provided very restrictively, only as a last resort when the lack of its application 
would result in consequences that would prove unbearable for the domestic legal order.230 This 
means that the foreign judicial decision shall not be recognized if the effect of the recognition 
thereof is contrary to the Slovenian public policy. The predecessor of this rule, Article 91 of 
the PIL act of 1982, had a more extensive solution, according to which the foreign judicial 
decision was not recognized in SFRY if it was in collision with of the basic principles of the 
civil order determined by the Constitution of SFRY. Generally, this provided for broader 
implementation of the public policy requirement where all of the foreign decisions which were 
in a way maleficent to the public policy (in that time it had the legal construction ‘in collision 
with of the basic principles of the civil order determined by Constitution of SFRY’) would not 
be recognized and enforced in SFRY. This produced broadening of the position and the goal of 
the public policy exemption.231 
 The position of Article 100 of PILP act of Slovenia is different.232 It accepts Lagarde’s 
understanding that the legal norm of the foreign law does not by itself confront the domestic 
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legal order itself, but only in correlation with concrete aspects of the domestic legal order. This 
means that the goal of the public policy is to ‘remove the incoherency’ in the interconnection 
of the foreign and domestic legal orders.233 Such an understanding of the public policy 
exception provides that the infringement must be in the context that the foreign legal norm by 
itself does not violate the public policy but only the effect of the foreign decision that it creates 
in context.234 
 Public policy has very broad meaning and its interpretation varies according to the 
national legal systems. Its scope and contents depend on the manner in which an individual 
state values its interests.235 This means that public policy or ordre public in Private International 
Law and Procedure can be understood as the sum of the values on which the legal, social and 
cultural order of a particular country depend and which must also be complied with  in the so-
called relationships with an international element.236 Generally there are two distinct 
methodological approaches in the determination of the content and the boundaries of public 
policy: the first provides for one abstract definition and the second follows a more detailed 
enumeration and listing of the legal norms that make up public policy.237 Today, most countries 
and legal orders follow the first approach.238 
 Slovenia in its PILP act does not contain a definition of public policy, but it states that 
the effect of the law (or the decision) must not be contrary to the Slovenian public policy.239 
Such a provision creates certain problems, namely, from this statement it cannot be concluded 
whether the content of the public policy refers to the substantive issues or the procedural issues. 
The PILP act of Slovenia does not specifically refer to ‘procedural public policy’ and neither  
did its predecessor, the PIL act of 1982, but as today this  category is globally recognized,  it is 
assumed that  it is also applicable in Slovenia.240 Another problem regarding ‘public policy’ is 
the correlation with Article 96 (right of defense) which was referred to earlier.241 
 The mere determination of ‘public policy’ is left to the courts (and relevant authorities) 
in the process of the application of the private international law rules.242 The Supreme Court of 
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the Republic of Slovenia has in several cases243 referred to the question of the content of public 
policy. In the II Ips 462/2009 case, the Supreme Court had held that: 
 The basic legal principles of domestic law, i.e. those on which the domestic legal order is 
founded and indirectly form the framework of public order, consist of: (i) legal norms: constitutional 
principles, basic principles arising from laws, basic principles of the legal order of the Council of Europe, 
European Communities and international agreements adopted to guarantee the minimum standard of 
legal protection, all with the restriction which prevents the institute of the recognition of a foreign judicial 
decision to fail: not every cogent (forced) regulation is a part of public order, only those where  violation  
would threaten the legal and moral integrity of the domestic legal system; (ii) international customary 
law; (iii) basic moral principles, and (iv) vital economic, political … interests of the state.244 
 The Supreme Court went even further by dividing the public policy into substantive 
and procedural public policy.245 Regarding the content of procedural public policy,246 the 
Supreme Court provided that procedural public policy is consisted of  
[c]onstitutional principles, the fundamental principles of individual legal branches, the fundamental 
principles of EU law, the principles derived from international treaty law, in particular the Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Official Gazette of RS, Nos. 33/94, no. 
7/94, ECHR), customary international law and basic moral principles.’  
 In this same decision the Supreme Court had held that it recognizes the abolition of the 
revision of the foreign court decision in its merits, however the Court must ascertain the 
substantive effect of the decision that would be derived from the recognition (substantive public 
policy) and the procedure by which the decision was adopted in the country of origin 
(procedural public policy).247 In this context the Supreme Court defined that the Slovenian 
procedural public policy represents:  
[t]he right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR), some constitutional rights (the right to appeal - Article 25 of 
the Constitution, the right to use its own language of Article 62 of the Constitution) and fundamental 
principles of Slovenian civil litigation.248 
 The Supreme Court also has addressed the issue of the incorporation of the ‘European 
public policy’ in its national concept of public policy.249 In II Ips 462/2009 case the Court held 
that European public policy is part of the Slovenian international public policy.250 The 
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understanding of what Slovenian international public policy is consisted of had been referred 
to in two previous decisions.251 In the decision of the Cpg 3/2003 case the Supreme Court held 
that international public policy  
[d]oes not include all mandatory provisions of domestic law, but only those imperative legal norms and 
moral rules, the violation of which would jeopardize the legal and moral integrity of the Slovenian legal 
order.252 
 From this standpoint regarding international public policy, the Supreme Court 
broadened or gave an additional element to the Slovenian international public policy as a 
consequence of the membership of Slovenia in the EU and the Council of Europe with the 
 [l]egal sources of these organizations (community and convention public policy which are constituting 
the so-called European public policy).253 
 Following this position, the Court then gave instructions that: 
Within the national public order the elements arising from the European legal sources also have to be 
protected, which means (i) that the courts have to reject the recognition of a foreign judicial decision, 
even if it is not contrary to the public order of their state, but  is contrary to the common values, and (ii) 
that the courts can no longer reject the recognition of a foreign court judgement, if it is contrary to their 
public order, however from the ‘European perspective,’ this rejection would not be justified or 
proportional.254  
 Although the public policy has its own national characteristics regarding the structure 
of the rule, the PIL act of Macedonia uses the same wording as the rule provided in the PILP 
act of RS.255  The Serbian PIL draft act contains a much broader rule.256 First, it specifies that 
the foreign decision must not be obviously contrary to Serbian public policy. Following this 
position, it states that the relation between the legal relationship and the connection of the forum 
(Inlandsbezeiehnung) plays an important role together with the significance of the 
consequences which would result from the recognition of the foreign decision. The Bulgarian 
PIL act contains a much simpler rule regarding the public policy criterion.257 It just insists that 
the recognition and enforcement should not be contrary to Bulgarian public policy. The 
Montenegrin PIL act has provided for a similar rule as the Slovenian one where the requirement 
is that the foreign judicial decision will not be recognized in Montenegro if the effects of its 
recognition would be contrary to Montenegrin public policy.258 It is considered that this rule 
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 The historical and doctrinal principles upon which recognition and enforcement are 
based are comity260 and reciprocity.261 The main idea behind the principle of reciprocity is that 
‘…states will and should grant others recognition of judicial decisions only if, and to the extent 
that, their own decisions would be recognized.’262 Such a position is developed to influence 
other States to recognize and enforce other judicial decisions and to enter into international 
conventions that consider recognition and enforcement.263 Today, a large number of States still 
include reciprocity as a condition for recognition and enforcement,264 although some States in 
their recent PIL acts have been abandoning reciprocity.265 
 The SFRY PIL act of 1982 provided for reciprocity as a legal obstacle regarding the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions.266An identical solution was given in 
the Slovenian PILP act in Article 101. With this rule, a foreign judicial decision is not 
recognized in Slovenia if there is no reciprocity.267 However there are three exemptions268 from 
this rule where the (non-) existence of reciprocity is not an obstacle in the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judicial decisions. These three exemptions are referring to judgments 
rendered in 1) matrimonial disputes; 2) disputes relating to establishment and contesting of 
paternity and maternity or 3) cases where the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judicial 
decision is requested by a Slovenian citizen. 
 In the years before the enactment of the PIL act of 1982, reciprocity was the most 
commonly-used legal obstacle based on which domestic courts refused to recognize and 
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enforce foreign judicial decisions.269  The reason for this reliance was the fact that according 
to the legal rules of that time, the existence of reciprocity needed to be proved in each case.270 
According to Article 92(3) of the PIL act of 1982 (Article 101(3) of the Slovenian PILP act), 
there is a presumption of existence of reciprocity until the contrary is proved. The question is, 
which kind of reciprocity is needed to be present so this condition is satisfied? 
 In legal theory, there is consensus that formal reciprocity cannot be called upon to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 101 of Slovenian PILP act (Article 92 of PIL act of 1982).271 
The reason for that is because to rely upon formal reciprocity means that there is formal equal 
treatment of foreign and domestic persons regarding some right.272 In the context of recognition 
and enforcement, foreign and domestic judicial decisions would be considered equal and thus 
they cannot undergo the procedure for recognition and enforcement.273 Therefore, substantive 
reciprocity is more appropriate, because it means that a foreign judicial decision will be 
processed in the same way as a domestic judicial decisions are processed in the country of the 
origin of the judicial decision which is to be recognized.274 
 However, when it comes to the question of whether to insist on diplomatic, factual or 
legal reciprocity, the legal doctrine is not so unanimous. It is considered that factual reciprocity 
suffices275 and also that diplomatic reciprocity is present in a number of international 
agreements.276 Nevertheless, questions have been raised on the assumption of factual 
reciprocity. The first question is whether the court can determine the existence of reciprocity 
upon its own motion. Article 101 (3) of the Slovenian PILP act stipulates that there is a 
presumption on the existence of reciprocity until proven differently and that if the court has 
doubts about reciprocity an explanation can then be given by the ministry competent for justice. 
At first glimpse, this rule positions the court in a ‘passive’ role, in that if there is no objection 
from the other party (the party against whom recognition is sought) then reciprocity exists.277 
However, courts have also ‘active’ prerogatives and can determine whether reciprocity exists 
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irrespective of the parties’ behavior, and whether this means that they will ask the ministry 
competent for justice.  
 The second question refers to the situation whether the factual existence of reciprocity 
needs to be in concreto (that a judicial decision coming from the state of recognition is 
recognized and enforced in the state of origin) or in abstracto (that a judicial decision cannot 
be recognized in state of origin). It is considered that in abstracto evidence is sufficient to prove 
that factual reciprocity does not exist and consequently that a judicial decision from the country 
of origin cannot be recognized in the country of recognition.278 This means for example that 
the existence of a rule that is conditioned279 and that if it’s expected that the foreign judicial 
decision would not meet such requirements (the defendant does not have domicile in 
Switzerland), then reciprocity does not exist and thus reciprocity represents a legal obstacle in 
the recognition and enforcement of the decision.  
 In the new PIL acts, there is no consensus on the question whether there is a need for 
the existence of reciprocity as a legal obstacle in the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judicial decisions.280 The Bulgarian, Macedonian and the Montenegrin PIL acts have 
completely abandoned this requirement for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions. On the other hand, the Serbian draft PIL act provides for partial abandonment. 
Specifically, in this act, reciprocity as a requirement for recognition and enforcement is 
abandoned in legal relations regarding personal status, family matters and succession, while it 
is still applicable in relations regarding rights in rem, shares and securities, intellectual 
property, and contractual and non-contractual relations.281 
 Countries strive for gaining recognition of their sovereignty and larger availability of 
rights for their nationals in another country. This fact serves as a basis for reciprocity as a 
condition for recognition and enforcement. However, in situations where the speed, reliability 
and the protection of individual procedural guarantees provide for more effective access to 
justice, the protection of national sovereignty is gradually losing importance. The availability 
of foreign rights today is achieved through increased cooperation between the countries and 
                                                 
278Živković M. and Stanivuković M. (n 8) 404 
279 For example, one scenario in Article 149 of the Swiss PIL Act provides that Foreign decisions relating to a 
right pertaining to the law of obligations shall be recognized in Switzerland if the decision pertains to a contractual 
obligation, was rendered in the State of performance of the characteristic obligation and the defendant was not 
domiciled in Switzerland.  
280 Countries which have abandoned reciprocity: Switzerland (1986), Venezuela (1998), Lithuania (2002), 
Bulgaria (2005), Macedonia (2007), Poland (2008) Montenegro (2014) and Spain (2015). Countries which still 
maintain reciprocity in their PIL: Tunisia (1998), Slovenia (1999), Turkey (2007) Romania (2013) and Czech 
Republic (2013). 
281Article 185 (3) of the Serbian draft PIL act. 
275 
 
through a large number of bi- and multilateral agreements. In such circumstances, reciprocity 
as a condition for recognition and enforcement can be considered as a residue of a certain 
period where an increased emphasis on national sovereignty was present.   
 
4. Rules for recognition of the status of persons 
 The Slovenian PILP act in Article 102 contains rules that refer to the personal status of 
a person who possesses the nationality (citizenship) of the country of origin of the judgment 
that is to be recognized in Slovenia. A foreign judicial decision referring to the personal status 
of a citizen of the State in which it was rendered shall be recognized in the Slovenia without 
examination according to Articles 97, 100 and 101 of the Slovenian PILP act (exclusive 
jurisdiction, public policy and reciprocity).282 This rule is largely 283 identical to Article 94 (1) 
of the PIL act of 1982.284 It had a particular ratio that there are no solid arguments to maintain 
regular control of the foreign decision because in most cases there wouldn’t be exclusive 
jurisdiction of the domestic courts, where the power to determine the personal status of citizens 
should be confined to each country and that the goal of reciprocity (to protect its own domestic 
citizens) in these cases does not apply.285 Nevertheless, there is not an absolute abolition of 
exequatur, but only of the requirements provided in Articles 97, 100 and 101. The other 
requirements, the finality of the decision (Article 95 of the Slovenian PILP act), res judicata 
and lis alibi pendes effects (Article 99 of the Slovenian PILP act), right of defense (Article 96 
of the Slovenian PILP act), exorbitant jurisdiction of the court of country of origin and violation 
of the agreement on the jurisdiction of the Slovenian Court (Article 98 of the Slovenian PILP 
act) are to be controlled by the relevant authorities. It is understandable that the requirements 
provided in Articles 95, 96 and 99 of the Slovenian PILP act are protected. These rules provided 
for control of the identity and the properties of the decision (Article 95), the elemental right of 
defense (Article 96) and the authority of the domestic legal system (Article 99).286 
Nevertheless, the safeguard of the requirements provided in Article 98 seems to be less obvious, 
especially when the threshold of exclusive jurisdiction is not examined in these cases and when 
the prorogation of the jurisdiction seems illogical. The approach taken in Article 102 of the 
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Slovenian PILP act seems to be an incorporation of Article 94 of the PIL act of 1982 by analogy 
and that brought an omission by the lawmaker which resulted a non-exclusion of Article 98 
from the group of requirements that are not controlled.287 
 Article 102(2) of the Slovenian PILP act provides that if in the opinion of the competent 
authority of Republic of Slovenia, the decision of a foreign court refers to the personal status 
of a Slovenian citizen, the recognition of that decision shall be subject to examination according 
to the provisions of Article 95 to 101 of the Slovenian PILP act. . This rule is identical to Article 
94(2) of the PIL act of 1982. It was considered that this rule in the PIL act of 1982 was 
unnecessary because it was redundant-- that the relevant authority would nevertheless conduct 
full control under the PIL act even when there wouldn’t be specific requirement of it doing so 
under a particular rule.288 The real meaning of this rule represents the fact it highlights, that in 
cases when a foreign judicial decision refers to a foreign and domestic (Slovenian) citizen, the 
decision would be treated as a decision referring to a Slovenian citizen and with that, it would 
undergo full control according to the requirements provided in Articles 95 to 101 of the 
Slovenian PILP act.289 
  
5. Types of procedures and courses of action (proceedings) for the 
recognition of foreign judicial decisions  
5.1. Types of procedures 
 
 The procedure for the recognition of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia is a special, 
non-contentious procedure.290 Such a conclusion can be drawn directly from Article 111 of the 
PILP act of Slovenia, where it is stated that if it’s not otherwise provided in the PILP act, then 
the rules of the Non-Litigious Civil Procedure Act apply together with the rules for recognition 
of foreign judicial awards in the PILP act. The consequence of this rule is that, for all the issues 
of the procedure which are not covered by the rules provided in the PILP act, the rules of the 
Non- Litigious Civil Procedure Act are applicable.291Nevertheless, any court may decide about 
the recognition of a foreign judicial decision as a preliminary question but with an effect 
                                                 
287 The requirements provided in Article 98 of the PILP act of RS did not exist as requirements in PIL act of 1982 
which may be a logical explanation why the law maker made such omission.   
288 Dika M. and Knežević G. and Stojanović S., (n 114) 314-315 
289 ibid. 
290 Wedam Lukić D., Priznanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb v Republiki Sloveniji, (n 171) 136. 
291 According to Article 37 of the Non-Litigious Civil Procedure Act, for all the issues which are not covered with 
this act, the rules of the Civil Procedure Act apply.  
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referring only to that particular procedure.292 The territorial jurisdiction over a recognition of a 
foreign judicial decision lies with the court having substantive jurisdiction.293 Regarding the 
enforcement of foreign judicial decisions, the territorial jurisdiction lies with the district court 
in the territory where the execution is to be carried out.294 The rules for the course of action 
regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions in Slovenia are provided 
in the PILP act of Slovenia in Articles 108 to 111.  
 Another peculiar aspect regarding the procedure for recognition in Slovenia is that it is 
envisaged as a ‘delibazione’ procedure (delebacijski postopek).295 The basic characteristic of 
this type of procedure is that the party against whom recognition (enforcement) is sought is an 
active participant in the process envisaged as a procedure that is contradictory to all of the legal 
remedies available in those kinds of circumstances.296 Against the decision of the Slovenian 
district court, a legal remedy is available and in such situations there is an adversarial procedure 
at the same court. This decision can also be appealed with another legal remedy which is 
provided; that is, an appeal to the Supreme Court.297 
 
5.2. Courses of action (proceedings) for the recognition of foreign judicial decisions 
 
 The procedure for recognition and enforcement in Slovenia can be divided into three 
stages which are similar to the systematization provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
(Brussels I Regulation).298 The first stage is the ex parte procedure, which is completed without 
the participation of the person against whom the recognition/enforcement is sought.299 Firstly, 
the procedure for the recognition of a foreign judicial decision is instituted upon application.300 
In matters referring to personal status, recognition may be sought by anyone that has legal 
interest.301 This first stage of the recognition is adjudicated by a single judge of a district 
court.302 This court, after considering the formal requirements (submission together with the 
application of the foreign judicial decision, or an authenticated copy, and the certificate of a 
                                                 
292 Article 108(6) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
293 Article 108(4) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
294 Article 108(5) of the Slovenian PILP act 
295 Wedam Lukić D., Civilno Izvršilno Pravo,(n 7) 9. 
296 Гавроска П., Дескоски Т., Меѓународно приватно право, Скопје, (2011), 472 
297 Galič A., The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia, (n 40) 271. 
298 ibid. 
299Article 109(1) of the PILP act. 
300Article 108(1) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
301Article 108(2) of the Slovenian PILP act. 
302Article 108(3) PILP act of RS 
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competent foreign court or another authority on the finality of the  decision under the law of 
the State in which the decision was rendered), and those which it determines ex officio 
(exclusive jurisdiction of Slovenian courts,  the final judgment between the same parties on the 
same subject matter, public policy and reciprocity) if it finds that there are no obstacles to 
recognition, adopts a ruling on recognition of the  foreign decision.303 
 As was previously stated, one of the main characteristics of the first stage of the 
procedure is that is conducted ex parte. Such a position of the procedure serves the purpose of 
having the element of surprise, which is necessary in a later enforcement procedure if the 
respondent is not to have the opportunity of withdrawing his assets from any measure of 
enforcement.304 This aspect of ‘surprise’ is less important in family matters, with some 
exceptions in child abduction cases.305 
 After this stage, the ruling on recognition is served by the Court upon the opposite party 
and/or upon other parties in the proceedings in which the foreign judicial decision was rendered 
with the instruction that an appeal can be filed within fifteen days of service.306There is one 
exception to this second stage of the procedure that is particularly important for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign decisions in family matters. In situations regarding divorce, the 
Court shall not serve the ruling on recognition of a foreign judicial decision relating to divorce 
upon the opposite party if the person applying for recognition is a Slovenian national and the 
opposite party has neither domicile nor temporary residence in Slovenia.307 
 The appeal against this first stage ruling is dealt by the same district Court (the Court 
that has adopted the ruling on recognition) but now in a chamber of three judges.308 In this 
stage, the Court can rule if the decision on the appeal depends on disputable facts, after a court 
hearing.309It must be stated that this adversarial hearing is not obligatory and the court can 
decide whether to hold this hearing if it finds it necessary. Nevertheless, whether it holds an 
adversarial hearing or if the court decides only according to the submissions by both of the 
parties, the principle of ‘equality of arms’ in the PILP act of Slovenia is provided and the 
opposing party can appeal the ruling on recognition in a way that is limited only to the 
                                                 
303Article 109(2) of the PILP act of RS. 
304 Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
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conditions provided in the PILP act of RS.  
 The third stage of this procedure is conducted in front of the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Slovenia. Against the court that refused the application for recognition and against 
the court ruling as to appeal, an appeal to the Supreme Court is permissible.310 The costs of the 
procedure are determined by the court in accordance with the rules that would be applicable if 
the matter were governed by the court or another authority of the Republic of Slovenia.311 
 When it comes to the enforcement of foreign judicial decisions, as was stated, territorial 
jurisdiction lies with the district court in the territory in which the enforcement or execution is 
to be carried out.312 However, in the cases regarding the recognition of a foreign judicial 
decision where a special procedure has not been instituted, any court may decide on the 
recognition as on a preliminary ruling, for example if the party refers on that question to the 
court having jurisdiction as to the enforcement. This court can decide on the recognition as a 
preliminary matter but only to the effect of that procedure.313 However, this does not preclude 
that on the request of the party, the recognition of the foreign judgment can be decided also as 
a main question, especially in the cases when the party fears that another enforcement will be 
necessary on the basis of the same decision.314 
 Generally, with slight modifications, these type of procedures are provided in the PIL 
acts of Macedonia,315 Montenegro316and the draft PIL act of Serbia.317The first stage is the ex 
parte procedure, the second stage is the participation of the party against whom enforcement 
is sought, and the third stage is an appeal to the higher court. 
  
6. The enforcement of decisions concerning custody and the right of access 
in Slovenia 
 
 The enforcement of judgments concerning custody and judgments on rights of access 
is contained in the Enforcement of Judgments and Protective Measures Act (Zakon o izvršbi in 
zavarovanju).318 In Articles 238a to 238g, there are contained rules that provide for two 
methods in which the execution of judgments relating to custody and judgments on rights of 
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access are carried out. The first method is indirect coercion, by which the parent that holds the 
child must, upon a judicial decision, hand over the child. If the parent does not do so, then 
financial penalties are carried out against him/her.319 The second method of execution of 
judgments concerning custody and judgments on rights of access is direct coercion, by which 
a bailiff physically executes the decision and hands over the child to the person who has the 
custody rights.320 The enforcement of such decisions is effective towards any person who has 
the child.321 Regarding the right of access, the execution of any such decision is primarily 
conducted by indirect coercion (financial penalties), while direct coercion is utilized only in 
exceptional cases.322 
  
                                                 
319 Article 238d of the Enforcement of Judgments and Protective Measures Act. 
320 Article 238e of the Enforcement of Judgments and Protective Measures Act. 
321 Galič A., The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia, (n 40) 268. 
322 Article 238f of the Enforcement of Judgments and Protective Measures Act. 
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Chapter III The recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial 
decisions in family matters from EU Member States in Slovenia 
 
 Slovenia is a Member State of the European Union. In the context of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judicial decisions, this means that two types of rules are applicable by 
the courts. The first set of rules which are applicable towards judicial decisions coming from 
non-EU states are provided in the Slovenian PILP act.323 The second set of rules which are 
applicable towards judicial decisions from EU Members States in specific subject matters 
which are provided in the legal sources of the EU are generally directly applicable in Slovenia 
and replace the Slovenian PILP act.324 
 Accordingly, the Brussels IIbis Regulation is directly applicable in Slovenia, meaning 
that there has been no implementing legislation enacted in Slovenia.325 Specifically, this means 
that the Brussels IIbis Regulation is directly applicable in Slovenia and, with that, for all of the 
issues which are left to the domestic law of the Member States, the relevant Slovenian legal 
sources apply. For these cases, firstly, the issues which fall under the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
are mainly resolved under the Non-Contentious Procedure Act, and secondly, the provisions of 
the Civil Procedure Act apply as a subsidiary legal source. 
 In Slovenia, the jurisdiction for recognition (as an independent proceeding) and for the 
issuing of a declaration of enforceability according to the Brussels IIbis Regulation is confined 
to the district court (Okrožno sodišče).326 Regarding appeal, there are two institutions in 
Slovenia which under the Brussels IIbis Regulation are given jurisdiction to hear the case upon 
appeal. These legal remedies are provided in Article 33 and 34 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation.327 The decision of the district court can be subject to a legal remedy on the basis 
of Article 33 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in front of the same court (district court – Okrožno 
sodišče) and the appealed procedure is envisaged as an adversarial procedure.328 In the course 
of proceedings, this decision can be appealed on the basis of Article 34 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation in front of the Supreme Court (pritožba na Vrhovno sodišče Republike Slovenije). 
In comparison with the procedure provided in the PILP act of the Republic of Slovenia 
                                                 
323 Text to n 90 Part III ch II sec 1. 
324 Wedam Lukić D., Priznanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb v Republiki Sloveniji, (n 171) 134. 
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327 Text to n 547 Part II ch V sec 5.2.1.1.3. 
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regarding recognition of judicial decisions from non-EU states, it can be seen that these two 
courses of actions substantially comply with one another.329 Nevertheless, some differences 
exist. What was novel for the Slovenian legal system was the fact that the institution of 
declaration of enforceability was unfamiliar.330 Specifically, the recognition of foreign judicial 
decisions in Slovenia can also be conducted also as a preliminary question, and this can be 
done by the court having jurisdiction for enforcement, with an effect only for that procedure.331 
From that it can be seen that the previous recognition or declaration of enforceability is not a 
prerequisite for execution in Slovenia.332 
 The procedure for making the application for declaration of enforceability is governed 
by the law of the Member State of enforcement.333 This means that when a foreign judicial 
decision from an EU Member State needs to be enforced in Slovenia the relevant rules of the 
Non-Contentious Procedure Act apply and, as a subsidiary, the rules of the Civil Procedure Act 
also apply. Such an analogy is drawn from the procedure for recognition and enforcement 
provided in the Slovenian PILP act, where the procedure for recognition and enforcement is 
non-contentious.334 Nevertheless, this does not contradict the implementation of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, because it does not infringe on the necessary requirements of the Regulation, 
especially in those provided in Article 33 (3), for a contradictory nature of the procedure for 
appeal. Namely, the district court which has jurisdiction regarding the legal remedy provided 
in Article 33, can (as is also the case in the recognition of foreign decisions from non-EU states) 
in the course of a non-contentious procedure fulfill the legal requirement in Article 33(3) of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation and allow the party to be heard. This is particularly important because 
during the first stage of the proceedings they are conducted as an ex parte procedure, where 
the court inspects the legal requirements for recognition provided in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation without the participation of the other party.335 The right of the party to be heard in 
contradictory proceedings, as is the case in the recognition of non-EU foreign decisions, is 
provided in the stage of appeal where the party against whom enforcement is sought can 
provide for its legal position and therefore  the principle of ‘equality of arms’ is protected. This 
principle is also provided in the Non-Contentious Procedure Act in Article 5, where the Court 
at all times during the course of proceedings is obliged to protect the rights and legal interest 
                                                 
329 Text to n 298 Part III ch II sec 5.2. 
330 Galič A., The impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Slovenia, (n 40) 271. 
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of all participants and with that the right of the party to be heard.336 
 The District Court, composed of a single judge, conducts the procedure and inspects if 
the necessary requirements given in the Brussels IIbis Regulation are fulfilled. Following this 
procedural stage, the ruling is served to the other party (the party from which enforcement is 
sought). In such cases the service is effectuated on the basis of Slovenian law, conducted 
through the Court. For that, the party first submits all of the necessary documents to the Court 
and the Court then serves the documents to the other party.337 The parties can file for legal 
remedy against the decision on the application for a declaration of enforceability on the basis 
of Article 33 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in front of the same court. In this case, again the 
District court composed of a single judge can decide on the appeal.338 In the next stage, on 
appeal according to Article 34 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, the Supreme Court of Republic 
of Slovenia decides. An appeal which is lodged on the basis of Article 342 of the Civil 
Procedure Act is filled in the court of first instance. The time limit for an appeal is 15 days,339 
while the opposing party can respond to the appeal within 8 days.340 
 In the interest of the procedure, Article 30(2) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation provides 
that ‘The applicant must give an address for service within the area of jurisdiction of the court 
applied to. However, if the law of the Member State of enforcement does not provide for the 
furnishing of such an address, the applicant shall appoint a representative ad litem.’ In the case 
of Slovenia, according to Articles 146 and 147 of the Civil Procedure Act, the plaintiff who 
lives in other country, if he does not have an attorney in Slovenia, must, upon filing the action, 
appoint a person authorized to accept the service in Slovenia on his behalf. If the plaintiff does 
not appoint an attorney, or a person to receive service in his/her behalf, the court will appoint 
a temporary representative authorized to accept service, and through him or her it will order 
plaintiff to appoint a person authorized to accept the service within a specified period of time. 
If the plaintiff fails to appoint the authorized person within a reasonable amount of time, the 
court will dismiss the action.341  
                                                 
336 This is especially important because the first stage proceedings regarding the recognition on the basis of 
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1.1 The enforcement of foreign decisions from the point of view of public international law is 
clear- foreign courts do not have the power to enforce judgments unless there is an international 
agreement or it is permitted by domestic law. While the non-enforcement of a foreign judgment 
is not a violation of public international law, it represents a tremendous inconvenience for the 
parties (or one of them) and a step back in the appraisal of their substantive rights. Therefore, 
to deny recognition of foreign judgments not only represents refusing enforcement of these 
judgments, but it actually means denying foreign created (declared) rights to have their full 
effect. The solution adopted by most of the countries to avoid re-litigation and provide for 
harmonized decisions in which parties’ rights are protected is that under certain conditions 
foreign judgments undergo recognition and later, if the nature of the decision requires it, they 
are enforced in the country of enforcement. With this, the country of enforcement balances 
between these two aspects- ‘trust’ in the procedural and substantive law standards of the foreign 
legal system and the extension of ‘control’ of the state of enforcement that it imposes on foreign 
decisions and through that of the foreign legal order. This decomposition of the exequatur to 
its components leads us to the two basic questions which should be firstly answered on general 
level: how much ‘trust’ can the countries have in each other and how far they can go with the 
‘control’. 
 
1.2 ‘Trust’ as an elementary fact of social life has been described by the eminent German 
sociologist Niklas Luhman as a ‘confidence in one’s own expectation to another person’s 
behavior’. Its purpose is to reduce the complexity of life with all its incidents and possibilities 
by the reliance of one’s expectation. So therefore, ‘trust’ as a behavior reduces the complexity 
of life to the degree where decisions about present alternatives of actions can be taken with a 
view to the future. This ties directly the ‘trust’ with the ‘control’. Where ‘control’ is guaranteed, 
there is no need for ‘trust’. Countries have provided a system of values which controls person’s 
behavior and have created institutions that protect these values. In that sense it can be said that 
‘law provides certainty by control’. If we look at the ‘trust’ and the ‘control/law’ from an 
inversely proportional aspect, we can conclude that if the ‘control/law’ is emphasized, meaning 
that it ‘reliably stabilizes expectations’, then ‘trust’ is lowered because the incidents and the 
possibilities are reduced. From the perspective of the goal that ‘trust’ and ‘control’ want to 
achieve, they serve the same purpose; they represent functional equivalents. To answer to the 
proposed questions, it is crucial to determine the balance between ‘trust’ and ‘control’ and with 
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that to expose the tools and modalities in achieving this balance.  
 
1.3 Countries historically have had different approaches and different concepts regarding 
exequatur. From the first position of free circulation of judgments to the révision au fond, the 
balance has shifted to the extremes. Because of some practical aspects, it was much easier to 
lower the ‘control’ regarding the way how the foreign court applied the substantive law. As a 
consequence, ‘trust’ was achieved much faster regarding this requirement. Minimum ‘control’ 
of the application of the foreign substantive law is still kept if these errors amount to violation 
of public policy.     
 
1.4 Still, the description of the interaction between the ‘trust’ and ‘control’ in the cases of 
exequatur does not explain why there is reduced legal control of foreign judicial decision. 
There were several theories and doctrines which proposed the answer to the question: why do 
countries recognize and enforce foreign decisions? In most of these theories, it was shown that 
the main reason for allowing recognition of foreign judgments was a question of policy by the 
recognizing country. The comity doctrine stated that the ‘trust’ in the foreign legal system was 
based on prudence and politeness. This understanding of the ‘trust’ afforded on the foreign 
legal system did not explain the existence of reciprocity ‘control’ of the foreign judgment. 
Scholars and practitioners went even further in the explanation on why a country should 
recognize and enforce a foreign decision. In the common law countries, the doctrine of 
obligation and the doctrine of acquired rights were proposed; however, they contained 
ambiguities and did not propose a realistic explanation. The doctrine of res judicata tried to be 
more pragmatic, but still failed to address the issue of public policy. In essence, all of these 
theories and doctrines were trying to explain some aspects of the exequatur. In fact, the ‘trust’ 
afforded to the foreign legal system is not so much based on the abstract legal comity between 
the countries, but on the ‘trust’ of the administration of justice by the foreign courts when 
addressing individuals’ rights of access to justice in due time and without disproportionate 
effort in international cases. Therefore ‘trust’ is not something general, but is an effective 
individualization in the performance of the judicial authorities when addressing cross-border 
cases. As has previously been stated, ‘trust’ in other countries’ administration of justice may be 
conceptualized as a practice for optimizing the individual’s effective access to justice in cross-
border cases. 
 
1.5 Having in mind these interactions of the ‘trust’ and the ‘control’ on general level, the answer 
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to the two proposed questions further stretches to the jurisdictional limits of the country of 
origin. Jurisdiction which has been properly determined on basis of reasonable, rational or 
harmonized jurisdictional criteria directly influences ‘trust’ and reduces the ‘control’ of law. So 
the jurisdictional requirements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments which 
are based on jurisdictional criteria of the country of recognition (mirror principle) or 
jurisdictional criteria which are agreed upon (in the EU or in international conventions) 
represents ‘controlled trust’. This is especially important because the main goal here is not only 
to protect individual’s effective access to justice in cross-border cases, but it is also to protect 
defendants’ rights because exorbitant jurisdiction puts at risk the defendants’ rights. In that 
aspect, this jurisdictional requirement represents a very important tool in the balancing of ‘trust’ 
and ‘control’. Also, other tools are available which directly influence the amount of ‘trust’ the 
countries have in each other and how far they can go in the ‘control’. These modalities refer 
to: the protection of the defendant’s rights, the existence of an earlier judgment or lis pendens 
of proceedings that conflict with the foreign judgment to be recognized, reciprocity, and 
(historically) the application of different substantive laws by the country of origin regarding 
some questions on the basis of different conflict of law rules from the country of enforcement.  
All of these requirements represent measures upon which ‘control’ is conducted by the country 
of enforcement and are regarded as minimum standards of this control. However, one question 
stands: can these controls be conducted by other authority, namely the court of origin? Yes; if 
it is agreed, if the countries share common procedural and substantive standards, and if their 
legal systems are harmonized on a larger scale, then this control can shift to the country of 
origin. The ‘confidence in one’s own expectation to other person’s behavior’ means that 
effective administration of justice is present in the country of origin and the country of 
enforcement is confident about what to expect from that judgment (regarding the minimum 
procedural standards). However, historically, it has been shown that this ‘trust’ is more effective 
when some kind of ‘control’ is exercised by someone other than the one controlled.  
 
2.1 All of these explanations refer to exequatur on a general level. However, on a specific level, 
some distinction must be made regarding judicial decisions in family matters. Family law is an 
area of particular sensitivity. Certain matrimonial matter judgments, such as judgments relating 
to divorce, marriage separation or marriage annulment are self-executing; That is, they require 
to be recognized but not to be enforced.  This can also apply for some of the issues relating to 
children, such as an appointment of a guardian. Nevertheless, many of the decisions relating to 
children will need to be enforced. In such cases, when enforcement of decisions regarding 
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children is required, the whole procedure should be designed around the best interest of the 
child. Here the link between enforcement and best interest of the child is of particular 
importance, because inept enforcement has serious consequences and can result in untold 
emotional and physical damage of the child. When it comes to children, circumstances 
surrounding them are particularly important because ‘change’ is much more compressed in 
time and in space and has a much larger resonance that it has among adults. Children grow and 
develop, so what is appropriate at one time may not be helpful at a later stage. In that context, 
judgments relating to parental responsibility are different from judgments in most other civil 
and commercial matters. They cannot be treated as equal with other judgments that relate to 
money or inanimate objects. Children are much more sensitive, and judgments cannot be 
applied to children as if they were some species of chattel or some type of good. Therefore, 
enforcement of judgments relating to children are particularly difficult and require more 
comprehensive solutions.  
 
2.2 The Dowling and Gorell-Barnes study has shown that a good relationship between children 
and their parents in the aftermath of divorce or separation is inversely proportional to the 
negative effects of the divorce. Children from divorcing families are caught between two 
feelings. They experience relief from the ongoing quarreling and high level of tension, but on 
the other hand they experience tremendous loss for the parent who leaves the home. In that 
aspect, they want to have a conclusion of their situation and have a meaningful relationship 
with the parent with whom they do not live. This study has also shown that a steady 
environment in the aftermath of the divorce helps them substantially and that it is crucial that 
children must express their feelings and their views. In these aspects, schools play a significant 
role because they provide for continuity at a time of change. 
 
2.3 In the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions that refer to 
children, the Dowling and Gorell-Barnes study could be referenced in several aspects. Firstly, 
the whole procedure should be swift. Children need a conclusion for their situation. Lengthy, 
complex and costly procedures for recognition and enforcement lead to serious damages and 
endanger the wellbeing of children. If the opposite path is taken, then children would live in an 
unresolved situation which would make their environment uncertain. At least this would 
prolong and thus normalize their situation. However, this swift procedure must be supported 
by some minimum requirements. Children should be heard during the course of proceedings 
regarding themselves and should freely express their views regarding the situation. Further, 
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they should maintain contact with the non-custodial parent or the parent with whom they do 
not live. This would help them mitigate the negative effects of divorce and provide for 
‘normality’ in the newly-developed situation. Lastly, if they attend school and if they have 
increased interaction with their environment, then the parents should try not to interrupt these 
ties because this would again expose children to an emotional roller-coaster. In this aspect, the 
wrongful removal or retention of children is so harmful. With a unilateral act by the abducting 
parent, all of these ties are undermined. Children are removed from their familiar environment, 
they are severed of any contact with the left-behind parent, and they are put in an uncertain 
situation with no possibility to express their feelings. So these are the basic principles upon 
which recognition and enforcement should be built: A swift procedure with the 
abovementioned safeguards.  
 
3.1 In light of the above said now, we should look at the recognition and enforcement 
procedures in the EU and in Slovenia. The idea of free circulation of judgments within the EU 
has existed for more than 35 years, but it was realized for the first time in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation for limited cases of child abduction and access rights. The principles upon which 
this abolition of exequatur is build are ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual recognition’. So in a way, 
increased ‘trust’ (constructed in the EU in the political idea of ‘mutual trust’) between the 
Member States is responsible among other reasons for the decrease of the ‘control’ that Member 
States have regarding exequatur. The basic formula is this: where ‘mutual trust’ exists, 
procedures for recognition and enforcement should be improved. However, this ‘trust’ 
(‘confidence in one’s own expectation to other person’s behavior’) is not something which was 
totally acquired through experience during the interaction between legal orders (‘actual trust’), 
but it is rather imposed ‘trust’, a political decision that Member States can have confidence not 
in their own expectation, but rather in the political assessment of the EU institutions that other 
Member States’ behaviors are satisfying expectations. So, for this trust it can be said that it 
represents an ‘indirect trust’ gained through the assessment of the EU institutions. In some 
cases, it was shown that the lack of the imposed ‘mutual trust’ was creating problems and 
resulted in the circumvention of the application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation regarding 
‘mutual recognition’. Thus, the cure which was proposed by the EU legislator is that the lack 
of ‘mutual trust’ should be improved by imposing an obligation for ‘mutual recognition’. Again 
here the problem is what comes first. Should ‘mutual trust’ be gained first and then the Member 
States should proceed in building system of ‘mutual recognition’ with further free circulation 
of judgments in mind or through the process of ‘mutual recognition’ the EU should build 
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‘mutual trust’?  What is necessary is that instead of building politically imposed ‘mutual trust’, 
Member States should steadily build ‘actual trust’ through direct contact between the 
authorities of different Member States and with trust in each other’s administration of justice. 
In this approach, the work of the European judicial network (EJN) and the European judicial 
training network (EJTN) play important roles.  
 
3.2 Because family laws among nations is different due different social backgrounds and legal 
traditions of the Member States full harmonization in this branch of law cannot be achieved. 
With the Rome III Regulation in the area of conflict of laws, certain efforts have been made on 
the basis of enhanced cooperation, but because of its nature the impact is limited only to 16 
Member States. So for having free movement of judgments within the EU in certain areas of 
family law, there is a need for unified jurisdictional criteria which would minimize ‘forum 
shopping’ and ‘rush to the court’. The present jurisdictional system in the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation facilitates ‘rush to the court’ between the spouses in matrimonial matters cases. 
Also, in some cases the jurisdictional rules for transfer of jurisdiction have been found to be 
ambiguous and as a consequence they were referred to the CJEU for further interpretation. 
Therefore, what is needed is a more comprehensive, jurisdictional system that allows spouses 
to choose the competent court in matrimonial matters by common agreement and which has 
more precise rules for residual jurisdiction and for transferring of jurisdiction. Such a system 
would help improve and create a more stable environment for processing these cases that are 
delicate and filled with emotional charge.   
 
3.3 Regarding the abolition of the exequatur, the position is much clearer as a policy 
consideration and as a theoretical observation than as a practical solution. As a policy 
consideration, the abolition of the exequatur should provide for judgments to move freely, as 
families do. The exequatur procedure leads to complex, lengthy and costly procedures. This 
could result in damaging the relationship between the child and his/her parents and can be 
harmful to the child’s interests. Another aspect in the Brussels IIbis Regulation which is 
problematic in view of the parental responsibility decisions is the existence of two possible 
approaches to enforcement. One, which is applied to custody or residence decisions, requires 
issuing a declaration of enforceability, and the other, which is applied regarding access rights, 
where the issuing of a declaration of enforceability is abolished. In that sense, such a situation 
could lead to a possible scenario where access rights may be enforced prior to a judgment 




3.4 Therefore, in view of enforcement of parental responsibility decisions in the EU, a question 
of balance between the ‘trust and ‘control’ stands. If we look at the recent approach taken by 
the EU regarding the abolition of exequatur in Brussels Ibis Regulation, certain safeguards 
were kept. So total ‘trust’ was not achieved but rather the approach of limited ‘control’ was 
postponed to a later stage. ‘Control’ was taken in the form that the ex ante control by the state 
now is transformed to ex post control initiated by the parties. So the abolition of the exequatur 
in the Brussels regime represents moving the coordination to a later stage of the implementation 
of recognition and enforcement. It is very realistic to assume that the new Brussel IIbis 
Regulation will follow these new tendencies in the Brussels regime. Again the question of 
balance regarding the Brussels IIbis Regulation translates to the answer of the question whether 
removing the requirement of exequatur could mean abandonment of certain ‘control’ and with 
that introducing new problems, without tackling what is important here, the child’s best 
interest.  
 
3.5 In that sense, what is expected from the new Brussels IIbis Regulation is the introduction 
of measures that will help facilitate this ‘tense’ situation. Because of their nature, Brussels IIbis 
Regulation cases are much more personal and emotional than the rest of the cases. In the legal 
aspect, this provides that the parties have fundamental objections to the judgment concerned 
and do not want them to be enforced. If we again look at the Dowling and Gorell-Barnes study, 
it gave the basic requirements for the protection of the child’s best interest. At the end, in all of 
these cases, the child’s best interest is what needs to be protected. In legal terms this means 
that the child’s voice has to be heard, that the procedure needs to be prompt and all of the 
authorities should facilitate the normalization of the situation through the available modalities 
of judicial cooperation in the European Union Justice system. For these purposes, there is a 
need for all of the authorities to be involved, because the exclusion of all judicial involvement 
in the Member State of enforcement creates certain disadvantages. The removal of any 
safeguards would worsen the resistance by depriving parties of recourse to the court or by 
making protest difficult. So on a theoretical level, balance between the ‘trust’ and the ‘control’ 
lies in building ‘actual trust’ by the involvement of all of the authorities, especially the courts, 
in adaptation of their powers for the benefit of the child and the abolition of exequatur with the 
adoption of minimum standards. However, it is naïve to think that only abolition of exequatur 
and adoption of minimum standards would resolve the problems of enforcing parental 
responsibility judgments. The EU contains different modalities and networks that could help 
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ease this problem. Only with comprehensive mobilization of all of the necessary resources can 
this situation have a positive outcome. Otherwise, the political ideas and the desires of the EU 
institutions would still be in front of the real practical issues.  
 
4.1 Regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Slovenia on the basis 
of the PILP act of Slovenia, it can be stated that there is space for certain improvements of the 
conditions for recognition and enforcement of this procedure. Regarding the violations of the 
jurisdiction of Slovenian courts provided in Articles 97 and 98 of the PILP act of Slovenia, it 
must be stated that these rules are only the last resort of the tackling of the jurisdictional issues. 
For comprehensive change, as a prerequisite for the amendment of Article 97 and 98 of the 
PILP act of Slovenia, there is need for a revision of the exclusive jurisdictional criteria in the 
PILP act of Slovenia (for example, this characteristic is not attributed to the choice-of-court 
agreements). Moreover, certain jurisdictional standards (habitual residence of the child) are not 
provided in the PILP act of Slovenia. If such standardization is accomplished, then de lege 
ferenda, the introduction of the combination of exclusive jurisdiction protection and the ‘mirror 
principle’ rule would be a welcomed solution. 
 
4.2 Article 96 of the PILP act of Slovenia covers the issue of violation of the right to a fair trial 
in the country of origin. However, the infringement of this right is also covered with the rule 
on (procedural) public policy contained in Article 100 of the same act. Although both of these 
rules can cover the same issue, there is no obstacle for the Court to deny recognition on both 
of these requirements, but the rule in Article 100 covers much broader issues and is determined 
ex officio, while Article 96 is determined after the initial ruling is served to the other party (the 
party against whom the decision was rendered) upon his objection. Moreover, the amendment 
of Article 96 should cover another aspect regarding the identity of the person who can object 
the recognition. Instead of objection upon the ‘…party against whom the decision was 
rendered…’ the new rule should be initiated upon the ‘… party against whom the recognition 
is sought…’ Lastly, there should be a third paragraph added in the new rule for the cases where 
the foreign judicial decision should be recognized despite the infringements on the right to  a 
fair trial, if the party, having no opportunity to participate in the proceeding, failed to commence 
proceedings to challenge the judgment in the country of origin when it was possible for him to 
do so. 
 
4.3 Article 99 of the PILP act of Slovenia contains the requirements regarding the ne bis in 
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idem principle for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions. Generally, this 
rule covers the main issues, however certain improvements can be made regarding the identity 
of the legal matter in specifying the subjective and objective elements (the same legal matters 
and between the same parties).  
4.4 The public policy rule in the PILP act of Slovenia is given in Article 100. Its content has 
been determined in several cases by the Supreme Court of Republic of Slovenia. These cases 
provide for a unified approach where the content is consisted of: (i) legal norms: constitutional 
principles, basic principles arising from laws, basic principles of the legal order of the Council 
of Europe, European Communities and international agreements adopted to guarantee the 
minimum standard of legal protection, all with the restriction which prevents the concept of 
the recognition of a foreign judicial decision to fail: not every cogent (forced) regulation is a 
part of public order, only those are where their  violation  would threaten the legal and moral 
integrity of the domestic legal system; (ii) international customary law; (iii) basic moral 
principles, and (iv) vital economic, political … interests of the state. It covers (although not 
directly specified in Article 100), both substantive and procedural public policy. In the case of 
procedural public policy, the Supreme Court even further defined the content of the procedural 
public policy containing the constitutional principles, the fundamental principles of individual 
legal branches, the fundamental principles of EU law, the principles derived from international 
treaty law, in particular the ECHR, customary international law and basic moral principles.  
 
4.5 Reciprocity loses its significance in the modern PIL acts. It has come to be  seen as ‘relic’ 
from the past. The position of reciprocity is in collision with the need for speedy, reliable and 
more effective access to justice procedures. Moreover, the availability of foreign rights through 
increased cooperation between the countries and large number of bi- and multilateral 
agreements diminishes its significance even more in the modern PIL acts. So for future 
prospects it is expected de lege ferenda that the reciprocity requirement will be abolished or 
that its subject matter would be substantially narrowed.   
 
4.6 In Slovenia, in legal aspects, there generally are no drawbacks which would seriously 
jeopardize the application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The substantive law and the national 
procedures are in line with the basic requirements of the Regulation but also there are some 
differences. The child and the parents can express their position in cases concerning them. 
There is no special procedure for recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions in family 
matters (only general) but in structure it resembles the procedure in the Brussels IIbis 
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Regulation. Such a procedure can be decided as a main question and as an incidental question. 
There are some differences between the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the Slovenian law in the 
context of the declaration of enforceability, where in the Slovenian legal tradition such an 
instrument is unknown. This can be a bit confusing because in Slovenia there is no need to 
request declaration of enforceability and the recognition can be decided directly in enforcement 
procedure as an incidental question. However, the main problems in the application of the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation again are not found in the application of the rules, but in the lack of 
‘trust’ between the implementing authorities of the Regulation. As it was shown with the 
Detiček case, there is a certain level of distrust between the authorities. This case is an example 
of the negative effects of the imposed ‘trust’. The court of enforcement is put in a position to 
blindly ‘trust’ the court of origin, where at the same time it is deprived of any possibility of 
‘control’. In such a situation the circumvention of the Regulation comes into play and becomes 
the leading fundamental objection of the enforcement.  
 
4.7 As much as the political will of the EU is understandable, there must be some kind of 
realistic expectations for the modalities of building ‘actual trust’. This cannot be achieved by 
imposing an obligation that Member States have to ‘trust’ other authorities. ‘Trust’ is not 
something which can be built by theoretical or political will. The persons who are 
implementing the Regulation have to have confidence in what to expect from the other person’s 
behavior in the application of the Regulation. Also, they have to understand the regulation and 
the values which it protects. When they have understood these values and when they are certain 
that the other persons also have understood the values, then the ‘actual trust’ would emerge. 
Without ‘trust’ all that would be left are ineffective rules, as much as they are flawlessly drafted 
or constructed.  The protection of the best interest of the child is a universal value. It must be 
understood and it must be protected. Children especially do not know boundaries. They 
understand only environments in which they can feel free, secure and loved. It is the duty of 
the countries to assure that nothing in their legal systems would be used so that children would 
be deprived of what is necessary for them and that is to have happy childhoods and to develop 







Doktorska disertacija ‘Priznanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb v družinskopravnih 
zadevah’ (Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments regarding family matters) nanaša 
se na zgodovinskega, socialnega in pravnega vidika priznanja in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb 
v družinskopravnih zadevah. Na splošni ravni, ko je stranka v pravdnem postopku pred sodnega 
organa (ali pri drugi instituciji, ki rešuje spore) obstaja le ena cilj: določiti odločbo ki varuje 
pravice strank. Vendar varstvo pravic strank ni zavarovano, vse dokler ni izrečena končna 
odločba sodišča. Stranka mora biti zadovoljna s dispozitivom izrečene odločbe. Na podlagi 
načela teritorialnosti povsem je jasno, da izrečena sodna odločba v enem pravnem sistemu ima 
pravnega učinka na ozemlju tega sistema. Država ima na razpolago vse potrebne ukrepe 
izvršitev sodnih odločb, kakor tudi varstvo pravic strank. Vendar, v odsotnosti mednarodnega 
sporazuma izrečena odločba v eni državi ne more imeti neposrednega delovanja lastne sile 
(proprio vigore učinek) v drugi državi. V tem primeru, morajo obstajati postopki kjer bodo 
stranke imele priložnost izognitev novega postopka pred sodišču tuje države. Potreba po 
priznanju in izvršitve ni sporna v mednarodnem zasebnem pravu, sicer je ena izmed nekaterih 
načinov preprečevanja ponavljajočih se postopkov ter nasprotujočih si odločitev, in s tem 
zagotavljanje nadnacionalne pravne gotovosti. To pomaga strankam izogniti se porabo virov 
za ponovnega postopka ter imeti usklajene odločitve. To daje stabilnost vsem posameznim 
razmerij med fizičnimi in pravnimi osebam. Takšna stabilnost je ključnega pomena za zaščito 
posameznih človekovih pravic, predvsem za prostega pretoka ljudi. Zaradi tega, mora se 
določiti cilj ki bo dosegel takšno stabilnost, nadnacionalno pravno gotovost in izognitev 
ponavljajočih se postopkov in nasprotujočih si odločitev. Ta cilj je: vsaka država mora sprejeti 
učinkovitega, hitrega in uravnoteženega postopka za priznanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb 
ob popolnem spoštovanju temeljnih človekovih pravic ter temeljnega načela civilnega 
postopka.  
  V zadnjih letih je Europska unija (EU) presegla samo urejanje gospodarskih odnosov 
in skupnega trga. EU je dopolnila uredbo o družinskih razmerij, področje kje se običajno spori 
rešujejo v skladu z nacionalnimi predpisi ali z uporabo mednarodnih pogodb. Takšna 
raznolikost pravnih virov je podvojila število potencijalnih pravnih pravil, ki se lahko uporabijo 
v enem položaju, a s tem še bolj zapletuje tako že zapleteni mednarodni zasebni položaj.  
 Drugi vidik, ki je zelo pomemben glede priznavanja in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb v 
družinskopravnih zadevah, da je nedavno prišlo do velike spremembe znotraj same družine. 
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Globalizacija ni le gospodarski pojav; ampak vpliva na vse družbene vidike. Zlasti so se zgodile 
velike spremembe v strukturi družine. Dolgotrajni tradicionalni koncept družinskega prava ki 
je sestavljen iz mešanico verskih, družbenih in kulturnih značilnostih enega naroda, sedaj 
doživlja večje spremembe kot kadarkoli. Te dve smeri (globalizacija in sprememba v strukturi 
družine) vplivata na priznavanje in izvršitev sodnih odločb na različne načine. Povečanje 
prostega pretoka ljudi v EU povzroča zapletene čezmejne družinske odnose ki zahtevajo 
primerno ureditev, ki temelji na temeljnih načelih, še posebej na načelo “medsebojnega 
zaupanja” kot predpogoj medsebojnega priznavanja, ki bo omogočal svobodni pretok sodnih 
odločb med državami članice. Na ta način vprašanje o ukinitvi postopka izvršljivosti 
(eksekvature) se poveča, če deluje primerno, ali če je zahtevana popolna ukinitev.  Po drugi 
strani, tradicionlani koncept družinskih odnosov predvideva določeno nelagodje pri izvajanju 
teh določb ter izogibanju spoštovanja pravil. Na nekateri način to je v nasprotju z načelom 
“medsebojnega zaupanja”. Zaradi tega, priznavanje in izvršitev družinskopravnih odločb je 
zelo pomembno, saj se znižuje do jedra problema “medsebojnega zaupanja” in razpredeli  
delovanja vzajemnega priznavanja v EU. 
 Ta doktorska disertacija predstavlja raziskavo, ki je izvedena na podlagi osnovnih 
elementov priznavanja in izvršitve tujih sodnih odločb in posebej značilnosti priznanje in 
izvršljivosti (exequatur) teh odločb (in njeno ukinitev) glede družinskih zadevah. Sestavljena 
je iz uvoda, treh delov, sklepa in bibliografije. Uvod zagotavlja uvodne ugotovitve o tezi, kakor 
tudi podrobno opredeljuje namen, cilj ter hipoteze doktorske disertacije. Uvodni del vsebuje 
pregled znanstvenih metod, ki se uporabljajo v disertaciji.  
Prvi del teze je sestavljen iz dveh poglavij. Prvo poglavje vsebuje kratek pregled 
preobrazbe družine z sociološkega vidika in prikazuje spremembe tega modela in njegove 
funkcije. To poglavje se začne z razumevanjem družine kot družbeno konstrukcijo z 
zgodovinske spremenljivke (v smislu njegove vsebine, strukture in oblike) in nekaj konsantov: 
biološko funkcijo, bio-družbeno funkcijo, družbeno funkcijo in ekonomsko funkcijo. V tem 
poglavju je zelo na kratkem prikazano, da je družina čez zgodovino doživela trajno spremembo 
njene strukture, funkcije kakor tudi odnosov znotraj nje, kateri so že vnaprej določeni z 
gospodarskih, socialnih in verskih postavitvah ki so bile prevladujoče v družbi v določenem 
času. V tem poglavju se poudarja na svetovnem pojavu “globalizacije” in njen vpliv na 
oblikovanju družine.  
Druga točka, ki je obravnavana v tem poglavju prvega dela, se nanaša na položaj otroka 
v času prenehanja zakonske veze in njene posledice.  Kakor se zakonske zveze sklenejo tako 
se razveljavijo.  Danes je bolj kot kadar koli v Evropi sprejeto da razveza predstavlja 
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civilizacijski proces prekinitve nefunkcionalne zakonske zveze. Vendar, to ne pomeni da se 
odnosi v družini končajo. Gredo skozi določeno preobrazbo, ki vpliva na vse člane, ampak 
predvsem otrokom. V skladu s študije Dowling and Gorell-Barnes teza prikazuje to, da če so 
se odnosi med starši tako silno poslabšali in posledično imajo pravico do prekinitev te zveze, 
potem starši in ostale institucije, ki so vpletene v tem procesu so dolžne poskrbeti za “normalni” 
odnos med obema staršema in otrokom tudi po prenehanju zakonske zveze. Zato je potreba o 
ohranjanju pomembnih odnosov s staršev in potreba otroka o zastopanju svoje lastne poglede  
človekova pravica določena v Konvenciji Združenih narodov o otrokovih pravicah ter v Listino 
Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah. Standard, ki mora biti implementiran v vseh pravnih virih 
vključuje tudi mednarodne zasebne pravne vire. 
Priznavanje in izvršitev predstavljata en vidik mednarodnega zasebnega prava kateri 
cilj je izogniti se ponovnega postopka in zagotoviti vsklajene odločitve v katerem so pravice 
strank  zaščitene. To pomeni, da morajo države spoštovati potrebe obema in to: na eni strani, 
morajo varovati svojo suvereniteto in integriteto pravnega sistema, a na drugi strani pa morajo 
zadovoljiti potrebe strankam in preprečiti ponovnega prožanja procesa pred tujem sodišču za 
isto zadevo in med istimi strankami za kateri je že bilo odločeno pred sodišču druge države. V 
bistvu to je povezano z ravnovesjem med “zaupanjem” v proceduralnimi in vsebinskimi 
pravnimi standardi tujega pravnega sistema in obseg “nadzora” država, ki izvršuje naložene 
tuje odločbe ter skozi to do tujega pravnega reda. V zvezi tega, da bi imeli bolj celovito 
razumevanje o priznavanju in izvršitvi, drugo poglavje prvega dela, najprej vsebuje nekaj 
predhodnih pripomb in konceptualnih razumevanj pravnega pojma “priznavanje” in 
“izvršitev”. Po tej konceptualni razlagi na osnovne pravne pojme v tezo, poglavje obravnava 
vrste odločb, ki se lahko priznajo in izvršijo z razlikovanjem med vrstami odločb ki so 
nedvoumne in so izvršljive (eksekvature) ter vrstami odločb, ki so sporne v odvisnosti ali jih 
je mogoče priznati in izvršiti v drugih državah. Na podlagi terminološke določitve pomena 
priznavanja in izvršitev, v drugem poglavju je podan pregled osnovnih doktrin (vljudnosti, 
doktrina obveznosti, pridobljene pravice in prenesene pravice ter res iudicata) . V tem poglavju 
je obravnan zgodovinski razvoj priznavanja in izvršitve tujih sodnih odločb v Evropi. Da bi 
imeli celotno terminološko in sistematsko razumevanje o priznavanju in izvršitvi, to poglavje 
obravnava sisteme, ki so prisotni v večini pravnih sistemov (sistem omejenega nadzora tujih 
sodnih odločb (revision au fond), sistem prima facie evidence, sistem revizije tujih sodnih 
odločb in sistemi, ki ne priznavajo tujih sodnih odločb razen če obstajajo mednarodni 
sporazumi. Zadnje, v tem poglavju je podan pregled pravnih virov vezanih na priznavanju in 
izvršitev v EU in Haško konvencijo o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu.  
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 Drugi del predstavlja bistveni del teze v katerem je prikazana podrobna analiza Uredbe 
sveta (ES) št. 2201/2003 z dne 27. novembra 2003 o pristojnosti in priznavanju ter izvršitev 
sodnih odločb v zakonskih sporih in sporih v zvezi s starševsko odgovornostjo, ter razveljavitvi 
uredbe (ES) št. 1347/2000 (Bruselj IIbis) s poudarkom na postopka o priznavanju in izvršitev 
ter ukinitev postopka izvršljivosti (eksekvature) v primerih ugrabitve otroka in pravice do 
stikov.  
 Ta del je sestavljen iz petih poglavij in obravnava priznavanju in izvršitev tujih sodnih 
odločb v zakonskih sporih in v zvezi s starševsko odgovornostjo v EU predvsem v Bruseljsko 
IIbis uredbo. Prvo poglavje obsega področje uporabe Bruseljske IIbis uredbe. Predvsem 
poudarja vsebinske uporabe uredbe, tudi poveča vprašanje glede ozemeljske in začasne 
uporabe. Bruseljska IIbis uredba zajema dva velika področja družinskega prava z čezmejnih 
dimenzij: zakonske spore in spore v zvezi s staševsko odgovornostjo. Zakonski spori se per se 
nanašajo na razveze, prenehanju življenske skupnosti ali razveljavitvi zakonske zveze, ali kot 
je bilo v enem komentaru navedeno, prenehanju in oslabitve zakonske zveze. Nadalje, v tezo 
je terminološko obdelanem avtonomnem pomenu pojma ”zakonska zveza” oziroma kako se 
razume v pravnem sistemu EU. Vendar, ta izraz ni brez polemike. Njenega pomena ni 
enostavno opredeliti, ker je pomen pojma ”zakonska zveza” obremenjen z nedavnim razvojem 
in spremembam v konceptualnem razumevanju zakonske zveze z vprašanji kot so: pravilna 
oblika zakonske zveze, heteroseksualne/homoseksualne poroke ter registrirane partnerske 
skupnosti. Dve najbolj sporna vprašanja glede razlage pojma ”zakonska zveza” v Bruseljsko 
uredbo zajemajo partnerske skupnosti ali bodisi se uporablja za istopolne poroke. V sklepu te 
teze se predlaga, zaradi številnim razlikam med državam članic na tem področju, da je v 
sedanjem bolje, da ne obstaja široka teleološka razlaga o partnerskih skupnosti in istospolne 
poroke v pojmu ”zakonska zveza”, in ohraniti poročnega partnerstva v Bruseljsko IIbis uredbo. 
Glede registriranimi partnerstvi, je bolj jasno in je večjo soglasje o tem, da te odnosi ne sodijo 
v področju uporabe Bruseljske IIbis uredbe. Vendar prilagajanje na dejansko stanje bo v bližnji 
prihodnosti potrebno in Evropska zakonodaja bo morala sprejeti nove instrumente, ki bojo 
zajeli registrirane partnerske skupnosti. Glede stališča o vključitvi istopolnih porok v področju 
uporabe Bruseljske IIbis uredbe, teza predlaga, da se na to mora počakati dokler čim več držav 
EU ne sprejmejo tega v svoje nacionalne pravne sisteme in s tem se ustvari skupno podlago za 
razumevanje novega fenomena v evropskem kontekstu.   
V drugem poglavju se obravnava razmerje med Bruseljsko IIbis uredbo in najbolj 
ustreznih mednarodnih sporazumov Haaške konvencije na področju mednarodnega zasebnega 
prava – Haaško konvencijo iz leta 1980 o civilnopravnih vidikih mednarodne ugrabitve otrok 
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in Haaške konvencije iz leta 1996 o pristojnosti, pravu, ki se uporabi, priznavanju, izvršitvi in 
sodelovanju na področju straševske odgovornosti in ukrepov za zaščito otrok. To vprašanje je 
še bolj pomembno, ker so države članice Evropske unije hkrati podpisnice teh mednarodnih 
sporazumov in so tudi zavezane z uredbo EU. Prav tako, večina rešitev ki so določenie v uredbi 
Bruselj IIbis so se pojavile ali so podobne tistim ki so bile določeni v Haaško konvencijo iz 
leta 1980 ter leta 1996. Ta medsebojna povezava med pravili zagotavlja povezanost in 
usklajenost pravnih virov, ki lahko pokrivajo področja, ki jih je mogoče razrešiti na podlagi 
dveh ali včasih več mednarodnih sporazumov in s posebnim predpisov EU.  
Glede Haaške konvencije o ugrabitvi otrok iz leta 1980, vse države članice Evropske 
unije so jo ratificirale in se še vedno uporablja v primerov ugrabitve otroka med državami 
članicami. Vendar, pa je Haaška konvecija iz leta 1980 dopolnjena z nekaterimi določbami 
uredbe, kjer v odnosih med državami članicami, pravila uredbe prevladujejo nad pravili 
konvencije, v tem delu ki se nanaša na zadevah ki jih ureja uredba. Razmerje med Bruseljsko 
IIbis uredbo in Haaško konvencijo o ugrabitve otrok iz leta 1980 je urejeno v 60. člena te 
uredbe, ki določa prednoste tega EU instrumenta nad vpisanih mednarodnih sporazumov, ki 
zajema Haaško konvencijo o ugrabitvi otrok iz leta 1980. V tem členu, je premoč prenesena na 
uredbo. V tem smislu, da imajo zadeve, ki so določene s pravili Bruseljske IIbis uredbe 
prednost pred pravili Haaške konvencije o ugrabitvi otrok. Kar se tiče pravil, ki niso zajete v 
Bruseljski IIbis uredbi, veljajo pravila konvencije.  V tem smislu je pogosto poudarjeno, da se 
instrumenti "dopolnjujejo". Bruseljska IIbis uredba je sprejela kar je treba poudariti, in to so 
vodilna načela Haaške konvencije o ugrabitvi otrok iz leta 1980. To je še posebej pomembno, 
saj zagotavlja kontinuiteto enotnega razumevanja pojmov, določenih v Haaški konvenciji o 
ugrabitvi otrok iz leta 1980, sodne prakse in primerni spisi priznanih strokovnjakov. 
Konvencija za zaščito otrok iz leta 1996 ima najširšo področje uporabe otroških 
konvencij Haaške konference in je sestavljena iz treh vrst pravil. Kot prvo, so pravila postopka 
ki se nanašajo na določitev pristojnosti in priznavanju ter izvršitev; kot drugo pa so konfliktna 
pravna pravila, ki se nanašajo na določitev veljavnega prava, in tretjič, precejšno število pravil, 
ki se nanašajo na sodelovanjem med oblastmi. Bruseljska IIbis uredba in Konvencija o zaščiti 
otrok, iz leta 1996, sta zelo tesno povezana. Konvencija predstavlja glavni temelj za tiste dele 
uredbe, ki so v zvezi z starševsko odgovornostjo. Ta velja v večini držav , ki so članice in za 
tiste države, ki niso članice EU. Konvencija ne vsebuje klauzule o adheziji za Organizacijo o 
regionalnem gospodarskem povezovanjem (ORGP) in zaradi tega morajo države članice 
Evropske unije same ratificirati konvencijo tudi v imenu Evropske unije. Bruseljska IIbis 
uredba ima prednost pred konvencijo za zaščito otrok iz leta 1996, v primeru če ima otrok 
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običajno prebivališče v pristojno državo članico. V drugi situaciji, ko je sodba izdana v drugi 
državi članici, priznavanje in izvršitev pa se izvajajo na podlagi pravil iz uredbe, četudi je 
otrokovo običajno prebivališče v državi ki je članica Konvecije o zaščiti otrok iz leta 1996, 
vendar ni država članica Evropske unije. Haaška konvencija o zaščiti otrok iz leta 1996 je še 
posebej pomembna v EU, ker je Bruseljska IIbis uredba omejena glede določitve veljavne 
zakonodaje za zadeve povezane z starševsko odgovornostjo. Glavni cilj Bruseljske IIbis uredbe 
je določitev pristojnosti, priznavanju in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb in sodelovanje med 
državami članicami EU. Konvencija o zaščitu otrok vsebuje konflikte pravnih pravil za 
določitev veljavne zakonodaje v primeru ukrepe za zaščito otrok. Takšna pravila niso navedena 
v Bruseljsko IIbis uredbi. To pomeni, da med državami članičami EU, je določitev veljavne 
zakonodaje določena s konvencije iz leta 1996, čeprav je pristojnost na podlagi uredbe. 
Tretje poglavje analizira pravila o pristojnosti glede zakonskih sporih in odločbah v 
zvezi s starševsko odgovornostjo ter se izrečno sklicuje na težave, ki se pojavljajo pri izvajanju 
teh pravil. 
V čertrem poglavju, teza analizira skupne določbe, ki so predvidene v 16-20 člena 
Bruseljske IIbis uredbe. Ta del uredbe je imenovan “skupne določbe” ki se splošno nanašajo 
na treh primerih: prvič, ugotavljanje pristojnosti, drugič, vprašanje o lis pendens, in tretjič 
začasni ukrepi zaščite.  
Glavno poglavje v tem delu je peto poglavje in je razdeljeno v treh podpoglavij. V 
prvem podpoglavju so prikazane splošne sisteme eksekvature v Evropski uniji. To obdeluje pet 
sistemov oziroma modelov za priznavanje in izvršitev sodnih odločb v EU ki so določeni v 
pravnih aktih EU.  
Drugo podpoglavje se nanaša na postopke o priznavanju in izvršitvi uredbe Bruselj 
IIbis. To podpoglavje najprej analizira postopke in pogoje glede zadeve o zakonskih sporih in 
nato za vprašanje v zvezi s starševsko odgovornostjo. Precejšni del drugega podpoglavja, 
petega poglavja je namenjen za odpravo postopka eksekvature v zvezi s pravico do stikov in v 
primerih o ugrabitve otrok.  
Z razvojem EU, države članice so prenesle del svoje suverenosti z nacionalne ravne na 
ravni EU. To je precej pomembno na področju mednarodnega zasebnega prava, v 
Amsterdamski pogodbi, ki je del mednarodnega zasebnega prava uveljavlen v prvem stebru. 
Kot posledica tega, EU ima neposredne kompetence nad priznavanju in izvršitvi tujih sodnih 
odločb, ki prihajajo iz države članice EU, zlasti v določenih pravnih področij. To neposredno 
vpliva na "zaupanje" med državami, kjer to načelo v EU postavlja se na novi ravni 
"medsebojnega zaupanja" in na področju priznavanja in izvršitev se odraža v načelu 
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"vzajemnega priznavanja". Ta vidik tudi vpliva na "nadzor" tujih sodnih odločb v EU , kjer vse 
manj in manj standardov so potrebni in tendenca celotne odprave (abolicijo, razveljavitev, 
ukinitev) eksekvature. V procesu o razveljavitvi eksekvature v EU, druga družbena pojava 
postane prisotna. To je družbena konstrukcija ki vpliva na živeljenje in razvoj ljudi, in s tem 
neposredno vpliva na družino: globalizacija. Priznavanje in izvršitev sodnih odločb je 
predpisana v III poglavja Bruseljske IIbis uredbe (členov 21-52) in je sistematično razdelejna 
na pet področij. V uredbi je vzpostavljen sistem, ki temelji na dajanje osrednje vloge sodišča 
države članice, ki ima pristojnost za določanje odločb. Vloga sodišča druge države članice je 
omejena.  
Obstajata dva ločena postopka priznavanja in izvršitev odločb, ki so primerni za 
priznavanje in izvršitev v skladu z Bruseljsko IIbis uredbo, kjer se primernost določi ne glede 
na to ali spadajo ali ne v področju uporabe te uredbe. Prvi postopek je klasični postopek 
eksekvature, ki se uporablja v zakonskih sporih in zadevah v zvezi s starševsko odgovornostjo, 
drugi postopek pa je tisti ki odpravlja eksekvature, ki je omejen na primerih o ugrabitvi otrok 
in pravice do stikov. Postopki eksekvature so podobni, vendar se razlikujejo v razloge za 
nepriznanje in izvršitev. Toda ti postopki se štejejo med klasične postopke eksekvature z 
razglasitev izvršljivosti.  Poleg tega, Bruseljska IIbis uredba je sestavljena iz drugačnih vrst 
postopkov, ki so bili novost v času ko je uredba bila sprejeta: postopek ki predstavlja 
razveljavitev postopka eksekvature, kar pomeni, da so odločbe, ki se nanašajo na določene 
primere o ugrabitvi otrok in pravice do stikov so izvršljivi v države članice izvršitve in, da jim 
ni treba izdajati izjavo o izvršljivosti in brez možnosti pritožbe.  
 Glede priznavanja in izvršitve tujih sodnih odločb v družinskih zadevah v okviru EU, 
ta teza se spopada z vprašanjem odpravo eksekvature, kot je določeno v Bruseljski IIbis uredbi. 
Prvo področje, na katero je bila eksekvatura v EU v celoti ukinjena, so primeri na  ugrabitve 
otroka in pravice do stikov. Ta dva posebna primera sta zelo pomembna, ne zato ker sta zelo 
pogosta, vendar zaradi načina kako odmevajo v družbi. Pogosto so v veliki meri ti primeri 
zajeti v medijah z negativnim prizvokom in predstavljajo resnično nevarnost za režimo 
ugrabitve otroka v EU in s tem do "medsebojnega zaupanja" med pravnimi odredbami EU. 
 Teza predlaga, da je glavni problem režima ugrabitve otroka v EU ni so le rešitve v 
Bruseljski IIbis uredbi, ki so v resnici stroge, temveč "nezaupanje" glavnih organov, ki izvajajo 
ta pravila. Evrospki sistem ugrabitve otroka je postavljen tako da je končni arbiter sodišče, ki 
je pristojno za mesto kjer je otrok običajno prebival, preden je bila ugrabitev. Država, ki 
izvršuje je omejena in ima skoraj neobstoječo priložnost da zavrne izvršitev končne odločbe o 
vrnitvi otroka. V takšni situaciji, sodni organi se izogibajo Bruseljske IIbis uredbe, da bi 
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zaščitili osebo ki ima njihovo državljanstvo. To se naredi tako, ne samo v državi ki izvršuje, 
temveč tudi v državi porekla. V vseh teh primerih, pristojni organi in stranke pozabita na eden 
pomembni vidik: Travmo čez katero je otrok podvržen. Zato kot rešitev je zelo pomembno, da 
je "vzajemno zaupanje" na področju ugrabitve otrok v EU in na vseh drugi področij, da postane 
"dejansko zaupanje", kjer so osnovna načela Haaške konvencije o ugrabitvi otrok iz leta 1980 
zaščitene. Določitev teoretičnega rešitev za tega problema je veliko bolj jasna, kot določitev 
praktične rešitve. V bistvu ideja o Bruseljskem IIbis režimu je, da ni povečanja koristi enega 
od staršev z enostranske izbire foruma in ustrezni forum reševanja vprašanj glede skrbništva je 
mesto kjer je otrok običajno prebival v času ugrabitve. Najpomembnejše od vsega, režim 
Bruseljske IIbis uredbe dosega tega, da sodišče svoje odločbe ne temelji na dejstvo, da ima en 
od staršev državljanstvo te države, ampak v najboljšem interesu otroka. Načelo o "najbolšem 
interesu otroka" pomeni to, da bo prehod otroških življenj šel lažje z dejstvom, da sta oba starša 
še vedno zainteresirana in odgovorna za njih. To pomeni, da lahko otroci ostanejo v stiku z 
obema staršema in, da lahko izrazijo svoje občutke in poglede. Sklenitev te teze je, če so načela 
zaščitena in jih izvajajo vsi ustrezni organi, potem je odprava (ukinitev) eksekvature v primerih 
ugrabitve otrok in pravice do stikov lahko rečemo, da je dosežen popolni uspeh. Vendar, 
smernice za reševanje teh problemov jih včasih ni mogoče ločiti od političnih vprašanj med 
državami članicami ter po vsebinskih in proceduralnih strandardov pravnega reda. Na eni 
strani, pravni viri EU nimajo moči za znižanja "nadzora" med pravnih redov in nalaganja 
"zaupanja". To ustvarja napetost med pravnimi sistemi držav članic in povzroča neposlušnost 
v uporabi Bruseljske IIbis uredbe. Ustrezen način za vzpostavitev "dejanskega zaupanja" treba 
začeti od ogranov, ki so odgovorni za uporabo teh pravil. Teza predlaga, da je potrebno, da 
namesto vzpostavitev politike treba naložiti "medsebojnega zaupanja", države članice trebajo 
vztrajno graditi "dejanskega zaupanja" z neposrednim stikom med organe različnih držav 
članic in z zaupanjem v drug drugemu pravosodnega sistema. Da bi ta pristop pravilno deloval, 
Evropska pravosodna mreža (EPM) in Evropska pravosodna mreža za usposabljanja (EPMU) 
igrajo pomembno vlogo. 
 V zvezi z odpravo eksekvature, je ta položaj veliko bolj jasen kot upoštevana politika 
in kot teoretično opazovanje in ne le kot praktično rešitev. Kot upoštevano politiko, odpravo 
eksekvature bo predvidevalo sodne odločbe da se gibljejo prosto, kot družine delajo. Postopek 
eksekvature privede do zapletenih, zapletenih in dragih postopkov. To lahko privede do 
poškodovanja odnosov med otrokom in njegovi/njeni starši in lahko škoduje interesom otroka. 
Drugi vidik Bruseljske IIbis uredbe, ki je problematičen glede odločitve o starševski 
odgovornosti, je obstoj dveh možnih pristopov k izvršitvi. Prvi pristop, ki se uporablja za 
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odločitve o skrbništvu in prebivališča, zahteva razglasitev izvršljivosti in drugi pristop, ki se 
uporablja glede pravice do stikov, kjer razglasitev izvršljivosti bo razveljaviti. V tem smislu, 
takšna situacija lahko pripelje do možnega scenarija, kjer se najprej izvršijo pravice do stikov 
pred sodbo o otrokovo prebivališče.  
 Glede izvršitev odločb o starševski odgovornosti v EU, izstopa vprašanje med 
"zaupanjem" in "nadzoru". V nedavnem pristopu, ki ga je EU sprejela, v zvezi z odpravo 
eksekvature, so nastali nekateri zaščitni ukrepi. Torej, skupno "zaupanja" ni bilo doseženo, 
ampak  pristop o omejenem "nadzora" se odloži v kasnejši fazi. "Nadzor" je sprejet v obliko 
tako da ex ante nadzora države se pretvori v ex post nadzor sprejet s strani stranke. Torej 
odprava eksekvature v Bruseljski IIbis režim predstavlja premik usklajevanja izvedbe 
priznavanja in izvršitev v poznejši fazi. To je zelo realno za pričakovati, da bo nova Bruseljska 
IIbis uredba bo sledila novim trendom Bruseljskega režima. Spet se postavlja vprašanje o 
ravnovesju glede Bruseljske IIbis uredbe, ki pomeni odgovor na vprašanje, ali lahko ukinitev 
zahteve o eksekvature pomeni opustitev določenega "nadzora" in s tem uvedbo novih 
problemov, brez rešitev tega kar je najbolj pomembno, oziroma kaj je najbolj v interesu za 
otroka.  
 V tem smislu, kaj je za pričakovati iz nove Bruseljske IIbis uredbe, je odvisno od 
uvedbe ukrepov, ki bodo pomagali olajšati nastalo "napeto" situacijo. Zaradi njihove narave, 
Bruseljski IIbis primeri so veliko bolj osebni in čustveno občutljivi kot ostalih primerih. Z 
pravnega vidika, se zagotavlja, da imajo stranke temeljne pripombe na navedene sodne 
odločbe, in ne bojo želeli da se izvrši. Študij Dowling in Gorell-Barnes daje osnovne zahteve 
za zaščtito interesov otroka. Na koncu, v vseh teh primerih, interesi otroka morajo biti zaščiteni. 
V pravnem smislu to pomeni, da je treba slišati otrokovega glasa, postopki se morajo izvajati 
hitro in vsi organi bi morali olajševati normalizacijo razmer s pomočjo razpoložljivih 
modalitetih sodnega sodelovanja pravosodnega sistema Evropske unije. Za te namene, obstaja 
potrebo sodelovanja od vseh organov, ker je izključitev vseh sodnih organov države članice iz 
postopka izvršitve ustvarja določene slabosti. Odstranitev vseh zaščitnih ukrepov bo stranke 
prikrajšalo za pritožbo do sodišča ali bo protest težje. Tako na teoretični ravni, ravnovesje med  
"zaupanjem" in "nadzorom" leži v izgradnji "dejanskega zaupanja" z vključevanjem vseh 
organov, zlasti sodišča, z prilagoditvam svojih pristojnosti v koristi otroka in odpravo 
eksekvature s sprejetjem minimalnim standardov. Vendar pa je naivno misliti, da je odpravo 
eksekvature in sprejem minimalnih standardov rešilo probleme z izvršitev sodnih odločb v 
zvezi s starševsko odgovornostjo. EU vsebuje nekaj načine in mreže, ki lahko pomagajo 
ublažiti ta problem. Le s celovito mobilizacijo vseh potrebnih virov, lahko ima ta situacija 
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pozitiven izid. V nasprotju, politične ideje in želje institucije EU bo še vedno pred dejanskim 
praktičnim vprašanj. 
 Tretjo podpoglavje podaja podrobno razlago sodne prakse Evropskega sodišča za 
človekove pravice (ESČP) glede primerih o ugrabitvi otrok, z podrobnejši opis odnosov med 
zaščito človekovih pravic in postopkov iz Bruseljske IIbis uredbe.  
 Tretji del teze razloži postopke za priznavanje in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb v 
Republiki Sloveniji, z posebnim poudarkom glede odločbe iz družinskega prava. Sestavljen je 
iz treh poglavij, v prvem poglavju je podan zgodovinski razvoj postopka o priznavanju in 
izvršitev v Sloveniji. To poglavje sledi razvoju mednarodnega zasebnega prava v Sloveniji. V 
obdobju pred Zakona o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu (MZP) iz leta 1982 do uveljavitvi 
Zakona o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku (MZPP), ki je danes veljaven v Sloveniji, 
to poglavje prikazuje skladni (dosledni) razvoj mednarodnega zasebnega prava in s tem 
postopku o priznavanju in izvršitev v socialnih in gospodarskih razmerah v določenem 
obdobju. Zakon v skladu z uredbo Konfliktna pravila s predpisov drugih držav v določenih 
zadevah (ZMZP iz leta 1982) predstavlja prvo kodifikacijo mednarodnega zasebnega prava v 
vseh državah ki so tvorile Socialistično federativno republiko Jugoslavijo (SFRJ). Podobnost 
med Slovenskega zakona MZPP in MZP iz leta 1982 je očitna. Oba zakona sta sistematično 
razdeljena na šest poglavij, ki vsebujejo pravila za mednarodne pristojnosti (in postopka), 
konfliktna pravna pravila, pravila za priznavanje in izvršitev in drugih predpisov, ki so 
vsebovani znotraj njih. Glede vprašanj na področju družinskega prava, močan vpliv na 
slovenskega zakona o MZPP ima njegov predhodnik. Kot zaključek, to omogoča(zagotavlja) 
dosledno razumevanje pravil in uporabo praktičnih ter doktrinarnih snovi pri razlagi rešitve v 
obeh zakona o MZP.   
 Tudi to poglavje vsebuje pregled pravnih virov, z nacionalnega in mednarodnega 
vidika, ki so pomembne glede priznavanja in izvršitev v Sloveniji. 
 Drugo poglavje analizira postopek o priznavanju in izvršitev v Sloveniji. Po splošnih 
ugotovitvah, to poglavje se ukvarja z vprašanjem glede vrst odločb ki jih je mogoče priznati 
ter katero sodišče je pristojno za priznavanje v Sloveniji. Glede prvega vprašanja, teza opozarja 
na 94. člena slovenskega zakona o MZPP, kjer je razvidno da je to pravilo osredotočeno na 
vsebino odločbe in ne na oblasti(organov), ki ga določijo ali ime same odločbe. S takšnega 
položaja, slovenski zakon o MZPP spoštuje suverenosti tuje države in nacionalne identitete 
tujih pravnih sistemov. Posledično, vse vrste odločb (ugotovitvene, konstitutivne in obsodilne), 
ne glede na njihov naziv, so lahko priznane in imajo pravne učinke v Sloveniji, vendar le 
obsodilnih odločb je mogoče izvršiti, zaradi njihove narave. Glede drugega vprašanja, 
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"pristojnosti sodišč v Sloveniji glede priznavanja tujih odločb" je odvisno ali se zahteva kot 
glavno vprašanje ali kot predhodno vprašanje. V Sloveniji, pristojnost za odločanje v 
neodvisnega postopka glede priznavanje tujih sodnih odločb je na voljo na okrožnih sodišč. 
Krajevna pristojnost za priznavanje tujih sodnih odločb je pri kateremkoli sodišču, ki je 
materijalno pristojno. Vendar, takšno pozicijo ne izključuje možnosti da priznanje tuje sodne 
odločbe nastane kot prethodno vprašanje, s strani sodišča ki ga izvršuje. Če ni bilo nobenega 
posebnega pravila izdano glede priznanja tujih sodnih odločb, lahko vsako sodišče o tem odloči 
kot predhodno vprašanje, vendar z učinkom, ki se nanaša samo na ta postopek.  
 Velik del tega poglavja je namenjen za razlago pogojev za priznavanju in izvršitev v 
Sloveniji. Poleg tega, pogoji za priznavanje in izvršitev v Sloveniji so dodatno pojasneni, s 
primerjalno metodo, pri kateri je določena širša dimenzija s primerjavo podobnih pravil v 
različnih pomembnih regionalnih in evropskih zakonih MZP.   
 Vsi pogoji glede priznanja in izvršitve so podane kot pozitivni ali negativni pogoji. 
Pozitivni pogoji za priznavanje in izvršitve so v 95. in 103. člena zakona MZPP, medtem ko so 
vsi drugi pogoji podani kot negativni.  Člen 95 določa, da mora prosilec za priznanje tuje sodne 
odločbe, da priloži k svoji vlogi: tujo sodno odločbo ali njegovo overjeno kopijo in potrdilo 
pristojnega tujega sodišča ali drugega organa o pravnomočnosti odločbe po pravu države v 
kateri je bila odločba izdana. Glede izvršitve tujih sodnih odločb, 103. člena se začne z istimi 
formanimi zahtevi za postopka izvršitve tujih sodnih odločb za tista, ki so bila predvidena v 
95. člena. Vendar, zaradi narave izvršljivih odločb, zakon o MZPP v Sloveniji in v 103. člena 
išče dodatne formalne zahteve, kjer prosilec za izvršitev tuje sodne odločbe mora priložiti tudi 
potridila o izvršljivosti po pravu države porekla. Ta zakon bo služil kot dokaz da je tuja sodna 
odločba izvršljiva v skladu prava države porekla.  
 Vsi ostali pogoji za priznavanje in izvršitve tujih sodnih odločb predstavljajo negativne 
pogoje. Te pogoji se predvsem nanašajo na konkretne primere, ko postopkovne vidike izdaje 
tuje odločbe vsebujejo pomanjkljivosti in zaradi obstoja takih pomanjkjivosti tuja sodna 
odločba ne more biti priznana v Sloveniji, ter sekundarno z vsebinskega vidika, kjer v izjemnih 
primerih sodišča lahko imajo pregled uporabljenega materialnega prava. Vendar, vsebinski 
vidik teh zahtev ne pomeni, da ima lahko sodišče poglobljeno analizo o vsebinskih vprašanj. 
Slovenija je sprejela sistem o nadzoru limita priznanja in izvršitev, s katerim sodišče je 
zadržano od analizo uporabe materialnega prava države porekla. Vendar pa je omejena količina 
takšne analize dovoljena v primeru izeme javnega reda. 
 Negativni pogoji so zahtevni kjer so priznavanja in izvršitve sprejete, razen če obstajajo 
v določenih okoliščinah, ki preprečujejo priznavanje in izvršitev. Ti negativni pogoji so 
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oblikovani kot pravne ovire. Takšno razumevanje je lahko izpeljati iz dejanske izgradnje 
besedila členov, kjer je navedeno da "Tuja sodna odločba se ne prizna, če ...". So modelirani 
tako, da dokaznega bremena premakne od prosilca na osebo proti katero je bila izdana odločba, 
saj bo v njihovo korist če dokaže da obstajajo nekaterih pravnih ovir ki preprečujejo 
priznavnaja in izvršitev odločbe. Vendar pa to ne pomeni, da je sodišče sproščeno od preučitvijo 
pravnih ovir, nasprotno, sodišče ima dolžnost preučiti pogoje, vendar le tiste ki so določeni po 
uradni dolžnosti.  
 V Zakonu MZPP obstajajo ločena pravila za priznavanje in izvršitve tuhih sodnih 
odločb, povezana s statusom oseb. Ta pravila so določena v 102. člena Zakona MZPP. 
 Ta teza vsebuje obsežna izvedba pogojev za priznavanje in izvršitev, razlaga njihove 
uporabe s strani ustreznih organov in opozarja na težave s katerimi se srečujejo. Primerjalni del 
teze predlaga obsežno razumevanje tega pravnega področja, zlasti skozi regionalno primerjavo, 
ker se "korenine" zakona MZP segajo že iz leta 1982 takratnega zakona MZP. V leti po razpadu 
Jugoslavije, so se pojavile nekaj različnih tendenc na področju priznavanja in izvršitev tujih 
sodnih odločb. Ta del teze, analizira vseh teh tendenc in zagotavlja najbolj primerne rešitve za 
nadaljnje izboljšave postopka priznavanja in izvršitev v Sloveniji in v širši regiji.  
 Na podlagi svojih ugotovitvah, teza predvideva(predlaga) da je glede priznavanja in 
izvršitve tujih sodnih odločb v Sloveniji na podlagi zakona o MZPP dovolj prostora za 
določenih izboljšav pogojev za priznavanje in izvršitev omenjenga postopka. Glede 
kršitev(neupoštevanja) pristojnosti slovenskih sodišč, določenih v 97. in 98. člena zakona 
MZPP je treba poudariti, da so ta pravila zadnja priložnost v reševanju vprašanj glede 
pristojnosti. K popolni spremembi, kot predpogoj za dopolnilo(amandma) 97. in 98. člena 
zakona o MZPP v Sloveniji, obstaja potreba po revizijo izključnih meril pristojnosti v zakonu 
o MZPP (na primer, ta lasnost ni pripisana v sporazumih o izbiro pristojnega sodišča). Poleg 
tega, nekateri standardi o pristojnosti (običajno prebivališče otroka) niso predvideni v zakonu 
o MZPP v Sloveniji. Če se takšna standardizacija doseže, potem de lege ferenda, uvedbo 
izključno zaščito pristojnosti  in pravilo "načelo ogledalo" bo pozdravljena rešitev.  
 96. člen zakona o MZPP Slovenije pokriva vprašanje o kršitvi pravice poštenega sojenja 
v državi porekla. Vendar, kršitev te pravice je zajeta tudi s pravilom (proceduralnim) javnega 
reda ki je določeno v 100. členu istega zakona. Čeprav, oba pravila lahko pokrivata isto 
vprašanje ni nobene ovire, da sodišče zanika priznavanje obeh zahtev, toda pravilo iz 100. člena 
vključuje širšo področje vprašanj in se določi po uradni dolžnosti ex officio, medtem ko se 96. 
člena določi po prvotna odločitev ki se vroči nasprotni stranki (stranko, zoper katero je bila 
izdana odločba) ob ugovoru. Poleg tega, dopolnilo 96.člena bo zajemalo en drugačen vidik 
xxviii 
 
identite glede osebe ki lahko ugovarja priznavanje odločbe. Namesto ugovor na "...stranke 
zoper katero je bila odločba izdana..." novo pravilo se treba začenjati "stranke zoper katero se 
priznavanje zahteva" Končno, treba je dodati tretji odstavek v novega pravila za 
zadeve(primeri) kjer se tuja sodna odločba treba priznati kljub kršitvah pravice do poštenega 
sojenja, če stranka, ki nima možnosti sodelovati v postopku, ni začela postopka za izpodbijanje 
sodne odločbe v državi porekla ko je mogel to storiti.  
 Člen 99 iz zakona o MZPP vsebuje zahteve glede načela ne bis in idem za priznavanje 
in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb. Na splošno, v to pravilo so zajete glavne teme, možni so 
nekatere izboljšave glede identitete pravne zadeve v opredelitvijo subjektivnih in objektivnih 
elementov (iste pravne zadeve in med istimi strankami). 
 Pravilo javnega reda je podano v 100. člena zakonu MZPP. Vsebina (čega) je bila 
ugotovljena v več primerih s strani Vrhovnega sodišča Slovenije. Ti primeri zagotavljajo enoten 
pristop kjer je vsebina sestravljena iz: (i) pravnih norm: ustavna načela, temeljna načela, ki 
izhajajo iz zakona, temeljna načela pravnega reda Sveta Evrope, Evropske skupnosti in 
sprejetih mednarodnih sporazumov za zagotovitev minimalnih standardov pravne zaščite, vsi 
z omejitvijo, ki preprečuje koncept priznavanja tujih sodnih odločb da propade: ni vsaka 
prepričljiva (prisilna) uredba del javnega reda, samo tisti, kjer bo njihova kršitev ogrožala 
pravno in moralno integriteto domačega pravnega sistema; (ii) mednarodnega običajnega 
prava; (iii) temeljna moralna(etična) načela ter (iv) ključnih gospodarskih, političnih... 
interesov države. Zajema (čeprav ni neposredno določeno v 100. člena) obe vsebinske in 
postopkovne javne politike. V primeru postopkovne javne politike, Vrhovno sodišče še dodatno 
opredeluje vsebino te politike, kjer so vsebovani ustavna načela, osnovna načela posameznih 
pravnih vej, osnovna načela prava EU, načela ki izhajajo iz mednarodnega pogodbenega prava, 
zlasti EKČP, mednarodnega običajnega prava in temeljna moralna (etična) načela.  
 Vzajemnost izgubi svoj pomen v sodobnih zakonov MZP. Prišlo je do tega obravnavati 
kot "ostanek (preostanek)" iz preteklosti. Položaj vzajemnosti je v konfliktu s potrebo od hitro, 
zanesljivo in bolj učinkovitega dostopa do sodnih postopkov. Poleg tega, dostopnost tujih 
pravic preko povečanega sodelovanja med državami in številnih dvostranskih in večstranskih 
sporazumov, zmanjšuje njen pomen v sodobnem zakonu o MZP.  Torej za prihodne možnosti 
se pričakuje de lege ferenda, da bo zahteva po vzajemnosti biti odpravljena ali pa se bo njena 
tematika(vsebina) bistveno zmanjšala. 
 Tretje poglavje razlaga postopek o priznavanju in izvršitev sodnih odločb ki prihajajo 
iz držav članic EU. V kontekstu priznavanja in izvršitev tujih sodnih odločb, to bi pomenilo, 
da sta dve vrsti pravil ki veljajo na sodiščih. Prvi sklop pravil, ki veljajo za sodne odločbe, ki 
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prihajajo iz držav, ki niso članice EU so na voljo v slovenskem zakonu o MZPP. Drugi sklop 
pravil, ki velja za sodne odločbe, ki prihajajo iz držav člani EU v specifičnih zadevah, ki so 
določeni v pravnih virov EU na splošno se neposredno uporabljajo v Sloveniji in zamenjajo 
slovenski zakon o MZPP. V skladu s tem, Bruseljska IIbis uredba se neposredno uporablja v 
Sloveniji, kar pomeni, da ni bila sprejata izvedena zakonodaja v Sloveniji. Natančneje to 
pomeni, da se Bruseljska IIbis uredba neposredno uporablja v Sloveniji, s tem, da za vsa 
vprašanja, ki so jih pustili v domačem pravu držav članic veljajo ustrezni slovenski pravni viri. 
Za te primere, so vprašanja, ki sodijo v Bruseljsko IIbis uredbo se v glavnem rešujejo v skladu 
z Zakona o izvensodnem postopku in tudi določbe Zakona o pravdnem postopku, uporabljajo 
se kot pomožni pravni viri.  
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